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This work examines the Egyptian experience of World War II, the development of an 
Egyptian-run constitutional state of emergency in response to economic and social crises 
during the war, and their effect on postwar support among diverse political groups for an 
active and even authoritarian state. This constitutional framework, based on French état 
de siège laws of the 19th century, became a routine institution after 1945. Egyptian 
Cabinet papers illustrate the process through which the Prime Minister’s office created 
state of siege legislation. These new laws and policies granted the Egyptian state strong 
police powers to imprison spies, saboteurs, and protesters without charges, along with 
those accused of stealing from the British army. The state of siege also included broad 
powers to regulate labor, to nationalize and subsidize the trade in wheat and bread and to 
suppress the resulting black market. The dissertation argues that this legal framework 
anchored new modes of surveillance and social scientific knowledge to material practices 
and institutions that provided continuity in crisis. These institutions were particularly 
important in the diplomatic colonialism of the British military occupation. They enforced 
legal jurisdictions and spacial zones and boundaries that microsocial interactions were 
always in the process of breaking down. I emphasize both inertia and change in relations 
of power through dynamic institutions: such as the police, food supply bureaucracy, labor 
unions and their surveillance, public finance and customs and nationality regimes. 





explains events conventionally understood through social and political discontinuities: 
British decolonization and the creation of the postcolonial Egyptian state. This analysis is 
the first to establish the early genealogy of the legislation, bureaucratic practices, and 
public discourses that institutionalized and legitimated a new form of authoritarian rule 
and legality in Egypt, which continued in the 1958 Emergency Law and military trials for 





In August 1947, Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmi Al-Nuqrashi traveled to Lake 
Success, New York, to ask the United Nations Security Council to pass a resolution 
calling for an end to the British military occupation of the Suez Canal. Despite his slight 
odds of success, Al-Nuqrashi took advantage of this rare opportunity for an Egyptian 
politician to challenge the British occupation before so many world leaders. Al-Nuqrashi 
asserted that the UN should void the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance, the only 
bilateral agreement legitimating Britain’s 65-year occupation, in three caustic exchanges 
with Britain’s first UN Ambassador Alexander Cadogan.1 The Second World War, the 
crisis this treaty had been designed to address, had ended. Then why, he asked, was 
Britain maintaining a garrison in Egypt many times greater than the 10,000 men allowed 
in the treaty? It was a question of fundamental consequence to the system of sovereign 
nation-states the UN was trying to establish. 
 The Egyptian government made a great deal of its fidelity to this treaty before the 
meeting, publicizing the many ways the Egyptian state had aided the Allied effort in the 
war. The Egyptian Council of Ministers had prepared a comprehensive essay on the 
subject in a pamphlet in Arabic and English published that year titled The Contribution of 
Egypt in World War II, which it circulated among UN diplomats and the Arabic and 
                                                 
1 Official Records of the UN Security Council, second year, 175th, 176th, 179th and 182nd meetings, 5, 11 




foreign-language press.2 This pamphlet compiled reports of more than a dozen ministries 
and government agencies, a project Wafd party leader Mustafa al-Nahhas launched in 
April 1944 when he was Prime Minister. 3 It enumerated every thinkable form of support 
Egypt gave the British, broadly categorized under “political, military, economic and 
financial” services, starting in September 1939, a year before the war threatened Egyptian 
territory.  
 The Egyptian government shaped its participation in the war with the state of 
siege, a state of emergency legislated in the 1923 constitution.4 The state of siege allowed 
the Egyptian Prime Minister to take a wide variety of extralegal security measures. These 
included interning potential spies, saboteurs, and political dissidents of any nationality 
without trial; procuring land and local labor for the Allied militaries; nationalizing the 
planning and trade of agricultural commodities to increase food production, and 
effectively advancing hundreds of millions of pounds sterling in credit to the British. The 
pamphlet asserted more specifically that Egypt’s breaking of diplomatic ties with 
Germany in 1939, Italy in 1940 and all other Axis countries, in the context of these 
services, represented a de facto declaration of war. In fact, Egypt had remained neutral 
until February 1945. “[Egypt] would have acted in the same manner if there had been no 
                                                 
2 Egypt President of the Council of Ministers, Khidmāt Miṣr Lil-Ḥulafaʾ Ithnaʾ Al-Ḥarb Al-ʿĀlamiya Al-
Thāniya (Cairo: Al-Maṭbaʿat Al-Amīriya, 1947). 
3 DWQ 0069-007383, a bound folder titled “Assistance given to Great Britain by Egypt for the Purpose of 
Winning the War.” Emad Ahmed Helal, “Egypt’s Overlooked Contribution to World War II,” in The World 
in World Wars: Experiences, Perceptions and Perspectives From Africa and Asia, eds. Heike Liebau, 
Katrin Bromber, Katherina Lange, Dyala Hamza and Ravi Ahuja (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 215-250, examines 
these documents in depth. 
4 The 1923 constitution was based on the Belgian constitutional monarchy and drew on French civil law 
concepts, including l’état de siège. The Arabic translation al-aḥkām al-ʿurfiyya is more ambiguous, and had 
been used also for British “martial law” in the First World War. All Egyptian legislation and proclamations 
were officially published in the government gazette both in French and Arabic until the 1950s. 
 
 3 
treaty,” Al-Nuqrashi added at the Security Council. “It did, in fact, act in the same 
manner in co-operating with the United States and others of the allies.”5  
 Targeted both at the global public and the members of the Security Council, the 
Egyptian government designed this pamphlet to demonstrate Egypt’s loyalty to the Allied 
cause, which in 1947 still equated directly with legitimate membership in the United 
Nations. However, there was another aspect to the Egyptian retelling of wartime history 
that had less to do with Egypt’s behavior towards the Allies than with the nature and 
presentation of the Egyptian state itself. If the international community still considered 
Egypt an unofficial protectorate of Britain because of the weakness of its own public, 
infrastructural, military, financial or social security, Al-Nuqrashi implied, then the British 
occupation would continue in order to support regional stability. But if Egypt could 
demonstrate that the British occupation was not only unjust, but it competed dangerously 
with Egypt’s own sovereign state power and was therefore threatening regional security, 
the Security Council would be justified in withdrawing its support for the British.  
 Al-Nuqrashi acknowledged international law supported the Treaty’s continued 
existence, but he proposed the Security Council override the law in the interest of 
regional stability. Al-Nuqrashi portrayed Egypt as one of the strongest of the world’s 
“small and medium powers,” which, while too weak to force Britain out by itself, was the 
only source of authentic and liberal-democratic leadership in the Arab world that could 
guarantee stability in a new global system of equally sovereign nation-states. As much as 
it had supported an anti-imperial worldview during the war, the United States was not 
prepared to disrupt Britain’s status-quo hegemony in the region with Soviet power 
                                                 
5 Official Records of the UN Security Council, second year, 176th meeting, 11 August 1947, 1865. 
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looming to the north. Ultimately, the United States did not support the measure or any 
alternatives and the issue was shelved. 
 Al-Nuqrashi’s failure to win the United Nations’ support for British evacuation 
transformed Egyptian politics. The nationalist historiography of Egypt has linked the 
public’s disillusionment with a diplomatic solution to the British occupation after 1947 to 
its populist rejection of the political elite’s domination of the Egyptian economy 
throughout the British colonial era. In this narrative of crisis, the impasse in negotiations 
led to an increase of extreme nationalist protest and terrorism, including the further 
radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 As a result of this definitive break between the Egyptian national movement and 
the diplomatic engagement with British power that had characterized the interwar period, 
both foreign and Egyptian histories have come to depict Egypt and Egyptians as passive 
observers of the Second World War. Although it failed to produce political results, Al-
Nuqrashi’s presentation of the mobilization of the Egyptian state in the war reveals much 
about the forgotten aspirations of late colonial Egypt. No Egyptian politician in 1939 
could have delivered Al-Nuqrashi’s speech with the language and confidence he did. It 
provides evidence of continuous growth in the Egyptian state, and it refutes narratives 
that crisis and revolution established a stark difference between state activities in the 
monarchy and republican ʿAbd al-Nasir Era.  
 This work therefore presents two interlocking arguments about the effect of the 
war on Egypt. The material consequences of war tell a social history of dislocation, 
trauma and opportunism both for individuals and for the institutions of government. This 
focus alone resurrects the historical agency of Egyptians in this period. At the same time, 
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the restructuring of Egyptian society and the state had effects on private enterprise, law 
and nationalism that persisted beyond the 1940s. 
 First, the war affected the life of every Egyptian, contrary to imperial narratives 
implying Egypt’s passivity. Direct attacks, the Allied occupation and other circumstances 
of war obliged the institutions of the Egyptian state to play an active role in the conflict. 
Its involvement caused wrenching growth in the state and a vast change in the 
relationship between the state and its subjects. The external military threat and internal 
disorder of British occupation transformed security and surveillance in the Egyptian state 
from a rural, privatized and decentralized set of practices to an urban, public and 
centralized one aiming towards total control of Egyptian sovereign space. Hand-in-hand 
with this trend, the crisis of war activated many of the étatist and welfare programs 
proposed before the war, but it also forced Egyptian officials to innovate policies to 
regulate social behavior, labor and consumption.  
 Second, the experience of war established the legal forms and political culture 
that regulated and legitimated these changes in the state. The war was the first 
international crisis in which Egypt acted as a legally sovereign state. The government 
used the state of siege as an effective mechanism that protected this legal fiction and 
allowed the smooth adaptation of Egyptian policy to British war aims. At the same time, 
the state of siege’s foundation in French constitutional law preserved the existence of the 
civil legislature and liberal legality more broadly. It instituted a unique route for state 
interventionism in Egypt by creating a two-track parallel legal system. On one side, the 
liberal constitutional government, legislature and a civilian judiciary continued to operate 
as normal. On the other, an increasing number of cases fell under the jurisdiction of a 
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prime minister emboldened as military governor, writing a code of fiat law adjudicated 
by a military judiciary. In the process of saving the liberal state, Egypt would risk 
institutional schizophrenia.  
 
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE EGYPTIANS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR? 
Egyptian official postcolonial historical narratives depict the 1940s as a decade of 
political corruption, colonial collaboration and state failure leading inevitably towards 
revolution. Their incongruous depictions of the virulence of the British occupation in the 
1940s and of the novelty of social welfare and state economic interventions as security 
policies in the 1950s demand a closer interrogation. The construction of this epochal 
divide served postcolonial political ideology in Egypt. After 1952, Gamal ʿAbdel Nasser 
and the Free Officers understood almost immediately the importance of shaping a popular 
historical narrative to portray their new coup and social policies as constituting a social 
revolution.6 The officers first co-opted respected academic historians like ʿAbd al-
Rahman al-Rafiʿi to diminish the importance of the Albanian Muhammad ʿAli dynasty in 
historical narratives in favor of the autochthonous struggle of the Egyptian people. In the 
last volume of al-Rafiʿi’s 1950s textbook series for the public school curriculum, The 
Struggle of Egypt in the Modern Era, he condenses the major events of the reigns of 
Kings Fuʾad and Faruq from the 1923 constitution until 1951 into the first third of the 
book, and spends the final two thirds on the 1951 abrogation crisis through the 1952 
coup, explaining why the prior events led inexorably to the present regime.7 He presents 
                                                 
6 Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History Writing in Twentieth-Century 
Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Anthony P. Gorman, Historians, State and Politics 
in Twentieth Century Egypt: Contesting the Nation. (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
7 ʿAbd al-Raḥman Al-Rāfiʿī, Miṣr Al-Mujāhida Fi-L-ʿAṣr Al-Ḥadith., Vol. 6 (Cairo: Dār al-_Ḥilāl, 1957). 
 
 7 
the events he chose to include in easy-to-comprehend bullet paragraphs outlining the 
dynamic of the struggle between a weak Parliament, overweening king and imperious 
British residency. Al-Rafiʿi depicts the Second World War in the three or four coercive 
interventions the British made in Egyptian government.  
 By the late 1950s, the Free Officers began to produce their own memoirs, and to 
promote them as primary sources of the highest authenticity for Egypt’s modern history. 
In newspaper op-eds, pamphlets and books, the young Free Officers explained the 
revolution through the experiences, ideas and decisions of their coming of age as junior 
officers in the 1940s. Gamal Abdel Nasser dwelled poetically on his nationalist feelings 
of shame as a young officer when the British replaced the Egyptian military at the Libyan 
frontier in September 1940.8 Anwar al-Sadat contributed a much more comprehensive 
story of the Free Officer movement in Secrets of the Revolution, published in 1957. He 
portrays the movement as a wide conspiracy dating to 1939 that supported treasonous 
wartime projects he mostly committed solo.9 Later memoirs by Abdel Latif al-Baghdadi 
and Karim Mohi al-Din have mostly reinforced Abdel Nasser’s and Sadat’s portrayals of 
the 1940s from the perspective of young officers, extending their immobility and 
                                                 
8 Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasir, Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington DC: Public 
Affairs Press, 1955). 
9 Anwar Al-Sadat, Asrār Al-Thawrah Al-Miṣriyya (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Hilāl, 1957). Such as assisting 
German spy Hans Eppler in 1942, for which he was temporarily imprisoned. He fails to mention his role in 
the assassination of Wafd Finance Minister Amin Osman. Although young officer political activity had 
been on the rise since the expansion of the military academy admissions to middle class young men in 
1936, the Free Officers did not in fact become organized until 1949. See Charles Tripp, “Ali Maher and the 
Politics of the Egyptian Army, 1936-1942,” in Contemporary Egypt: Through Egyptian Eyes: Essays in 
Honour of Professor P.J. Vatikiotis, ed. Charles Tripp (London; New York: Routledge, 1993); Tewfik 
Aclimandos, “Revisiting the History of the Egyptian Army,” in Re-Envisioning Egypt, 1919-1952, eds. 
Arthur Goldschmidt, Amy J. Johnson and Barak A. Salmoni (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 
2005) contains a concise and accurate history of army politics in the 1940s. 
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dejection metaphorically into stagnation of the Egyptian nation.10 This foundation of 
authentic historical narratives for postcolonial Egypt casts its protagonists as dissatisfied 
young men within a branch of the government who broke with it and forged ahead with 
radically new social and economic policies. It delegitimates narratives that the Free 
Officers actually relied heavily on the old bureaucracy for its ideas and implementation.11 
 Eyewitnesses wrote the first foreign-language histories of wartime Egypt in the 
three decades afterwards. While they were less beholden to a revolutionary nationalist 
perspective, their approaches to the narrative tended to be idiosyncratic. In 1952, George 
Kirk, a British historian who had worked in military intelligence in Cairo, published a 
well researched and far more comprehensive account of political events in Egypt and the 
Middle East during the war that has become one of the few standards of the genre. 
Although it is structured as an objective narrative, Kirk betrays a perspective based on 
both his personal experience and as a British intellectual in the mid-1950s; he laments the 
end of empire and highlights episodes of political contention between the British and 
Egyptian governments as “bids for independence.” His orientalist evaluation of the 
average Egyptian’s engagement with the war denies any room for his or her agency. At 
the height of the Axis threat in 1942, he writes, “Egypt’s ‘have not’ population 
maintained throughout an impassive calm… it was… the stoic indifference of a people 
accustomed through the ages to letting waves of conquest roll over their bent backs…”12 
Yet, the background of Kirk’s account is filled with the threats of bread riots, industrial 
                                                 
10 ʻAbd al-Laṭīf Baghdādī, Mudhakkirāt ʻAbd Al-Laṭīf Al-Baghdād (al-Qāhirah: al-Maktab al-Miṣrī al-
Ḥadīth, 1977), 11-13. al-Dīn Muḥyī, Khālid, Memories of a Revolution: Egypt, 1952 (Cairo, Egypt: 
American University in Cairo Press, 1995) 14-15, published in Arabic in 1984. 
11 Recovered in Joel Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) and Roel Meijer, The Quest for Modernity: Secular Liberal 
and Left-Wing Political Thought in Egypt, 1945-1958 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002). 
12 George Kirk, The Middle East in the War (Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, 1952), cited in a 
long block from the Christian Science Monitor correspondent, 220. 
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and service strikes and other lower class actions that seem to pass as natural forces only 
somewhat connected to elite politics and economic policies. Memoirs of other 
intelligence operatives and a published selection of British Ambassador Sir Miles 
Lampson Lord Killearn’s detailed diaries are valuable primary sources of Britain’s 
weakening colonial grip in the period that, in a dearth of academic research, passed for 
authoritative history in the ’60s and ’70s.13 
 The postcolonial Egyptian regime’s monopolistic control over state archives has 
made it difficult for private Egyptian or foreign historians to produce complete competing 
narratives that emphasize bureaucratic action or political economic policy. Unlike the 
Muhammad Ali dynasty’s ‘Abdin historiographic project of the 1920s to compile state 
papers up to the British occupation in 1882 and to encourage academic interpretation of 
these papers as the only authoritative version of history about the dynasty, the republican 
regime has chosen mostly to make government documents after 1952 unavailable to 
historians. Documentation from the period 1882 to 1952 remains fragmented and poorly 
organized as a result of decades of changing, uncoordinated and incomplete preservation 
projects across the different ministries.14 Both Egyptian and foreign archival researchers 
have concentrated their efforts on 19th century Egyptian history, while political scientists 
and sociologists have dominated the interpretation of contemporary Egypt after the 
consolidation of area studies in the 1950s. Moreover, Egyptian historians of the first half 
of the 20th century have relied inordinately on British government documents, which 
                                                 
13 Alfred William Sansom, I Spied Spies (London: G. G. Harrap, 1965); Miles Lampson Killearn and 
Trefor Ellis Evans, The Killearn Diaries, 1934-1946: The Diplomatic and Personal Record of Lord 
Killearn (Sir Miles Lampson), High Commissioner and Ambassador, Egypt (London: Sidgwick and 
Jackson, 1972). 
14 Helen Anne B. Rivlin, The Dār Al-Wathāʾiq in ʻĀbdīn Palace At Cairo as a Source for the Study of the 




often carry over their authors’ unshakable belief in British hegemony and their blindness 
to Egyptian agency. The most recent historical writing about the Second World War by 
Egyptian authors like ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Ramadan and Yunan Labib Rizq remains focused 
on the party politics and diplomatic crises of 1939 to 1942, ignoring the longer-term 
connections between those events and state, defense and diplomatic policy.15 In 
particular, all of the above accounts give short shrift to the period from 1942 to 1945, 
after the military crisis passed, but when wartime laws, supply shortages and economic 
and labor policies underwent the most crucial transformations and public debates. 
 By the 1970s, the failure of modernist development projects in Egypt and rise of 
neoliberalism led many foreign academic historians to view the culture and government 
of the interwar period more favorably than many Egyptian nationalists have. Afaf Lutfi 
al-Sayyid Marsot perhaps epitomized the idea in her book Egypt’s Liberal Experiment 
1922-1936, published in 1977, and Selma Botman’s chapter in the multivolume 
Cambridge History of Egypt refers to “The Liberal Era, 1923-1952.”16 Interwar 
narratives focused on the liberal aspects of politics concentrate on several key events. A 
series of mass rural and urban protests in early 1919 in Cairo and the countryside 
vehemently rejected a wartime British protectorate and regime of martial law imposed 
when the Ottoman Empire declared war on the Allied powers. The British subsequently 
opted unilaterally to support a liberal constitutional monarchy and withdraw gradually 
from direct administration of the Egyptian government. However, it reserved the right to 
                                                 
15 ʻAbd al-ʻAẓīm Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Ramaḍān, Miṣr Wa-Al-Ḥarb Al-ʻĀlamīyah Al-Thānīyah: Maʻrakat 
Tajnīb Miṣr Wa-Yalāt Al-Ḥarb (Cairo: Al-Hayʾah al-Miṣrīyah al-ʻĀmmah lil-Kitāb, 1998); Muḥammad 
Gamāl al Dīn Al-Masdī, Yūnān Labīb Rizq and ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Ramaḍān, Miṣr Wa-L-Ḥarb Al-ʿĀlamiya Al-
Thāniya (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2001). 
16 Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, Egypt’s Liberal Experiment, 1922-1936 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977); Selma Botman, “The Liberal Era, 1923-1952,” in The Cambridge History of Egypt. 
Vol. 2, Modern Egypt, From 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century, eds. M. W. Daly and Carl F. Petry 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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manage Egypt’s foreign affairs, to preserve the legal privileges of foreigners, to keep 
direct control of the Sudan, and to maintain a small garrison of soldiers at the Suez Canal. 
The 1936 treaty eliminated extraterritoriality for foreigners, but institutionalized the other 
aspects of Britain’s hands-off dominance. A return to the many political memoirs of the 
major politicians, notably Muhammad Husayn Haykal and Ismail Sidqi, allowed the 
narrative of the parliamentary battles of the interwar years to dominate the political 
historiography of Egypt more generally. Others identified the tenuousness of liberal 
nationalist and democratic ideologies in classist and Orientalist analyses valorizing the 
Pharaonic territorial nationalism popular among the upper classes in the 1920s and 
describing the shift to Islamic themes in literary production and in youth and political 
groups in the 1930s as a “crisis of liberalism.”17  
 However, these critiques radically severed the meaning of liberalism in political 
culture from liberalism in the judicial system or political economy. Many histories of the 
interwar era have since revisited and problematized the meaning of liberalism in this 
period, with an eye to the effects of British neocolonisalism and the growth of the 
Egyptian state. In particular, Egyptian and foreign historians have both emphasized King 
Faruq’s and certain radical nationalist groups’ opportunistic sympathy for the Axis as 
emblematic both of the weakness of liberal democratic principles at the heart of the 
Egyptian political system and of the futility of their resistance to British hegemony. The 
recent work of James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni has punctured this narrative and put 
the minor historical importance of Nazi sympathy in Egypt in the context of the much 
                                                 
17 Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Political and Intellectual 
Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961); P. J. Vatikiotis, The 
History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
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more widespread Egyptian denunciation of Axis racism and neo-imperialism.18 I argue 
that the focus of the historiography on liberalism and authoritarianism as populist 
political ideologies prevents a clear analysis of the war as a social and economic event in 
Egypt. The state of siege itself has helped legitimate narratives that nothing happened to 
the Egyptian state. By establishing functional boundaries between the state’s emergency 
laws and police organs and the institutions of the civil state, the continued state of siege 
allowed later critics to ignore the less visible innovations of the state while criticizing 
political malaise. But what were these less visible innovations? 
 
BEYOND COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE 
Imperial history has emphasized the ways the Second World War contributed to the 
demise of colonial empires. However, the war also transformed colonized states and 
societies in long-lasting ways that have received less direct attention. Focusing on 
Egyptian agency through the war reveals the direct and rapid changes in the material and 
ideological basis of local governance during war time, how these changes both emulated 
and resisted colonial forms of governance, and how the experience of war itself affect 
both British and Egyptian technocratic knowledge on the state and economy. 
 Stark divides in the research programs and methodology of historians that 
prioritize the agency of colonized subjects, such as the Subaltern Studies group, and the 
imperial historiography that dominate so many narratives about war and empire, make 
dialogue and synthesis between them difficult.19 As Frederick Cooper has argued, the 
                                                 
18 Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Confronting Fascism in Egypt: Dictatorship Versus Democracy 
in the 1930s (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
19 Dane Kennedy, “Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory,” in The Decolonization Reader, ed. James 
D. Le Sueur (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
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Subaltern program of identifying the autochthonous sources of resistance to colonial 
domination, epitomized in Ranajit Guha’s Dominance without Hegemony, “constrain(s) 
the search for precise ways in which power is deployed and the ways in which power is 
engaged, contested, deflected and appropriated.”20 In Egypt, the war collapsed the careful 
boundaries and distinctions that separated Egyptian cultural and political life from a 
sometimes distant neocolonial British control. The sudden, shared events of war forced 
Egyptians and British together, in a short period of time and at every social level, and it 
defined shared or competing goals. My narrative of the war therefore seeks to explain 
British and Egyptian involvement and interactions in the shared enterprise of governance 
through the careful employment of sources and perspectives in English and Arabic from 
government officials and private individuals. 
 Several early British assessments of the impact of the war on the Egyptian state 
focused on the Middle East Supply Center (MESC), a British inter-ministerial council 
that coordinated agricultural planning and limited trade resources across the Middle East. 
These histories considered the British to have dictated policy and viewed any Egyptian 
responses as either obedience or resistance.21 The first Egyptian historians who focused 
on the wartime economic crises and policies did not have access to the Egyptian archives 
and therefore these studies reflect a nationalist idiom, that considered domestic policies 
as completely transient and entirely dependent on politicians either aligned with or 
                                                 
20 Frederick Cooper, “Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History,” The American 
Historical Review 99:5 (1994), 1517. 
21 See A. R. Prest, War Economics of Primary Producing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1948); E. M. H. Lloyd, Food and Inflation in the Middle East, 1940-45. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1956); Martin W. Wilmington, The Middle East Supply Centre (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1971). 
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opposed to British control.22 The rise of Marxism among Egyptian historians at ʿAin 
Shams University in the 1960s for the first time sought to link economic analysis to the 
history of politics and social policy. The most direct contribution of this school to Second 
World War history is ʿAsim Disuqi’s Egypt in the Second World War. Based on Disuqi’s 
master’s thesis, it contains the first analysis of the differential roles liberal, leftist and 
Islamist ideologies played in political negotiations on the economy during and after the 
war. Disuqi’s contribution includes his analysis of the complicated liberal attitude 
towards the expansion of state power in the war: He carefully describes the shifting 
arguments between professionals, capitalists, government officials and politicians over 
the proper level of wages, rents and prices, on which many former allies differed.23 By 
contrast, Egyptian Marxists most commonly depict the large landowning bourgeoisie 
dominating economic policymaking in this era, with British intervention playing a 
negative but generally passive role, in longue-durée analyses.24 Other members of this 
school have therefore not followed up on the topic of the war’s effect on Egypt. 
 In the 2002 volume War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East, 
editor Steven Heydemann argues social scientists and historians have had difficulty 
defining the effect of war on colonized states. Charles Tilly’s influential Social Science 
Research Council research project of the 1970s, published in The Formation of National 
States in Western Europe, popularized a strongly Eurocentric model of state and social 
                                                 
22 See Ragaei W. El-Mallakh, “The Effects of the Second World War on the Economic Development of 
Egypt,” (Ph.D., Rutgers University, 1955); Muhammad Mutawālli, Tārīkh Miṣr Al-Iqtiṣadī Wa-L-Ijtimāʿī 
Khilāl Al-Ḥarb Al-ʿĀlamiya Al-Thāniya, 1939-1945. (Cairo: Dār al-Thaqāfa lil-Tibāʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1977). 
23 ʻĀṣim Dasūqī, Miṣr Fi Al-Ḥarb Al-ʻĀlamiyah Al-Thāniyah (Cairo: Al-Manẓama al-ʿArabīya li-l-Tarbīya 
wa-l-Thaqāfa wa-l-ʿUlūm, 1976), 212-217; 311-321. 
24 Most notably, the combined work of Disuqi and RaʾufʿAbbas recently published in English as Raʼūf 
ʻAbbās Ḥāmid and Assem El-Dessouky, The Large Landowning Class and the Peasantry in Egypt, 1837-
1952 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2011). 
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development in war.25 In Tilly’s model, the mobilization of financial and demographic 
resources for war leads directly to the formation of centralized nation-states. Heydemann 
proposes a different analytical model for the effects of war in the Middle East, where he 
writes “war making has been indirect, mediated and deeply transnationalized.”26 Rather 
than leading directly to the consolidation of institutions and an increase in state power, he 
argues war turns “the structure and roles of the state into highly contested issues of public 
debate.”27 In their article in the volume, Heydemann and Vitalis argue Allied economic 
control policy in Egypt and Syria in World War II implemented through the MESC 
introduced new “Keynesian” étatist institutions and norms well before the postcolonial 
states did in the 1950s. Following Heydemann’s thesis, they argue,however, that these 
policies had a much more limited and shorter-term effect on the structure of the political 
economy than in Allied countries themselves. They argue that under the pressure of local 
elites, free-market capitalism returned to both countries when the MESC broke apart 
under Anglo-American commercial competition soon after the war’s end.28 By contrast, 
Elizabeth Thompson depicts the Second World War in Syria as a unique period of 
increased mass political mobilization for welfare services, which the Vichy and Free 
French increased in the early stages of the war to hold on to the last thread of legitimacy 
                                                 
25 Charles Tilly and Gabriel Ardant, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), cited in Steven Heydemann, “War, Institutions, and Social Change in the 
Middle East,” in War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East, ed. Steven Heydemann 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 13. See Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: 
The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New York; Toronto: Free Press; Maxwell Macmillan 
Canada, 1994) for a similar variation on this argument. 
26 Heydemann, “War, Institutions, and Social Change”, 9. 
27 Heydemann, “War, Institutions, and Social Change”, 17-18. 20 
28 Robert Vitalis and Steven Heydemann, “War, Keynsianism, and Colonialism: Explaining State-Market 
Relations in the Postwar Middle East,” in War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East, ed. 
Steven. Heydemann (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 133. 
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in their colonies.29  After the French withdrawal in 1943 and Syrian and Lebanese 
independence, elite politicians further accelerated the funding of health and education, 
but began to direct these welfare efforts towards state-directed corporatist organizations. 
Most importantly, Thompson argues that the welfare programs that successfully came 
into existence did so in relation to the strength of popular demands of non-elite interest 
groups, rather than as the result of a top-down design. 
 New studies into specialized fields of technical expertise that enabled the 
diffusion and elaboration of colonial power, like agronomy and irrigation engineering, 
economics, sociology, anthropology, and public health provide a means of showing the 
interactions between state policies, ideas of governance and public demand. Timothy 
Mitchell’s Rule of Experts in particular has reopened the study of the Egyptian political 
economy prior to 1952, which a generation of scholars had consigned to the realm of out-
of-date positivism, with a focus on the intellectual/discursive construction of universal 
national “economies” in the colonial setting.30 Manu Goswami developed this concept 
from the mid-19th century geographic imagining of the Indian economy, the consolidation 
of a scientific field of economics opposing colonial exploitation through the nationalist 
mobilization of boycotts and swadeshi (home cloth spinning) and industrial planning 
movements of the mid-20th century.31 In both these cases, Indian and Egyptian elites, 
                                                 
29 See Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in 
French Syria and Lebanon (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Elizabeth Thompson, “The 
Climax and Crisis of the Colonial Welfare State in Syria and Lebanon During World War II,” in War, 
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California Press, 2000), 59-94. 
30 In particular, Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002), Chapter 3. “The Character of Calculability,” 80-119; Omnia S. El-
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31 Manu. Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago: University of 
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while products of European education and collaborators with different forms of European 
colonial domination, were the driving force in the definition of their own national 
economies. By the 1930s, the urban Egyptian public was articulating what they 
demanded of the state in the language of social and agricultural science. Considering the 
global economic shocks of that decade, British administrators could at best keep up with 
an ideologically charged discourse linking and permeating metropole and colony alike. 
Such an approach to the technological and ideological factors behind wartime policy in 
Egypt can expand Heydemann’s idea about the mediated nature of war in the colonized 
Middle East. There were more levels of mediation in the Egyptian administration, and 
hence more complexity to Egyptian political interests and outcomes during and after the 
war, than merely the domination of the metropolitan British military. Just as the British 
and Allies mediated the strategic military and world-scale economic forces affecting 
Egypt, the new technocratic Egyptian ministries mediated the Allied labor and supply 
demands and attacks on the home front for the Egyptian public. 
 A productive way of viewing these new and transitory wartime practices and 
institutions is to look to what Nicos Poulantzas calls their “institutional materiality.”32 
Just because the Egyptian institutions failed to achieve all their intended goals does not 
mean these goals did not affect the outcome of events altogether. Just as the British, 
Egyptian elite politicians and common Egyptians as workers and consumers shaped 
institutions to their ends, the material existence of these institutions in return affected the 
horizons and aims of those actors. Poulantzas further remarks that the interaction between 
political interests and state institutions are worked out through “spacial and temporal 
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matrices.”33 The direct threat of war violence certainly intensified the attitude of state 
institutions towards controlling borderlands and the rhythm of transportation through 
civilian and military space, but these institutions also confronted the spacial disorder of 
sudden urbanization due to war industrialization, and nationalized the nation’s grain 
fields and the agricultural calendar itself. In conditions of strained resources and limited 
time, the bureaucrats who shaped these evolving institutions played crucial politicized 
roles. Fenced in by the various requirements of different British agents, meager budgets, 
the criticism of opposition politicians and popular demands, these bureaucrats practiced 
what Ilana Feldman names “tactical bureaucracy.”34 Just as Egyptian politicians, faced 
with the paradox of Egyptian sovereignty, practiced the politics of the possible, Egyptian 
bureaucrats formed their own social networks, pursued their own aspirations (and on 
occasion, committed their own crimes) in the process of piloting the ship of state.  
 
LAW AND REORDER 
The negotiations over the establishment of the liberal constitutional monarchy between 
1923 and 1936 succeeded in establishing Egyptian sovereignty in international law, 
which profoundly affected political behavior and discourse. The literate public perceived 
this sovereignty as legitimate precisely because it was expressed in an idiom of liberal 
political representation, through the first mass male franchise.35 The early political 
Islamists of the 1930s and 1940s, among them the Muslim Brotherhood, proposed 
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alternative forms of sovereignty based on Islamic law, but they participated in 
mainstream political life and even ran candidates for parliament before turning to 
political terrorism after the Second World War. 
 The neocolonial conception of sovereignty the Egyptian and British elite shared 
complicated protest against British imperialism. Politicians from all parties as well as 
Kings Fuʾad and Faruq sought to channel populist opposition to the British for their own 
ends, but this opposition often turned into independent protest against the elected 
Egyptian government itself because of its collaboration with the British. Dipesh 
Chakrabarty identifies this as one of the key problems for postcolonial politics: 
accounting for the persistence of disobedient, illegal and even violent political protest, a 
tool that had been essential to anti-colonial resistance, once the public has the ability to 
elect its representatives in a sovereign, postcolonial state. Nehru could not countenance it: 
“We have democracy in India. …We cannot get anywhere by beating up one another or 
breaking the laws.”36 Although Egypt remained under more significant British coercion 
in the 1940s than India was in the 1950s, its symbolic link of sovereignty with liberal 
legality was similar. The Egyptian state struggled with the rise of mass political media 
and mobilization in the 1930s and had not yet resolved the contradictions of liberal 
attitudes towards speech, publication and protest and the threat they could pose to the 
dominant expressions of the Egyptian state and the Egyptian nation. 
 The approach of the Second World War acutely tested but ultimately affirmed this 
negotiated, if flawed, definition of Egyptian sovereignty. The British military eventually 
moved hundreds of thousands of troops into dozens of military bases, mainly on the 
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outskirts of settled land, but also in highly visible urban areas, as Egypt became both the 
crucial logistical base for all operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East as 
well as the main British war front in the west from 1940 to 1942. The British largely 
dictated Egyptian foreign relations with Axis countries, and as stated before, mostly 
monopolized foreign trade with Egypt. However, the British recognized the symbolic 
value of Egyptian sovereignty in organizing and defusing Egyptian domestic political and 
social discontent. The negotiated vehicle for achieving both military efficiency and 
domestic pacification was an Egyptian emergency law, based on the French état de siege. 
What the British failed to anticipate was the deep effect this interlude in constitutional 
governance would have on the Egyptian state and political life. Rather than sparking an 
immediate crisis between the Egyptian political elite and government that the 
reimposition of British martial law could have caused, or a dictatorship of the executive, 
the state of siege instead caused a slow transformation in the meaning of the law and 
sovereignty in Egypt. In short, it institutionalized and legitimated illiberal security 
practices alongside the traditional, liberal judiciary and a liberal (if dysfunctional) 
electoral government.  
 The acquiescence of civil society to the prerogative of executive power in states 
of emergency has been a permanent problem for liberal political philosophers. John 
Locke and J.S. Mill both acknowledged this essential role of the state to secure private 
property, despite their recommendation of limits to its interventions.37 Legal scholars 
have been sensitive to historical change in their analyses of the state of emergency and 
have usefully described the genealogy and evolution of what were typically military 
measures during the 19th century into a sophisticated security apparatus in the present 
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day.38 However, this type of argumentation focuses on the state as the author of 
legislation and ideology without equal emphasis on how legal bureaucracies operate or 
how the general public experiences them. Foucault’s description of the evolution of 
political power in modern states from the physical, coercive “sovereign” power of the 
military, police, law and courts, through the various institutions of discipline to the 
capillary, microsocial and self-enforcing practices of “governmentality” (which he called 
“security” in his first lectures on the topic) instead incrementally deemphasizes the power 
of government institutions over social and scientific discourse in the 20th century.39 This 
model has trouble accounting for the practice of power at historical conjunctures like 
wars or revolution, and in places like colonial states, where the undemocratic domination 
of a foreign power disrupts the consolidation of microsocial power.40 
 Recent studies on the role of law in colonial empires have done more to 
deconstruct the positivist narrative of progress that previously made the development of 
western legal systems an invisible and natural tool of modernization, and to tell the social 
history of colonized people through these courts. Archival work throughout the formerly 
colonized world reveals the inherently complex, plural nature of the legal institutions of 
colonial states.41 Throughout the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, European states 
established strong trading links and in many cases, military dominions, of various 
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legitimacy and legality. This situation led to an enmeshment of the jurisdiction of civil, 
shariʿa and consular courts and legal systems.42 Historians of India have also emphasized 
the paradox of British liberal legality as it applied differently to Westerners and Indians, 
as well as to different social classes of Indians. As an ideology of rule, the juxtaposition 
of universal liberal values with the fundamental racial difference of the colonial subjects 
justified the eternal postponement of their legal rights.43 Yet this did not prevent the 
courts from developing into a forum for political contention by which Indians, their 
lawyers and later the Indian judiciary could fight for fairness under the system or at least 
reveal the hypocrisy of British standards.44 Ayesha Jalal has shown how strength of the 
judiciary in postcolonial India has been a strong factor for political pluralism against the 
various factors of authoritarianism, especially compared to Pakistan, where the courts fell 
early into executive control and have only recently regained autonomous power.45 
 Is it possible to reconcile Foucault’s critique that systems of legal justice are 
merely masks for real power relations with the seeming salvation of liberal values in 
colonial legal pluralism? Nasser Hussein has argued that the performative aspect of 
British violence during periods of martial law in its colonies, such as the massacre by 
machine gun of a crowd in Amritsar, Punjab in 1919, was a permanent tool for defending 
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the colonial state’s threatened sovereignty.46 He has also described contemporary states 
of emergency as no longer distinct from civil legal systems, but “rather part of a larger 
methodology of governance.47 Spieler speaks of the “frequency” with which “legal 
experiments under a state of emergency has wound up as norms,”48 while Raman has 
analyzed the “oscillation” between trying brigandage under military, civilian and treason 
codes of law in early colonial south India.49 All of these scholars are trying to replace the 
temporally static, if institutionally intricate, models of either Foucault’s micropower or 
the infinite toolbox legal pluralism, with a more dynamic analysis of the relationship 
between legal institutions and power. The liberal fallacy is that the legal system 
represents a permanent solution to the problems of justice and domination. Through the 
constant production of a variety of types of legislation, and through the changing spaces 
of their execution, the contours and operational logic of legal systems are always 
constantly being remade. 
 Colonial Egypt’s pluralistic legal hierarchy has framed similar debates in the 
literature over the relationship between law and power. Nathan Brown’s The Rule of Law 
in the Arab World has drawn attention to the importance of the judiciary as a central 
institution of the colonized Egyptian state.50 Until the promulgation of the 1923 
constitution, the power to make legislation governing and to pass judgments on an 
individual or corporation in Egypt or even on the Government itself was fragmented 
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between an autocratic khedive, his aristocratic ministers, the British residency and, 
because of the Ottoman Capitulations, the consulates of several European nations. The 
contest for political and economic power between these actors was only regulated 
through the legal codes of the Native and especially Mixed Courts, which were run by an 
independent international commission to adjudicate all disputes between foreigners and 
Egyptians. Brown’s revisionist narrative of the origins of this system stresses the 
Egyptians’ strategic creation of the Mixed Courts to hold off British influence, in contrast 
to the more common depiction of the imposition of these western legal forms for the 
purposes of economic neocolonialism. After the end of the Mixed Courts and the British 
evacuation, he argues that the purely Egyptian judiciary began resisting the growing 
power of the Egyptian executive branch as epitomized by its frequent resort to emergency 
law after the consolidation of the state of siege in the Second World War.51 Brown 
indicates that despite its independent role, the judiciary has always played an important 
role in the growth and centralization of the state, not because it legitimated it or gave a 
voice to civil society, but because it regulated and made predictable the actions of the 
regime itself. 
 Timothy Mitchell and Samera Esmeir have exposed a different perspective on the 
relationship between power and the rule of law in colonized Egypt. Despite the fact that 
the British routinely counterposed their support of the rule of law and independent 
judiciary to the “Oriental despotism” of the prior system of Ottoman administrative 
justice to justify their military occupation, Mitchell and Esmeir have noted the growth 
during this period of areas of “private sovereignty” or “non-juridical legalities,” 
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particularly in the private village plantation or ʿezba.52 Drawing on a Foucaultian 
understanding of the capillary spread of power, they argue the British and Egyptian 
authorities simply ignored ʿezba owners’ violence and demands for unpaid labor on 
infrastructure residents by excluding the ʿezba from state jurisdiction, “purifying” the rule 
of law.53 Unlike Brown, who sees the state of exception as ultimately disruptive to the 
consolidation of the Egyptian state, Esmeir believes exceptional legality was definitive of 
the regular legality of the colonial state. 
 I find useful concepts in both these perspectives as they regard the rule of law and 
the institutionalization of the Egyptian state. However, the unique turn of local and global 
events in the Second World War challenges the exact applicability of either as a model 
for this period of transition at the end of Britain’s colonial power in Egypt. Brown’s 
argument stresses the distinction between the strategies of the executive and the judiciary, 
but the neocolonial division of both executive and judicial power between an Egyptian 
and European military, bureaucracy and judiciary complicated this relationship. The 
Second World War arrived at a moment when the decolonization of the courts was near 
completion, but still not entirely assured. The state of siege military courts allowed 
Egyptian judges (on a panel with two junior officers from the Egyptian military) 
jurisdiction for the first time over all foreign civilians, to which the British uneasily 
consented to ensure Axis citizens would be under firm legal control. This process created 
a tighter cooperation between the Ministries of Justice, Interior and the Council of 
Ministers than prior to the British occupation. In contrast to the indefinite legalities 
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Esmeir argues prevailed at the turn of the 20th century, the war forced the suspension of 
the laissez-faire logic of colonial legality. But this does not imply the Egyptian state or its 
politicians abandoned a liberal project of governance or property ownership. Where the 
exceptional legality of Cromer-era Egypt sought to make the liberal rule of law sovereign 
by institutionally ignoring its violations, the state of siege institutionalized a separate 
code of law and a court system that was not subject to the oversight of the elected liberal 
institutions, but which preserved the parallel existence of those institutions during a time 
of crisis.  
 
THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
The argument of this dissertation is twofold. First, I argue that the war was a formative 
event in the 20th century history of Egypt. This is not merely a critique of the 
historiography that has sidelined and downplayed it, it is productive of a new social 
history. Because of the war, a larger proportion of Egyptian society experienced both new 
opportunities and social mobility — and trauma and immiseration —  than at any other 
prior point in the century. As a result, the war helped consolidate new types of knowledge 
about society and Egyptian nationhood. For a time, optimism about Egypt’s role in the 
fight for global democracy helped reinforce liberal attitudes of progress in domestic and 
international political life. At the same time, fears of changes resulting from labor 
migration and mass poverty led to the conception of new social crises and abstracted 
discourses on their reform.  
 Second, I propose that, despite the many limitations to its powers, Egyptian state 
played a crucial and active role in mediating Egyptians’ experiences of the war and the 
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new ways of thinking the war provoked. These changes had huge consequences for the 
state’s interaction with the British diplomatic corps and military, its relationship with 
Egyptians and foreign residents, and its role in defining nationalist ideology. The 
dissertation will therefore follow three intertwined themes: the changing meaning of 
Egyptian sovereignty, the new roles of law and bureaucracy in structuring politics and 
society, and the fraught interchange between Allied war narratives and Egyptian national 
narratives. 
 The question of sovereignty epitomizes the reasons the Second World War has 
trouble fitting in Egyptian historiography. In the period from 1923 to 1952, British 
diplomacy and the British military presence defined Egyptian sovereignty with distinct 
but untested limits. With the coming of the war, these distinctions blurred and 
sovereignty became an official paradox. The British military was both Egypt’s essential 
defense against Axis invasion and an aggressive occupation. The Egyptian state was 
neutral under international law, but it was also enthusiastically assisting the British. I 
argue that the Egyptians worked quickly to bracket these paradoxes with legal fictions 
and spacial and bureaucratic regimes. Chapter one presents some better known aspects of 
the problem of sovereignty in interwar Egypt. After 1923, British diplomats continued to 
make coercive threats to achieve goals in Egypt. These threats spoiled any stable 
relationship between King Faruq and elected parties and officials. However, during the 
war, the British did not have the power to directly police political, social or economic 
policies tied to their broader aims. The clever and unlikely solution to this problem, 
examined in chapter two, was the institution of the state of siege. The British gave up 
their discretion to intervene in domestic problems in exchange for logistical cooperation 
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and extraordinary powers for the Egyptian prime minister to carry out these wartime 
goals. Chapter three illustrates the problematic enforcement of this legal institution in 
Egyptian space. Egyptian politicians and police used the state of siege to keep distinct 
Allied (extraterritorial) from Egyptian (territorial) regimes of jurisdiction. As much as the 
Egyptian state gained in control over its civilians, it frequently had to compromise in its 
ability to prevent the unruliness and crime of British soldiers in urban areas.  
  Egypt experienced more obvious limitations on its independence in the economic 
realm. Here, the British Empire wielded weapons of weakness: its control over Egypt’s 
very limited imports and its power to compel Egypt to accept unlimited Sterling credits in 
exchange for Egyptian pounds, examined in chapters four and five, respectively. These 
shortcomings further undercut the diplomatic fiction keeping British and Egyptian space 
separate. For example, the promise of high wages drew hundreds of thousands of 
Egyptians to work in British military workshops. Yet these two restrictions also provoked 
many different creative responses. These responses included the acceleration of import-
substitution industrial production, the refusal to yield up agricultural goods for export to 
the British Empire, the conversion of the Egyptian debt to local currency, the limited 
expansion of income taxation, and an unfortunate eventuality: a vigorous black market. 
While the Egyptian state yielded sovereignty in military matters, chapter six examines 
how the military crisis expanded Egypt’s sovereignty over foreign civilians. In a 
development both extremely troubling to British diplomats but essential to the negotiated 
scheme of shared power, Egyptian security gained responsibility for interning potential 
Italian fifth columnists and sequestering Italian goods — and even for policing Allied 
civilians who committed crimes that threatened war aims. I argue that this legal and 
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administrative framework, and not xenophobic nationalism alone, helped contribute to 
the exodus of Egypt’s foreign communities by the 1960s. 
 In the process of claiming zones of sovereignty from the British through the war 
crisis, the Egyptian state necessarily expanded its power and redefined its relationship to 
the Egyptian people themselves. Through the second theme of the dissertation, I argue 
this expansion of state legal power and the state bureaucracy met both encouragement 
and resistance from different bureaucrats, politicians and intellectuals at different times. 
But all these negotiations occurred as conscious redefinitions of the liberal legal and 
political framework and aspirations of the era. Defining liberalism in interwar Egypt 
presents problems, as the brief breakdown of historiography above illustrates. I seek to 
simplify the terms of analysis here. Because of the centrality of political economic policy 
to my dissertation, the default meaning of liberalism in the coming chapters is interwar 
Egypt’s politically and legally defined regime of private property, the limited size of state 
institutions and the restrictions on its intervention in the private sphere. I argue that 
Egypt’s bureaucrats transformed this regime with the intention of saving it, rather than 
destroying it. They had limited success. 
 Chapter one analyzes the ways the Great Depression prompted redistributive 
programs to save the vast majority of indebted peasants. In the late 1930s, the Egyptian 
bureaucracy began a subdivision into ministries addressing specific new forms of social 
scientific state knowledge: Public Health, Social Affairs, Supply, and others. The state of 
siege made such state interventions easier for the prime minister, but it by no means 
granted him the unfettered power to define “necessity” alone. Chapter two illustrates the 
continued negotiations between the bureaucracy and parliament over state of siege 
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proclamations, while chapter three analyzes the messy implementation of the emergency 
legal regime in Egyptian space. Because of the limitations of its resources and the 
compressed time it had to address problems of the war, Egyptian bureaucrats had to make 
functional compromises on the enforcement of laws the state of siege enabled. This was 
even more evident in the creation and maintenance of the food supply system, analyzed 
in chapter four. While this system eventually worked well enough to prevent widespread 
famine in the short term, its weaknesses fostered a huge increase in income inequality 
that threatened the liberal economy in the long term. The huge demand for Egyptian labor 
forced liberal entrepreneurs and the government to compromise on their long resistance 
to recognizing the trade union movement. However, the terms of the expansion of 
Egyptian industry, chapter five argues, undercut benefits for workers and worker 
solidarity. Unions could not venture into the British workshops, and enterprises 
everywhere paid wages in increasingly worthless money. These conditions both fostered 
and hampered the communist movement, a major threat to postwar liberalism. Egyptian 
bureaucrats found the state’s new jurisdiction over foreign residents also meant 
responsibility for their welfare during a war that turned many communities into havens 
for refugees and broken families. These demands for support further intensified the 
state’s interest in defining and surveilling nationality. 
 Official state history sublimated Egyptian war narratives in the 1950s, as distinct 
stories about the Second World War and the Egyptian nation’s role in it. But this project 
was necessarily incomplete. I argue that many of the tropes of national thought 
originating from Egypt’s war experience set precedents for and in turn reflected later 
wars and civil crises. This third theme brings popular narratives of social and economic 
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changes, which the war accelerated, back to the place they occupied in the national story 
at the time.  
 The state of siege was at first an effective tool for political and social control 
precisely because it aligned with the expectations and desires of the educated middle 
class of the era, which had been shaped by the seriousness of the war’s threats and the 
commitment of this class to Egypt’s liberal democracy. In chapters three, four and five, 
the narrative tropes regarding the failure of the Egyptian state to properly use its powers 
to protect the Egyptian people helped in a negative way to shape definitions of the proper 
relationship of the state and nation. Despite assurances that the war was not actually 
happening in Egypt, Egyptians suffered for years the traumatic threat of Axis air raids 
and the social traumas brought by military occupation: crime, drugs and worse, 
prostitution. The black market became forever after a symbol of the impossibility of 
social justice in Egypt. The simultaneous peaking of inflation with massive end-of-war 
industrial layoffs made government promises of planning and progress, encouraged by 
the expansion of the bureaucracy and the global victory of Fordism, laughable fictions in 
the eyes of most Egyptians. Despite these failures, the dialogue between the Egyptian 
state and Egyptian people completely reshaped the terms of Egyptian nationalism. After 
the war, the state would be expected to perceive and record all activities see everything 
within its territory, to plan for its progress and improvement, and to protect Egyptians as 
individuals and the abstractions of Egyptian culture, the Egyptian family, and 
increasingly, the Egyptian economy. This increased focus on the way the state must serve 
the nation culminates with the maneuvers analyzed in chapter six: the purification of the 
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Egyptian body politic by distinguishing real Egyptians, eligible for those privileges, from 
foreigners. 
 It is this national self-image that Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi presented to the United 
Nations in 1947. This depiction was synthesized from the technocratic reports of more 
than a dozen government ministries. Many of these ministries had not existed before the 
war, and this dissertation will examine a few of them in significant detail. I believe that 
the experience of the Second World War was inscribed on these new institutions. While I 
do not pretend that the events of a period now firmly 70 years in the past are 
determinative of present events, it is my intention to put forward a genealogy of the 
Egyptian state and political culture in a period that was formative to the conditions of the 
postcolonial, ʿAbd al-Nasir era. The changes of this period have framed problems of 
individual rights, collective welfare, political representation and the sovereign power of 





The Crisis Years 
 
Egyptian Society and the Egyptian State Mobilized in a Total War 
 
November 10, 1942 was a busy day for the Cairo Military Court. A panel of one civilian 
judge and two Egyptian army officers passed sentences on 47 cases in a single day, 
according to a report the military parquet (state’s attorney) sent to the prime minister’s 
office.1 The Second World War had created conditions of scarcity in Egypt, plunging the 
weakest into poverty and enriching those who served the occupying British military. The 
Egyptian state, day by day, struggled to restore order. The military court passed heavy 
judgment on black market merchants ʿAbdu Ibrahim Sayid Ahmad and Philippe 
Tawdrus, sentencing 20 lashes of the whip each and one and four months imprisonment, 
respectively, for selling consumer goods for higher than the government fixed prices. 
Andrea Malara and Iskandar Arʾiree were fined LE 10 and LE 5, respectively, for selling 
alcohol without a license, and their businesses were closed for a week each. A woman 
only registered as Umm ʿAli Salih (mother of ʿAli Salih, a common kunya or honorific 
name) was sentenced to three months in prison and a LE 50 fine for trading in wheat 
without a permit. Two men were charged 180 and 30 piastres for carrying (probably 
small) weapons without a permit. Others received more minor fines, such as 50 piasters 
for buying goods without a ration card, or LE 1 for trespassing on British military land. 
                                                 
1 DWQ 0081-030436, Report of the Cairo Military Parquet, 10 Nov. 1942. 
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 These individual stories provide glimpses of the huge social upheaval that 
occurred in Egypt as a result of the war. The British military presence brought 
opportunity for gain, attracting Egyptian labor to urban areas, but inflation resulting from 
military spending upended social relations in both city and countryside. Wealthy 
landowners began demanding cash rents from their peasants just as the government began 
to requisition a large share of peasants’ food crops for the cities, often giving them no 
choice but to sell a portion of their produce on the black market to make ends meet. 
Egyptian workers in the British camps enjoyed high wages but also instability and poor 
treatment; many took the risk of stealing food, weapons and other hardware from their 
stores. The fact that all these heterogenous cases ended up in the same courtroom under 
an exceptional jurisdiction reveals the consolidation of a unified episteme for organizing 
and adjuticating them: the maintenance of public security. 
 The inability of weaker politicians to confront these wartime crises had prompted 
the British to compel King Faruq to appoint his principal political enemy, Wafd party 
leader Mustafa al-Nahhas, as his prime minister. They had prepared an alternative: a 
written abdication that British Ambassador Sir Miles Lampson delivered to Faruq in 
ʿAbdin palace at the head of a column of tanks on February 4, 1942. In his speech at the 
opening session of Parliament in November 1942, after nine months in office, al-Nahhas 
spent the first several minutes celebrating what he considered his government’s chief 
accomplishment: restoring morale and physical security to the country at the height of the 
Axis invasion. In the conclusion of his speech, al-Nahhas said,  
My government is continuing negotiations with the representatives of the ally (i.e. 
the British) and her armed forces in this critical time to ensure for Egypt the 
security of her public institutions, and to reassure for her sons the security of their 
persons and their property, and to shield the country from the misfortunes of war. 
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We have received from these representatives every appreciation of the Egyptian 
point of view, respect for the sovereignty and independence of the country, and 
deference to its interests and rights.2  
 
 The final sentence weighs heavy with irony, but as a whole, this declaration 
unifies several important messages. The British Empire was burning through both its 
financial and political capital to maintain its position in Egypt and throughout the Middle 
East and South Asia. It had originally wanted the Egyptian army to play a more active 
role in the war, but al-Nahhas now understood it was only inclined to intervene in 
Egyptian politics with force if the security of its base in Egypt was threatened. Al-Nahhas 
was willing to use the full machine of the Wafd party and the expanded emergency 
powers of the state to provide that security. His message contains a populist element that 
is linked essentially to the concept of state security: a promise to shield the country from 
the misfortunes of war (tajnīb al-balad min waylāt al-ḥarb). Egypt had negotiated a 
division of labor with the British over the defense of the country: The British army would 
ensure its external defense, while the Egyptian security apparatus would ensure internal 
peace. In the context of al-Nahhas’ policies, “misfortunes of war” can only mean a repeat 
of the 1919 Revolution, which occurred after several years of British authoritarian 
mismanagement of the Egyptian government and economy during the last world war.  
 Egyptian writers and intellectuals saw through al-Nahhas’ sophistry. Egypt was in 
a crisis because it was at the very center of the maelstrom, not because the government 
had failed in any particular way. Several contemporary commentators defined the war as 
a “war of sinews” (harb al-aʿṣāb), meaning a war in which the total productive force and 
                                                 
2 Record of the Chamber of Deputies, 19 Nov. 1942, 13. 
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logistical prowess of nation-states would determine victory, and not just military power.3 
Although Egypt was neutral, these authors bore witness that its economic and social fate 
had been hard wired to the Allied war effort. A more successful governmental approach, 
they argued, would recognize this fact and intervene more strongly to harness the 
productive power of Egypt. This interchange between official and public comment helped 
legitimate some of the more controversial policy decisions about such new interventions. 
 A sense of social crisis pervaded Egyptian discourse by the end of the Second 
World War. In this chapter, I argue the experience of the interwar period strongly framed 
the ways the Egyptian people conceived of and the government bureaucracy addressed 
this crisis during the war. On the one hand, the establishment of a constitutional 
monarchy in 1923 was a victory for the Egyptian bourgeoisie. It provided Egyptians 
political representation, the power to make new legislation, and constitutional guarantees 
of expression and private property that fostered a huge expansion of economic and 
cultural activity. However, the continuing British occupation prevented the development 
of other political issues and destabilized relations between the King and parliament. 
Moreover, the very mobilization of society created new problems on a scale which 
Egypt’s elite were unfamiliar with: mass urban protest, unemployment, poverty and 
disease. In the 1930s, the state security apparatus began a halting expansion and 
elaboration beyond its traditional activities of rural surveillance and detention. With the 
coming of war, a series of new ministries began full operation, redefining the art of 
governance in Egypt. While some of these new agencies sharpened the coercive powers 
of the state, others sought to improve its reach with education and welfare. I argue that 
                                                 
3 “Egypt: War of Sinews,” Ruz al-Yusuf, 2 July 1942; Fuʾad Muḥammad Shibl, ʿAṣab Al-Ḥarb (Cairo: 
Maṭbaʿat al-Maʿārif wa Maktabatha bi-Miṣr, 1944). This phrase is likely a reference to the fifth Phillipic of 
Cicero, which had become current in British discourse on the war. 
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despite the difference in their appearance, these functions served the same goal: the 
establishment of state security, and in the hands of its wielders, political power. 
 
SPLIT SOVEREIGNTY AND MASS POLITICS BETWEEN THE WARS 
The British declaration of a protectorate over Egypt in 1914 upon the Ottoman Empire’s 
declaration of war with the Central Powers precipitated a contest over Egypt’s 
sovereignty and governance that had not been resolved by 1939. Britain’s declaration of 
martial law and its unplanned and extensive intervention into the Egyptian economy over 
the course of the First World War radically changed the terms of British colonial power, 
which had been more minimalist and laissez-faire with regards to the political economy. 
The arbitrary acquisition of food grains and pack animals from rural areas, as well as 
extensive pressure from the British military to recruit Egyptian peasants into dangerous 
military work gangs in Syria and as far away as France turned mass public opinion 
against British plans to consolidate their power after the end of the war. Ideological and 
symbolic politics played an important factor, too: it was only after the British deported a 
delegation (later dubbed the Wafd: delegation, party) of Egyptian politicians led by Saʿad 
Zaghlul intending to travel to the Versailles Peace Conference in March 1919 that rural 
and urban protests erupted simultaneously, an event that has become remembered in 
nationalist history as the 1919 Revolution. 
 Although anti-imperialism and demands for British evacuation were the major 
ideological force behind these varied protests, neither the Wafd nor the more spontaneous 
uprisings outside Cairo had a well-formed agenda with regards to the future form of the 
government of Egypt. The middling landed elite who were the leadership of the Wafd in 
 
 38 
part sought inclusion in the formation of state policies of interest to them, while the 
peasantry in some cases took a more violent anti-statist stand.4 British support for a 
constitutional regime set up by the landed elite was a strategic gambit resulting from 
these protests. Facing the possibility of recurring insurrection in the most populous Arab 
country, it became apparent to the British that force in Egypt could never be a permanent 
solution to securing British interests in the Empire as a whole, which were mostly 
elsewhere. An investigative mission led by staunch imperialist Alfred Milner, who had 
previously proposed incorporating Egypt into the Empire, recognized the British 
responsibility for the symptoms of the revolt without being prepared to offer substantial 
Egyptian autonomy in governance.5 As a result, nearly every former minister of the 
Egyptian government, even Anti-Wafdist conservative politicians, refused to join any 
new cabinets and collaborate with the regime. The stalemate in negotiations was broken 
on February 28, 1922 when High Commissioner Lord Allenby unilaterally declared 
Egyptian independence with “four reserved points:” control of Egyptian foreign affairs, 
the Egyptian military, lines of communication (i.e., the Suez Canal) and the Sudan. 
Against the opposition of Sultan Fuʾad, Allenby sought to bring Egyptian politicians back 
into government by supporting a constitutional government that guaranteed them powers 
against the Sultan and representation in matters of legislation, along the lines of 
representative governments being set up at that time in the successor states to the German 
and Austro-Hungarian empires. 
                                                 
4 Reinhard C. Schulze, “Colonization and Resistance: The Egyptian Peasant Rebellion, 1919,” in Peasants 
and Politics in the Modern Middle East, eds. Farhad Kazemi and John Waterbury (Miami: Florida 
International University Press, 1991), 194-195. 
5 Jacques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism & Revolution (London: Faber & Faber, 1972), 315. 
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 Elie Kedourie’s account of the political compromises of the 1922 constituent 
assembly, which set the legal framework of the Egyptian state and political strategy for 
the coming 30 years, leaves no doubt that popular sovereignty was not the goal of the 
document.6 The members of the assembly found it difficult to write a constitution that 
balanced the powers of the sultan (now redesignated king) and parliament that the king 
would not reject outright. The Wafd, discerning British aims through the assembly’s 
support for the conservative clique, boycotted it, although they ran for seats and won a 
majority in the first parliament in 1924. It became quickly apparent that the constitution 
could stand as a symbol of liberal legality and governance — and that all parties would 
ignore and twist it to purposes contrary to the intentions of the drafters. The constitution 
defined sovereignty as residing in the Egyptian people, but political power remained 
sharply divided between the British, the King and now the parties elected to parliament. 
As Kedourie puts it, 
This, then, was a model, a textbook constitution… full of checks and balances, an 
ordered and intricate toyland in which everything was calm and beauty. Its radical 
failing in the actual conditions of Egyptian politics was that it assumed and took 
for granted that elections in Egypt could possibly elicit, as they did elsewhere, the 
will of the electorate… Egyptian elections, rather, proved to be ratifications by the 
masses of decisions taken by the king, or else by the Cairo politicians, depending 
on which side had, for the time being, the upper hand.7 
  
Politics therefore took on a symbolic and ironic aspect: instead of enforcing a present 
state of affairs, the constitution described an ideal achievable in the future that the parties 
(principally the Wafd) would use among many other political tools to gain advantages in 
the present. 
                                                 
6 Elie Kedourie, “The Genesis of the Egyptian Constitution of 1923,” in Political and Social Change in 
Modern Egypt, ed. P.M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 355. 
7 Kedourie, “The Genesis of the Egyptian Constitution of 1923”, 354-355. 
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 Both Egyptian and foreign historians of Egypt have drawn soft boundaries 
between the flourishing political and cultural liberalism of the interwar period (the 1920s 
in particular), despite its flaws, and the stark inequalities of social relations, income and 
wealth that existed in this era, which revolutionary nationalists of the 1950s dubbed rural 
“feudalism.” 8 I want to stress, however, that it was the very legal liberalism and laissez-
faire capitalism imposed during the era of Lord Cromer (1880s-1900s) that helped 
establish the Egyptian large landed bourgeoisie.9 This class then extended its power to 
reproduce and protects its privileges through legislation in parliament after the 1919 
revolution. Indeed, the concentration of land ownership only continued to increase in the 
1920s and 30s, before reaching crisis levels thanks to the war. The percentage of land 
held by the superwealthy (owners of more than 50 feddans) increased from 40% in 1919 
to 57% in 1945.10 In rural areas, large landowners used their social and economic power 
to effectively lock up electoral results for the Wafd party, although this pattern became 
less assured as the party fragmented over time.11 Despite the authoritarian aspects of 
social relations especially in the countryside, I argue that it is incorrect to divide these 
two aspects of Egyptian liberalism, which was a structural determinant of these classes 
that social codes and lingering aristocracy only faintly disguised. 
 It is simpler and more accurate therefore to consider the newest aspect of 
Egyptian politics between the world wars as mass participation than “liberalism” in the 
neutral sense. The constitution enshrined a limited freedom of the press, which heralded a 
                                                 
8 Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement, 76-78. 
9 Eric Davis, Challenging Colonialism: Bank Miṣr and Egyptian Industrialization, 1920-1941 (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983). 
10 Gabriel Baer, A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt, 1800-1950 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1962), 91-120, 224-225. 
11 See Ḥāmid and El-Dessouky, The Large Landowning Class. 
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golden age of private-sector publishing in Egypt and a corresponding growth in the 
varieties of public opinion. The granting of a universal male franchise brought contention 
over party loyalty and public policy into the private spaces of peasants and the urban 
proletariat in a much more specific way than before. However, it is difficult to describe a 
system as liberal in which foreign residents still enjoyed the privilege of trial in a separate 
judicial system, the Mixed Courts, best characterized by a governing commission of 
several European states. Struggles over this commission guaranteed political and 
diplomatic intervention in, rather than exclusion from, the judiciary and court system.12 
In subsequent chapters, I will analyze just how extensive the intervention of wartime 
emergency measures was on the legal privileges Europeans enjoyed prior to the war. 
 The principal political issue in Egypt between 1923 and 1936 was the effort to 
negotiate a bilateral treaty with the British that would replace the unilateral British 
declaration of Egyptian independence and more properly define Egyptian sovereignty in 
international law. For much of the 1920s, local security issues trumped regional or global 
defense concerns. Particularly after the assassination of the Sirdar of Sudan Sir Lee 
Stack, the British were reluctant to give up their lingering advisory control over key parts 
of the bureaucracy like the Ministry of Interior, or direct control of the Egyptian army.13 
Wafd brinksmanship over the continuing British presence in administration resulted in 
the king dissolving parliament frequently. As Kedourie states, the election boycott 
                                                 
12 Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World, 26-29, 41-43. 
13 The British almost declared martial law after Stack’s assassination, on 19 Nov. 1924. However, the 
Royal Courts of Justice recommended to the Foreign Office against either a formal declaration of martial 
law or extrajudicial military internment of political suspects. FO 141/672/1, 5 Jan. 1925. The issue was 
raised again at the beginning of the Ethiopan crisis, in a recommendation for a joint state of siege and 
British martial law, as a way of controlling Italians, but it was never implemented. FO 371/19053, Booth to 
Lampson, 13 Oct. 1935. 
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became one of the Wafd’s only effective protests against government machinery and a 
bureaucracy that was often explicitly biased against them. 
 Calling the interwar era “liberal” also disregards the five years between 1930 and 
1935 during which the king and his allies suspended the 1923 constitution with the tacit 
approval of the British. By 1930, King Fuʾad still resented the power the Wafd party 
enjoyed because of its powerful rural voting machine. He used the state fiscal crisis 
resulting from the plunge in the price of cotton at the start of the Great Depression to 
form a new government led by Ismaiʿil Sidqi that unilaterally repealed the 1923 
constitution and imposed a new basic law that restricted the franchise and dramatically 
reduced the size of the legislature. Sidqi managed to hold on to power for three years 
because of the unswerving support of the king, the cooperation of some opportunistic 
politicians, and because of the significant emergency economic reforms he made to usher 
Egypt through the global financial crisis.14 In a certain regard, Sidqi’s three-year 
administration was a dress rehearsal for the exceptional measures taken under the state of 
siege during the Second World War, which also disrupted liberal economic regulations to 
resolve a variety of economic crises. However, the state of siege would work in harmony 
with the 1923 constitution and obtain its legitimacy, rather than radically departing from 
it.  
 Sidqi had badly miscalculated how far he could backtrack from the gains 
nationalists believed they had won in 1923, and his successor Tawfiq Nassim faced 
increasing public protest to restore the original constitution, culminating in late 1935 with 
a series of college student-led rallies. Two thousand of a total 8,000 students of Fuʿad 
                                                 
14 This included increasing tarriffs and providing tax and even rent relief for rural tenants; Malak Badrawi, 




University (now Cairo University) marched from Giza to the parliament building, joined 
in subsequent days by thousands more secondary school students, of whom two died in 
clashes with the police. The palace capitulated on December 12, 1935 and reinstated the 
1923 constitution.15 Enrollment in higher education had soared since the early 1920s, and 
the mass media commemorated the protests as the “year of youth.”16  
 King Fuʿad’s illness and death within a few months of the protests, followed by 
the succession of his young and popular son Faruq to the throne and a year of Wafd rule 
breathed new life into the monarchic constitutional system. The final condition for the 
restoration of a timetable towards full Egyptian independence that liberal nationalists 
could believe in was the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance. After years 
of deadlock on negotiations, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 compelled British 
negotiators to make some concessions by 1936 to the Egyptians to legitimize the 
presence of British troops at the Suez Canal, in the interest of imperial defense. Coming 
after a decade of more aggressive Italian colonization of Libya against the Senussi-led 
independence movement, Mussolini made signals in public and private messages 
acquired by British intelligence that his ultimate goal was dominance of the 
Mediterranean through the conquest of Egypt.  
 The British took this threat seriously, to the extent even of making preparations to 
request the Egyptians declare “martial law” (i.e., the state of siege) and begin interning 
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Italian civilians in Egypt in September 1935.17 This crucial episode is generally 
downplayed in the literature on interwar British military history and the European 
political negotiations leading to the Second World War in Europe.18 The new High 
Commissioner Sir Miles Lampson strove to include the leaders of all parties, including 
the Wafd, in negotiations to make the treaty legitimate to all future governments.19 
Despite its binding force in international law, the final compromise on the treaty text that 
the Wafd proposed was largely symbolic. Much of what the British agreed to — its troop 
levels reduced to 10,000, and troops withdrawn completely from Alexandria and Cairo to 
                                                 
17 FO 371/19052, J 5348, Kelly to Lampson, 26 Sep. 1935. 
18 Steven Morewood, The British Defence of Egypt, 1935-1940: Conflict and Crisis in the Eastern 
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the Canal Zone, as a principal example — existed only in an ideal peacetime scenario. 
Even in 1936, both parties could envision the so-called “apprehended emergency” 
centering on an aggressive Germany and Italy in which, according to article seven, all 
such restrictions were null.  
 The settlement of the treaty finally allowed Egypt’s entry to the League of 
Nations and its explicit definition in international law as an independent state. The British 
High Commissioner was reduced to an ambassador and Egypt was allowed to conduct 
official independent diplomacy. The Egyptian Army was freed of British commanders, 
indeed, it developed a plan with the British to expand rapidly after 1936 albeit under the 
guidance of a military that ultimately restricted its access to arms and ammunition. A 
similar exodus of British officials occurred in every other branch of government. The 
powerful advisors of the Ministry of Finance and the “European department” of the 
Ministry of Interior stepped down by 1937; because of their existing work contracts, and 
after diplomatic negotiations, some British and European urban police commanders and 
officers and less important employees like schoolteachers and clerks working in foreign 
languages remained at their posts until the late 1940s.20 Another article in the treaty led 
directly to a conference in Montreux with the nations subject to the Capitulations in 1937 
that scheduled an end to the Mixed Courts and Consular Courts’ jurisdiction over 
foreigners in Egypt by 1949.  
 Despite the achievement of all these steps towards Egyptian independence, or 
perhaps because of them, the Wafd faced a new round of political infighting with its 
                                                 
20 In 1936, 900 of 1618 Europeans working for the Egyptian state were British, of whom the majority were 
teachers: FO 371/20125, Lampson to Foreign Office, 7 Feb. 1936. Roughly two-thirds this number 
remained employed in 1945, but very few remained by 1951. Personal Papers of Herbert Addison, Middle 
East Archive, St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, “List of British Officials in the Egyptian Service,” 
(Cairo, n.p., May, 1945), with handwritten annotations from November 1951. 
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opponents and King Faruq, who was beginning to explore his political powers. His most 
influential advisor was an independent politician, ʿAli Mahir, who had become the chief 
of the King’s Diwan, or administration. The Wafdist campus groups had been active in 
the 1920s, but this event helped them reorganize in a pseudo-paramilitary organization, 
the Blue Shirts, and inspired a competing youth group, the Green Shirts, organized by the 
anti-liberal radical nationalist group Young Egypt.21 The new Islamist organization the 
Muslim Brotherhood also intensified its recruitment of students after this date.22 ʿAli 
Mahir helped cultivate the political activity of Islamist groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Young Men’s Muslim Association, precisely to have calculated force to 
counter Wafdist voices in street protests.23 He also began making political overtures to 
the Egyptian officer corps, which was expanding after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty 
removed old limits on its size.24 After Mustafa al-Nahhas and the Wafd youth groups 
staged one too many loud protests against the king’s allies, Faruq dissolved his Wafdist 
cabinet in 1937 and held new elections. In response, the Wafd boycotted these elections 
in early 1938. It therefore occupied for four years an anomalous position as both the most 
popular party in Egypt by far and also the opposition and chief critic of government.  
 From 1938 to 1942, King Faruq formed coalition ministries from the members of 
parliament of several smaller opposition parties and technocrats. With his clout with the 
Egyptian officers and the public rising, ʿAli Mahir arranged to become prime minister 
                                                 
21 James Jankowski has written most extensively on these groups. See James P. Jankowski, “The Egyptian 
Blue Shirts and the Egyptian Wafd, 1935-1938,” Middle Eastern Studies 6:1 (1970), James P. Jankowski, 
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himself shortly before the start of the war in Europe, in August 1939. Mahir successfully 
installed himself as military governor, the executive of the state of siege, against the 
opposition of parliament. He issued the first proclamations defining Egypt’s relationship 
to Germany and its citizens, imposing censorship and building up spacial divisions 
between British military areas in Egypt and the civilian population. Although Mahir 
cooperated with the letter of the treaty with Britain, British administrators were extremely 
suspicious of his connections to radical nationalist groups that made statements 
sympathetic to the Nazi cause, and of his power base in the Egyptian military.25 In June 
1940, upon the catastrophic loss of France, the British successfully pressured King Faruq 
to remove Mahir from power.  
 The following two prime ministers, Hassan Sabri and Husayn Sirri, were non-
partisan politicians who found themselves in the difficult position of compromise leaders, 
as the British had pushed out Mahir and the King refused to accept Mustafa al-Nahhas. 
They struggled to keep Egyptian policy up to the tempo of events. After an initial success 
in Libya, the British military faced repeated setbacks in other theaters, such as the loss of 
Greece and Crete and the revolt of the Iraqi military under Rashid ʿAli in April 1941. 
Allied troop levels in Egypt increased tenfold from 40,000 to 400,000 in this period. 
Most troops were stationed in camps in the Western Desert or Suez Canal Zone, but a 
significant number lived in Cairo and Alexandria as a part of HQ and supply staffs or on 
leave. This caused an immense strain on the housing supply in the major cities, and the 
Egyptian government requisitioned apartments and capped rents by proclamation. The 
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market for vice — alcohol and prostitution — exploded, catering to soldiers on leave and 
proclamations strictly controlled the availability and quality of these illicit pleasures to 
protect public health and order. 
 By the summer of 1941, it was clear that the wheat crop had failed after two 
seasons with severe shortages of artificial fertilizer. The government ramped up the 
haphazard supply control regime, strengthening punishments on black marketeering, 
adjusting flour quality rules, restricting meat consumption, and requiring farmers to 
inform the government of their stocks of fertilizer and crop yields. The British created the 
Middle East Supply Center (MESC) at this time to coordinate supply policies across the 
region, and many of the Egyptian proclamations bear the intellectual stamp of its 
engineers and economists, but its impact was still minimal. Large landowners led by 
Ismaʿil Sidqi (and the obstructionist Wafd) opposed severe restrictions in cotton 
cultivation and mandates to produce more wheat for the next season.26 Although a 
political crisis set off by Sirri’s decision to cut diplomatic ties with the Vichy French was 
the immediate context of his resignation on February 3, 1942, the deplorable food supply 
situation was arguably a more important cause. 27 
 The coup of February 4, 1942 has been depicted as a turning point for the tenuous 
legitimacy of the constitutional monarchy. All three participants in this event — the 
British, King Faruq and Mustafa al-Nahhas and his Wafd party — emerged permanently 
damaged in Egyptian public opinion after the event became common knowledge in 
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1945.28 However, there were immediate advantages to all three participants. The King 
kept his throne and his popularity and symbolic leadership of the national movement 
reached its pinnacle. The Wafd had a solid platform to build a long-term legislative 
program, which it confirmed with victories in generally fair elections in March 1942 that 
led to its longest term in office in its history (two years, eight months). Finally, the 
British secured the leadership of a political party that could actually force unpopular 
legislation through the opposition in parliament, and when appropriate, as military 
proclamations under the state of siege. The most remarkable aspect of al-Nahhas’ 
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proclamations as military governor is their steady progression of government regulation 
over nearly all supply commodities. Al-Nahhas issued proclamations creating a total 
government monopoly on the trade of wheat and rice, grain and flour, as well as 
compulsory deliveries of all to the government, usually assessed at around two-thirds of 
each farmer’s crop of these grains. Generally, the contest between the Wafd party and 
King Faruq produced a dynamic whereby the British could obtain the collaboration of 
either party when it suited them, which prevented all out revolt during the war of the sort 
that had occurred in Iraq. 
 By October 1944, when the British no longer needed the Wafd party to enforce 
the security measures necessary for a war front, Lampson tacitly withdrew his support for 
its continued government. King Faruq immediately removed al-Nahhas from office and 
formed a series of minority governments composed of opposition ministers that lasted 
until 1950. Significantly, Sa’adist party (i.e., ex-Wafdists who named their party after 
Saʿad Zaghlul) Prime Minister Ahmad Mahir and his successor Mustafa al-Nuqrashi did 
not immediately add to or change the wartime policies set up under the Wafd, and indeed 
maintained the state of siege they had criticized so loudly, until October 1945. 
 
THE WAR AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR 
The increased pace of commerce and political life throughout Egypt and particularly in 
urban areas before and during the war prompted the Egyptian state to expand its 
intelligence collection and police presence. The relative sidelining of the political role of 
the Army after the fall of ʿAli Mahir in 1940 made the Ministry of Interior the key 
institution in the Egyptian government’s conception and enforcement of public security. 
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As examined in the next chapters, Mustafa al-Nahhas eventually used his power as 
military governor to fuse the military parquet to an office in the Ministry of Interior that 
he could oversee directly. But public security was not just about indiscriminate 
expansion. The remainder of this chapter explores the qualitative changes in the 
elaboration of a network of security and social services the Egyptian state undertook to 
comprehend a more complex society 
 Preferring the police to the military emulated the tactics of Britain’s unofficial 
colonial rule of Egypt of the prior 60 years. After the defeat of the Egyptian Army in 
1882, the British administration dismantled what was a 100,000-man force and kept it at 
a level of 10,000 troops for several decades. At the same time, the British army also 
withdrew to the barracks, and only became a tool for the enforcement of public security 
in times of extreme unrest like the 1919 revolution. The British filled the gap, in a way 
more financially and socially efficient, by building up their authority in the Ministry of 
Interior, especially after the accession of the young Khedive Abbas II Hilmi in 1892, who 
resisted more informal forms of British power.29 The British advisor to the ministry 
developed a “European department” that ostensibly existed to fulfill the British 
commitment to protect foreign subjects of capitulatory powers. In fact, it gave the British 
influence over the development of the police apparatus and, even more important, access 
to the intelligence sources that made governing the countryside possible.30  
 As in India, British administrators in Egypt based their sociological 
“governmentality” on half-baked conceptions of Egyptian society that in turn shaped 
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society in their image. In the case of criminal justice, the further application of scientific 
and techno-medical methods in investigation, as well as statistical analysis of 
countrywide trends, affirmed Orientalist ideas about the causes of crime in Egypt, in 
particular, the Egyptian peasant’s penchant for revenge killing.31 As useful as this 
information was to contain everyday forms of criminality that threatened a placid public 
order, this colonial sociology broke down when it came to anticipating, reacting to and 
explaining larger unrest — in particular, the 1919 revolution. The political officers of the 
British High Commission had constructed a network of Egyptian informants focusing on 
Pan-Islamist and proto-nationalist ideologies and political action among a small elite and 
otherwise held a stereotyped view of the behavior of farmers and workers, which left 
them completely unprepared for the mobilization of large groups from the urban and rural 
lower classes.32 This event, and the tumultuous decade of political violence that followed, 
kept the British security administration on a more militarized footing than previous to the 
First World War, despite (perhaps because of) the fact that they could not improve the 
quality of their intelligence, especially as the British withdrew from direct administration 
of government. 
 One of the conditions of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936 was the removal of 
all British employees from advisory positions at all ministries (although a few British 
police commanders and schoolteachers would remain for more than a decade in the 
employ of the Egyptian government). This meant the end of the European department in 
the Ministry of Interior in January 1937. The last director of the department, Alexander 
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Keown Boyd, made preparations for firm channels between the British Embassy and the 
now purely Egyptian department of public security before he left, making informal but 
detailed arrangements to continue sharing information at several levels. Al-Nahhas 
explicitly agreed to share information about political movements that were clearly 
threatening to both the British and the Egyptian elite, like communism. But the British 
also hoped for continued information about internal political matters, which pro-British 
Interior officials would continue to provide unofficially though the Oriental Secretary, Sir 
Walter Smart. “There is reason to believe Hamdy Mahboub [the current director of public 
security] will co-operate with the Oriental Secretary as far as possible within the limits 
imposed by his political chiefs,” Lampson wrote to Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office, 
“but if he were replaced by a less accommodating person our difficulties would obviously 
be greatly increased.”33  
 The official realization that the colonial mode of intelligence was not enough to 
ensure Egyptian security in the midst of the new threats of a more modern war made the 
British increasingly irrelevant to future Egyptian police policymaking. After 1936, the 
Egyptian veteran bureaucrats who assumed authority from the British at the Interior 
Ministry reassessed the meaning of crime and public security, and developed new 
policies for the enforcement of public order. A major cause of this reassessment was the 
state’s reaction to Egypt’s rapidly growing complex urban spaces. Between 1937 and 
1947, Egypt’s overall population grew 20% from roughly 16 to 19 million, while the 
population of its urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Damietta, Port Said, Ismailia 
and Suez) exploded 50% from 2.2 million to 3.4 million. The number of these urban 
residents originally born in rural areas increased from 1.1 million to 1.7 million, 
                                                 
33 FO 371/20909 J 253, Lampson to Eden, 9 Jan. 1937. 
 
 54 
indicating strong migration to the cities to find employment in war industries; at the same 
time, the foreign, mostly European, population fell from 160,000 to 120,000.34 As a 
result, while overall employment in the Ministry of Interior stayed relatively constant at 
around 100,000 employees, officers, and laborers, the urban police force increased from 
roughly 20,000 to 40,000 officers during the 1940s, while the number of rural police 
decreased proportionally.35  
 Muhammad al-Babli Bey, a judge and instructor in the Royal Egyptian Police 
Academy, published his comprehensive Crime in Egypt: Its Causes and Means of 
Remedy in 1941. The work was based largely on the older colonial social scientific and 
psychological ideas of crime, but it also tries critically to comprehend the new types of 
political crime emerging from urban social organization and new ideologies.36 Under the 
influence of the present circumstances, al-Babli foregrounds the negative effects of war 
on public security in his explanation of political activity and crimes.37 Like many 
policemen of his generation, al-Babli is profoundly suspicious of politics. He balances an 
easy acceptance of Egyptian national determination, about whose progress he was was 
still optimistic after the recent treaty settlement, but he is also wary of new nationalist 
movements that are rejecting the national consensus embodied in the treaty. He actually 
dismisses the likelihood of a repeat of the 1919 revolution because of the fragmentation 
of the Wafd into competing parties, and his belief that more radical ideologies like 
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communism basically don’t appeal to Egyptians. However, he acknowledges that the 
experience of war produces multiple stresses in society that can lead to unexpected social 
behavior. This includes economic stresses not only of shortages and inflation leading to 
hardship, but also the unexpected wealth of war contracts, as well as the exposure of 
mobile populations to desensitizing violence and new ideologies.38 All of these factors, 
he argues about the First World War and afterwards, have led to a decline in fearful 
respect (al-hayba) of police authority which had led not only to increased political crime, 
but crime of all types. As a result, he says the role of police must shift from that of social 
caretaker to one of more active watchfulness of any challenges to their authority from the 
lower classes. His suggestions of how this may be achieved are familiar, including 
expanding the police force and enforcing the correct message about political crime and 
state authority in the mass media, which he argued partisanship had irresponsibly 
enflamed. In tune with Rifaʿat and al-Ghazali, after this relatively small section, al-Babli 
dedicates a further 300 pages to address various forms of spoils-system corruption and 
crime that the maladministration of the interior encourages, particularly at the provincial 
and village level among the mudirs (regional administrative head), maʾmurs (regional 
security chiefs), ʿumdas (mayor), shaykhs (village head) and ghaffirs (village guards).  
 These new ideas about space, crime, politics and security found practical 
application in the 1944 second edition of Military Training for the Police written by 
longtime police academy commandant ʿAli Hilmi Bey for the school curriculum. When 
Hilmi wrote the first edition of the book in 1927, this instruction was limited to marching 
in a variety of formations and the correct assembly of the police rifle. However, the 
Ministry of Interior decided it was time for an update “because of technical advances in 
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the field around the world and lessons learned from other countries over the course of the 
war,” Hilmi writes in his introduction.39 The textbook still contains hundreds of pages of 
precise drill instructions, but Hilmi added a new section entitled “Field Operations 
Necessary for Policemen.” This section encourages police commanders to treat any 
civilian protestors reflexively as violent and well-organized insurgents. As such, it is one 
of the first modern anti-insurgency tracts in the Arabic language. The introductory 
paragraph of this section is worth quoting at length: 
The Police are not required to fight the enemies of the nation in the field of battle, 
but rather protect the amenities of everyday life and public institutions, and 
preserve the material foundation of the country by facilitating army operations in 
time of war. For the country is virtually the "spine" of the fighting army, since the 
ways of fighting war have developed to the point that the enemy first tries to 
weaken the material spirit of a country before the attack by using any possible 
means like air rads, misleading and discouraging rumors and forming a "fifth 
column.” Therefore, victory is secured on the “home front" (jibhat al-shaʿab) 
before the “battlefront.” This confirms the importance of the police forces in 
fighting material and moral sabotage (al-takhrīb al-mādī wal-maʿnawī) that the 
enemy promotes at the home front and preventing revolutions and conflicts 
especially during times of war when woe and worry are heightened. 
 
Types of enemy actions: 
1. Direct action by enemy agents, expatriates or paratroopers to attack civilian 
targets. 
2. Air attacks that drop enemy bombs or publications. 
3. Attacks by armed or unarmed riffraff (al-raʿāʿ) for loot and plunder, especially 
during times of disorganization like air raids. 
4. Speeches or written statements that cast doubt on the strength of the armed 
forces or leadership of the government. 
5. Revolutions and strife (thawrat wa fitin) raised by elements or classes at the 
prompting of the enemy with the pretext of a demand for independence or regime 
change… etcetera.40 
 
 The unit goes on to study the practical problems of civil defense, building 
sandbag emplacements and extinguishing bombs. But it returns shortly to describing the 
close police surveillance necessary at “sensitive” times and places. In the case that 
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gatherings of civilians become too large or appear to pose a threat to the public order, 
there are instructions with distinct phases to confronting and neutralizing this threat: 
shaping the field, preventing the criminals (al-ashqiyāʾ, literally wretches, a term long 
used to refer to rural bandits) from forming large groups, preparing the line for attack, 
and the tactics of the attack and the defense. According to Hilmi’s instructions, prior to 
the attack, the police should form into mobile smaller units to cover all possible exits to 
an area, but also to divide the criminals from each other. When attacking, the police 
should take the most caution at entrances and exits, or bottleneck areas; they should move 
quickly through these areas, but also not be careless to overlook areas where criminals 
may be hiding (see Figure 1.3) “The best weapon in these situations is the baton or pistol; 
rifles are not appropriate.”41 Once an area is clear, Hilmi advocates a sophisticated 
network of relay stations to maintain constant surveillance and prevent the 
protest/gathering/looting from breaking out anew.  
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 This complicated tactical instruction is a significant development from the 
practices of the Cairo Police and judiciary from only a decade earlier. After the large-
scale 1936 urban protests, Thomas Russell, the Cairo Police Commandant, complained to 
then-Prime Minister ʿAli Mahir about his restraint in using police force to discourage 
university students from protesting. His comments reveal a miscomprehension of the new 
era of mass politics emerging in Egypt, “If your excellency could find some method of 
legalizing quick and sharp corporal punishment for these children at the moment of 
arrest, student rioting would not lead to the inevitable mob rioting which has resulted in 
casualties and funerals.”42 What Russell understands as chaotic behavior resulting from 
immaturity and containable by quick coercive violence, Hilmi now understands as well-
organized and perpetual threat to the public security containable only by military-like 
precision — and, it is implied, indefinite detention under the state of siege. 
 Ironically enough, the paternalistic British attitude caused British administrators 
to delay adopting the state of the art in interwar crowd control technology — tear gas. 
Shoul argues convincingly that it was the British public’s instinctual opposition to using 
even non-lethal chemical gases, because of the millions of young British soldiers who 
died and still suffered from mustard and chlorine gases used in the First World War, that 
prevented the authorities from employing it against labor strikers or even in its colonies.43 
As a result, in the Amritsar Massacre and other large policing maneuvers, the British 
police relied on live ammunition, which led to far higher fatalities than if it had switched 
to tear gas. This doesn’t mean that the British weren’t studying the chemistry and tactics 
behind the most effective use of tear gas on civilians. In Egypt, the Ministry of Interior 
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began tests in earnest, again during the 1935-36 wave of protests. While the consensus of 
the British officers was that the police should always be prepared to use gas (although 
never in “European areas”), Cairo Police Vice-Commandant Miralai F.D. Baker Bey 
seemed skeptical about its effectiveness:  
It is little use employing gas unless the objective is worth while. The average 
demonstration in Cairo is a very fluid affair. It is only when schoolboys ensconce 
themselves inside their schools and throw stones from there that the objective can 
ever be considered stationary. The usefulness of lobbing grenades into a 
schoolyard seems questionable since the one idea of gas is to disperse and break 
up hostile mobs… What the police generally have to encounter is a group of 100 
to 200 demonstrators who go merrily along until the first police lorry comes into 
view. There is then a general ‘sauve qui peut’ of the more timid members and 
perhaps a bout of stone throwing by the leaders. The police then get in amongst 
them and beat them up, and they all run away a few streets and proceed to throw 
the remainder of their ammunition at buses and trams, and break lamp glasses. 
Over and over again this process is repeated and it never varies whether it is riff-
raff or students.44  
 
 Faced with more organized and disciplined political protesting as the 1940s 
progressed, the independent Egyptian Interior Ministry had no reservations in deploying 
tear gas, and the second edition of Hilmi’s textbook reviews its use and tactics. However, 
the general shortage of domestic munitions that so stymied the Egyptian army during the 
war and post-war austerity applied to the police as well. In particular because of the early 
British opposition to tear gas, American industries cornered the market in tear gas 
manufacture, but Egypt was short of dollars in the 1940s and had difficulty procuring 
supplies. The police therefore only started obtaining large stocks of gas directly from the 
United States in early 1952. The Free Officer coup in no way interrupted these sales.45 
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 Military tactics could only be one element of the ministry’s new wartime urban 
security strategy. Containing urban political activity also required a more sophisticated 
understanding of what constituted that activity, as well as preventative engagement with 
political actors behind the scenes. The strong state of the historiography on the nationalist 
movement of the interwar period is a testament to the diversity of opinion and the 
promotional skill of these groups.46 The political police intelligence reports reveal the 
Ministry of Interior’s growing awareness of the interpenetration of differing ideologies 
across different student, religious, professional and political organizations. Despite the 
state of siege censorship and police powers, the Azhar and Cairo University students 
(particularly the Law and Education faculties) continued a constant roil of protest in favor 
of the King or against British occupation, or the general maladministration in 
government.47 The Muslim Brotherhood, al-Shubban al-Muslimun (YMMA), and Misr 
al-Fatah (after 1940, the Islamic Nationalist Party), in addition to minor groups like 
Shabab Muhammad (Youth of Muhammad), Misr al-Hurra (Free Egypt) and Jamʿiyat al-
Islah al-Watani (The Society of National Reform), were constantly recruiting among 
these students.48 At the same time, labor union activity was growing in proportion to the 
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15, 19, 20 and 23 continuously to Feb. 4 1942 (0073-005234). 
48 Free Egypt was an obscure protest movement from early 1941 (DWQ 0073-005211, Cairo Police Special 
Branch secret political reports 1117 June 10 and 1127 June 17). The Shabab Muhammad was led by an 
 
 61 
rapid growth in the transportation, printing and textiles sectors, but many of these groups’ 
members were frequently also members of nationalist organizations. In a few examples 
of associational political cross-pollenization, a raid staged on the apartment of two 
workers of the Egyptian State Railways print shop turned up a large amount of Misr al-
Fatah propaganda in June 1941.49 The veterinary branch of the Doctor’s Syndicate 
contained several members of the Muslim Brotherhood and wished to hold an election for 
its representative to the leadership of the syndicate at the Brotherhood headquarters; the 
police report asks the commandant whether the police should oblige the veterinary 
doctors to hold it in a different location.50 The secret police even kept very precise reports 
about the meetings of the Islamist groups that were open to the public and hosted by 
prominent public figures, like the Shubban al-Muslimin’s celebration of Islamic New 
Year in Alexandria in January 1941, which was attended by Prince ʿUmar Tusun, the 
governor and president of the municipality, and the head of the special branch of the 
police himself, Muhammad Khairy Pasha.51  
 The Wafd and the Palace both tried to cultivate alliances with the radical extra-
parliamentary political groups at the same time that the security bureaucracy frowned on 
their official existence. The most familiar example from this era is the cultivation of pro-
Palace politicians ʿAli Mahir, Saleh Harb and ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAzzam of the Army, 
Islamist and youth groups in the late 1930s.52 The Wafd also cultivated a youth party in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Army Lieutenant Hussein Youssef, followed similar themes to the Muslim Brotherhood. See DWQ 0073-
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the 30s,53 but its activities among the other radical groups in the 1940s and later is 
generally more obscure. The police records contain intelligence of repeated contacts 
between Ahmad Hussein and high-ranking Wafd members in 1940 that resulted in no 
particular commitments.54 The tenuous alliance between the Wafd and the Muslim 
Brotherhood during its 1942-44 government was based on a doubly-disingenuous public 
promise that the Brotherhood would “stay out of politics.”55 Of course, the Brotherhood 
continued building its organization and its charitable and religious-educational activities, 
but it redoubled its behind-the-scenes bargaining with nearly all political actors. The 
Wafd, on the other hand, hoped to acquire some of the Brotherhood’s political influence 
through these networks, to help them against their minority party rivals.  
 
SOCIAL REFORM AS COMPETING RAISON D’ÉTAT 
At the same time the Ministry of Interior was arming its police officers for urban war and 
holding parties with potential enemies, it was releasing some of its responsibilities to 
other offices. The sophistication of social science knowledge made the potential tasks of 
preventive government action in areas of social security beyond the capability of armed 
police. Timothy Mitchell has usefully highlighted the role of bureaucrats and scientists in 
regularizing and legitimating more sophisticated government intervention in Egyptian 
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education, labor, health and reproduction.56 Omnia El-Shakry has illustrated the increase 
in the number and importance of anthropological and sociological statistical studies on 
Egyptian population, health, hygiene and productivity in the interwar years.57 Her book, 
The Great Social Laboratory tracks the rise and moderation of neo-Malthusian discourses 
typical of liberal critiques of population early in the century, through more intensive 
étatist solutions of land reclamation and state-run industry to employ Egyptians by the 
Nasser period. In effect, she argues the Egyptians were themselves finishing the job of 
“colonizing Egypt,” in ways that Britain’s more superficial rule had not.  
 Older forms of social protection and pacification, like politics, had occurred on 
the personal scale. Public and private charity long existed in many forms in Egypt. 
Religious institutions collected and administered the zakat, a charitable tithe and one of 
the five pillars of Islam, while wealthy families founded waqfs, trusts backed by land 
rents or other fixed property that funded charitable schools, water fountains or bakeries. 
Even in periods of strong central government, such as the Mamluk dynasties, the sultan’s 
charity took similar forms of personal aid and limited, local institution building.58 The 
growth of a central state in the nineteenth century under the Muhammad Ali dynasty 
included a centralized system for policing, recording and assisting or excluding the poor 
based on more uniform classifications of need and deservedness.59 Such initiatives 
suffered under the fiscal austerity Lord Cromer and the British residency imposed to pay 
                                                 
56 Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, ch. 1, 19-53, deals with business interests and the 
technocratic response to the malaria crisis during the Second World War. See Michel Foucault, 
“Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, eds. Michel Foucault, Graham 
Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), from Foucault’s 
1978-79 lecture series for his original definition of the term. 
57 El-Shakry, The Great Social Laboratory. 
58 Adam Abdelhamid Sabra, Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt, 1250-1517 
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
59 Mine Ener, Managing Egypt’s Poor and the Politics of Benevolence, 1800-1952 (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 26-38. 
 
 64 
the state’s debts starting in the 1880s, and like many other aspects of the Khedivial state, 
charitable services became effectively privatized. As Mine Ener demonstrated, the British 
(with sublimated irony) made the poor condition of charitable services one of the 
ideological elements justifying their informal occupation of Egypt.60 
 With increasing autonomy after the First World War, the Egyptian state budget 
began a halting expansion from LE 28 million per year in 1922-23 to LE 48 million in 
1938-1939, thanks in part to the new tariff regime.61  A significant portion of this sum 
went to improving Egypt’s long-underfunded educational system, the poor state of which 
had long been a symbol to nationalists of British colonial exploitation.62 Smaller portions 
went to developing Ministries of Agriculture, which made the first detailed surveys of 
land use and sponsored scientific studies to improve yield fertility, and Trade and 
Industry, which organized tariffs to encourage nascent import substitution industries, and 
Health, which sought to combat the endemic diseases of the countryside. 
 The fall of world agricultural prices at the onset of the Great Depression posed a 
significant threat to the Egyptian economy. This crisis further prompted the Egyptian 
government to regain controversial regulatory powers over domestic economic activity. 
One of Ismaʿil Sidqi’s most popular acts among large landowners was his imposition of a 
new protectionist regime of tariffs.63 The new regime in particular propped up the value 
of grain crops and mass consumer industrial products like textiles, food processing and 
construction materials. Creditors and large landlords were not as happy with Sidqi’s 
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decision to declare a one-time cancellation of some mortgage, tax and rent debts owed by 
smaller landholders and tenants. Although they helped prevent an overall collapse in 
economic confidence, Sidqi’s new policies also operated to the detriment of the standard 
of living of all wage-earning workers and salaried employees, as prices remained high 
and unemployment rose. The urban roots of the protests leading to Sidqi’s downfall and 
the “restoration of democracy” in the 1923 Constitution again demonstrated both the 
increasingly politicized nature of economic preferences, and the state’s inability to make 
policies that mitigated the increase in urban inequality and urban social mobilization 
more generally.  
 If the Egyptian peasant, or fellah, had been a symbol of the goodness and 
authenticity of the national character to Egyptian nationalists since the beginning of the 
20th century, government administrators and scientists discovered, especially in the 
aftermath of the Great Depression, that the nationalist elite had ill-served the fellaheen in 
the past 50 years. After a long-term transfer of land, fueled by European mortgages, from 
the smaller peasantry to a European and Egyptian cotton growing agrarian bourgeoisie, 
Egypt’s first economists and epidemiologists began to discover the negative social results 
of extreme wealth and income disparity. Eight million of 12 million rural residents were 
dispossessed wage laborers or renters, who made no more than 5 piasters for a day’s 
work at a time when the price of one feddan of land (roughly an acre) cost LE 100 or 
more, 2,000 times this wage. 64 Many peasants, particularly in Upper Egypt, suffered 
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from the parasite Bilharzia from unsanitary use of standing water in irrigation basins. 
More than 90 percent of the population was still illiterate in the 1940s. 65 
 Since the 1919 revolution, British administrators had treated peasant unrest not 
merely as a nuisance to business as usual, but as an existential threat. A series of 
panicked memoranda during the agricultural crises of 1933 requested a stronger police 
presence in the countryside where “public security is at present worse than it has ever 
been since I can remember. Murders, arson, theft with violence… are being committed all 
over the country in broad daylight. The financial state of the fellah is appalling - hence 
the increase in crime & making crime a necessity in order to live.”66 There was an 
objective upswing in the number of communal peasant protests against landlords, tax 
collectors and politicians in the early 1930s.67 By the Second World War, under the 
influence of the increasing government intervention in education and other social 
services, officials of the Ministry of Interior were expanding the purview of public 
security to more ambitious goals, such as mandatory housekeeping and hygiene education 
for women, the provision of clean water and even the wholesale reconstruction of 
targeted villages.68 The rise of separate bureaucracies to handle different aspects of state 
intervention into rural society did not imply that these problems lost their status as public 
security concerns, but the intensification of resources did cause new liberal dilemmas 
over the right amount of intervention and the results obtained for the investment of 
capital and effort. 
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 Another important factor leading to the diversification and expansion of social 
policy in the interwar Egyptian government was the dissemination of the new social 
scientific and compassionate reform discourse in Egypt’s mass media. This was essential 
to the transformation of rural reform into an important political issue discussed across the 
ideological spectrum, from liberals to Islamists and communists.69 Through the 1930s, 
the mainstream liberal media consolidated the rallying trope of the “social problem” to a 
fight against “poverty, disease and ignorance,” and numerous magazine and newspaper 
articles appeared addressing solutions to one or all three of these problems, usually in 
rural areas.70 In many cases, popular media seemed open to ideas. Al-Ithnayn wal-Dunya 
investigated a village in 1944 in which a wealthy benefactor was helping his tenants 
experiment with common ownership of food, services and agricultural inputs: Al-Ithnayn 
made it sensational with the headline “A Village on the Way to Socialism.”71 Sayyid 
Qutb, who was a young modernist before becoming the notorious thinker of Jihadi 
Islamism in the 1960s, posed the problem in a more transcendental fashion: “Social 
Consciousness is more important than Social Reform.”72 Meanwhile, nationwide 
charities, some sponsored by members of the royal family, made huge strides in the 
1940s on popular issues like the fight against malaria in Upper Egypt.73 
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 The competing programs for social reform that new social groups proposed 
challenged the political supremacy that the Wafd party had held among the peasantry and 
working class since 1919. This made fully public state social welfare programs attractive 
to the very opposition groups that thwarted the Wafd’s attempts to introduce them earlier 
in the 1920s. ʿIn 1936, Prime Minister Ali Mahir, who was skilled at manipulating the 
support of the anti-Wafdist nationalist groups, cannily organized several European-
trained Egyptian social scientists into an official advisory body, the Higher Council for 
Social Reform. He subsequently hired many of them to be the civil servant leadership of 
a new Ministry of Social Affairs in his second term in office in 1939. Amy Johnson 
argues that from the perspective of the liberal social reformer Ahmed Hussein, director of 
the ministry’s peasant department for a decade and ultimately minister in 1950, the 
ministry emerged from a desire to transfer welfare activities from private philanthropic 
efforts to public agency to rationalize a solution to these humanitarian crises.74 She 
                                                 
74 Johnson, Reconstructing Rural Egypt, 52. 
 
 69 
concedes the political aspect of the consolidation of these activities played an important 
role in their ultimate form, citing what Robert Bianchi argued “signaled the first attempt 
to bolster authoritarianism by sponsoring a legitimist set of interest groups and creating 
the illusion of a modern welfare state.”75 
 These views need not be contradictory. I argue that the Ministry of Social Affairs 
was rather a step towards a more sophisticated form of liberal security through real 
welfare programs. British memoranda dating to the transfer of authority in the Ministry of 
Interior after 1936 reveal the extent to which the Social Affairs Ministry cobbled together 
several orphan offices of the government’s agricultural bureaucracy with some that had 
been the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior’s department of public security.76 These 
included the peasant, or “fellah” department, which began building rural health and farm 
educational centers, a department to monitor and promote rural cooperatives and credit 
unions, and departments to monitor the activities of charities, newspapers, labor unions 
and other new civic associations and professional syndicates, which had previously been 
under the control of the Ministry of Interior. Under Wafd Social Affairs Minister ʿAbd al-
Hamid ʿAbd al-Haq, this ministry bureaucracy began officially patronizing the Muslim 
Brotherhood (as well as the labor unions; I continue this subject in Chapter 5). The 
Muslim Brotherhood magazine proudly reported the visit of ʿAbd al-al-Haq and 
Agriculture Minister Fuʾad Sirag Ad-Din, Supply Minister Ahmad Hamza and a group of 
other senators and deputies to the group’s headquarters in June 1943 (to repair relations 
after a period of conflict between the Wafd and the Brotherhood), in which 1,000 
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members and the Wafd politicians made the sunset prayer together.77 Hasan al-Banna 
delivered a speech on the occasion in which he said, “Our position and our daʿwa (call) is 
not much different from yours. Indeed, our branch in ʿAbu Girgis is next door to the 
Ministry of Social Affairs branch there, and it has been kind to encourage the activities of 
our members there. So it is not strange that the Brotherhood would want to return the 
assistance.”  
 I consider the elaborations of the government interventions examined above a 
“liberal” security regime because they were formatted on the principle of securing private 
ownership and freedoms of association and speech foremost, but they sought to go 
beyond the formerly repressive mode of Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Social 
Affairs provided services productive of an expansion of peasant property ownership, 
education in “correct” forms of knowledge, or the incorporation of alternative nationalist 
views in a “big tent” Egyptian nationalism. The division of labor into these social 
programs increased confidence in the intentions of the bureaucrats carrying them out, 
while at the same time improving the quality of knowledge and cooperation of the 
subjects of this knowledge. These programs also prepared the government for 
intervention in the countryside during the war, when agricultural shortages necessitated 
emergency economic programs culminating in the wholesale requisition of wheat and 
maize starting in 1942. 
 Ahmed Hussein and the peasant department of the Ministry of Social Affairs 
became the public, humanitarian face of the ministry over the course of the 1940s, but the 
labor and cooperative wings of the department each had bigger impacts during the war as 
                                                 




conduits of information, and each provided new resources and new options to distinct 
segments of the rural and urban population. The ministry, then, epitomized the 
contradictions of Egyptian liberalism — the promise of better work opportunities or 
improved living conditions to mold more equal Egyptian subjects consonant with 
populist claims, combined with sharper surveillance on the spread of labor unionism and 
small peasant complaints that a landlord or industrial magnate could come to respect. 
Most importantly, these bureaucracies took on a material existence and followed political 
projects not entirely coterminous with the political interests that had constituted them.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In the interwar period, Egypt underwent an internal struggle to determine the role the 
state would play in interacting with and managing society in all its productive aspects. 
The fragmentation of Egypt into political interest groups reflected the way the state was 
beginning to divide these same groups, co-opt them or address their issues in an atomistic 
fashion. Egypt’s bureaucratic concern with exercising sovereignty over its territory, 
therefore, emerged at the same time that the entire world was rethinking the relationship 
of the nation state to its productive capacity as “an economy.” 
 The crisis of war, coming as perhaps the crowning moment of this transformation, 
was the context in which Egyptian liberals adopted an ideology of security to define and 
defend a state of étatist and welfare modernism. Many leading politicians and a growing 
wing of the effendi intelligentsia promoted this ideology throughout the government 
bureaucracy and in the mass media during and after the war. The war certainly stoked the 
virulence of nationalist opposition to continued British occupation, the explosion of 
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which in 1946 is a well-recorded feature of late-colonial Egyptian history.78 But the 
government’s response to the war itself and its tectonic changes to the landscape of world 
politics also changed the character of Egyptian nationalists’ ideologies and goals 
regarding the state. Despite criticism of the questionable legal methods of the security 
state, there was popular support for the idea that the Egyptian state should move towards 
greater sovereignty in its internal policing and to provide better services to the poor. This 
perspective refocuses the traditional concern of the study of late-colonial politics and 
nationalism on the origins of postcolonial authoritarianism towards a more total cultural 
and political-economic reconciliation of liberalism to these new conditions. 
                                                 




The State of Siege 
Exception as a Parallel Legal Institution 
“Military Governor or... Prime Minister?” 
 
During a parliament debate about the Suez Canal bond issue, several speakers referred 
to Husayn Sirri Pasha, saying, "...but his excellency the President of the Council of 
Ministers issued a military proclamation," whereupon his excellency [Sirri] stopped 
him to say: “Military Governor, if you please.” 
 So the speaker continued, "...but the Military Governor, when he is asked a question 
at the council of ministers," and Sirri Pasha interrupted him again and said "use 
'president of the council of ministers,' please.” 
 The deputies present laughed and the speaker, Tawfiq Duss Pasha, said, "Military 
Governor, President of the Council of Ministers — they're the same thing!”1 
 
National politics in interwar Egypt was defined by a binary struggle between bourgeois 
politicians, who defended the 1923 constitution and the legal rights and electoral 
institutions it guaranteed, and the king and the British, who sought to undermine or often 
simply ignore or replace the constitution or its guarantees. However, the conservative 
politicians who drafted and defended this constitution built a subtle institution into it that 
could allow enhanced executive power to politicians and bureaucrats without suspending 
it: L’État de Siège. (In Arabic legislation, the state used al-ahkām al-ʿurfiyya, which is 
closer in meaning to “martial law;” in English, I will use “the state of siege”). Intended to 
be activated in times of war or internal emergency, the state of siege was not intended to 
suspend electoral democracy. Rather, it created a set of institutions parallel to it with 
completely separate legislative, executive and judiciary functions. As illustrated in the 
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vignette above, the Prime Minister assumed an ambiguous position as executive officer 
of both the civilian government and of state of siege institutions. In practice, under the 
continued coercive power of the British military occupation, these distinctions blurred. 
 This chapter introduces the ways the state of siege transformed the Egyptian 
executive and legal systems as a consequence of the Second World War, and how it 
emerged in and affected public political discourse. The British leadership had paid little 
attention to the inclusion of a state of siege clause during the drafting of the 1923 
constitution, assuming it could continue to use British martial law at its discretion, as it 
had done during the First World War. After the Egyptian parliament passed the state of 
siege in 1939, the British embassy found that the strong new boundaries the state of siege 
raised between Egyptian and British authority instead suited British war aims. The state 
of siege gave Egyptian prime ministers the power to restrict free speech, intern civilians 
at will, and eventually to commandeer the Egyptian economy to guarantee the civilian 
food supply. It also allowed them to institute by proclamation progressive social policies 
that political party and royal interference had blocked since the 1920s. Moreover, the 
state of siege gave the Egyptian government limited criminal and civil jurisdiction over 
all foreign residents for the first time in several centuries.  
 In the process, emergency legislation and exceptional courts became a routine 
element of Egyptian state administration, but without a charismatic and unitary executive 
wielding transcendental power. The prime minister still had to answer to the King, the 
British and the parliament, and so his personal political capital often affected his range of 
options within the state of siege. Like any new legislation, it also shifted the rules for 
political participation, business development and profit and personal rights and 
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obligations, prompting new social strategies of resistance and collaboration among 
Egyptian subjects. The widespread view that the Second World War was a transformative 
time for the world and the Egyptian state promoted the educated middle-class effendiyya 
public’s conditional adaptation to this new legal regime rather than its outright rejection 
of it. When in the opposition, politicians and parties attacked governing ministries’ 
abuses of the state of siege, but no broad coalition arose to oppose the state of siege as a 
legal concept or institution integral to the liberal legal system. As a result, I argue this 
long-term exceptional use of state power by the Egyptian government allowed the shared 
British and Egyptian objective of public security and order to become a defining 
characteristic of Egyptian sovereignty in the final years of its nationalist movement for 
independence. 
 
THE ORIGINS OF THE STATE OF SIEGE 
The British had never positively decided the form they wished their power to assume vis-
a-vis the Egypt government after the First World War. These aims were an endless source 
of controversy since the start of the protectorate in negotiations between the Foreign and 
Colonial offices, the Military, and with the capitulatory parties. Most important to the 
Egyptians was drawing the state of martial law to a close. It had continued for more than 
a year after Allenby’s declaration of independence because of the possibility of an 
Egyptian legal reprisal against the exceptional arrests and expropriations the British took 
under martial law.2 The British finally ended martial law on July 5, 1923, when the 
interim Egyptian government passed a bill of indemnity for all British actions during the 
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prior nine years. This diplomatic failure was the occasion for soul searching in the British 
foreign service. In defending the idea that Egypt and Britain had always shared 
sovereignty during the protectorate, British legal advisor Sir Maurice Amos claimed in 
1925 that “it was, from the legal point of view, an irrelevant accident that the claim to 
ancillary sovereignty made by the British Government bore the name of martial law.”3 He 
had made an earlier, more telling comment privately to another Foreign Office employee: 
“Martial Law of course is doomed. But were it not for its unsavoury name and for its 
political implications, it may well be supposed that the Egyptian government will soon 
learn to regret its disappearance.”4  
 Amos could have read the minutes of the constituent assembly writing the 1923 
Constitution as proof that no regret would be necessary. Despite their intransigence 
towards the British, once empowered to draft the constitution, Prime Minister ʿAbd al-
Khaliq Tharwat and the conservative elite who were shortly to become the Liberal 
Constitutionalist party chose to include an article allowing the King to declare a state of 
siege based on the French État de Siège laws of 1848 and 1878. French emergency 
legislation had evolved over the course of the 19th century from provisions suspending 
Republican rights and liberties in cities actually under military siege by an attacking force 
during the Napoleonic Wars into a “fictive” state of siege, after the 1848 revolution, that 
could be applied to the entire country in times of social turmoil. Early in the Third 
Republic, a newly strengthened parliament adjusted the code in 1878 in response to its 
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abuse by Napoleon III and interim governments before the constitution of 1875.5 Unlike 
the traditions of martial law in British common law, which suspended the legislature and 
allowed the executive to rule by decree, the state of siege in theory existed in parallel 
with all the constitutional legislative and judicial institutions. Not only did parliament 
continue to sit and pass laws during a state of siege, as well as provide a check on abuses 
of state of siege authorities, but the civil law judicial system also operated as usual. 
However, all infractions, military and civilian, of the proclamations pursuant to the state 
of siege fell automatically to the jurisdiction of separate military courts, without rights of 
a punctual trial, habeas corpus or appeal. From the perspective of the early 1920s, the 
state of siege had been an important help to the French war effort, of which Egyptian 
lawyers and the political elite were keenly aware. While the French military courts often 
exceeded the letter of the legislation at the beginning of the First World War, harshly 
penalizing public criticism of the government and infringements of rationing, less 
draconian measures were necessary as the military courts became better integrated into 
the security apparatus of the home front. Significantly, the French state of siege 
legislation contained time limits and other mechanisms that allowed normal constitutional 
life to resume shortly after the end of the war.6  
 Interestingly, the constituent assembly of the 1923 Constitution legislated the 
state of siege with a French legal structure while retaining the spirit of the style of power 
that British military governors had recently exercised during the First World War. The 
assembly had difficulty writing a state of siege clause (Article 45) with as many 
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safeguards as the French constitution. The chairman of the assembly, Husayn Rushdi, 
was obsessed with accommodating King Fuʾad so that the king would not reject the 
assembly’s work outright. Kedourie argues this is one of the reasons why the constitution 
provided so little protection for parliament.7 Interestingly, it was a young ʿAli Mahir, who 
would be the first Military Governor in the Second World War, who argued strongly in 
the assembly’s debates for French-style time limits to the state of siege. But the majority 
overruled him.8 Mahir did succeed in pushing for parliamentary oversight of the 
beginning of the state of siege, and for a guarantee (Article 155) that parliament would 
continue to exist during the state of siege.9 These decisions would cause Mahir no small 
amount of political anxiety when he engaged in such a political struggle with parliament 
as Prime Minister in 1939. 
 A final factor in the ultimate success of the state of siege as a purely Egyptian 
institution was the important precedent British and Egyptian administrators set in their 
preparations for war during the 1935 Abyssinian crisis. The British, in the midst of the 
negotiations that would lead to the 1936 treaty, initially thought a joint British Martial 
Law and Egyptian State of Siege could satisfy both parties of control in their respective 
spheres. However, the Foreign Office and military backed away from this plan by 
November 1935, in part because of the strong nationalist sentiment at the time, and 
decided to allow the Egyptian state to control the state of siege (and the military courts 
established under it), with close diplomatic surveillance.10 The Anglo-Egyptian treaty 
formalized this settlement. As the state of siege was designed to function seamlessly 
                                                 
7 Kedourie, “The Genesis of the Egyptian Constitution of 1923”, 353. 
8 Muhammad al-Sharif, ʿAla Hamish al-Dustur, (Cairo, 1937), 216. 
9 Ibid., 216, 592. 
10 FO 371/19053, “Eventual Emergency Measures in Egypt,” Captain Godfrey to Campbell, 11 Nov. 1935. 
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within the constitution, Egyptian Prime Ministers using the extra powers it provided 
successfully demonstrated their commitment to the constitution itself. This would help 
later to neutralize criticisms of the state of siege from opposition parties. 
 
DIPLOMACY AND THE STATE OF SIEGE  
After three years of spiraling Nazi aggression and Allied appeasement, the “apprehended 
emergency” the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance so presciently legislated arrived 
in August 1939. The exact nature of the crisis and the measures required of Egypt were 
not clear in the first year of the war, because Italy remained neutral until the next 
summer. The British embassy, military and Egyptian cabinet eventually hammered out 
the rights, responsibilities and avenues for bargaining within the bounds of the state of 
siege over the course of the war. The British diplomatic record reveals British officials’ 
uncritical belief in their hegemony over Egyptians in matters of public security, which 
resulted in a limited attention span in bargaining. The only apparent acknowledgement of 
the increased powers that the state of siege put in the hands of the Egyptian government 
and prime minister in particular came in the increasing brinksmanship in their diplomatic 
relationship that culminated in political crises over the position of the prime minister. 
Through it all, the Egyptians insisted on the inviolability of their executive power over 
the state of siege and British Ambassador Sir Miles Lampson (despite his own struggles 
for control with Prime Ministers) defended this state of affairs against all comers, usually 




 The British Embassy wrote to ʿAli Mahir on August 24, 1939 to invoke article 
seven of the Treaty in a request to increase British troop levels and for Egypt to declare a 
state of siege.11 Article seven stipulated in open-ended terms that if either party went to 
war, the other would “immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally.” However, 
the concluding paragraph of the article betrayed the fact that the only likely scenario was 
Egyptian aid in a British war: 
“The aid of His Majesty the King of Egypt in the event of war, imminent menace 
of war or apprehended international emergency will consist in furnishing to His 
Majesty The King and Emperor on Egyptian territory, in accordance with the 
Egyptian system of administration and legislation, all the facilities and assistance 
in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes and means of 
communication. It will accordingly be for the Egyptian Government to take all the 
administrative and legislative measures, including the establishment of martial 
law and an effective censorship, necessary to render these facilities and assistance 
effective.”12  
 
 Mahir replied on August 27 assuring Lampson that the Egyptian government 
would not only provide the contractual support through the state of siege, but also that the 
the political establishment was loyal to the British cause.13 ʿAli Mahir and King Faruq 
issued the declaration of the state of siege on September 2, the day after Germany 
invaded Poland. Under pressure from Lampson, Mahir promised by telegram to 
“synchronize” Egypt’s additional declaration of war with Britain’s on Germany the next 
day.14 However, by the next morning, Mahir reported to Lampson that after a long 
meeting with his council of ministers, he could not convince them to unanimously 
support the declaration of war, because of their fears of an aerial attack on Egypt; he 
                                                 
11 FO 371/23368, J 3345, Bateman to Ali Mahir (attachment), 24 Aug. 1939. 
12 Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty, in respect of the United Kingdom, and His Majesty the King of 
Egypt, 26 August 1936. London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1937. 
13 FO 371/23368, J 3457, ʿAli Mahir to Lampson, 27 Aug. 1939. 
14 FO 371/23369, J 3671, Mahir to Lampson, 2 Sep. 1939 attached to Lampson to FO, 12 Sep. 1939. 
Britain had desired an uncoerced declaration of war from an ally for the demonstration effect on the world 
perception of British imperial morale, particularly because commonwealth states and crown colonies like 
India were obliged or forced into belligerency. 
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claimed he did not want to declare war without their full support.15 The Foreign Office 
and Lampson were particularly insistent on Egypt’s declaration of war because they did 
not yet believe that the Egyptian state of siege would allow Egypt to take all necessary 
measures against German interests in the country. In an embassy meeting on September 4 
with ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAzzam, Minister of Waqfs and Mahir’s political right-hand man, 
it became clear that ʿAzzam was the chief opponent of the declaration of war, both 
because it lacked popular support and, he admitted, because it “favours too much a return 
of dictation by Great Britain.”16 However, ʿAzzam also advanced the first vision of 
building the Egyptian state of siege into a complete compromise: he argued it could 
provide all the beneficial support for the British without any of the drawbacks of making 
                                                 
15 FO 371/23368 Lampson to FO, J3518, 3 Sep. 1939. 
16 FO 371/23368 Lampson to FO, J3550, 4 Sep. 1939. 
 
 82 
Egypt a belligerent state. ʿAli Mahir initially made good on the first element of this 
argument by using the state of siege to suspend relations with Germany and expelling the 
German diplomatic mission immediately, then banning trade with Germany, sequestering 
German property, and mandating registration for all German subjects between September 
15 and 19.  
 The potential for reprisal against the 43 Egyptian students and diplomats under 
internment in Germany evolved into Egypt’s next excuse for not declaring war or 
physically interning the entire German community. This situation helped transform the 
issue of Egypt’s belligerency into an internal debate between British diplomats and 
generals. The War Office could not tolerate the number of Germans left at large in Egypt, 
or Egypt’s desire to trade Germans they considered dangerous for the Egyptians in 
Germany. Moreover, General Archibald Wavell, then the commander of the British 
Middle East Forces, protested to Lampson that leaving the 33 “dangerous” Germans in 
Egyptian custody might result in their escape or their trade. Wavell used this as an excuse 
either for forcibly removing the Germans, or even declaring British martial law to enforce 
measures of importance to the British army. Despite Lampson’s own struggles for control 
over Egyptian politics, he could not tolerate the destruction of his own delicate tools of 
diplomacy, complaining to the Foreign Office that Wavell “obviously regards Egyptian 
independence as a joke that can be completely disregarded with no ill effects.”17 In the 
uncertain period before the Italian declaration of war, these military demands increased 
further. In a complaint about the lenient treatment of alleged Italian spies, Wavell 
demanded Lampson force “(a) the issue of a Proclamation under Etat de Siege 
authorising Military Courts to inflict the death sentence for offences against the state, 
                                                 
17 FO371/23369, J 3736, DV Kelly, “Egyptian Relations with Germany,” 15 Sep. 1939. 
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including espionage and sabotage. (b) that all persons arrested for offences against the 
British Forces… should be handed over to the British Military authorities for trial.”18 
Lampson replied that new proclamations in the state of siege would criminalize 
espionage in military courts, but that “the best course would be to carry on with Egyptian 
État de Siège as long as possible, until, in fact, it broke down;” he reminded Wavell that 
the military zones set up in the cities and western desert would become areas of British 
jurisdiction in case civil order broke down.19 
 The Italians entered the war after the fall of France in June 1940, a moment of 
great weakness for the Allies. ʿAli Mahir therefore made every effort to remain officially 
neutral, withdrawing the Egyptian army from the Libyan border and issuing a promise 
not to retaliate even as he cut diplomatic relations with Italy.20 But despite the diplomatic 
blow this episode represented for the Foreign Office, the War Office had already changed 
its policy against an Egyptian declaration of war, principally because of its increasing 
belief in the unreliability of the Egyptian army. In early 1940, the British Military 
Mission to the Egyptian army reported to the War Office and the Egyptians their 
estimations that the Egyptian military was not going to reach its targets for expansion 
from roughly 12,000 men in 1937 to 56,000 men by 1942. The army had expanded only 
to 20,000 to date, of whom barely 5,000 were fully armed and equipped. The British were 
facing severe limitations in arming any more men, and Egyptian munitions 
manufacturing was still in the planning phase.21 In a subsequent attack on Sallum at the 
Libyan border in September 1940, the Foreign Office considered Egyptian reticence to 
                                                 
18 FO 371/24633, J 1409, Wavell to Lampson, 19 April 1940. 
19 FO 371/24633, J 1409, Lampson to Wavell, 27 April 1940. 
20 This hedging provoked the British to threaten the King to remove ʿAli Mahir, although his successor did 
not follow an outwardly different policy. Kirk, The Middle East in the War, 38-39. 
21 DWQ 0076-000216 Memo: “The formation and condition of the Egyptian Army.” 1 April 1940. 
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declare war to be “absurd,” but Lampson reported that the service chiefs in the Middle 
East Command declared that “at present the balance of the advantage lies in Egypt not 
declaring war.”22 Even during heightened Axis threat in the Eastern Mediterranean in 
April 1941, when thousands of British troops in Egypt were sent to fight in Greece, the 
British Military leadership had firmly settled on an attitude that the Egyptian military 
should remain away from the front on supply and internal security duties only.23 The 
symbolic aspect of Egypt declaring war at this point was much less important to the 
Foreign Office than at the beginning of the war. At the same time, the intensification of 
state of siege punishments and completion of their application to the Italian community 
satisfied the British military that the Egyptian government could uphold their basic 
security prerogatives.  
 
THE PARLIAMENTARY REACTION 
The British hoped that they would escape political controversy by allowing Egypt to 
remain non-belligerent, but Egypt’s unruly legislature quickly brought the state of siege 
itself to a referendum. On September 23, 1939, in accordance with articles 45 and 155 of 
the constitution, Faruq called an extraordinary session of parliament for both houses to 
debate and ratify the decision to declare the state of siege. The lower house, the Chamber 
of Deputies (Majlis al-Nuwwab) met on October 2. The Wafd government had fallen 
since promulgating the 1936 treaty. The party had boycotted another election in 1938 and 
so only a small remnant of party members plus certain independent deputies led the 
opposition to the measure. As the ranking Wafdist member of the sub-committee tasked 
                                                 
22 FO 371/24634, J2015, G.H. Thompson internal memo, 30 September 1940. 
23 FO 371/27483, J966, Lampson to FO, 14 April 1941. 
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to the state of siege, ʿAbd al-Hamid ʿAbd al-Haq delivered a long argument against the 
state of siege in full session. (Interestingly, ʿAbd al-Haq would become one of the most 
enthusiastic partisans of worker’s rights as Wafd Minister of Social Affairs in 1942, and 
used the state of siege to threaten industry owners to pay mandatory pay bonuses, among 
other uses.) 
 ʿAbd al-Haq’s first and principal argument against ratification related to the 
specific form it took, namely concentrating all extraordinary powers in the hands of ʿAli 
Mahir. He argued that paragraph 12 of article 3 of the state of siege law contained logic 
that forbade the prime minister from holding the office of military governor (legislated as 
“the authority in charge of the state of siege”): “It is incumbent upon the Council of 
Ministers to limit the powers attributed above to the authority in charge of the state of 
siege or to authorize it to take any other measures which may be necessary for the 
maintenance of public security and order in all or a part of the territory declared to be in 
state of siege.”24  
 ʿAbd al-Haq argued that there would be no way that the council of ministers could 
effectively supervise a “military governor” that was also its chairman, the Prime Minister, 
particularly because the council itself decided whether and when to end the state of siege. 
He pointed out that the explanatory note appended to the law in 1923 explicitly suggested 
that a high-ranking officer, governor or mudir (rural state executive officer) would be an 
appropriate choice. His back-up argument was a bolder call to scrap the state of siege 
altogether, based on the contradiction between the Anglo-Egyptian treaty and the law. 
While the treaty implied all measures should be taken even in an “implied international 
emergency,” article one of the law states the state of siege may be declared only when 
                                                 
24 Maḍabiṭ Majlis al-Nuwwab (Parliamentary Record), 11 October 1939, 70. 
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“public security or order is threatened … either by the threat of invasion by enemy armed 
forces or by internal disturbances.” “Thank God,” ʿAbd al-Haq said, “neither of these 
events has yet come to pass.”25  
 Ibrahim ʿAbd al-Hadi, the minister of state for parliamentary affairs (an office 
ʿAli Mahir had presciently created), made the rebuttal for the government; his arguments 
establish two important tropes that would become mainstays of official discourse about 
the state of siege. Regarding the appointment of the military governor, just as there was 
nothing requiring the prime minister to take on that role, ʿAbd al-Hadi argued that there 
was nothing in the law that prevented it either. He cleverly played to his audience arguing 
that the prime minister was the best man to hold the position, since “rather than 
parliament directing the military governor at a distance of two degrees, with the council 
of ministers as mediators… the prime minister is responsible before it directly.”26 This is 
a reference to parliament’s ability to remove the prime minister with a vote of no 
confidence, although it never once did this before the 1923 Constitution was abrogated.27 
Despite this fact, ʿAbd al-Hadi even accused ʿAbd al-Haq of a lack of faith in the 
constitution when the latter protested that parliament’s supervision of the government 
was merely “theoretical.” 
 More significantly, ʿAbd al-Hadi denied that the Anglo-Egyptian treaty had 
infringed Egyptian sovereignty. In 1914, the institution of martial law had facilitated the 
alienation of Egypt from the Ottoman state and its power remained solely in the hands of 
a British military governor. In the present case, he argued “the state of siege was imposed 
                                                 
25 Ibid, 72. 
26 Parliamentary Record, 11 October 1939, 77 
27 Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 98-99. 
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in the name of Egyptian sovereignty, and it is improper to compare (the two situations)” 
(my emphasis).28 The declaration of the state of siege upheld a bilateral contract that both 
parties had freely entered into as discrete and independent nation-states. More 
importantly, ʿAbd al-Hadi argued, the state of siege is an action that only Egypt’s 
leadership can take to defend itself from the various and unforeseen effects of a world-
wide crisis.29 The majority of deputies were either opposed to the Wafdist position or 
genuinely convinced of the seriousness of the emergency and the government’s 
commitment to its treaty, and the measure passed by general acclaim on October 11. 
 As a partially appointed body with longer terms, the upper house of parliament or 
senate (Majlis al-Shuyukh) still held a much larger contingent of Wafdist or sympathetic 
politicians. After the Shuyukh sub-committee rejected the measure five to three, Mahir 
and Lampson conferred about a fool-proof way to pass the state of siege: simply ignore 
the Senate. “The claim is that this can constitutionally be done on the grounds that a 
Ministry depends for its parliamentary support only on the chamber of deputies,” 
Lampson wrote.30 The British felt that ʿAbd al-Hamid Badawi, the long-standing head of 
the Government Legal Office (Idarat Qaḍaya al-Hukūma or Contientieux), would 
interpret the constitution in a way favorable to the royalist government. The President of 
the Senate informed the British prior to the final vote that in the case it was rejected, an 
official interpretation of article 45 that both houses must vote to cancel the state of siege 
decree would be read to the chamber, to the effect that the state of siege would remain in 
                                                 
28 Parliamentary Record, 11 October 1939, 77. In 1951, eminent anti-imperialist historian ʿAbd al-Rahman 
Al-Rafiʿi would argue that Second World War-era state of siege was better for Egyptian society than the 
First World War British Martial Law, by definition, because the Egyptians were in control, ʻAbd al-
Raḥmān. al-Rāfiʻī, Fī Aʻqāb Al-Thawrah Al-Miṣrīyah: Thawrat Sanat 1919, Vol. 3 (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-
Maʻārif, 1987), 80. 
29 Parliamentary Record, 11 October 1939, 88. 
30 FO 371/23370, J 4147, Lampson, “War Policy of Egyptian Government, 13 Oct. 1939. 
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force.31 However, the senate approved the state of siege by a vote of 68 to 59, ending the 
extraordinary session on October 16, and no irregular measure ended up being necessary. 
 
THE STATE OF SIEGE IN PRACTICE 
The Wafdists need not have worried about the Prime Minister becoming an instant 
dictator along the lines of Hitler or Mussolini when they exploited state of emergency 
legislation to seize unlimited executive power in Germany and Italy, respectively. Those 
leaders were both backed by massive popular movements and did not have colonial 
occupations curbing their military and diplomatic independence.  In contrast, Egyptian 
prime ministers used their powers under the state of siege as one more source of political 
capital, granting services to the British or to the opposition in exchange for concessions 
in other areas. The most remarkable aspect of the state of siege, therefore, was its tactical 
evolution over the course of the war, growing and changing to suit the needs of the 
Egyptian government and Allied military year by year. Beyond automatically activating a 
range of police powers, the state of siege granted new legislative and judicial powers that 
the prime ministers crafted to suit their ends.32 
 It was not a new development during the monarchic period for the executive wing 
of the state to exercise significant legislative powers. An important cause of political 
strife under the 1923 constitution was its provision for the king to pass decree-laws while 
parliament was in recess, usually from August to November. Prime ministers allied with 
                                                 
31 FO 371/23370, J 4160, DV Kelly memorandum, 15 October 1939. 
32 Al-Rafiʿi briefly notes the various ways Wafd politicians and lawyers manipulated the state of siege to 
gain power and financial rewards, al-Rāfiʻī, Fī Aʻqāb Al-Thawrah Al-Miṣrīyah: Thawrat Sanat 1919, 122-
123. Ramadan, typically more sympathetic to the Wafd, deems the Wafd continuation of the state of siege 
was not necessary to their staying in power, because of their broad popularity. He also claims that it had no 




the king could achieve a great deal this way; although parliament had the power to cancel 
this legislation by majority, by inertia and obstructionism, many controversial laws 
remained in place.33 Regardless of its origin, all legislation until this point had been 
promulgated in the name of the King. The innovation of the state of siege, as it expanded, 
was that more and more legislation was signed in the name of the prime minister alone as 
military governor. The King still had the power to appoint and remove prime ministers, 
although in practice this power was restricted by political factors — principally British 
preference. It was not within the scope of the state of siege, however, for the prime 
minister to authorize legislation changing his basic relationship to the king. However, 
prime minsters found it possible to issue proclamations that progressively expanded the 
scope of the state of siege’s powers. Over the course of six years and three major 
government changes, this led to the accretion of a large new bureaucracy, power centers 
and procedures, as well as new goals for government that would outlast the state of siege 
itself. 
 Article three of the 1923 state of siege law authorized the military governor 
explicitly to confiscate weapons and explosives, search private property at any hour, 
censor the press, postal and electronic communication, prohibit public assemblies or 
public transit through forbidden zones, relocate civilians at whim, detain “suspects” and 
vagabonds, and requisition all means of transportation. It concludes by stating the council 
of ministers may “authorize it to take any other measure which may be necessary for the 
maintenance of public security and order.” The law did not grant these executive powers 
immediately, but it required definition and publication through military proclamations. 
                                                 
33 The state of siege increased Egyptian academic interest in this feature of the constitution; see Hassan 




Following the French model, the Egyptian Parliament continued to meet throughout the 
war and passed legislation as normal. Many of the laws passed during the war had 
security and welfare intents similar to military proclamations; most importantly, 
Parliament retained control over revenue and budgetary matters. Because the king 
appointed ministers independent of parliamentary majorities, the military proclamation 
became a tool to implement policies the British and Egyptian governments deemed 
strategically necessary but unpopular with the political elite, which could have held them 
up even when the prime minister’s party enjoyed a majority.  
 As explained in chapter one, Mustafa al-Nahhas was much more effective at 
producing war legislation and coordinating its execution with the appropriate new 
bureaucratic offices. But even under al-Nahhas, the process of creating a military 
proclamation took several steps and involved the collaboration of different branches of 
the government bureaucracy. The cabinet sent ideas for proclamations, whether from 
within the government, from the British or by popular complaint, to the ministry most 
concerned with the issue in question, which made a memo with a draft proclamation. For 
example, the Ministry of Interior noticed a rise in tire thefts in mid-1944 and wrote to the 
cabinet to approve drafting a proclamation to criminalize it in military court.34 In the case 
of British requirements, joint committees with Egyptian ministry, British embassy, 
military and MESC officials addressed a number of issues such as wheat supply, 
transportation and refugee administration and reviewed drafts brought by British experts. 
The prime minister’s office kept a file on “martial law complaints” that mixed petitions 
for intervention in a court decision with requests for new proclamations. The most 
frequent requests were for new restrictions on prostitution and public morality in general 
                                                 
34 DWQ 0075-050075, Ministry of Interior memorandum to the Council of Ministers, 22 August 1944. 
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as well as from traders requesting a more advantageous price or distribution of the supply 
commodity of their concern, and notes indicate the cabinet took these concerns into 
consideration.35 Drafts were sent to the Government Legal Office, a bureau at the 
Ministry of Justice charged with defending the government in lawsuits brought against it, 
for its opinion and any necessary adjustments to prevent conflict with the constitution or 
existing laws.36 Final drafts then passed the full council of ministers before the Prime 
Minister promulgated the proclamation.  
 The most significant aspect of the military proclamations listed above, besides the 
novelty of their origin in the executive branch, is that all infringements of them fell to the 
jurisdiction of a separate and parallel system of military courts.37 The national and mixed 
courts continued to sit throughout the war and hear civil and criminal cases under their 
jurisdiction, while the military courts tried all crimes legislated in military proclamation. 
As described above, many proclamations created new prohibitions, but many others 
altered the penal code to transfer the jurisdictions of crimes to military courts. 
 The state of siege law of 1923 provided for the trial of civilian infractions of 
military proclamations in military courts, but it only defined a few parameters for the 
system. Courts would be composed of one Egyptian national court judge and two 
Egyptian army officers of rank Yuzbashi (Captain) or higher. The maximum penalty the 
                                                 
35 DWQ 0081-030620 contains petitions from 1939 to 1945 from the Cairo governorate, 0081-030621 
contains petitions from all over the country for the year 1945, especially against the Wafd administration of 
1942-44. 
36 Examples are contained in ʿAbdin and Council of Ministers units at DWQ, e.g. 0069-000653, Amīn Anīs 
to Muṣṭafa Nuṣrāt, regarding Proclamation 527, 27 September 1944; 0075-055602 Muhammad al-
ʿAshmawi to Council of Ministers regarding Proclamation 487 on rent control, 26 April 1944. Its 
subordination to the ministry made its legal opinions somewhat less than independent. Laṭīfah Muḥammad 
Sālim, Al-Niẓām Al-Qaḍāʾī Al-Miṣrī Al-Ḥadīth (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Miṣrīyah al-ʻĀmmah lil-Kitāb, 2000), 
285. 
37 Except when stipulated in the proclamation, notably for rent control; disputes over urban rental contracts 
were directed to the native and mixed courts, cf. Proclamations 151 and 315. 
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courts could levy would be LE 4000 and eight years imprisonment.38 There are no precise 
figures before the end of 1941, but the number of cases tried remained small until the 
middle of that year, when many new British bases opened to accommodate retreating 
soldiers from Greece and reinforcements from India, Australia and New Zealand and the 
supply crisis became acute. After Mustafa al-Nahhas became prime minister, there was a 
continued expansion in the volume of cases and the severity of punishments sentenced 
until the end of the war, resulting from the increasing number of offenses described 
above. Over the course of the war, the Egyptian government tried between 140,000 and 
160,000 Egyptian and foreign civilians in military courts.39 The vast majority of these 
cases were not political or military crimes like anti-government protests or conspiracies, 
espionage or sabotage. Rather, most were targeted at controlling the mundane economic 
struggles of the lower and middle classes. The principal offenses were thefts from Allied 
military camps and smuggling and hoarding stolen military supplies, assault and robbery 
on Allied military personnel, running illegal brothels, and breaking rules on rationing, 
price control, meat slaughtering, alcohol and bread quality, and agricultural crop 
requisitioning. An analysis of these cases therefore provides sources for the social history 
of Egypt during the war as well as a window into the social and economic priorities of the 
British and the Egyptian governments. 
                                                 
38 Because of the small number of proclamations and cases occurring during the “phony war,” the military 
courts were not formed until Proclamation 44 of June 1, 1940. Prior to this, cases tried in national court on 
the basis of military legislation were subject to the approval of a military council. Sālim, Al-Niẓām Al-
Qaḍāʾī, 276. 
39 There was no official count made after the fact. My estimation is based on an average of 1.1 defendants 
per case calculated from a list of 5545 individuals tried in 5106 cases between October and December 1942 
in a sample Council of Ministers’ file (DWQ 0081-030436) and an estimated total of 150,000 cases drawn 
from totals in Ministry of Interior annual reports on public security 1941-1943, a February 1944 ʿAbidin 
Palace report gathering Egyptian ministries’ contributions to the war effort (DWQ 0069-007383) and 
monthly reports from the military parquet for 1942-1945 (DWQ 0081-030438 to 0081-030809). 
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 By design, the speed of military court procedure, compared to the civilian courts, 
was intended to ease the crisis of insurrection or war. Many of the military governor’s 
records show summary courts trying up to 80 to 90 cases in a single-day session, or more 
if the cases involved similar offenses from a similar area, such as failing to report 
agricultural information or petty theft from military bases.40 While it is clear from some 
case descriptions that a few defendants had lawyers, the majority did not, and a 
significant number were sentenced in absentia; defendants had no rights of habeas corpus 
and many endured long delays before trial. However, the civilian judges took the letter of 
the law and police investigation seriously, sometimes engaging in tortuous reasoning to 
apply fact to contradictory military proclamations. As a result, about 10% to 20% of the 
accused were acquitted for lack of evidence or jurisdiction, a trend that rose over time. 
(See Figure 2.3 below). 
 The military court system’s development tended towards an increasing hybridity 
with the civilian criminal justice system. As I will investigate further in chapter three, the 
issue of jurisdiction was far more complicated under Egyptian control of the military 
courts. The law explicitly allowed the council of ministers to transfer any offense in the 
civilian penal code to the jurisdiction of the military courts by prior proclamation; ʿAli 
Mahir passed the first such proclamation shortly before Italy entered the war, moving 
espionage offenses as “sabotage” to the military courts. Unlike the First World War, 
during which only crimes committed towards the British Army or criminals captured by 
British military police were subject to the tribunals’ jurisdiction, any part of the Egyptian 
Ministry of Interior, from the lowest ghaffir (village guard) through the secret police, 
                                                 
40 For example the Sharqiya Military Court sentenced 125 people on 25 Feb. 1942, 48 of which were small 
fines for entering Allied camps without a permit. DWQ 0081-030432, Office of Military Courts. 
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could transfer any offense through the military prosecutor’s office in the Ministry of 
Justice. In response, many defendants challenged the right of the military court to try 
their offense in ambiguous cases, or as a legal strategy to buy time.41 Foreign citizens and 
subjects were the most common challengers to the jurisdiction of the military courts, but 
their defense commonly failed, except in the case of crimes committed by Allied soldiers 
or their families, who enjoyed immunity.42 
 Jurisdictional challenge was the main defense strategy in high-profile cases. The 
defense used this strategy in trials for the robbery of the Heliopolis branch of the National 
Bank of Egypt on May 18, 1944, and the assassinations of British Secretary of State Lord 
Walter Moyne on November 6, 1944 and Prime Minster Ahmad Mahir on February 24, 
1945.43 These lawyers argued that competence over the murder of civilians or robbery of 
civilian institutions had not been transferred to the military courts. But the military 
governor had found a way around this defense late in the war. In all three cases, Chief 
Judge Mahmoud Mansur ruled that the court had jurisdiction because in both cases the 
                                                 
41 Some examples of the huge range of circumstances include a butcher’s failed challenge of the central 
government’s right to alter the Giza slaughtering schedule (DWQ 0081-30610 Supreme Military Court 
Case 1890/Giza for 1943); Sixteen students of the al-ʿAbbasiyya Textile Industrial School charged for 
spreading communist propaganda who successfully transferred their cases to the civil courts (DWQ 0081-
030607 Supreme Military Court case 449 for 1942, 13 Jan. 1943); and an unlicensed Port Said dockworker 
whose case was canceled and sent to the civil courts because the (civil) penalty for working without a 
license was greater than the (military) penalty for trespassing in a naval area. (DWQ 0081-030441, Military 
Court for Port Said case 2066/1944, 20 May, 1945). 
42 There was plenty of room for debate about who was eligible for this immunity. Aircraftsman Barough 
was charged in Port Said Military Court on 8 Sep. 1942 of smuggling watches and fined LE 3. The British 
embassy and intervened with a regretful note that the investigative branch of the British Military Police 
should have intervened earlier and sent the case to a court martial; the Egyptian Prime Minister cancelled 
the Egyptian case. (DWQ 0081-030636, British Embassy to Ministry of Justice, 9 April 1943). In another 
case, the Greek wife of a British soldier, Beatrice Wood née Ilias, was arrested for running a brothel in 
Ezbekiya after her husband had been posted outside Egypt, the Egyptian administrators debated for several 
weeks over who had jurisdiction until the British Embassy considered she “had ceased to be a member of 
the British Forces as the result of the departure of her husband from Egypt and she no longer has any claim 
to exemption from the Jurisdiction of the Egyptian courts.” (DWQ 0081-030604, Military Court of 
Ezbekiya, case 2951/1942; British Embassy to Egy. Min. Foreign Affairs, 27 Nov. 1942.) Chapter 2 further 
addresses the status of foreign soldiers, and chapter 5 deals with foreign civilians. 
43 The Ministry of Justice compiled the judges’ report on these cases in Ministry of Justice, Majmūʿa Min 
Aḥkām Al-Maḥkama Al-ʿAskariya Al-ʿUliya (Cairo: Al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīrīya, 1947). 
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defendants were carrying unlicensed firearms, a crime under the state of siege. Citing 
Proclamation 389 of April 21, 1943, which allowed all crimes committed in one incident 
to be tried in the same military tribunal as long as only one of the crimes was under its 
jurisdiction, Mansur sentenced the death penalty for premeditated murder in both 
assassination cases and 15 years hard labor for the bank robbers. Legal technicalities 
aside, Mansur’s comment about the logic and justice of the military court trying a bank 
robbery is telling of the judiciary’s attitude: “The intended goal (of this proclamation) is 
the preservation of security and public order under the circumstances that led to the 
declaration of the state of siege.” Trying the civil crimes and military crimes separately, 
according to Mansur, would not be adequate because it is the connection between them 
that represents the threat to security: “The composition of the civil courts do not permit 
the execution of the intention of the legislation because they are empty of the military 
element (i.e., officer-justices) necessary to understand the circumstances of military 
affairs.”44  
 The sharp increase in the volume of cases resulting from the vast growth of 
military jurisdiction led to a bureaucratization of the system that undermined the 
apolitical nature of the tribunals as imagined in the 1923 legislation. Al-Nahhas expanded 
the court system shortly after entering office. Whereas the French state of siege 
legislation allowed the supreme court (cour de cassation) of the ordinary judicial system 
to hear appeals to standing military court decisions, al-Nahhas created separate Supreme 
Military Courts, which heard some appeals and automatically heard capital cases.45 Al-
                                                 
44 Justice, Majmūʿa Min Aḥkām, Supreme Military Court case 1065/Heliopolis, 5-6. 
45 The court de cassation in some cases could review and evaluate the legality of new laws, but keeping the 
jurisdiction restricted to a military court meant no proclamation was likely to be overturned. Moushkeli, 
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Nahhas also sought to enforce and improve his legal prerogative as military governor to 
approve, reject or even change military court decisions, which opened a second informal 
avenue of appeal. More than 50 files in the Egyptian Archives containing full ledgers and 
occasional case descriptions of military court cases from 1941 to 1945 are the work of a 
large bureaucracy he created to monitor the courts. This correspondence reveals that he 
not only had a dedicated staff in the council of ministers’ office, but that he had 
assembled an entire branch of the public security authority at the Ministry of Interior to 
review court cases as the Office of Military Judgement. The volume of work became so 
heavy that he repeatedly had to ask for an increased budget. The Office of Military 
Judgement eventually comprised ten judges of different levels and as many secretaries.46 
The reports of this office reveal the multiple inputs to the final sentence of the court. As 
an example, in the Supreme Military Court case 449 of 1942, against Anwar Kamil 
Osman and 17 other students and young men in Cairo for spreading communist 
propaganda, the defense lawyers successfully proved that the military court had no 
jurisdiction because the definition of the crime in question (“a foreign threat to the 
security of the state”) fell into articles of the penal code that had not technically been 
transferred to military jurisdiction. The Office of Military Judgement summarized the 
court proceedings, and then summarized its consultation both with the military parquet, 
which disagreed with the result and recommended interning the students indefinitely, and 
the Government Legal Office, which agreed that the judgement was a sound application 
of the law. The report even included the substance of a petition by the father of two 
                                                                                                                                                 
Michel. “L’État de Siège en Egypte et Le Régime des Proclamations Militaires,” L’Egypte Contemporaine, 
April-May 1943, Nos. 212-213, 309. 
46 DWQ 0075-05551, Ministry of Finance requisition request to Council of Ministers, 16 Feb. 1944. El-
Nahhas reported the caseload was an average of 6032 cases per month and his office was 16,000 cases 
behind for Alexandria alone. 
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defendants, “so that they won’t fall behind in school.” The report ends with the office’s 
final recommendation to the military governor to uphold the military court’s sentence of 
innocent. At the same time, it instructed the prosecutor to resubmit the charges for the 
three ringleaders in civilian court, and recommended that the military governor issue a 
new military proclamation to close the loophole.47 
 Responding to official and unofficial petitions became major work for this office. 
Al-Nahhas’ biggest struggle was therefore to gain legitimate power to adjust or suspend 
sentences rather than simply affirming or canceling them. This reflects the bureaucratic 
logic of the Egyptian state of siege, which was a departure from the spectacular 
demonstrations of violent punishment under British martial law. Except for these rare 
cases for which the civil penal code was used in the military courts to obtain punishments 
for murder or treason, the state of siege statutes limited punishment to imprisonment or 
fine. Al-Nahhas inherited several dozen outstanding military cases upon his installment 
as prime minister and decided to cancel some that his predecessor Husayn Sirri had 
already accepted; Muhammad Salah Ad-Din, the head of the military parquet, informed 
him that the military court had refused to allow him to change cases that had been closed 
by the military governor.48 This sparked a four-month battle between the parquet and 
office of military judgement, who used a number of arguments — including British 
martial law — for near total flexibility in the military governor’s power to adjust military 
cases, and the government legal office, which claimed the military governor could only 
cancel cases in the event he believed the law had been misapplied.49 There is no evidence 
                                                 
47 DWQ 0081-030607, Supreme Military Court case 449 for 1942, report dated 13 Jan. 1943. 
48 DWQ 0081-030604, Chief Military Prosecutor Salah Ad-din to El-Nahhas, 12 April 1942. 
49 DWQ 0081-030604, Amin Anis, Director of the Government Legal Office, to Salah Ad-Din, 29 April 
1942; A memo from the director of the office of Military Judgement, Sayyid ʿAli Al-Sabibi to El-Nahhas 
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of a permanent settlement within the bureaucracy, but court records indicate the Ministry 
of Justice tolerated the military governor’s “line item” cancellations of part of a sentence 
(say, a fine or jail time). 
 ʿAli Mahir had actively promoted political support for his patron, the king, in the 
army.50 In contrast, al-Nahhas’ management of officer appointments to the military courts 
is evidence of his ambivalence about this political strategy. While the law required 
officers serving as judges to be captains or higher ranks, he rarely appointed officers 
higher than lieutenant colonel (bimbashi), and he rotated appointments every three 
months.51  
 It would be more accurate, therefore, to view the Ministry of Interior as the real 
arbiter of the military courts. While the civilian judge from the Native Courts could 
influence the decision making of his two junior officer-judge colleagues, the Interior 
ministry had many other ways of affecting the outcome of military trials as mentioned 
above. Besides Mansur’s published judgements, I have not been able to find a public 
comment by an Egyptian judge on the state of siege system during the war that includes a 
negative reaction to this type of executive interference in the work of the courts. Some 
judges pushed back against the repeated cancellation of their judgments in memoranda to 
the government. However, the civilian judiciary was undergoing a great deal of change in 
this period, and governments often stressed the temporary nature of the military courts, 
which prevented the emergence of unified opposition to them. Al-Nahhas even curried 
                                                                                                                                                 
suggests that the 1893 rules of court martials for the Egyptian Army supports the military governor’s 
intervention, 14 May 1942; Salah Ad-Din began to couch the reform in terms of “streamlining” the system 
to avoid bureaucratic delay in a memo to the public security department at the Ministry of Interior, 16 June 
1942; and Anis to El-Nahhas, 28 July 1942. 
50 See Tripp, “Ali Maher and the Politics of the Egyptian Army”. 
51 DWQ 0081-030604, Council of Ministers memoranda to Ministry of Justice, 22 July, 11 Aug., 22, 23, 30 
Nov., 1942; 11 Jan., 29 May, 30 June, 10 Nov. 1943; 4 Jan., 5 Feb., 12 Sep. 1944, 16 May, 1945. 
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favor with the judiciary, fulfilling a long-term Wafd platform promise introducing into 
parliament a law guaranteeing its institutional independence in 1943.52 The innovations in 
the law gave the judges much greater power over the ministry of justice bureaucracy in 
the appointment and promotion of judges than before.53 However, al-Nahhas had 
pioneered a form of control over cases sensitive to political or security matters that 
rendered judicial independence irrelevant. 
 The importance to al-Nahhas of controlling the military courts became evident 
early in the Wafd administration, during a conflict with his lieutenant and confidant 
Makram ʿUbayd from the party in a political struggle.54 ʿUbayd alleged his expulsion was 
partly the result of his refusal as Minister of Supply to withdraw a military charge for 
yarn smuggling against al-Nahhas’ brother-in-law. ʿUbayd struck back with a long series 
of angry interpellations in parliament exposing the Wafd abuses, which he compiled and 
published in Black Book of 1943 after he was expelled from parliament. Among many 
other kinds of corruption, ʿUbayd accused al-Nahhas of distributing scarce import 
permits to Wafd cronies, and also protecting his family members and business partners 
who were operating without permits by quickly canceling any military court cases against 
them.55 If even a small number of these accusations are accurate, then the Wafd 
effectively used the wartime import and ration restriction regime to run a patronage 
network with extremely lucrative results for businessmen on the inside. This fact exposes 
                                                 
52 Law 66 of 1943, promulgated July 21, 1943. 
53 Sālim, Al-Niẓām Al-Qaḍāʾī, 310. This did not prevent the Wafd government from attempting to obtain 
preferential appointments for important judicial positions, like Amin Anis to the Presidency of the Court of 
Cassation later that year. FO 141/945, 120/3/44, Memorandum by Walter Smart, 8 Jan. 1944. 
54 Malak Badrawi, “Financial Cerberus? The Egyptian Parliament, 1924-52,” in Re-Envisioning Egypt 
1919-1952, eds. Arthur Goldschmidt, Amy J. Johnson and Barak A. Salmoni (New York: American 
University in Cairo Press, 2005); Yūnān Labīb Rizq, Wafd Wa-Al-Kitāb Al-Aswad (Cairo: Muʾassasat al-
Ahrām, 1978). 




one of the principal weaknesses of al-Nahhas’ files as an archive of the military courts: 
they have been scrubbed clean of any trace of war profiteering at a level higher than retail 
operations. 
 The state of siege allowed the military governor to imprison indefinitely 
individuals who posed a political or military threat to Egypt or the Allies. The principal 
goal of this power, from the British perspective, was to suppress enemy spies or agents. 
Upon the entrance of Italy to the war, however, this expanded quickly to justify the 
wholesale internment of a potential fifth column — more than 10,000 young Italian men 
and women. As in many other areas, the Egyptians negotiated for nominal control over 
the processing and imprisonment of the internees by creating yet another Anglo-Egyptian 
committee to regulate British influence over the system. There were more gradations to 
the Military Governor’s powers than merely direct imprisonment. Military governors 
could put vagabonds, repeat misdemeanor offenders or politically active students, for 
example, “under surveillance” and oblige them to report to a police station on a regular 
basis or face typically a one to three month sentence in military court.56  
 In the crucial summer of 1941, after the former Army Chief of Staff ʿAli ʿAziz al-
Masri tried to escape to Iraq in the middle of Rashid ʿAli’s revolt against the British, Sirri 
interned several politically active Egyptian public figures in the nationalist groups, 
notably Ahmad Husayn, the leader of Misr al-Fata, and Hasan al-Banna, the general 
guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. Of the two, Ahmad Husayn had been much more vocal 
in his denunciation of the British and Egyptian assistance to the Allies in the war. He 
even publicly attacked the state of siege among his law student acolytes: “Which one of 
                                                 
56 DWQ 0081-030432 and 030436 military court records reveal a frequency of 20-30 such cases per month 
in 1941 to 1943. Proclamation 449, December 6, 1943, delegated the power of internment and judicial 
surveillance to the Minister of Interior. 
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you is ready to sacrifice himself in the way of revolution?” He asked at a meeting in 
March 1940. “This (state of siege) has no validity over you — we must rise up and smash 
it.”57 Hasan al-Banna had taken a more subtle approach to anti-British agitation, mainly 
proselytizing in private groups and in the less extreme tones of Islamist revival. However, 
because of his anti-imperialism he was also effectively placed under surveillance from 
February to October 1941, when the Ministry of Education transferred his teaching post 
from Ismailiya to Qena in Upper Egypt. After a temporary return to Cairo, he and his 
deputy Ahmad al-Sukkari were arrested in October for one month because of al-Sukkari’s 
associations with al-Masri. The Brotherhood waged a major campaign in public and 
among politicians to release al-Banna, who subsequently broadened his political base 
beyond ʿAli Maher and the royalists to include the Wafd party.58  
 Because internment required no judicial procedure and produced little paperwork, 
it is difficult to precisely describe the extent of the internment of Egyptians, but there 
were at least 50 high-profile political internees by 1943, and anecdotally, this number 
increased during the Wafd government.59 Unconfirmed petitions provide evidence of 
many more, rotating on a short term basis and undocumented through Egypt’s prisons, 
which were already overcrowded from the large number of prisoners formally convicted 
in military court. Sadiq Tammam petitioned al-Nuqrashi in May 1945 for the 
investigation of the mistreatment of a group of 41 students interned under the Nahhas 
government for political organization: the jailers “refused to let the sick go to the 
hospital, or provide them food or water or allow their families to visit them, and forced 
                                                 
57 DWQ 0073-005150, Cairo Police Special Branch secret political report, 3 Mar. 1940. 
58 Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 22; the police found documents linking al-Sukkari to al-
Masri in a raid on his house, Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass 
Movement, 1928-1942, 263-267. 
59 FO 141/941, 71/25/44, Embassy memo, 16 March 1944. 
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them to sleep on the floor without blankets. This provoked them to start a fight with the 
guards, who responded by opening fire on the prisoners, wounding many of them.”60  
 As illustrated above, the majority of British complaints about the Egyptian war 
effort concerned the reservation and weakness with which the Egyptian government 
resorted to the use of these state of siege powers. This changed, however, once the tide of 
war turned away from eastern Africa. The opposition parties started strenuously 
complaining of restrictions to civil liberties under the state of siege. The Wafd was the 
principal target of attack, but the British were always next in line, especially as al-Nahhas 
consistently insinuated the British were requesting security measures against specific 
politicians, like Makram ʿUbayd, that were in fact Wafd decisions.61 Lampson had 
previously complained that Husayn Sirri hadn’t been tough enough in interning 
“troublemakers,”62 but now al-Nahhas’ repression was causing the British Embassy 
headaches. Both British and American diplomats were constantly subject to pleas and 
petitions from Egyptians for intervention with the Egyptian Government, particularly 
from the hard core of convicted agents and propagandists.63 When Anwar Sadat and 14 
other internees in Zeitun prison went on hunger strike in Februrary 1944 and petitioned 
the British Embassy to be accorded the same treatment as political prisoners in India, 
officials wrote to military intelligence to discover which petitioners were “interned (a) for 
security reasons at our request and (b) by the Egyptian Government on their own 
initiative.”64  
                                                 
60 DWQ 0081-030621 Petition from Sadiq Tamam to Ministry of Communication, forwarded to Council of 
Ministers, 21 May 1945. 
61 FO 141/941, 71/18/44, Smart, Embassy Memo, 6 March 1944. 
62 FO Confidential Print J 1948/36/14 Nahhas to Eden, April 12, 1942. 
63 NARA RG 84 711.5 American Embassy Files Petitions to Alexander Kirk, 19 Dec. 1942, 3 Feburary 
1943, 12 November 1943. 
64 FO 141/941, 71/8/44, Tomlyn to Colonel Jenkins, 25 Feb. 1944. 
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 Their presumption, repeated elsewhere in the diplomatic record, is that Egyptian 
government internments were not related to “security,” but were rather political 
internments that served no purpose other than to aid the Wafd. Presumably because the 
Anglo-Egyptian Internment Committee had been out of use since both the major waves 
of arrest at the beginning of the war and because the direct military threat was no longer 
present, the Embassy staff in 1944 needed to be reminded that it had ever existed. More 
importantly, Assistant Oriental Secretary F.H. Tomlyn reminded Lampson that “the cases 
of ʿAbbas Halim, ʿAli Mahir, Muhammad Tahir, etc. were not dealt with by the 
Internment Committee.”65 The British discovered that of 50 political internees, they 
considered at least 20 to pose no threat to their war interest; their internment was 
motivated purely by Wafd political interest. Upon the British complaint, Amin Osman 
offered to Oriental Secretary Sir Walter Smart that the Egyptian government would only 
intern individuals at British request, and not on its own initiative, although they would 
reserve the right of veto and maintain the facade of government control. Under this 
promise, the Egyptian government would refer any and all future internment cases to the 
committee, not just those recommended by the British. However, Tomlyn remained 
skeptical that al-Nahhas would really agree to it, and Smart warned to keep the agreement 
oral only, “the Egyptian government must retain the right not to intern or to maintain in 
interment. This right is of course inherent in Egyptian sovereignty, but we do not want to 
emphasize this right in a written agreement.”66 
 Despite Osman’s assurances, al-Nahhas never relinquished control over Wafd 
internments until Faruq dismissed him from the cabinet six months later, although he 
                                                 
65 FO 141/941, 71/25/44, Embassy memo, 16 March 1944. 
66 FO 141/941, 71/27/44, Embassy memo, 7 April 1944. 
 
 104 
allowed persuasion for clemency in individual cases. Ahmad Mahir set most of the 
Wafd’s enemies immediately at liberty when he became Prime Minister, like Makram 
ʿUbayd, who immediately joined Mahir’s cabinet as Minister of Finance. Because of the 
Saadist party’s long stance against the state of siege, they instead took reprisals against 
the Wafd party in civilian courts.67 However, by the end of the state of siege in October 
1945, Mahir’s successor al-Nuqrashi noted there remained 950 Egyptians under detention 
at Tora Prison, both under internment and serving military sentences, and 7,000 
Egyptians still under surveillance. He refused to release all these prisoners at once, and 
passed a decree law that would only gradually release these prisoners and extend their 
parole “for reasons of public security.”68 
 
THE STATE OF SIEGE IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
The institutional record I have examined above unambiguously shows the Egyptian state 
surveillance, judiciary and penal system in a halting process of expansion. But the 
archival record has limitations both in the extent of documents remaining to historians as 
well as its ability to convey the intent of administrators and lawmakers. Here and in later 
chapters, I will use the news media to investigate the political and cultural context of 
these developments. After decades of laissez-faire business and publication practices by 
the 1940s a larger proportion of the public read privately-owned and uncensored news 
than at any period after 1952.69 War news dominated the front pages of the daily 
newspapers and magazines, which became slimmer over the years because of a restricted 
                                                 
67 FO 141/1005, 1/31/45 Amin Osman meeting with Walter Smart, 22 Jan. 1945. 
68 Government of Egypt, Al Waqāʾiʿ Al-Miṣriyya (Official Gazette), 7 October 1945. 




supply of newsprint, but publishers left plenty of room for an examination of the war’s 
effect on local politics and the economy. The purpose of my analysis is not to divine an 
“average” public opinion about the war. More than 80% of the population, the lower 
urban and rural classes, were still illiterate, limiting their engagement with politics to 
mobilization through the Wafd or, more recently, through labor unions. It is more useful 
to consider the huge diversity of publications as a mechanism for foreign expatriates, the 
propertied elite, professional classes and government employees, known increasingly 
together as the effendiyya, to carry on a conversation with themselves. The generally 
liberal attitude towards censorship prior to the war fostered an atmosphere in which 
political criticism from anonymous authors could cut vertically through the official 
hierarchy of the legislature, bureaucracy or judiciary. Censorship imposed new “red 
lines,” but the editorial spirit remained. A large number of important publications were 
actually official organs of the parties and independent politicians: The Wafd had two 
daily newspapers, the Saʿadist party published Al-Dustur, Fikri Abaza, a prolific 
parliamentarian, published Al-Musawwar magazine, etc. Despite the deep flaws of 
Egypt’s parliamentary democracy, an elite pluralism was alive and well and had an 
important role in the wartime state expansion. Although the vast majority of domestic 
political discourse focused on the explicit traditional power centers like the King, the 
British or the parties, persistent commentary about the state of siege institutions reflected 
a wide range of ideas about sovereignty, power and the possible futures of the Egyptian 
state. 
 
The Parliamentary Opposition 
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It is not surprising that the most frequent parliamentary complaint about the state of siege 
concerned the government’s use of censorship that restricted political news the 
opposition felt had no bearing on military security. This is ironic, because the French 
precedent in state of siege legislation kept parliament in session during a state of crisis 
rather than shuttering it, as customary under British martial law, which allowed it to 
remain a pulpit for dissent.70 Although the press was prohibited from publishing directly 
from some of the parliamentary record, the full record was published in the parliamentary 
gazette. Parliament’s right to publish it survived a significant challenge in late 1941.71 
The complaints increased under the Wafd government, because of their firmer control 
over the elected and unelected institutions of state and because censorship seemed less 
justified as the war receded from Africa. The recently founded Journalist Syndicate 
frequently petitioned government to slacken censorship. In early 1943, they reminded 
Minister of Interior Fuʾad Sirag al-Din that the Wafd had editorialized on April 1, 1940, 
when out of power, that “…military censorship should not mean censorship over all the 
political affairs of Egypt so that Egyptians become blind automatons in an era of 
independence with no share in the matters of their country…”72 Opposition party leaders 
eventually made higher profile public petitions to the British embassy and then to 
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in November 1943 demanding they intervene to end the 
censorship of state of siege, which in their opinion represented an infringement of 
                                                 
70 Although there was initially a "State of Siege" committee that would make rulings on the legality of 
military proclamations, there was never any legal or constitutional requirement that the military governor 
had to follow these rulings. This caused controversy during Hussein Sirry's tenure when parliament was 
split between opposition parties (Ithnein wa Dunya, Jan 26 1941), but once the Wafd won the majority of 
seats in 1942, they simply did away with the committee and let Nahhas do as he pleased. 
71 FO 371/27434, J 3596, Lampson to FO, 24 Oct. 1941, narrates Lampson’s effort to censor the sessions. 
72 DWQ 0069-013218, Petition from Journalist’s Syndicate to Minster of Interior, 4 June 1943. 
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Egyptian sovereignty.73 This was a veiled reference to the British coup that put the Wafd 
in power. However, these politicians knew that the British could influence which party 
was in power, but their treaty commitments had restricted them from actually interfering 
in day-to-day Arabic language censorship decisions. After reviewing many newspapers 
and magazines from this period, considering the allegations of the Journalists’ Syndicate 
above, and according to the reports of the British foreign-language news censor Robert 
Furness, it seems that besides forbidding actual war events, censorship of political issues 
was rather patchy and it was used more readily as a weapon against specific enemies 
rather than to completely obliterate all types of oppositional political discourse.74 
 The other explicit focus of contention in parliament was the government’s 
internment of its political opponents, most notably al-Nahhas’ imprisonment of ʿAli 
Mahir for the three years of Wafd rule. The opposition alleged that this infringed his 
parliamentary immunity as a member of the Senate.75 Al-Nahhas countered in several 
public forums including commissioning an article in the legal journal Al-Muhama by the 
head of the military parquet that argued it was within al-Nahhas’s right as military 
governor to carry out an act that would protect the sovereignty of the country. He cited 
examples of political dissidents being removed from the parliaments of France and 
Germany during World War I, in addition to a healthy dose of British martial law 
precedent in justification.76 The Wafd parliament passed a declaration of the act's legality 
before the end of 1942.  
                                                 
73 FO 371/35541 Petition from Ahmed Mahir, Makram ʿUbayd and Muhammad Husayn Haykal to 
Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt, Via British Embassy, J 5200, 29 November 1943. 
74 St. Antony’s College Middle East Archive, Personal Papers of R.A. Furness; see in particular “Note on 
censorship: particularly as applied in the interest of the Egyptian Government,” 1944 n.d. 
75 Covered heavily in April 1942 press; see Ithnein wa Dunya, 27 April 1942, 2-3. 
76 Tawfiq Ahmad Khashan, “Essay on the Right of the Military Governor to Arrest… A Member of 





If public criticism over the abuse of these executive measures as political tactics was 
quite common, opposition to the long-term shifts in governmental policy under the state 
of siege were less frequent and more diffuse. These critics came from the elite minority 
that had the most to lose from the etatist political economic bent of the war measures: 
landowners, industrialists and especially foreign businessmen. As I will examine in 
chapter four, the war crisis actively helped consolidate certain interest groups, like the 
Federation of Egyptian Industries, whose membership increased by 50 percent in the first 
four years of the war alone, and which advocated a better (i.e., more liberal) balance of 
“personal rights, social development … and the government control over economic 
life.”77 
 The publication that wrote the most frequently about the judicial and legislative 
developments in the state of siege was the French-language Journal Des Tribunaux 
Mixtes. For the first time in the history of these courts, military proclamations and 
judgments were creating new Egyptian law to which foreigners were subject. As a court 
gazette, the majority of its published material was simply the text of the proclamations, 
laws and regulations as well as court decisions and contract advertisements. Most of the 
original articles were intended to explain inconsistencies resulting from the overly rapid 
promulgation of some laws, especially when they touched on civil law, contracts or 
taxation. However, a definite editorial voice emerges. Although the Mixed Court 
personnel were resigned to their fate — the courts were slated to close in 1949, and the 
journal ceased to publish at that time — they hoped to preserve the shared spirit of liberal 
                                                 
77 Egyptian Federation of Industries, 1943 Annual Report, 8. See also Dasūqī, Miṣr Fi Al-Ḥarb, 311-316. 
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legality and liberal economic policy that had animated the last 70 years of Egyptian 
governance. They frequently editorialized on specific proclamations, such as 
Proclamation 358, which required industrial companies of a certain size to pay low-
income employees annual 40% cost of living bonuses to compensate for war inflation. 
The editorial criticized both the questionable macroeconomic principle of this policy, as 
well as the unfairness of targeting particular businesses and interfering with their liberty 
of contract.78 
 Journal contributor Michel Moushkeli, a professor of public law at Fuad 
University and L’Ecole Francaise de Droit, wrote most specifically about the theoretical 
expansion of executive power the state of siege represented and the possible long-term 
repercussions of day-to-day government operating in this fashion.79 Moushkeli pointed 
out while many proclamations were merely executive, like setting the price of a 
commodity or appointing judges, many others took the form of genuine statutes, which 
themselves required executive regulations from the ministries that would be charged with 
enforcing them. These proclamations often cited existing laws to adjust their provisions, 
increase their penalties or to shift penal jurisdiction to the military courts; others created 
completely new services, like licensing and inspection regimes at ports, that overlapped 
with prior practices. Bringing up the Wafd’s original objection to giving the position of 
military governor to the prime minister, Moushkeli pointed out that the prime ministers 
also delegated this legislative power to deputy military governors in special military 
zones in Cairo, Alexandria, the Canal and the North Delta, who together issued thousands 
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and 30 Nov. 1943, 1. 
79 Moushkeli, Michel. “L’État de Siège en Egypte et Le Régime des Proclamations Militaires,” L’Egypte 
Contemporaine, Nos. 212-213, (April-May 1943): 292-396. This article was digested and published more 
widely in the Journal Des Tribunaux Mixtes, 5 June 1944, 8 Jan. 1945. 
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of local proclamations over the course of the war. He speculated that the more deeply 
martial legislation became embedded into ordinary legislation the more difficult it would 
be to end the state of siege, or that many illiberal statutes would end up being preserved 
by decree. These predictions ended up coming true. 
 The focus of Moushkeli’s critique, however, is the government’s evolving 
interpretation of “necessity” that justified proclamations remote from military operations. 
His principal example was Proclamation 113, passed in January 1941, which allowed the 
Suez Canal Company to suspend making payments to its bondholders because war 
conditions had closed the Mediterranean Sea to shipping, and its revenues had almost 
entirely dried up. Perhaps of all the proclamations, none hit so immediately at the 
financial interests of the wealthy elite, who had invested in those bonds, and the issue 
was debated before parliament shortly after its opening in November 1941. Minister of 
Finance Hasan Sadiq defended the cabinet’s decision to make the proclamation on the 
following lines: “Modern wars aren’t waged only on battlefields, they are waged on the 
political and moral planes, as well as in the economic domain… the war economy must 
therefore be included in the concept of public order.”80 This argument relocates the state 
of siege and the concept of security from relating simply to the realm of military or police 
actions to keep civilians safe or to prevent immediate threats to the war front. It justifies 
action in nearly any possible field of government regulation and possibly with very long-
term and abstract goals. In short, he argues, the text of this proclamation explicitly 
conflates the concept of “public interest” with “public order and security.” Moushkeli 
concludes that the Egyptian constitution’s state of siege and assorted legislation have 
                                                 




become a hybrid between the form of French martial law and the spirit of British martial 
law inherited from the experience of the First World War that allowed the constant 
redefinition of necessity, but with none of the urgency of a real state of exception. 
 In contrast to the pragmatic, short-term, situational British attitude to the state of 
siege, the Americans constantly had their eye on the long-term political implications of 
expanded executive power in Egypt, especially after the US military presence in Cairo 
expanded in 1943 during the North Africa campaign. Jasper Brinton, a long-serving 
American judge on the Mixed Courts, sent the top US embassy officials a 25-page memo 
in July 1944 outlining the history and current structure of the state of siege. Under 
Moushkeli’s influence, he complained of the numerous proclamations that “fairly fall 
outside the scope of the law as not being ‘necessary for the maintenance of security and 
public order’.”81 Like the British, he pressured American officials to do what they could 
in the short term about the treatment of foreigners in prison. His principal concern, 
however, was the long-term consequences for the presence of the American community 
in Egypt. He complained that Americans unaware of rapidly-changing military 
proclamations on economic matters could be at a disadvantage in military courts 
conducted entirely in Arabic and frequently with summary procedures. US Embassy 
Counselor Joseph Jacobs’ gloss on Brinton’s report refocused the issue on diplomatic 
strategy. Lacking Brinton’s experience with or taste for complex negotiations to restore 
the compromises of the capitulations era, which was drawing swiftly to a close, Jacobs 
recommended judicious pressure on the British to support ending the state of siege as 
                                                 
81 NARA RG 84, 800 Egypt, Brinton to Tuck, 2 July 1944. While Brinton was a prolific contributor to 
legal journals and wrote what was for a long time the definitive history of the Mixed Courts, he kept these 
comments in private memos to the US Embassy as a legal attaché. This became his principal job in semi-
retirement after the Mixed Courts closed permanently in 1949. Brinton rewrote and updated this memo a 
year after the state of siege was declared again during the Palestine war. 
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early as possible. He denied the issue was very urgent, as so few American civilians were 
subject to the state of siege; the majority of US residents were immune armed forces 
members. Finally, he pointed out the irony that the British had coerced the Egyptians to 
declare the state of siege without foreseeing how drastically it would increase the prime 
minister’s powers. This explained “why the British are so anxious always to see that the 
Prime Minister is pro-British, or otherwise there would be far more headaches than Judge 
Brinton refers to in his memoranda.”82 It seems the Americans learned more about the 
coming age of neocolonial influence from this episode in Egyptian history than the 
British did. 
 
Support for the State of Siege 
Just as the majority of attacks on the state of siege powers took place in the greater 
context of political struggles, opinions supporting these powers also failed to distinguish 
them from other aspects of Egypt’s war effort or its new social welfare commitments. 
Fidelity to the treaty and participation with the British in the war effort as an act of 
Egyptian sovereignty remained resonant tropes in the public news media until the post-
war betrayals over treaty renewal in 1947 and Egypt’s disastrous defeat in its war against 
Israel in 1949. Even before the threat from Italy was immediate, early 1940 witnessed an 
upsurge in popular and patriotic support for defending Egypt. The news media 
highlighted volunteerism for special police forces and civil defense squads, and later, for 
refugee aid.83 ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAzzam had multiple parades for his newly created 
“Territorial Army,” a 20,000-man force recruited from the peasantry to act as auxiliaries 
                                                 
82 NARA RG 84, Egypt 800, Jacobs memorandum to Tuck, 5 July 1944. 
83 “Al-Azhar will carry weapons!” Al-Musawwar, 22 March 1940, shows Al-Azhar seminarians casting off 
their robes to don scout uniforms. 
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to the Egyptian and British Military in the case an Italian force reached the delta, and 
stressed the social development and education opportunities given recruits.84 At the 
moments when the threat of war to Egypt had been its greatest, in late 1940 and late 
1942, the top-circulating daily newspaper Al-Ahram and weekly magazines Al-
Musawwar and Al-Ithnayn wa-l-Dunya ran editorials specifically praising government 
cooperation with the British, which had protected Egyptian civilians from physical harm, 
and in favor of social measures that prevented them from privation.85 In July 1942, the 
pro-British editor of Al-Muqqatam Karim Thabit ran repeated editorials dedicated to 
supporting the enforcement of interior security, affirming the police’s decision to 
preemptively intern 100 “dangerous individuals,” and to increase the enforcement of 
supply infractions.86 These magazines also kept up with stories of Nazi barbarity in the 
territories they conquered, comparing favorably the austerity of the state of siege and the 
relative remove of the British military presence with the forced labor regimes and 
starvation rationing of the German occupations (directed at the Egyptian popular 
imagination in the pronoun neutral “What happens when the Germans invade a country?” 
my emphasis).87 
 Egypt’s biggest-selling magazine Al-Ithnayn wa-l-Dunya also had the means to 
begin running public opinion polls about the war and other topics of interest to the 
effendiya, like marriage and education. Without any information about its methodology, I 
consider the information the magazine presented to more accurately reflect the editors’ 
                                                 
84 “They Were Lifeless, Now They March,” Al-Musawwar, 12 Jan. 1940. This project was an outgrowth of 
ʿAzzam and Ali Mahir’s sponsorship of pro-monarchy paramilitary youth groups in the 1930s. See 
Jankowski, Young Egypt. See Chapter Two for the controversy over its political role. 
85 For example, coverage in Al Ahram, 15 Dec. 1940, Musawwar, 20 Dec. 1940. Special “war issues” of 
Musawwar and Al-Ithnayn wa-l-Dunya were produced in December 1940 and Jan. 1941, respectively. 
86 Karim Thabit, “Internal Security in these Critical Times,” Al-Muqattam, 1 July 1942, 5; “Internal 
Security Continued: No Mercy and No Hesitation!” Al-Muqattam, 2 July 1942, 5. 
87 “When the Germans invade a country…” Al-Ithnayn wa-l-Dunya, 2 Sep. 1941. 
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ideas than anything else, but these polls are still fascinating artifacts because of the 
facades of objectivity they present. During the heavy air raids of 1941, they asked the 
public “Should Egypt be governed by a parliament or without a parliament?” This 
question was framed in response to the parliamentary logjam on issues of supply and 
emergency economic measures, but it also reflects the public’s confusion about the 
structure of the state of siege, under which parliament would always remain in session. In 
any case, the magazine was able to divide the response by social class: 78% of “upper 
class” respondents said parliament should remain in session, but only 63% of middle and 
lower class respondents said so (19% of the lower class had no opinion).88 This result 
could reflect the differential class benefits that the war was bringing Egyptian society: 
Parliament was defending the upper classes’ ability to reap high agricultural prices, and 
doing nothing to improve wages for the working class — but an all-powerful executive 
would be able to be more fair. 
 The popular media explained and popularized the prime minister’s semi-separate 
identity as the military governor, the executive officer of the state of siege. When he 
made important proclamations, this usually received prominent coverage with some 
context about the problem the proclamation was targeted at solving. Using his title as 
“military governor,” despite the position’s tenuous connection to the Egyptian military, 
emphasized that these policies were Egypt’s principal contribution to the war effort. The 
extraordinary result is that the incarnation of the military governor was constantly 
narrated as solving problems, while the “prime minister” was stuck negotiating with an 
                                                 
88 “Al-Ithnein asks the Public’s Opinion in Cairo: Should Egypt be governed with a Parliament or without a 
Parliament?” Al-Ithnayn wa-l-Dunya, 28 July 1941, 1. In another question, 50% of the lower classes 
supported holding new elections at the present moment compared to only 44% of the middle classes and 
32% of the upper classes, presumably because they wished to see the Wafd regain control of parliament. 
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intractable parliament. The political caricature, which had become a common popular 
feature in the weekly newsmagazines, even more starkly portrayed this legal fiction, 
frequently showing the prime minister in a military uniform. The satirical possibilities are 
indicative of the public view of this position: in one August 1941 cartoon, Husayn Sirri 
dressed in uniform as the military governor is seen hauling off Husayn Sirri in a suit as 
the Prime Minister, saying “Haven’t you read the military proclamation that punishes any 
slander of (Egypt’s) fiscal reputation?”89 (Sirri had been bargaining with the British to 
subsidize the cotton crop and Parliament opposed raising taxes to supplement the low 
British offer).  
 From 1942 to 1944, the Wafd party was more credibly able to cultivate popular 
support for its use of the state of siege than prior governments, and this policy enjoyed 
some success, particularly among workers.90 Much of its program for labor policy was 
                                                 
89 Al-Ithnayn wal-Dunya, 18 Aug. 1941, 5. 
90 Beinin and Lockman, Workers on the Nile, 285-304, explains the Wafd’s courtship of the trade union 
movement during the war. 
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passed as laws in parliament, including the recognition of unions, a personal work 
contract, compulsory worker injury insurance, and personal worker identification codes. 
But rather than charging striking workers in military courts right away, it took many steps 
to attempt to negotiate their returning to work. Military proclamations instituted 
conciliation committees between management and workers for strikes; more importantly, 
a series of proclamations forced industries to pay increasing cost of living adjustments to 
their workers starting at 25% of base pay to more than 100% for the lowest paid workers 
at the end of the war. These measures received constant positive coverage in workers’ 
papers like Shubra and al-Madaniya until Wafd corruption became increasingly evident 
at the end of 1943.91 To a certain extent, the state of siege food supply program won 
popular support and stemmed urban unrest because it worked: The state did bring cotton 
cultivation under control, increased the supply of basic foodstuffs and maintained their 
prices in cities. Increases in the urban population’s cost of living were mitigated by 
subsidized bread, grains, meat and fuel, and during good harvest years, landowning 
peasants benefitted from high fixed government prices. As I will examine in more detail 
in chapter four, the government made an effort to publicly deflect complaints about 
corruption in wholesale supply onto retail black marketers. This strategy extended to the 
nature of the penal code itself: most military court convictions in rationing or price 
infringement cases mandated the publication of the conviction in the shopkeeper’s local 
newspapers to alert customers. The minister of supply also made repeated appeals for 
private subjects to denounce suspected hoarders.92 
                                                 
91 “Military order targeting price increases,” Shubra, 17 Sep. 1941. “Minster of Social Affairs speaks on 
workers and low-income employees,” El-Madaniya, 12 June 1942. 
92 “Total War on Profiteers,” The Egyptian Gazette, 4 May 1943. “Are YOU guilty of working hand in 
hand with the black marketeers?” The Egyptian Gazette, 14 May 1943. “Supply matters: ways of fighting 
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 Even opposition politicians that had criticized the abuses of censorship could turn 
around and support extreme implementations of the state of siege in other more populist 
areas. In July of 1942, weekly magazine Ruz al-Yusuf, which was typically anti-Wafdist 
in its political orientation,93 ran a series of articles entitled “If I Were the Military 
Governor General.” They enlisted a series of opposition politicians to give their ideas — 
and rather than opposing the wide powers of the Wafd, these politicians proposed much 
more draconian policies than even those just being introduced by al-Nahhas. Zakariya 
Mihran, member of the senate, wrote he would pass proclamations forcing absentee 
landlords back to their land and setting high quotas of grain procurement to encourage 
them to improve their land. He proposed raising the tax rate on exceptional profits from 
the current range of 20% to 50% up to 70%, the complete nationalization of all food 
supply and even the appointment of “Military Social Guides” in rural areas that would 
specifically investigate and enforce military proclamations “designed to raise the social 
level of the peasant.”94 ʿAbd al-Salam al-Shazly, royalist ex-minister and member of 
parliament, went further the next week, claiming he’d increase penalties on hoarding, 
spreading rumors, and even impose the death penalty for smuggling.95  Ruz al-Yusuf’s 
interviews with employees of the Ministry of Social Affairs “to gain a look at the 
technical side of drafting military proclamations” reveal the force of the bureaucracy’s 
support for implementing social reform by proclamation. Of the three men and two 
women interviewed, several voiced support for proclamations more explicitly targeting 
                                                                                                                                                 
hoarding” Al-Ahram, 13 May 1943, featured instructions “to our citizens” to denounce neighbors to a 
telephone hotline to the ministry of supply. 
93 Ruz el-Yusuf was subsequently shuttered between January 1 and April 1, 1943 by the censorship office 
for making unsubstantiated veiled rumors about Mustafa el-Nahhas. The Egyptian Gazette, January 28, 
1943. 
94 Zakariya Mehran, “If I Were the Military Governor,” Ruz el-Yusuf, July 16, 1942. 
95 ʿAbd el-Salam el-Shazly, “If I Were the Military Governor,” Ruz el-Yusuf, July 23, 1942. 
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public vice, banning prostitution, alcohol, gambling, dancing and begging, and setting 
dress codes. They also proposed broad welfare programs (“raise the salary of the 
Egyptian soldier,” “require a minimum of Egyptian employees at companies,” “educate 
the illiterate,” “finish the Aswan dam and Electric plant”) as well as nationalist goals 
(“make Arabic the official language of government and business,” “force cinemas to play 
Egyptian movies.”)96  Finally, two suggested punishments of lashing and the death 
penalty for black marketeering, and one for “young men who deceive girls.” While some 
of this is clearly ideological grandstanding, it reflects new norms of government 
intervention becoming widespread ideals among all government employees and 
politicians. Finally, despite Makram ʿUbayd’s criticism of Wafd corruption in his Black 
Book, ʿUbayd naturally portrayed his own role enforcing military proclamations as the 
Minister of Supply, prior to his expulsion, in a positive light. He depicts the arbitrary 
influence of the military governor as the one serious fault in a supply and rationing 
system that was generally necessary during the war crisis.  
 As early as 1941, a political trope forecasting the new world order “after the war” 
emerged in all varieties of publications.97 Commentary in government and private 
discourse contained great hopes that all the assistance Egypt had given to the Allies in 
winning the war would justify the Egyptian government’s demand for a treaty negotiation 
that would lead to the withdrawal of British troops by a defined date. By 1945, the 
                                                 
96 “Technical Military Proclamations…!” Ruz el-Yusuf, July 30, 1942. On the dominance of Hollywood in 
this period, a result in part of demand from Allied soldiers, see Robert Vitalis, “American Ambassador in 
Technicolor and Cinemascope: Hollywood and Revolution on the Nile,” in Mass Mediations: New 
Approaches to Popular Culture in the Middle East and Beyond, ed. Walter Armbrust (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2000). 
97 A few examples: “Development of Industry after the war,” Shubra, 11 June 1942; “Women after the 
War,” Al-Ithnayn wa-l-Dunya, 11 May, 1943;Hassan ʿAkūsh and Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Al-Fīshāwī, 
Mushkilāt Miṣr Baʿd Al-Ḥarb (Cairo: Sharikat Al-Shamarlī bi-Miṣr, 1945) (Egypt’s Postwar Problems); 
Muṣṭafā Nuṣrat, Siyasa Ma Baʿd Al-Ḥarb Fī Miṣr: Al-Zirāʿa (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Lajaʾ al-Aytam al-Māsunī, 
1944) (Egypt’s Postwar Agricultural Policy) 
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successor government to the Wafd had the difficult job of reconciling its virulent 
opposition to the state of siege in 1943-44 with both this self-promotion and the 
management of a bureaucracy that had become accustomed to these forms of power. The 
British War Office opposed the end of the state of siege prior to victory in Europe, but al-
Nuqrashi bowed to pressure to phase out censorship in June 1945 months before formally 
ending the state of siege.98 An uneasy public dynamic emerged in the following years 
between the official government portrayal of the security state easing up as a part of the 
realization of its goal of liberal and democratic independence, and increasing police 
crackdowns on the more Radical student, leftist and Islamist movements. 
  
CONCLUSION 
The British, who for 20 years tacitly considered the state of siege clause as a potential 
replacement for martial law under the control of their own military, received the 
necessary facilities to conduct their war — and yet circumstance forced them to cede the 
administrative controls with which they maintained hegemony throughout similar 
informal areas elsewhere in their empire. Mustafa al-Nahhas, the Egyptian prime minister 
who by the consensus of all political actors commanded the loyalty of the greatest 
majority of the electorate, resorted to exploiting his illiberal powers as military governor 
in order to achieve legislative goals any prime minister should have been able to obtain 
far earlier under a fairer constitutional monarchy — without British interference in 
Egyptian politics. The military penal system took two divergent paths, but each became 
                                                 
98 WO 208/505, War Office to General Officer Commander in Chief, BTE, 5 Dec. 1944; the Wafd was 
pressuring for an end of the state of siege to guarantee freer elections in January, in which they ultimately 
lost heavily. NARA RG 84, 800, Tuck to State, “Egyptian Government’s Partial Revocation of Martial Law 
and the State of Siege,” 13 June 1945. 
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more closely tied to the legal and bureaucratic structure of the state than during British 
martial law: the majority of offenders became subject to misdemeanor fines and short 
prison sentences in parallel jurisdiction to the civilian courts, while a minority 
disappeared altogether into indefinite detention. Despite the system’s subversion of 
liberal legality, the law of the state of siege was not merely a facade for authoritarian rule 
— rather it actively determined projects and power struggles. 
 Moreover, it is difficult to disaggregate the opinions of the political elite about 
law, punishment, constitutional necessity, welfare and modernity in the complex of 
legislation and institutions that the state of siege represented. Although my focus at the 
end of this chapter has been on public support for étatist measures enforced by an 
illiberal justice system, a public discourse of liberal constitutionalism in support of the 
state of siege remained an important element for the duration of the war. Especially 
towards the end of the war, most of the Egyptian media expressed with infectious 
optimism that the war would secure its aim of making the world safe for democracy, and 
that decolonization and reform in Egypt would result in the solution of various social 
problems through liberal methods. The strength of this optimism connected state of siege 
reforms to the performance of budding Egyptian sovereignty, especially in areas where 
the state of siege eliminated distinctions of foreigner and Egyptian. However, the war 
aggravated the state’s interest in maintaining the security of public space, private 
property, agricultural production and population movement. The following chapters 
examine the ways in which the state of siege powers became embedded in the different 
practices of the increasingly more independent Egyptian state. 
 
 121 
Figure 2.3. Military Court Parquet Misdemeanor Reports to the Military Governor 
A. Before the Wafd reorganization: 70 court dates between Feb. 5, 1941 and Mar. 23, 1942. Source: DWQ 0081-030432. See Appendix for detail. 
Type of 



















Theft 765 100 7 655 3 2140 55 7 13  
Agriculture 160 8 119 22 11 315 14 3 2  
Black Market 1411 210 991 171 39 283 27 1 26  
Weapons 569 39 453 73 4 646 148 3 9  
Meat and 
Alcohol 177 12 117 45 3 536 35 1 0  
Bread 32 4 27 1 0 1201 90 3 4  
Trespass 258 23 232 3 0 93 28 0 0  
Parole 80 7 0 73 0 0 70 0 5  
Other 105 15 59 30 1 453 32 0 1  
TOTAL 3557 418 2005 1073 61   18 60  
 
B. After the Wafd: 72 court dates between July 18, 1942 and Dec. 3 1942. Source: DWQ 0081-030436. See Appendix for detail. 
Type of 



















Theft 150 150 3 888 9 1152 57 63 30  
Agriculture 928 183 199 22 524 1270 87 283 50  
Black Market 2167 576 1114 359 118 1581 95 50 93 
403 shop closures 
123 lashings 
Weapons 224 38 136 55 5 903 104 9 7  
Meat and 
Alcohol 461 56 447 66 2 583 56 6 36 
188 shop closures 
1 lashing 
Bread 175 32 114 11 18 603 85 2 4  
Trespass 43 6 27 10 0 147 22 3 1  
Parole 63 2 0 61 0 0 52 0 7  
Other 142 15 101 17 9 612 98 1 1  





Distinguishing Military and Civilian Spaces and Subjects 
 
Around sunset on August 4, 1941 at the al-Rous railway station, a small stop on the 
desert branch line between Wasta and Fayyum, 75 kilometers south of Cairo, Egyptian 
employees were enjoying an evening cup of tea when three European soldiers firing their 
guns in the air burst into the station house. Upon understanding the soldiers’ claim to be 
British officers staging a raid for escaped German POWs, the rattled clerks allowed them 
to search the station and even offered them tea and fuel for their airplane. The soldiers 
made a quick scan of the premises, and squad leader Second Lieutenant Bellamy-Brown 
shot the lock off a storage shed to search inside it. They then declared they were returning 
to the nearby airplane landing strip where they had arrived and expected the German Air 
Force would try to rescue the prisoners. The stationmaster reported the incident to the 
local Egyptian police, who understood that there was now a squad (or two) of European 
soldiers that were either a British raiding party and/or escaped Axis prisoners at the al-
Rous airstrip. At 3 a.m. the next morning, the police approached the airstrip in two cars, 
which the encamped European soldiers surrounded, ordeing “hands up!” and firing upon 
them when the police did not obey. There ensued a gun battle of several minutes in near 
darkness that ended only when the local commandant realized the soldiers were British, 
who had assumed they were the German escapees, and shouted a ceasefire in English. 
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Two Egyptian policemen were seriously injured, and one required the amputation of his 
arm. 
 As explicated in a series of letters between Egyptian Minister of National Defense 
Hassan Sadiq and Commander in Chief British Troops in Egypt (BTE) General Sir James 
Marshall-Cornwall, the miscommunication of this sensitive information occurred along 
parallel lines of communication that overlapped but failed in three instances.1  On August 
3, British GHQ had informed Cairo Police Vice-Commandant Miralai Salim Zaki of the 
escaped prisoners, and Zaki told the Ministry of Interior and presumably local authorities 
in Fayyum. However, Marshall-Cornwall could not deny that GHQ had never contacted 
Zaki again, nor even the nearest British military installations, after they decided the next 
day to stage a British commando mission just hours before sending it off. Whether or not 
the Ministry of Interior intelligence reached the al-Rous police outpost, these Egyptian 
police contacted their local British military counterparts, who knew nothing of the raid, 
so both parties considered the men at the airstrip armed and dangerous fugitives. Sadiq’s 
retort reflects the fragile balance with which the Egyptian security forces maintained their 
authority separate from the British, but the importance to which he attached that 
distinction: 
“As you no doubt realise, this is a very grave incident which should never have 
happened and should certainly not happen again in the future. Searching houses 
and offices should only be done by the Egyptian Police Authorities under orders 
from the Military Governor or the Parquet. British soldiers should not be in a 
position to take such matters in their hands unauthorised. Moreover, an incident of 
                                                 
1 DWQ 0076-000301. The preceding account is an interpretation of the two narratives in Sadiq to Marshall-
Cornwall, 7 Aug. 1941, and Marshal-Cornwall to Sadiq, 10 Aug. 1941. Further correspondence in the file 
relates to compensation for the Egyptian policeman whose arm was amputated. The Ministry of Interior 
initially demanded LE 500, about 10 times his annual salary, but the BTE Deputy Assistant Director for 
Claims rebutted with an offer of LE 75. The issue was not settled by December 1943, when the Mudir of 
Fayyum wrote to the Minister of Interior complaining about the meagerness of the sum. 
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this nature is liable to lead to complications and misunderstandings with possibly 
very unfortunate results.”2 
 
 The event occurred in a remote enough area and censorship was effective enough 
that no form of this story ever became public knowledge. More broadly, the 
historiography of the war in Egypt in both English and Arabic, under the influence of an 
ideology of security, has sought either to conceal or explain incidents like the vignette 
above as an anomalous penetration of civilian territory rather than a routine aspect of war 
for Egyptians. These narratives follow the Egyptian state’s two-century-long production 
of distinctly defined desert, agricultural, maritime and urban space, as well as the 
contemporary division of space between the British and Egyptian authority and the 
production of defensive space dictated in the 1936 treaty. In fact, the threat posed by Axis 
air attacks was ever-present throughout Egypt from Libya in the West from 1940 to 1942, 
from Greece and Crete in the north from 1941 to 1944, and from Ethiopia in the south 
and Syria in the east from 1940 to 1941. Warplane technology, including explosive and 
incendiary bombs, parachute mines and paratroopers, challenged and exposed these 
diplomatic and military distinctions. Moreover, security threats to the Egyptian state and 
Allies in wartime were not limited to explicitly identifiable military attacks. They also 
included foreign espionage and fifth-column sabotage, opportunistic crime and political 
protest. The circulation of nearly half a million Allied troops near major population 
centers compounded the problems of managing civilian security.  
 State of siege and immunity agreements with armed forces established the 
jurisdictional regimes that maintained the fiction that the European war and Egyptian 
civil life were distinct. Just as the diplomatic agreements restricted the Allied armed 
                                                 
2 DWQ 0076-000301. Sadiq to Marshall-Cornwall, 7 Aug. 1941. 
 
 125 
forces to their courts martial and civilians to Egyptian courts, the Egyptian state of siege 
made a subsidiary distinction, rendering civilians as either subjects of civil or military 
courts. But both of these mechanisms strained to contain the intensive daily contact 
between Egyptians and European soldiers. Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians went to 
work daily on Allied military bases, and nearly as many Allied soldiers crossed into 
Egyptian civilian space either in an official capacity or on leave in Cairo and Alexandria. 
The more spacial distinctions the security regime produced, the more possibilities for 
their violation existed, requiring a further expansion of the bureaucracy to enforce them. 
 
CREATING MILITARY SPACE 
No code of law exists without the creation of discrete spaces of its jurisdiction and the 
complications of its enforcement in these spaces. In light of the rapid expansion of the US 
homeland security and military-industrial complex after September 11, 2001, social 
science disciplines and long-form journalism have directed a critical eye towards the 
social effects of the transformation of space and bureaucratic surveillance both 
domestically within America,3 and in its military occupation in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
bases in many other countries.4 As the Second World War remains the realm of the field 
of history, there have not yet been as many examples of critical analyses of the war that 
use space as a social theoretical concept. More typically, military history subordinates 
                                                 
3 For example, Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American 
Security State (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2011);Michael Sorkin, Indefensible Space: The 
Architecture of the National Insecurity State (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
4 See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2006); Michael Schwartz, War Without End: The Iraq War in Context (Chicago, IL: 
Haymarket Books, 2008). 
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occupation and logistics to narratives of conflict and movement, while social history of 
the home front treats economic and cultural effects of war in a unified national space.  
 Historians of the formation of the modern state over longer time periods have 
turned frequently to Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and biopower to explain the 
homogenization of the power of the state, and its privatization, through spacial 
organization.5 Henri Lefebvre has further challenged positivist conceptions of space in 
state and society. Lefebvre casts the violence of war in defense of state space as the 
defining characteristic of modern sovereignty. However, Lefebvre’s belief that abstract, 
sovereign state space never fully succeeds at becoming homogenous, even under normal 
conditions, makes his writing a provocative lens for understanding the fictions of state 
space in both colonial regimes and in wartime.6 The abstract concept of parallel spaces 
where war was sanctioned and where it was not sanctioned did not correspond easily to 
the actual microsocial spaces in which Egyptians had to negotiate their position and role 
in the war enterprise. Egypt was neither occupied by an enemy during the war nor was it 
an independent actor in defending its own national space. The spacial facts of war 
threatened to implode the diplomatic and legal definition of Egyptian sovereignty. 
 The British preference for organizing Egyptian space in the Second World War 
was a shift from its typical colonial mode of fiscal restraint and veiled influence. Besides 
the sine qua non aerial defense of the home front and general security measures across 
the Empire, from Dunkirk until D-Day, the British fought their war in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Situated at the center of sea, air and land transportation networks, Egypt 
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had long been the planned backbone of any defense against Italian aggression. But Egypt 
was not naturally predisposed to host a mechanized air and tank war. The absolute 
importance of Egyptian territory, labor and supply to the British war effort made many of 
the logistical demands the British military could have made in Egypt politically 
embarrassing and inconvenient to British diplomats. 
 Just as the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty created the legal grounds for staging war, 
it also framed the space for both the British and Egyptian armies to conduct advantageous 
defensive battles against invading armies. As a treaty condition for Britain to move its 
forces out of the urban military bases in Alexandria, and in Cairo at Qasr al-Nil, 
Abbaseya and the Citadel, the Egyptians undertook in the treaty to provide land, build 
barracks with one quarter British financial support for new army bases at Ismailiya (a 
base that became known as “Moascar,” from “military camp” in Arabic) and at Geneifa 
southwest of the Great Bitter Lake on the Suez Canal for 10,000 troops and 4,000 civilian 
employees.7 In the event, wartime personnel increases meant the British occupied both 
the old and new planned barracks, and these were merely the kernel of a much larger set 
of bases and aerodromes the British army built throughout the Canal Zone and desert east 
of al-Sharqiya, south of Alexandria, on the outskirts of Cairo, and sprinkled throughout 
the rest of Egypt (see map, Figure 3.5 below).  
 The concentration of British imperial manpower in such a relatively small place 
astonished even veteran officers, and it required the intensive use of Egyptian land.8 
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From an existing level of around 20,000 troops mainly barracked at Abbaseyya and 
Alexandria in 1939, the number of troops in Egypt increased relatively slowly until the 
1940 defeat in France, when Britain began reinforcing the Middle East heavily in 
anticipation of an Italian attack from Libya. The total size of the Middle East Force 
(MEF, which included forces in Palestine, Iraq, Sudan and Aden and, in particular, the 
campaigning forces in the Western Desert) rose from 120,000 troops in September 1940 
at the average rate of 1,000 men and women per day to reach about 400,000 by July 
1941. At this point, 164,000 Allied troops were garrisoned permanently in Egypt as a part 
of the British Troops in Egypt (BTE), a sub-command of the MEF.9  
 The MEF continued to grow to an estimated 800,000 troops, despite the capture 
of 30,000 prisoners at the fall of Tobruk in June 1942.10 Nearly all of these men and 
women were stationed in Egypt between the first and second battles of El Alamein, July 
to November 1942, of whom 320,000 were the BTE garrison and HQ and more than 
400,000 were part of the Eighth Army, of which roughly half comprised the fighting 
force fielded against the Axis at El Alamein and half support and logistics.11 After 
General Montgomery and the Eighth Army left the Middle East command area, the BTE 
garrison became its largest element. Egypt remained the major staging ground for the 
battles for Italy, and it was the principal rest and recreation area for soldiers on leave. 
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11 WO 201/2316, MEF 4 Paper No. 4, Lt. Col. Hoare, 27 Oct. 1942; WO 169/4324, BTE DDST Feeding 
Strengths, 14/15 Oct. 1942; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East V., 4 p. 30. 
 
 129 
Troop levels continued to grow to 354,000 in April 1944. They declined only after the 
western European front opened, down to to 254,000 in December 1944, and 238,000 by 
October 31, 1945.12 Postwar reductions proceeded very slowly. 80,000 British soldiers 
remained in Egypt at the end of 1946 and 50,000 in mid-1948. Despite the efforts of the 
Treasury office to save money and reach the 10,000 man limit in the 1936 treaty, the 
complications of disposing of 1.3 million tons of war material worth £230 million 
delayed action.13  
 This astoundingly large number of troops had a significant impact on 
infrastructure and public life in the small settled area of the Nile Delta. By comparison, 
the British garrison in World War I peaked at 80,000 and declined to around 40,000 after 
Allenby and the Egyptian Expeditionary Force departed to the Levant in 1917; American 
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troop levels in the War in Iraq ranged between 130,000 and 160,000 from 2003 to 2008.14 
The war also demanded a network of prison camps on the fringes of the delta to hold 
interned Axis citizens and prisoners of war, which were frequently built alongside the 
military camps to provide convenient guard labor. The canal zone prisons held 80,000 
Italian POWs after the first invasion of Cyrenaica in 1941, and about 40,000 Germans, 
Italians and Libyans after El Alamein, who were transported to become a prison labor 
force throughout the British Empire.15 In the aftermath of the victory in Europe, Egypt 
received nearly 200,000 Axis prisoners; part of the complications of reducing the British 
garrison in 1947 was dealing with the 80,000 prisoners that remained in the canal zone.16  
 Just as important to the British as well situated military bases were improved 
transportation and communication networks that could become dedicated supply and 
attack arteries during military operations. Put differently, if the 19th century cotton trade 
and European debt capital built the Egyptian railroad, this 20th century motorized war 
built Egypt’s network of paved highways. At the time of the Abyssinian crisis in 1935, 
Egypt had merely 500 kilometers of paved road. This prompted the British to require the 
Egyptians in the 1936 Treaty to fund and construct the first paved desert six-meter 
highway in Egypt between the Giza pyramids and Alexandria to allow quick motor 
access to the western desert.17 The poor quality of the original work done on this road 
required frequent maintenance and reconstruction, especially after the Battles of El 
Alamein, leading to an LE 75,000 disputed bill between the Egyptians and British with 
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the contractor Shell. In the following year, the British greatly expanded the defense road 
building program, following stringent construction standards mandated in the treaty. It 
included two major new paved highways, one between Cairo and Ismailiya and a second 
parallel to the Suez Canal, as well as paving the delta highway from Ismailiya to 
Alexandria via Zagazig, Tanta and Damanhour and improving the Alexandria-Marsa 
Matrouh, Cairo-Alexandria and Cairo-Suez roads. All treaty highways required bypasses 
around villages and bridges capable of bearing 30-ton vehicles.18 The Egyptian 
government spent around LE 400,000 per year between 1937 and 1943 and diminishing 
amounts until the late 1940s on the treaty road building program.19  
 The roads became a crucial resource for the Allied military during the war, when 
Italian attacks rendered the Mediterranean and Suez Canal inaccessible, and troops and 
supplies needed to be moved from the Red Sea to the Western Desert. While the military 
continued to move supplies via the railroads, they had to do so under contract to Egyptian 
State Railways, which still had to carry passengers and commercial freight, although at a 
lower priority. The railroads were also easier targets for bombing attacks and 
continuously suffered from outdated rolling stock and coal shortages, since nearly all 
Egypt’s coal was imported. Shell brought Egypt’s first oil refinery online during the war, 
and supplies at Dharan and Abadan were nearby, so the railways sponsored a series of 
coal-to-oil conversions for many of their engines.20 Most importantly, the British could 
more completely monopolize the new highways for military traffic with the consent of 
the Egyptian authorities. This was certainly the case for the inland Suez Canal highway, 
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which was built as a military alternative to the Canal company’s own monopoly road 
bordering the Canal.21 They also relied on the Cairo-Alexandria Desert road in 
emergencies like heavy air raids on Alexandria, when the fleeing civilian population 
choked the railroad and smaller roads to Damanhour.22   
 While the treaty designated the space for military operation and the capital outlays 
to transform it, the state of siege allowed Egyptian state sovereignty to trump British 
military authority in issues of jurisdiction of Egyptian subjects in British military zones. 
In the last of his first five military proclamations, ʿAli Mahir created three military zones 
in Cairo, Alexandria and the Suez Canal. He delegated his powers as Military Governor 
General to the respective governors to pass further proclamations to protect public 
security in force only within their boundaries. Before the state of siege was fully 
institutionalized prior to the entry of Italy to the war, General Officer Commanding-in-
Chief Wavell was pushing heavily for zones of exclusive British martial jurisdiction, or at 
least jurisdiction over crimes against the British forces. Lampson agreed to push for 
expanded British military jurisdiction in the Alexandria and Canal military zones, but he 
preferred the Egyptian state of siege to continue as it was constructed under the current 
conditions, since it would simplify applying British martial law exclusively in these 
zones in case Egypt found itself at war or the state of siege “broke down.”23  
 From 1940 to 1942 the British military produced multiple plans for running the 
country in case civil government fell apart, especially with an eye towards a scenario 
similar to the 1919 revolution. The British back-up plans extended to marshaling military 
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manpower to run the railroad system — one plan included a warning that “The local 
population in the BENHA - TANTA - ZAGAZIG is said to be more fanatical and more 
likely to give trouble than that in other districts.”24 This planning peaked in the aftermath 
of the fall of Tobruk in May 1942, when the army prepared several secret plans to deny 
war supplies or Egyptian infrastructure to the enemy, by demolishing bridges, telephone 
cables, petroleum and water pumps and pipelines and electrical power stations, burning 
food and military stores and even wrecking irrigation works, against the anticipated 
resistance of the Egyptian Army itself!25 
 In the end, the British defenses remained intact and the nominal legal and physical 
boundaries between British and Egyptian authority proved more useful than coercion to 
the British army in maintaining Egyptian cooperation. This collaboration remained 
extremely sensitive, in particular because of the surveillance powers the British Military 
Mission had over the Egyptian army. Political narratives about the Egyptian military in 
the interwar period,26 and the strife between the ministry of defense and general staff 
resulting from the King’s control over military promotions,27 have been well researched. I 
will mention here only the functional role the Egyptian military played during the war. 
Egyptian military participation, normally circumscribed, became pragmatic and even 
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activist at the height of Axis attack. Lt. Gen. Marshall-Cornwall arrived to command the 
BTE on April 16, 1941, just as the Axis counterattack on Egypt was beginning. Marshall-
Cornwall immediately sought to shore up the defense of the Delta from the threat of 
paratrooper assault or a desert attack skirting the major cities and requested manning 
Tanta and other regional centers with British units. Sadiq protested that no British troops 
should be posted outside British military bases or desert areas by prior agreement with 
the Commander of the Middle East Forces General Wavell.28 Marshall-Cornwall politely 
backed down, but requested all the same to send parties to study routes across the Delta 
towards Tanta “as it cannot be foreseen how rapidly the threat of attack across the Delta 
may develop… so that there need be no delay once a decision has been taken to send 
troops there.”29  
 Later in the month, Sadiq had cause to complain about the process the British 
military was taking in requisitioning land for new bases, by applying to district officials 
rather than first asking the Ministry of Defense. This illustrates a competition between the 
Ministries of Interior and Defense for the ultimate authority over the use of eminent 
domain on Egyptian land. Marshall-Cornwall agreed to inform Sadiq first from then on.30 
Continued miscommunication over jurisdiction led to the Anglo-Egyptian gun battle cited 
at the beginning of the chapter. As late as 1942, the Egyptian army was still ironing out 
the extent of its responsibilities to defend territory under its jurisdiction in a memo to the 
chief of staff. While the principle of neutral Egypt firing anti-aircraft guns on bombers 
attacking its cities was internationally accepted, an Egyptian officer requested of Sadiq, 
how should Egyptian troops treat Axis soldiers paratroopers or frogmen who breached 
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the outer British defenses around settled land?31 Because of the rarity and variety of such 
incidents, these questions were only ever answered on a case-by-case basis. The nascent 
Egyptian Royal Air Force had more leeway to break the aforementioned boundaries 
between the military forces. Egyptian squadrons flew in formation with the British in 
patrols over the Red Sea from Suez and Almaza in 1940-41 to protect shipping during the 
battles against the Italians in East Africa; to maintain the fiction of Egyptian neutrality, 
these were officially deemed “training runs.” Although the Egyptians quashed the desire 
of the British Royal Air Force to enlist Egyptian pilots directly into the RAF, around 20 
Egyptian pilots actually flew British planes in delivery convoys to the Italian front in 
1943 and 1944.32  
 Tensions extended to the social spaces of the army as well. Inter-services 
cooperation between the Egyptians and British usually went smoothly, but there was a 
fair share of animosity. For example, a brawl at the Ismailiya government employees’ 
club in January 1942 was started by a drunk coterie of British intelligence officers who 
insulted two Egyptian officers and then proceeded to beat them when they talked back. 
When informed that one of the soldiers they were beating was wearing the uniform of a 
captain, one British officer declared, “If he were a colonel, then I would beat him twice 
as hard!” General Basset, British Commanding Officer for the Canal Zone, contacted the 
Egyptians’ commanding officer to apologize personally.33 The murkiness of public 
authority for on-duty officers, especially in urban areas, could lead to conflict between 
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the services. On March 30, 1942, an Indian army truck driver delivering supplies to Qasr 
al-Nil Barracks rear-ended an Egyptian motorcyclist on Fuad I street a few hundred 
meters from the barracks in the early evening, knocking him unconscious. Rather than 
waiting to fill paperwork with the Egyptian police traffic officer who approached the 
truck, the driver and two passengers, all Indian soldiers, came down from the truck and 
beat up the officer. They escaped into the barracks before more Egyptians could arrive.34 
The BTE command soon restricted military traffic to a few main roads to prevent events 
like this from happening more frequently.35 
 Even after the Egyptians fulfilled most of their commitments to the treaty building 
program outlined above, much of the negotiation over spacial authority and privileges 
frequently turned on both parties’ financial limitations. This was an old habit of colonial 
administration that harked back to the fiscal tightness of the Cromer administration 
(1883-1907). The British demanded concessions for on-duty officers to ride the state 
railroad for free, and yet balked when it came to offering local British military units to 
help clear air-raid damage to railway installations for free.36 The Egyptian army reported 
that by 1942, the value of labor done for the British in building defense emplacements 
and warehouses, paving airstrips and roads, and assembling a squadron of tanks, equalled 
LE 136,000.37 The British, for their part, extracted an additional commitment of LE 
250,000 from the Egyptian Government for defense measures that it would selectively 
credit to building works that would become permanent features of Egypt’s defense 
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infrastructure after the war.38 Even when combined with Egyptian state liability to British 
military supply (most of which was re-claimed for the duration of the Second World 
War), the British debt to the Egyptians in non-convertible pounds sterling was orders of 
magnitude larger. Not surprisingly, both sides resisted settling these accounts until the 
war was long over. 
 Anglo-Egyptian cooperation in matters of policing and intelligence remained 
functional throughout the war, but it was not free from political infighting between 
Egyptian bureaucrats and politicians, and indeed the British military and diplomatic 
establishement, as the Egyptian state began to restrict the access of former colonial 
administrators. In his unpublished memoirs, Brigadier Robert J. Maunsell, who was 
appointed a Defense Security Officer in 1932 and rose to become the head of the unified 
military intelligence service Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) in 1940, recounts 
the transfer of power from the last British Interior officials to the Egyptians in 1937: 
“During the long-drawn-out treaty negotiations, DSO Egypt visited the European 
Department of the Ministry of the Interior two or three times a week, armed with a 
capacious brief-case which various British officials helped to fill with files, or extracts of 
files, dealing with subjects or persons of security interest — or thought to be so. This 
'documentation' was a useful adjunct to existing records at GSI BTE, and thus the 
Defence Security Office Egypt did not have to start from scratch. At the same time, 
contact with the Egyptian Under-Secretary of State for the Interior, Hassan Rifaʿat Pasha, 
who gave us the absolutely full measure of help throughout the war, and with the 
Egyptian secret police was closely maintained so that when the Treaty was finally signed, 
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there was virtually no break in Anglo-Egyptian co-operation on the security front.”39  
 When he wrote this memoir in the 1960s, Maunsell remained blithely confident 
that his organization had been able both to suppress Axis espionage during the war, and 
effectively control the Egyptian security establishment at arm’s length. Hasan Rifaʿat, a 
figure infrequently noted in Egyptian histories of the period despite his long tenure as 
director of public security during the First World War and as first permanent secretary of 
the Ministry of Interior from 1935 through 1948, appears frequently in the British 
diplomatic record both to provide them with intelligence and to bargain for British 
support for himself.40 Most of the time, when Rifaʿat was coordinating his administrative 
goals along the dictates of British security requirements in ways the sitting governments 
agreed with, including the Wafd, they had little complaint about his well-known 
connection to the embassy. Ministers of Interior came and went, but it was understood 
that the special British relationship with Rifaʿat and his informants was sacrosanct. For 
example, it was only in October 1944 when al-Nahhas sought to remove Rifaʿat’s 
director of public security, Mahmoud al-Ghazzali Bey, for taking down banners praising 
al-Nahhas at the command of the King, that the British finally withdrew their support for 
the Wafd party and King Faruq dissolved its government.41 But even the King did not 
wish to challenge Interior’s structural prerogatives: According to Sadat’s early memoir, 
when King Faruq was considering conspiring with the Muslim Brotherhood in early 
1945, the King scolded Sadat for talking about this on the phone, remarking that “Hasan 
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Rifaʿat taps my phone.”42 However, much of the intelligence that Rifaʿat brought the 
British, while useful, reveals he was not as fully in control of the security forces as his 
self-image implied. In particular, the strength of the Wafd administration allowed al-
Nahhas to isolate Rifaʿat from his own bureaucracy. Rifaʿat sent the British a long 
memorandum in early 1944 complaining “Village ghaffirs, omdahs and sheikhs, 
municipal workers, officials high and low, have been subjected to a regime of oppression 
and persecution and have been replaced by open supporters of the [Wafd] party,” and 
referring to “the case of the Minister of Interior [Fuʾad Sirag Ed-Din] trying to bring the 
police into party politics.43 Later that year during the fight over the Wafd’s internment of 
political opponents, al-Ghazzali complained of being excluded from the decisions of 
“Nahas’ gestapo” under the command of Amin Khalil, a party lieutenant without an 
official Interior position.44 
 The independent action of the Egyptian security apparatus was not always a 
matter of direct confrontation. Rather, the constant bureaucratic friction resulting from 
the different spacial logic of British and Egyptian jurisdictions prevented the British from 
exercising the control they assumed they would have. Miralai Selim Zaki, as Vice 
Commandant and highest ranking Egyptian officer of the Cairo Police in 1940, oversaw 
the expansion of the intelligence wing of the police into the Special Branch (Al-Qism al-
Makhṣuṣ), which began writing up much more detailed reports than in previous 
agencies.45 Of the large body of these reports available from 1940 to 1942 at the Egyptian 
National Archives, before the Wafd further reorganized the organization and the file unit 
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ends, the majority is in Arabic, but there is a separate series of English reports.46 Not 
surprisingly, daily Arabic police reports (sometimes more than a dozen per day) focus on 
domestic political issues, most predominantly the activities of the parties in opposition. 
Increasingly, informants infiltrated the meetings of Islamist parties and labor unions. 
Other Arabic reports also include surveillance and arrest reports about possible Axis 
spies. The English language reports, which Zaki wrote personally, are almost entirely 
about the activities of the expatriate communities of the Axis nations, the activities of 
particular propagandists and potential spies, and the status of the community’s 
internment, education and welfare.47 This helps explain why Maunsell was satisfied with 
the cooperation of the Egyptian Interior Ministry but the British embassy so frequently 
was not: military intelligence took precedence over domestic intelligence, and the 
Egyptians were happier to assist in the former venture than the latter. As a result, the 
Arabic language reports contain information about the radical nationalist and labor 
movements at a level of detail that simply does not exist in British embassy reports of 
this period. While it was certainly possible for British diplomats to gather information 
about the new radical movements through other avenues, it is evident Egyptian 
intelligence was not strictly beholden to their needs and prerogatives. 
 
VIOLATIONS OF MILITARY SPACE 
Maintaining the functional, financial, jurisdictional distinctions between Egyptian and 
British forces was difficult enough, but British military space was also extremely porous 
to Egyptian civilians. The British kept camps near urban areas so they would be 
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accessible both to water and supplies and to their low-cost Egyptian workforce. By the 
peak years of 1942-43 the British would estimate as many as 250,000 Egyptians were 
employed by the Allied Forces. The constant transit of Egyptian workers in proximity to 
plentiful military supplies led to endemic theft. “Looting of WD stores was a perpetual 
menace,” remarked a junior officer at a camp south of Ismaʿiliya. “‘Compared to the 
Egyptian,’ he quoted his Commander-in-Chief, ‘the vulture is a bungling amateur.’ 
Particularly sought were Army tents, which reappeared in the sails of the feluccas that 
made their stately progress along the Sweetwater canal.”48  
 Egyptian military proclamations early on criminalized civilian trespassing in 
military zones, including camps, ports, certain bridges and roads, without authorization, 
such as a work license.  Fines for infringement ranged from 25 to 100 piasters, several 
days’ wages for most unskilled laborers. Wearing a British military uniform without 
authorization also carried a one to two pound fine. For large workshops like those at the 
Royal Engineers Base 2 near Al-Tel Al-Kabir, Egyptian workers lined up at the 
beginning and end of shifts for full body searches.49 (See Figure 3.2) The most popular 
items from camps on the black market were high-value, light and fungible commodities 
like matches, army blankets, tea, cigarettes and electrical wire. Because of a rubber 
shortage, tires were extremely valuable on the black market, but were molded with 
identifying marks and easily recovered by the army. BTE officials estimated their gross 
losses to pilferage in Egypt overall at 70 tons per month in 1943.  
 By 1942, petty theft cases were coming to the military courts at a rate of 50 cases 
per month in Alexandria and Al-Sharqiya, where the largest concentration of troops were 
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stationed.50 Conviction of theft from military camps in Egyptian military court always 
resulted in a prison term, usually one to three months among most summary cases. Cases 
of pilferage could escalate quickly into gun battles with more serious consequences if the 
perpetrators were well armed and caught in the act. Sayyid ʿAbdu, a 19-year-old peasant 
from Al-Sharqiya, was spotted stealing sacks of flour from a train outside Ismaʿiliya with 
four others at 5 a.m. on February 21, 1942, and opened fire on the Egyptian guards who 
advanced on the group.51 The guards fired back and wounded ʿAbdu, but his confederates 
got away; ʿAbdu was sentenced to five years in prison. Ahmad Makki, a 22-year-old 
Egyptian army soldier was caught in a similar situation stealing electrical equipment with 
another soldier. When chased by the police, they fired back and fled, but his partner was 
crushed to death by a moving train; for the combination of offenses Makki received 15 
years in prison.52 
 Perhaps the most highly-valued item from military camps were firearms, 
ammunition and explosives. Clamping down on the secondary market for weapons to 
                                                 
50 Based on DWQ 0081-030436, Military Court Registers Sept.-Dec. 1942. 
51 DWQ 0081-030607, Military Felony 450 for 1942, Ismaʿiliya. 
52 DWQ 0081-030610 Military Felony 212 for 1944, report of 4 June 1944. 
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ensure civil security was more important to the British than simply punishing the theft of 
those weapons. The British constantly harped on the Egyptians to more vigorously 
enforce state of siege legislation against the private trade in arms that had existed since 
the beginning of the war. In May 1940, ʿAli Mahir imposed a stringent licensing regime 
on all weapons, even large knives, and by the time the military governor’s records start, 
the military courts were hearing dozens of cases a week on unlicensed weaponry. Simple 
possession of knives or firearms brought a fine that increased on volume and by weapon 
type from 50 piastres to cases with a total of LE 70; only about 15% of cases in 1942 
resulted in jail sentences, with an average of two to three months.53 A large majority of 
these cases, disproportionate to population and all other types of military crime, occurred 
in Upper Egypt. While this may reflect a cultural preference among the peasants in that 
area towards gun ownership, the large numbers were likely a result of the British belief in 
such a stereotype, and their pressure on the Egyptian administrators to crack down in this 
area. By 1944, the British believed there to be 200,000 unlicensed firearms across the 
country, concentrated in Upper Egypt, obtained from military camps and other sources. 
They persuaded the Egyptians to launch a one month amnesty period, in which gun 
owners could turn in unlicensed weaponry and even license new weapons (within the 
strict requirements). Upon the failure of this scheme to bring in many weapons, the 
British military decided to start a program in to pay 20 piaster rewards for information 
leading to the recovery of weapons, and buy back stolen pistols and rifles at their nominal 
price, specifically in Upper Egypt.54 This had little success, and constant surveillance of 
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the gun trade and military trials seemed to make the only impact. These weapons 
invariably made their way into the hands of radical groups, including the secret apparatus 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, which committed several assassinations and attempted 
assassinations over the course of the late 1940s. 
 Many of the new restrictions on the use of space did not come into effect without 
disruption and miscommunication. Within days of the military orders against 
approaching bridges in boats after sunset in 1940, Egyptian police guards twice opened 
fire on skiffs and feluccas in Cairo that approached Ismailia and Qasr El Nil bridges 
without stopping to identify themselves when demanded — including a launch belonging 
to King Faruq’s yacht.55 Egyptian soldiers shot and killed a British major in the RASC 
who was boating on the Nile as he approached the bridge later in the week.56 The security 
paranoia about bridges in particular led to proclamations restricting the photography of 
bridges and even preventing civilians from crossing the Nile Barrages (irrigation dams 
north of Cairo at the divide between the Rosetta and Damietta branches of the Nile) at 
night without a permit. The photography restriction, which remains in Egypt to this day 
on military installations, garnered little respect. Even Allied soldiers, who were 
enthusiastic tourists when on leave, found this requirement impossible, judging by the 
repeated exhortation in British Troops in Egypt general orders not to take pictures of the 
Nile or important buildings. Eventually, the BTE restricted development of all soldiers’ 
film to one approved photo lab under strict censorship in each major city in Egypt.57  
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 The state of siege also increased the severity of punishments during crucial 
military time: namely, during air raids on urban areas. State of siege legislation 
considered Egyptians who took advantage of the cover of blackout to steal property from 
civilians who had departed for air raid shelters without locking their homes and 
apartments greater than usual threat to public order and security. As such, they were 
liable to severe penalties in military court. For example, in 1942, ʿAbd al-Moneim 
Tantawi, 25, received three years imprisonment for stealing clothing from an empty 
house during an air raid and Muhammad ʿAbd el Hadi al-Sharif, 18, also received three 
years for attempting to steal earrings from a woman in a darkened air raid shelter.58 The 
severity of many of these sentences for very minor and often squalid offenses are 
surprising when compared to the more lenient punishments leveled against some black 
marketeers. 
 Interactions between Egyptian civilians and Allied soldiers were heavily 
circumscribed by state of siege regulations and therefore frequently subject to military 
court jurisdiction. The authorities made constant attempts both to provide positive public 
events where soldiers and civilians could socialize, like shared religious celebrations with 
Egyptian and Indian muslims and to promote positive relations in every possible medium, 
including radio and newsmagazines.59 However, the default official attitude to the 
individuals who crossed the fictional boundaries between military and civilian space was 
suspicion. Certainly, some Egyptians viewed western soldiers as wealthy marks from 
                                                 
58 DWQ 0081-030607 Alexandria Military Felony 391 for 1942 for ʿAbdel Moneim Tantawi; 0081-030437 
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which to beg or to sell goods — or to rob. Naturally, most robberies took place near to 
military bases, typically in urban areas at night. Groups of young men preyed on lone 
soldiers in the darker corners of cities, overwhelming them by numbers: Hasan ʿAbd al-
ʿAziz and al-Sayyid ʿAbdu Yass, 20 and 17-year-old coppersmiths, respectively, were the 
only two of seven individuals who a mugged British soldier that the soldier could 
identify. They were sentenced to three years with labor for aggravated assault with a 
knife.60 Cases frequently foundered on too little evidence when the soldier in question 
was the only witness.61 The military court case descriptions reveal that many incidents 
were not simply anonymous street muggings. Rather, Egyptians frequently interacted 
socially with the soldiers to some extent, drinking together at a bar, or promising to find 
them prostitutes and then taking their valuables, after an altercation or by prior plan. 
Judges handed down more severe sentences in these cases, typically five years 
                                                 
60 DWQ 0081-030607, Military Felony 302 for 1942, report of 20 Jan. 1943. 
61 For example, Sayyid Osman, a 15-year-old salesboy tried to take an Indian soldier’s wallet on June 5 
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imprisonment.62 While the British were involved in the creation of Egyptian military 
proclamations, and frequently referred Egyptian suspects to the state of siege military 
justice system through their Military Police or the remaining few British officers in the 
urban police forces, they usually remained distant from the operation of the military 
parquet and courts. In some cases of theft in the British camps, the proceedings seem to 
indicate a disagreement or discipline issue between Egyptian worker and soldier that 
escalated to a charge brought by the British MPs. Ahmad Gharib ʿAbd al-Rahman, a 32-
year-old camp worker in Suez, was accused in military court of robbing cigarettes and a 
pipe from a British soldier but was ruled innocent when several co-workers testified that 
the solder had traded with him for the tobacco prior to the incident.63  
 The British military also instituted a spatial disciplinary regime for soldiers on 
leave as much to protect them from becoming the targets of crime as to prevent them 
from misbehaving. Soldiers arriving in Cairo were required to turn over rifles and all 
other weapons at the Bab al-Hadid military prison adjacent to the central railway station. 
Many drunken soldiers ended their evening in one of the retaining cells there if picked up 
by the Egyptian or British military police.64 Cairo was carved into three parallel zones for 
the troops: approved hotels, bars and cabarets, where prices and quality were guaranteed, 
off-limits areas, which included nearly all parts of the city not in Khedive Ismaʿil’s 
modern city center, and unapproved locales downtown where troops were allowed but 
                                                 
62 DWQ 0081-030607, Higher Military court case 264 for 1942; 0081-30610 Case no. 1975 Cairo for 1944; 
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similar prostitution ring that was targeting officers, who were too ashamed to report being robbed after 
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could risk unexpected encounters with the locals.65 Space for soldiers was further 
subdivided by rank and class: only officers were permitted to take rooms at the elite 
Shepheard’s hotel; the other ranks had to make do with hostels.  
 Restrictions on vice increased over the course of the war. Wish al-Birka, a street 
running due north of Ezbekiya Gardens, was the legal, licensed red light district for the 
first half of the war. Nearly all soldiers on leave had an encounter there, although many 
came just to look, and many disapproved of what they saw for a variety of reasons. The 
British military medical staff did its best to get visitors to visit the nearby “hygiene 
museum” before deciding whether to head to a brothel.66 In 1942, the Wafd government 
closed all licensed brothels altogether, citing increased violence in Wish al-Birka and 
high rates of venereal disease. It was also done as a political favor to the Muslim 
Brotherhood.67 However, prostitution merely spread to smaller operations in the inner 
suburbs of Cairo and Alexandria, areas not difficult for motivated soldiers to travel to and 
not as easy for the police to monitor.68 Servicemen were also restricted from drinking 
alcohol in civilian areas to between the hours of 6 and 10 pm, but this also frequently had 
the effect of pushing them to speakeasies that served drinks of questionable and even 
dangerous quality, as well as harder stuff like hashish and opium. The police marked a 
pronounced increase in drug confiscation, from 1,900 kilograms in 1939 to 4,000 kilos in 
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67 Cooper, Cairo in the War, 116. On the shaky relationship between the Wafd and Muslim Brotherhood, 
see Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 27. 
68 Military court records reveal that families, often dominated by a matriarch who prostituted herself or her 
daughters and her friends, ran many of these brothels. Judges had difficulty winning convictions in these 
cases because Allied soldier clients were usually unwilling to testify. DWQ 0081-030607, military felonies 
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1942, in particular from Allied servicemen who were smuggling them usually from 
service further east in Iran or India.69 
 Intoxicated or provoked soldiers engaged frequently in more serious or violent 
criminal behavior. In his memoir, Captain J.B. Tomlinson reminisced about “the Battle of 
Cairo.” He and “several hundred” men from his division were on leave in Cairo in 1944 
after fighting in Italy for several months. Sexually frustrated by the rejection of the 
women’s auxiliary members (who he claims were “warned off” by the non-combatant 
male clerical officers based in Cairo), they went on a rampage through Khan al-Khalili 
when they felt the vendors were cheating them. The BTE command took pains to cover 
up the incident.70 The Egyptian police better recorded British violence targeting the elite. 
On July 26, 1941, two British soldiers broke into and looted the house of Hassan Mazlum 
in downtown Cairo.71 Even more serious, a group of five drunk British soldiers attacked 
Mustafa al-Nahhas’ residence in Heliopolis on October 10, 1941. They smashed open the 
door to the front room of the mansion and roughed up two of al-Nahhas’ servants, 
demanding water to drink and “a girl.” The Egyptian police investigated the incident, 
found no political aspect to it, and forwarded their report to the British military police; 
the most the Egyptians could do was post a permanent guard at al-Nahhas’ house.72 
Hyperactive soldiers on duty could also inflict accidental injuries and death on nearby 
civilians. On December 1, 1942, British soldiers returning from the Western Desert 
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tossed some of their captured Axis smoke bombs at a group of Fuad I University students 
waiting for the bus as they passed in a troop transport. In the stampede that ensued, one 
student struck his head on the pavement and later died from the injury. (As this was a 
public daytime incident with many witnesses, rather than attempting to suppress the 
news, al-Nahhas staged an elaborate funeral with a staged British apology in order to 
placate the students.)73 
 In accordance with the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, British soldiers were tried on 
criminal charges in their regimental courts martial, and their families and civilian workers 
in the army were subject to a special British consular tribunal. This fact made it much 
harder for Egyptians robbed or killed by soldiers to obtain justice. A fight between 
uniformed Allied soldiers and Egyptians in which both parties were wronged was 
therefore sorted out in two separate, sometimes distant, courts where the opposing sides 
would not frequently appear to give testimony against the other, resulting frequently in 
acquittals. Off-duty soldiers not in uniform could still be tried in courts martial but were 
not immune from civil suits in the Egyptian Mixed courts. The western embassies fielded 
many complaints of this sort, like one from Greek lawyer Michael Syriotis to the 
American embassy in 1943 asking for instructions to prosecute an American engineer 
working for the army who allegedly assaulted his two clients, Greek employees of the 
Metropolitan Hotel.74 The British army eventually accepted that, although it had no legal 
liability in these cases, it was politically expedient to settle the cases with small payments 
to the claimants, frequently bar owners with smashed windows.75 
                                                 
73 NARA RG 59, 883.00/1310, Kirk to State, 6. Dec. 1942. 
74 NARA, RG 84, 820.03 Michael Syriotis to Kirk, 13 Mar. 1943. 
75 FO 371/31561, J 2083, Scrivener to Lampson, recommending he discuss the matter further with 
President of the War Claims Commission, 23 June 1942. 
 
 151 
 The racial logic behind the responsibilities and placement of British, Dominion 
and Colonial troops in the Imperial military also had an impact on their respective 
interactions with Egyptians. Except select groups of Indian soldiers (the so-called martial 
races such as Punjabis and Pashtuns), nearly all colonial troops recruited after the start of 
the war were preferred for “pioneer” labor corps in rear areas, although many ended up 
fighting when manpower needs demanded it. These laboring groups included 
Palestinians, other Arabs from British mandates, and “natives” of West, East and South 
Africa. British military administrators assigned them to a very detailed pseudoscientific 
hierarchy of capacities. These latter groups were recruited most intensively in 1942 and 
their numbers increased from a very low level to nearly 50,000 troops, or one-sixth of the 
Egyptian garrison. The MEF adjutant general staff commented on the inversion of the 
colonial order this represented: “While non-European troops are serving in the Army they 
must necessarily have privileges that are not normally given them. For example, many 
African races are not permitted to carry arms in their own countries, and yet must be 
armed for their own protection when serving in the Army.”76  
 As investigated by Eve Troutt Powell, the meaning of race between Egyptians and 
black Africans had a complex history.77  Egypt still contested the “condominium” 
sovereignty it had shared with Britain since 1898 over Sudan. The slave trade from Sudan 
had been outlawed for decades, but many Sudanese servants in the households of the 
Egyptian elite were former slaves or descendants of slaves. That the British put Sudanese 
in positions of legitimately violent authority over Egyptians was particularly rankling to 
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the Egyptian police. East African soldiers ended up disproportionally on guard duty at 
camps and on railway cars. Faced with endemic looting from military stores, these troops 
were required to fire upon looters if they did not stop when commanded. Incidents during 
which black guards shot and killed Egyptians on the railway accelerated over the course 
of 1943. After six in December alone, the Egyptian Railway Police issued a protest that 
Minister of Interior Fuʾad Sirag Al-Din forwarded to the British Embassy. The Egyptians 
killed were in all cases themselves railway guards or workers who the British claimed 
were taking advantage of their access to pilfer goods. The railway police claimed these 
men were innocent; more significantly, the language of their protests projects the cause of 
the incidents onto the race of the guards. The Mamour Zapt (detective) of the railway 
police complained of “African black troops… the class of troops who are so silly and 
brutal as to fire and kill 3 policemen in less than 10 days;” Sirag ad-Din repeated the 
allegation that “the continuance of this brutal murdering of innocent policemen… may 
lead to the most deplorable results… I hope that you will take the most drastic measures 
against the black troops concerned.”78  
 Isolated black African Allied soldiers were subject in particular to abuse by 
crowds of Egyptian children and beggars. A Sudanese sergeant commanding a squad of 
Sudanese and other East Africans on a rail convoy through upper Egypt reported his men 
were mobbed by poor Egyptians demanding to buy army rations or blankets from the 
cars. When refused, crowds turned ugly and threw rocks and bottles, cursing the soldiers 
as “black slaves,” which the soldiers “endured with forbearance.”79 When off duty, it was 
also easier for non-white troops to break out-of-bounds rules and visit the “native” 
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quarters, where they were subject to the usual or sometimes aggravated forms of hostility. 
For example, a fight between three African-American soldiers and an Egyptian crowd in 
Port Said in early 1943 resulted in the death of an Egyptian. This led directly to the 
American military negotiating for the same types of criminal immunity for its troops as 
the British troops and their families enjoyed under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.80  
 
PUBLIC SHELTERS TO PUBLIC HOUSING  
Epidemic disease killed tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of Egyptians between 
1939 and 1945.81 However, the novelty, suddenness and spectacular physical destruction 
of Italian and German air raids on Cairo, Alexandria and the Suez Canal made them the 
most explicit threat to public security during the war, both to the Egyptian government 
and in the public imagination. Between Italy’s entry to the war and the end of 1942, air 
raids killed 2,092 and wounded 3,455 civilians in Egypt and were responsible for most of 
the Egyptian military’s 1,300 casualties.82 Beyond physical destruction, air raids posed a 
dire threat to public order. After serious raids, hundreds of thousands of civilians many of 
whom abandoned their work at utilities and vital war industries, fled from the cities to the 
countryside,. In coordination with the Egyptian and British military, the Egyptian 
government built up a civil defense administration that could maintain a blackout, air raid 
sirens and a network of public and private shelters, as well as provide accommodation 
and welfare services for refugees to the countryside. Even after the Axis defeat at the 
battle of El Alamein, the Luftwaffe retained the ability to stage raids over Egypt from 
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Crete until 1945, nearly exclusively for the purposes of surveillance, but this forced the 
Egyptian government to maintain its civil defense regime until nearly the end of the war 
in Europe. 
 Like everywhere else in Europe, the Egyptian government had been studying the 
techniques for civil defense from air raids in 1938 and 1939. Yet Egypt remained 
woefully unprepared when Italian attacks began in earnest because of uncertainty about 
how much money to commit to the effort, and where to commit it. The Ministry of 
Finance commissioned a study from British military engineers in early 1939 about the 
preparedness of the ministry building for an attack. The engineers deemed the Belle 
Epoque style of government buildings in Downtown Cairo sturdy, but by no means 
protection enough, especially to protect the Finance Ministry’s crucial paperwork and 
cash reserves kept on the premises. They recommended building shelters in its wide 
courtyards, as the Ministry of Interior had already done.83 After the start of the war, the 
prime minister delegated the creation of blackout regulations and preliminary civil 
defense measures in 1939 to the military governors of the respective zones, but on 
December 12, 1939, the government had coordinated the first nationwide urban blackout 
with satisfactory performance from the police and populace at large.84 The military 
governors negotiated with the British to allow the British to take possession of spaces at 
particular risk of air raids in urban areas through their state of siege powers of eminent 
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domain, such as a shantytown that had grown up around the oil storage tanks in 
Alexandria’s western harbor.85 
 Air raids on Alexandria began shortly after the Italian declaration of war, with the 
first on the night of June 21, 1940. They accelerated in frequency and severity through 
November of that year, after which the British advance into Libya temporarily pushed 
Italian planes out of range. Despite the repeated drills and propaganda, the population of 
Alexandria found that civil defense resources were still desperately meager for the 
average resident. By October 1940, the authorities had built shelters that could only 
accommodate 23,000 people in a city of 700,000. They had spent merely LE 130,000 on 
this work and in laying in first aid supplies.86 The areas south and east of Alexandria’s 
western harbor, high-density lower-class neighborhoods like Kermouz and al-Wardiyan, 
were particularly vulnerable to bombs that overshot their intended military and naval 
targets. As a result, 200,000 civilians fled the city in several waves following particularly 
heavy attacks. The government found another vital service overwhelmed: railway 
transportation. One solution was to offer free passes at lower priority times to the poor, 
for which 100,000 accepted. Many others left to Kafr al-Dawwar, some 20 kilometers, on 
foot or by cart.87 There were only about 20 raids on Cairo in 1940, of which only three 
dropped bombs, once in the wealthy suburb of al-Maadi.88  
 Egypt’s cities experienced a six-month respite in attacks after the successful 
British counterattack in December 1940 pushed the Italian forces out of Cyrenaica, and 
most civilians returned to full time residence in Alexandria. However, the German entry 
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to the North African front, combined with a successful German attack on Greece in April 
1941 that drew away a good deal of British army and air power, opened Alexandria and 
the Suez Canal to devastating attack. During the nights of June 4 through June 8, heavy 
firebombing killed 700 and wounded a similar number of civilians in Alexandria 
neighborhoods near the harbor, several times the total number of casualties to date, and 
causing an even bigger exodus than the prior summer’s attacks. The Luftwaffe kept up 
regular and heavy bombardment in 274 air sorties against Alexandria between June and 
October 1941. Administrators noted that casualty figures decreased over time simply 
because civilians had fled the most threatened areas.89  
 It was only after these severe attacks that the Egyptian government seriously 
approached the logistical tasks that restricted resources had prevented it from confronting 
earlier. The American consul had complained earlier that the state’s response to refugee 
and victim relief had been limited to soliciting donations from private organizations like 
the American Red Cross and to tapping into sequestered Italian funds.90 As with the other 
financial negotiations over defense arrangements, there was a naturally accelerating 
commitment after the most fatal attacks: a new public works levy for LE 40,000 for 
reconstruction on June 5 evolved into an LE 450,000 commitment for the current and 
coming budgetary year for new hospital capacity, refugee accommodation and in building 
new shelters.91 The British pledged LE 1 million for repairs and building shelters, 
conditional on accepting supervision over its expenditure by technical advisor Colonel 
Burt-Smith and more general supervision of civil defense wardens by the police (which 
still had a contingent of Europeans including two British commanders, Russell and 
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Fitzpatrick).92 Egyptian volunteer air raid wardens helped lead their neighbors to public 
shelters, to maintain traffic in blackout conditions, and to perform rudimentary 
firefighting.93 The minister of public works argued for increasing the annual salary base 
of the civil defense administration that ran this network and coordinated emergency 
medical and fire services from a mere LE 1,500 to LE 23,000 by hiring 200 new 
employees.94 This administration eventually evolved into a full ministry in August, 
assuming responsibilities and employees from Interior, Public Health and public works 
and reaching an annual budget of LE 56,000 by 1943.95  
 The Luftwaffe staged air raids on the Suez Canal in late 1941 from Crete, with a 
total of 34 night attacks from July to October, totaling 390 sorties. These were also of 
greater intensity and range than 1940, and destroyed a large section of the seaport and 
customs warehouses in Port Said on September 1, and killed 66 Egyptian soldiers in Suez 
on September 4.96 Cairo also received the heaviest bombing of the war in September and 
October 1941, killing dozens on several occasions. Muqattam and the Egyptian Mail 
pointed out that this contravened the German propaganda promise not to bomb Cairo 
during the holy month of Ramadan.97 The arrival of the Axis army to within 100 
kilometers of Alexandria in July 1942 threw the Egyptian civil defense effort into high 
gear, even if this effort ended up being unnecessary. These preparations again illustrate 
the artificial and fragile boundaries between British military and Egyptian civilian space. 
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Shortly after the Axis advance was stopped at El Alamein in July 1942, the Egyptians and 
British developed cooperative plans for a full evacuation from Alexandria. BTE 
commander Lt. General Robert Stone recommended a policy of “thinning out” the 
civilian population to avoid gridlock on the roads approaching Alexandria in case the 
Axis armies were able to break the defenses at El Alamein.98 Al-Nahhas retorted to Stone 
that it could only participate in such a scheme with funding from the British. Subsidizing 
transportation and accommodation for the prior evacuations had stretched the Egyptian 
budget for such measures to its utmost limit. In the meantime, another Anglo-Egyptian 
committee drew up detailed maps with transit and final evacuation zones in Eastern 
Gharbiya and Sharqiya for civilians routed through Abu Qir in such a way not to disrupt 
reinforcement from Tanta or the Desert road.99 However, the number and severity of air 
raids near or on civilian areas declined over the course of 1942 because of a limited stock 
of fuel for Axis air forces, which was tied up in the Russian campaign and then 
prioritized for the attack on Tobruk and for advancing tank squadrons to El Alamein. 
Moreover, the allies had shifted much more of their supply overland from Suez rather 
than through Alexandria harbor in reply to the attacks of 1941.100 Therefore, there were 
far fewer volunteers to participate in such a thinning out scheme in the first place; thanks 
to the Allied success at El Alamein, the Egyptian resources in this area were ultimately 
not further taxed. 
 The threat of air raids resonated widely through the Egyptian popular and artistic 
imagination. Weekly illustrated magazines published double-truck pictorial reports of the 
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destruction after large attacks on Alexandria, as well as human interest stories of refugees 
to the countryside and conditions in public air raid shelters.101 These magazines also 
employed cartoons to educate the public about safe conduct during a raid and also using 
air raids as material for political satire. There was scarcely a week in 1941 or 1942 when 
the prime minister was not depicted hiding from a warplane or bomb. Egypt’s literary 
authors and dramatists picked up on this episode in Egyptian life, but frequently went 
much further in exposing the social anxiety and fear of modernity beyond mere physical 
harm that raids represented. Perhaps the best known depictions of wartime Egypt are in 
Naguib Mahfouz’ al-Sukkariya (Sugar Street), the final volume of his Cairo Trilogy 
published in 1957, in which the elderly patriarch al-Sayyid Ahmad ʿAbd al-Gawad dies 
from a heart attack after the excitement of fleeing his home during an air raid, symbolic 
of the irrevocable change Egypt had undergone in the foregoing 30 years.102 Mahfouz 
addressed the terror of air raids for the residents of al-ʿAbbasiyya, the neighborhood 
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adjoining the largest military base in Cairo, in Khan al-Khalili, published in 1945, the 
first of his novels set in the present day after writing a trilogy set in ancient Egypt. A 
terrible raid triggers the plot, as the family moves to an older neighborhood surrounding a 
famous mosque to avoid the danger of further raids. Ahmad, the protagonist, remembers, 
“…one bomb had landed so close that everyone imagined that it had actually exploded 
inside their very hearts and minds. They all raised their hands as though to protect 
themselves in case the ceiling fell in on them. There was more screaming and praying; 
the word ‘God’ was on everyone’s lips… how can anyone possibly forget that awful 
screeching sound—the screech of death itself—as it made its inexorable way in their 
direction; how the entire building had shaken and the windows had rattled before it 
actually landed.”103 
 Mahmoud Taymour brought dread of air raids and life of the shelters to the center 
of his fictional narratives with a finely-tuned dose of social commentary in two plays he 
wrote during the war itself, Makhbaʾa Raqm 13 (Shelter 13, in 1941) and Qanabil 
(Bombs, in 1943). In Shelter 13, a dozen characters from the full social spectrum of 
Cairo’s urban society become trapped in a shelter after a bomb hits the building above its 
entrance. Taymour takes advantage of the limits of the stage to emphasize the 
claustrophobia and panic of prolonged enclosure in a small space. His dialogue 
investigates the way social and state authority constructs this space. At first, it is clear 
that Cairo has not yet received a serious attack, and the upper-class characters are mostly 
dismissive of the threat and indignant about being forced into the shelter by police on the 
street. A shoeshiner, old beggar and cake-seller continue to ply their trades in the shelter. 
                                                 




The aristocratic Nabil Bey goes so far to suggest that shelters should be constructed with 
multiple “classes,” like railway cars, to avoid this nuisance.104 A cabaret singing girl 
provides the requisite musical number and entertains the bored Cairenes, but offends the 
sensibility of the young daughter of a Pasha, a subtle hint at the sexually threatening 
aspect of close gender mixing across classes in shelters and the scandals mentioned 
above. After the intense raid blocks their exit for 14 hours, the social value of the lower 
class characters, especially al-Fuli the cakeseller, rises accordingly. Nabil Bey, who 
resented the interference of the government before, is now indignant that al-Fuli is 
breaking government price rules by demanding 100 piasters for one of his cakes — but 
he pays it.105  
 Qanabil poses an even deeper examination of the anomic violence of bombs and 
the techno-medicalization of modern life.106 Retired Sheikh ʿAbul Yusuf and Dirgham 
are Cairene neighbors and distant relatives; ʿAbul Yusuf is relatively better off, but his 
daughter Luliyya is engaged to Dirgham’s son Mahrous. After the death of all of his other 
children, Dirgham is anxious of losing Mahrous, who has volunteered as a soldier to 
work in civil defense. Dirgham persuades them all, including Mahrous and ʿAbu al-
Yusuf’s footloose son Nasih, to depart Cairo for ʿAbu al-Yusuf’s rural manor after a 
severe air raid occurs at the end of act one. It becomes evident the strains of war are 
preventing the characters from getting their priorities straight. Engrossed in civil defense 
preparations, ʿAbul Yusuf is neglecting the proper irrigation of his rice crop, despite the 
complaint of his bailiff Hawwash. Once in the countryside, ʿAbul Yusuf and Luliyya 
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become more interested in social improvement projects like distributing insecticide to the 
peasants to prevent the spread of malaria and continue to neglect the harvest. Seeking to 
prevent Mahrous’ return to the city, Dirgham hides his rifle from him, only for it to 
reappear Checkhov-style in a gun battle with the family of a peasant woman Nasih has 
seduced in his ample spare time in refuge from the city (Dirgham believes it is an air raid, 
even far outside the city). In the final act, the two families learn that the government is 
about to impose a quarantine on the village, which will trap them with the risk of 
catching malaria. They attempt to stay up until late in the evening and then drive back to 
Cairo under cover of night, but doze off during a servant’s (allegorical) story about a 
medieval sultan who sought in vain to avoid death. The play ends with ʿAbu al-Yusuf and 
Dirgham awakening in panic, presumably trapped in the quarantine. While containing 
more conventional critiques of government administration or of the laziness and self-
deception of the upper classes, these plays manage also to represent the fears and 
anxieties of these groups in a cutting fashion that most media avoided. Al-Hilal magazine 
cited both plays in a 1945 review of recent theater that best managed to capture the “feel 
of the war,” and judged it superior to the majority of “escapist, music-hall fare.”107  
 Public shelter building campaigns led to larger-scale state interventions in 
surveillance and housing, to try to reimpose order on hundreds of thousands of refugees. 
After the severe June 1941 air raids, the civil defense and interior bureaucracies struggled 
to keep track of the largest emergency internal migration to date in 20th century Egypt. 
300,000 people, almost half the population of Alexandria, fled the city, many with no 
homes to return to. Officials arranged special 1,600-person trains from Alexandria to 
Cairo in the first two weeks of June, and monitored travelers on other trains, producing 
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daily lists of 73,000 arrivals to Cairo and through traffic of 52,000 refugees traveling to 
Upper Egypt in the first week after the attack. Regional police departments reported the 
arrival of 30,000 in 20 Delta smaller towns, many of which only received a few hundred 
people each, but who were enough to significantly stress their resources.108 Cairo public 
and charitable private refugee shelters could take only very small numbers in groups of 
no more than one to three hundred, totaling around 4000. Official correspondence 
indicates the belief that the majority of refugees going to small towns or rural areas were 
going to stay with relatives; census data from 1937 indicates nearly one quarter of 
Egyptian Alexandrians were born outside the city, including 60,000 from Upper Egypt, 
and many more still had roots in the countryside.  
 The assumption families could absorb the excess population proved faulty almost 
immediately, judging by the avalanche of complaints and petitions the King’s diwan and 
bureaucracy received. Many were from individuals who wanted special treatment or 
compensation for the loss of a husband or son, or house, but many others ask for 
permission to move to another area because of overcrowding and food supply shortages 
or to complain the police in the village where they took refuge expelled them against 
their will.109 The government received notification from wealthy owners of villages in the 
Delta that were overrun with both relatives of farm laborers and strangers and had no 
medical facilities or sufficient services for these numbers of people. The congestion 
problem was particularly bad in the villages in lower Beheira, like Kafr al-Zayat and Kafr 
al-Dawwar, that were commuting distance from Alexandria. Many workers of crucial 
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industries tried to ensure the safety of their families by moving them to these towns and 
taking government-organized shared cars to their factories every day at subsidized rates.  
 The ministry of public health eventually developed a questionnaire that it required 
refugees to complete to be eligible to receive food or other assistance that allowed it to 
collect information about where or with whom these families were living, and what the 
productive labor capacity of its adult members was. The eventual solution to the housing 
crisis was to launch the first regime of public housing for the modern Egyptian state. 
Recognizing the hardship the refugees would face living in tents in winter, the council of 
ministers approved LE 200,000 program to build 3,140 brick and wood tenements that 
would accommodate on average 20 people each, in the major towns in Gharbiya and 
Buhayra.110 The Egyptian government did not consider this building campaign to be a 
permanent program, however, and it tried to share expenses for construction of public 
housing with industries that would repurchase the structures after the war to be workers’ 
housing, as they did with Misr Spinning and Weaving in Mahalla al-Kubra.111  
 By the end of the war, the unprecedented size of shantytowns at the heart of Cairo 
forced the state to intervene, for the first time, with fully funded public housing. Major 
unplanned settlements had grown up on land around the central railroad station and 
railroad lines in Bulaq and Shubra, and older buildings adjoining areas had become high-
density tenements. The residents of these communities, in this case, were more likely 
refugees from rural poverty and labor migrants (who are examined in chapters four and 
five). In early 1947, the council of ministers planned to demolish these slums “in the 
interest of public health in Bulaq, Sayyida Zeinab, Shubra and Khalifa,” and to build 
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6,100 units of public housing for 20,000 people on 200 feddans of land in Imbaba and 
100 feddans in Ezba al Kharbouti north of the urbanized area of Shubra.112 Such a plan 
was certainly in the interest of public security as well, to remove potentially politically 
troublesome elements from the railroad and its workshops, sites of increased trade union 
activity. 
 The plans (optimistically) included elementary and secondary schools for boys 
and girls, a vocational school, a hospital, two mosques, police station, a “social center” 
with a theater and cinema, and a tram line, all at a budget of LE 1.125 million, with the 
goal of charging residents no more than 15% of their wage in rent. Hints of the profit and 
political patronage to be earned through such a removal and demolition project peek 
through the thick concern of social reform. Administrators proclaimed that once the 
shacks are gone, the area could be properly urban planned and sold off to “become one of 
the best areas of the city.” By mid-1949, the committee’s staff reported that 100 feddans 
had been reclaimed from slums in Bulaq, a new street grid was being laid out and land 
sold to investors.113 Meanwhile, only 550 out of the planned 6,100 units had been built in 
Imbaba.114 Where the thousands of residents who had been pushed out of Bulaq but who 
did not receive units ended up, the record does not say. It does not appear the urban plan 
achieved its aim in the long run — its proximity to many small industrial factories 
encouraged working class migration. Ironically, President Sadat acted again to remove 
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the poor residents of Bulaq in 1979-1981 and attempted to redevelop the area, 
particularly land facing the corniche, with luxury apartments and five-star hotels.115 
 Besides the fear of violence and death that the air raids directly presented, 
Taymour’s plays reveal how the state-driven solutions to this threat themselves distorted 
social space. In both the air raid shelter and quarantines, Egyptians found that the 
government was willing in the name of security to compel the mixing of social classes 
and in particular, genders, in a way it never had before. The provision of emergency 
housing also raised social challenges related to the balance between granting services to 
needy subjects and maintaining appropriate familial and community linkages. Just as the 
government wished to return the housing stock to private ownership, they sought to 
accelerate the return of dependents and women to private care. For example, an article in 
al-Ithnayn wal-Dunya featured a group of dozens of young unmarried women from 
Alexandria whose families had been made destitute or killed in the air raids and flight to 
the countryside who sought a solution to their plight by seeking marriage, arranged 
through the Ministry of Social Affairs (which would ensure they received the appropriate 
bride price).116 This offer directly precipitated the satire in the cartoon from chapter one 
(Figure 1.3), published a few months later. The government now not only undertook to 
shelter Egyptians from violent bombing and then house them when rendered homeless 
after such attacks, but it sought to play matchmaker for homeless women and reverse-
engineer the Egyptian family in the name of social security. Where did this leave the 
paternal underpinning of the traditional Egyptian family? 
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In contrast to Foucault’s concept that contemporary states have moved toward security 
with diffused and privatized practices of power, Egypt in the war and late colonial era 
generally required visible and costly operations of force to produce increasingly complex 
divisions of space. These operations were the necessary result of the abstract legal 
jurisdictions that the state of siege enabled and the conditions of war activated. Close 
state surveillance of the limited but rich Egyptian agricultural land had long been a fact of 
governance. However, the events of war — including mass migrations of 600,000 rural 
Egyptians to the cities to find work, repeated emergency evacuations of as many as 
400,000 Alexandrians to the interior to escape heavy air raids, along with the garrisoning 
of 350,000 and the transit of more than a million Allied troops — demanded a shift from 
a static to a fluid definition of space in security policy. Maintaining public order between 
soldiers with legal immunities and the Egyptian people required an illiberal fictive 
division of public space, creating shifting zones which Egyptians were not allowed to 
traverse or to view. Although immunities for foreigners and the Mixed Courts ended 
shortly after the war, the Egyptian state’s finely tuned distinctions between civilian space 
and military or security space endured. This presentation poses important questions about 
the way this spacial logic continued after the British turned over the wartime military 
bases that occupied the desert space framing the major cities of the delta directly to the 
Egyptian military. The Egyptian military’s ownership of desert land is one of its principal 






Empire of the Granary 
The Political Economy of State-Controlled Agriculture, Trade and Consumption 
 
Winston Churchill was a frequent visitor to Cairo after the major British offensive effort 
shifted to the Middle East in 1941. Ambassador Sir Miles Lampson hosted Churchill at 
his residence and recorded the events of these visits in his diary. He implies this close 
contact, along with British military success at El Alamein, led to his elevation to the 
peerage as Lord Killearn on January 1, 1943. Churchill became friendly in his meetings 
with King Faruq despite Faruq’s frequent hostility to the British leadership and its 
coercive treatment of him. Although Churchill at first found him flippant and cynical, he 
mused, “he wasn’t entirely sure that something might not yet be made of the boy.”1 Their 
shared aristocratic outlook on life in general and Egyptian commoners in particular, love 
of cigars and guns, and their orientation towards the big picture of the war’s outcome 
helped foster this relationship. 
 Churchill’s interactions with Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas were 
never as easygoing. During a meeting on January 28, 1943, Killearn noted,  
[Churchill]… mentioned the question of supplies, emphasizing the vital necessity 
of getting what we wanted from Egypt [i.e., surplus rice]. This drew from Nahas 
(sic) a long explanation of local difficulties and more particularly, how could we 
expect to get what we wanted from Egypt in the way of cereals, etc. If we did not 
supply her with adequate nitrates. All of this of course was well over the head of 
                                                 
1 Killearn and Evans, The Killearn Diaries, 230-231. 
 
 170 
the P.M., who naturally is not concerned with such details… I was afraid at one 
moment, when Nahas was well in his stride, that Winston was going to sleep. He 
sat with his eyes shut and looked like it, but in actual fact he was only getting 
bored.2 
 
 It is a tribute to Churchill’s confidence in Killearn that he could find matters of 
food logistics, military or civilian, so boring. Although not as dramatic as fighting and the 
adoption of new military technology, historians have argued the careful management of 
food in the Second World War was just as crucial to the eventual success of the Allies in 
the long war of economic attrition. Strict British agricultural planning and the American 
cornucopia helped keep industrial output high on the home front and morale up among 
soldiers fighting overseas.3 The Japanese military, scattered across the archipelago of 
South East Asia, by contrast suffered bitterly from lack of food.4 German efforts to 
maintain high rations for German citizens while ruthlessly exploiting the industrial labour 
of underfed Poles and Ukranians from conquered territory backfired, as the lack of farm 
labor and general chaos in these areas prevented them becoming the breadbaskets that 
German economic managers had hoped.5 
 Allied states prioritized food supply for their militaries and metropoles, although 
the resulting suffering and death in their colonies did not compare to the genocidal intent 
of Nazi food policies. The balancing act often required pragmatic stances. By late 1942, 
the looming threat of food shortages leading to mass rural and urban uprisings were 
haunting British administrators from Alexandria to Rangoon. The worldwide shortage of 
                                                 
2 Killearn and Evans, The Killearn Diaries, 247-248. 
3 Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society, 1939-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1977), 245-293; Ina. Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 
1939-1955 (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
4 E. M. Collingham, The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food (London: Allen Lane, 
2011), 273-315. 
5 J. Adam. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London ; 
New York: Allen Lane, 2006), 513-551. 
 
 171 
fertilizer, rice and wheat in 1942, which caused a severe famine in Bengal that was 
unfolding as Churchill yawned, has drawn critical historical attention to the role this 
event played in the Indian nationalist movement.6 The relative success of the American-
Anglo-Egyptian management of supply for Egypt and the Middle East, through the 
Middle East Supply Center (MESC), has made it the subject of several hagiographic late-
imperial institutional memoirs but not much critical historical analysis.7 This institutional 
writing from the 1950s and early 1960s sought to explain the failure of the last phase of 
British neocolonial influence after the war, in its modernization and development 
programs largely patterned on the MESC.8 The chief British economist for the MESC 
during the war, E.M.H. Lloyd, has written about the logistical, ecological and 
monetary/fiscal natures of the MESC’s tasks without particularly touching on the 
political nature or effects of coerced neocolonial economic policy formation. 
 Robert Vitalis and Steven Heydemann provide one of the only academic 
treatments of the MESC that judges its effects on postwar policy in Egypt and Syria. 
They identify the impact of both world wars as a major historiographical gap in the 
understanding of mid-century and postcolonial political economies across Africa and 
Asia. They portray the total control over all imports the Allies exercised during the war 
on shipping as a direct cause of the fundamental shift away from the colonial export-
oriented free market, arguing, “…wartime regulatory changes did not just promote the 
transition from market liberalism to statism. They shifted Middle East political 
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economies onto a distinctive path, constructing a singular, if flexible template for how 
statism would become organized… If state elites in Egypt and Syria were not themselves 
steeped in the techniques of demand management, they were nonetheless heavily 
influenced by the Keynesian-esque regulatory environment that Allied bureaucrats 
created, one in which state intervention easily acquired legitimacy as a solution to 
problems of economic development.”9  
 Their chapter identifies many of the problems the MESC faced when fitting 
policy goals to the topography of local politics, particularly when it came to corruption in 
distribution of supplies and opposition to the expansion of state fiscal structures through 
the expansion of taxation. However, lacking in-depth archival research into the Egyptian 
and Syrian government bureaucracies, they can not explain why the MESC faced this 
trouble, or how specifically these struggles shaped future policy. I also suggest that their 
focus on Allied administrators as the most important filter through which Egyptian 
politicians and society understood and managed the war economy slights the full political 
and cultural context in which these negotiations occurred.  
 The first important context is the framing concept of this dissertation, that the 
emerging concept of state security, and not merely economic development, was the 
principal lens through which the Egyptian authorities understood wartime management 
policies. Although the war crisis produced state planning policies similar to the 
Keynesian policies that had been implemented throughout western economies in the 
1930s, the basic economic problem in Egypt was different from those classic 
Keynsianism addressed. Rather than requiring increased government spending to 
stimulate demand on a depressed economy, in Egypt the economy groaned under an 
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influx of fiat money backed by British credit that flooded to Egyptian contractors and 
laborers, coupled with wide reaching shortages of food and other essentials. The model 
for the Egyptian state that Allied administrators and Egyptian politicians adopted through 
trial and error was not that of a caretaker that slowly guided society towards greater 
income equality so as to improve the demand basis of the economy. Rather, it imposed 
sudden unplanned subsidies to make sure the majority could purchase the minimum 
amounts of necessities to prevent mass riots breaking out in the street.  
 The other important context for wartime state economic management was 
preexisting political discourses about the role the Egyptian state should take to provide 
welfare services to its subjects. Despite a general intellectual malaise among the liberal 
elite with regard to increased government social services, a small wing of effendi 
intellectuals and technocrat academics was taking great strides in connecting public 
education, public health and more daring ideas of redistribution to improve living 
conditions for the peasantry to a modernist definition of Egyptian nationalism.  
  A mixture of hesitation and haste in Egyptian war policymaking, along with a 
chronic shortage of resources and managerial skill, meant that many of these policies 
failed, or were always in the process of almost-failing. However, their breakdown 
provides an opening in the archival record to examine the state at work. The neocolonial 
context of the war — marked by short-sighted demands and inter-agency competition 
among the British — certainly aggravated Egyptian administrators’ problems. Moreover, 
the monopoly conditions, combined with the deep political insecurity of the Wafd Party, 
made corruption in supply and import licensing widespread. These problems did nothing 
to discredit the overall idea that state management was necessary for social security. This 
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idea in fact became entrenched during the postwar and 1948 Palestine war-era austerity. 
Despite the inextricable interconnection of economic factors, this chapter will focus on 
the way the war affected agricultural production and the consumption of food and 
imported goods resulting from the world shipping crisis, or the “supply” side of the 
economy. The following chapter treats changes in the labor market, prices and fiscal 
policy on the “demand” side of the economy. 
 
MANAGING A CLOSED DOOR POLICY 
The war’s first blow to the Egyptian economy was the loss of the German and Polish 
market for the 1940 raw cotton crop, followed by most of the remaining continental 
European countries for the 1941 crop and Japan in 1942. These states had consumed 45% 
of Egypt’s cotton in 1939.10 The ownership and use of much Egyptian agricultural land 
had been transformed over the course of the 19th century from peasant subsistence 
farming into private cotton plantations for export to Europe.11 The Egyptian soil and 
climate was particularly suitable to the production of long and extra-long staple cotton, 
and by 1900 Egypt produced 70% of the world’s supply of this luxury good, although the 
United States and India produced much larger volumes of cotton overall. Long staple 
cotton was not only bound to European capital and factories in Lancashire, the Ruhr 
Valley and Milan for manufacture, it was also less marketable in Egypt because the 
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average Egyptian could not afford expensive fine cotton fabric.12 There had therefore 
been little investment in spinning and weaving machinery in Egypt that could produce 
textiles to European market quality, and making inexpensive cloth with expensive raw 
cotton was not cost effective. 
 While I focused in chapter two on the constitutional and political debates around 
the founding the state of siege, parliament actually spent more time during the 
extraordinary session in October 1939 debating how emergency powers should be used to 
subsidize threatened cotton growers. Ultimately, the British government agreed to form a 
commission with the Egyptian government to purchase any cotton offered to it that could 
not find a foreign buyer, for which both parties would share the cost. The commission 
purchased 6.7 million of 9 million qintars produced in 1940. The UK Ministry of Supply 
assumed control of importing cotton from private British agents (who had previously 
acquired 2.7 million qintars or 32% of the 1939 crop).13  
 The nature of the economic problem changed in June 1940 when Italy joined the 
war, its submarine fleet closed the Mediterranean to shipping, and the world committed 
more shipping tonnage overall to war purposes. Despite the growing Allied demand for 
cotton, the British simply could not transport it all to the requisite factories, and they 
began to push the Egyptians to pass legislation restricting the 1941 cotton crop in favor of 
food crops. Ironically, when Prime Minister Hassan Sabry, shortly after succeeding ʿAli 
Mahir in June 1940, created a Ministry of Supply to manage kerosene ration cards and 
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Macmillan, 2004) discusses the development of the market reputation of long-staple Egyptian cotton in this 
period. 
13 FO 371/31556, J1850, Scrivener Memo on Egyptian Cotton, 18 April 1942. The commission purchased 
the lint cotton at an average price of LE 70 a ton, which was an improvement over the previous year’s 
average of LE 57 per ton, however, cotton growers unhappily suspected that the British would reap even 
higher prices on its reserves when wartime scarcity became apparent. 
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any other shortages that arose, its first agricultural task was to act as a buyer of last resort 
for surplus wheat, rice and onions from the strong 1939-1940 winter growing season.14 
The British military accepted 20,000 tons of Egyptian wheat in the first half of 1941.15 
These surplus conditions were short lived, however, and yields started falling 
precipitously with the winter crop of 1941 because of bad weather and soil exhaustion 
from lack of fertilizer.  
 In addition to technological and diplomatic conditions of worldwide war that 
made the near total isolation of the Egyptian economy possible, a recent revolution in 
artificial fertilizers also compounded the Egyptian economy’s vulnerability. In the course 
of just 20 years, Egyptian land had become some of the most heavily fertilized in the 
world. As new irrigation works built during the British occupation era expanded the areas 
of the country with adequate water to plant crops in three distinct seasons during the year, 
vital nutrients in Egypt’s soil began to be depleted. Of the three most important minerals 
most plants need, Egypt’s soil had adequate potassium naturally, and rock phosphorus 
was present in mineral deposits in the desert east of the Nile, but the intensive crop 
rotations used up nitrogen in the soil faster than it could be replenished, even with 
occasional fallow cycles. Chilean nitrate, better known as saltpeter, used in the 
production of both nitrogenous fertilizer and explosives, had been the world’s only 
substantial source of solid chemical nitrogen prior to the 20th century. Egyptian 
consumption of Chilean nitrate-based fertilizers had been 70,000 tons in 1914. 
Consumption increased exponentially after the end of the First World War because the 
introduction of artificial fertilizers caused the average price to fertilize a typical feddan to 
                                                 
14 DWQ 0081-019346, Royal Decree founding the Ministry of Supply, 27 June 1940. 
15 Lloyd, Food and Inflation, 119. 
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fall from LE 25 to LE 5.16 Consumption tripled in particular in the last half of the 1930s 
because of increases in credit available to poorer peasants and a new government policy 
of import tariffs to encourage the growth of wheat, which responds much better to 
fertilizer than cotton.17 Egyptian farmers consumed 500,000 tons of fertilizer per year by 
1939. By comparison, the entire United States consumed an average of 334,000 tons and 
Great Britain consumed merely 50,000 tons per year of nitrogenous fertilizers in the years 
before the war.18  
 The Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Industry had realized as early as October 
1939 that stocks of nitrogenous fertilizers would be threatened by world wartime 
demand, and encouraged traders to increase their amount of imports with guarantees the 
ministry would purchase any surplus in the following season. Surely enough, the 
Ministry of Finance reported in December 1940 the difficulty of Egyptian traders in 
acquiring the 200,000 tons necessary for the winter crop. The Ministry of Supply made 
the difficult decision to directly acquire 150,000 tons and ration fertilizer in that and 
coming seasons. The government was only able to obtain 85,000 tons by early 1941, 
which they held in reserve until the coming year.19 The average farmer only received 
only 100 kg of nitrates per feddan for wheat sown for harvest in May 1941, where prewar 
usage had been about 175 kg per feddan. Because of corruption in distribution, smaller 
peasants received much less than this. Robert Vitalis has chronicled the epic 20-year 
                                                 
16 In the First World War, the Allied blockade of Chilean nitrate caused the German military to commit 
resources to developing the synthesis of artificial nitrates for fertilizers and explosives. Carl Bosch and 
Franz Haber of BASF (later the largest component of IG Farben) developed a chemical method that could 
capture surplus nitrogen from petrochemical refinery processes into ammonia, an important building block 
for fertilizer. 
17 Alan Richards, Egypt’s Agricultural Development, 1800-1980: Technical and Social Change (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 131. 
18 Mirko Lamer, The World Fertilizer Economy (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), 643. 




capitalist competition to build a fertilizer plant connected to a hydroelectric power plant 
in Aswan as an import substitution solution, but from the minute the fertilizer shortage 
became apparent in 1940, importing the machinery to build a factory rather than 
importing the finished product fell to low priority.20 The control over this job was subject 
to intense business group infighting, and the plant was not completed until long after the 
war and shortages were over. 
 Despite state administrators’ long experience planning agricultural sowing 
schedules in order to distribute irrigation water fairly, Egyptian government intelligence 
about the final crop yield and the private domestic trade of produce remained 
rudimentary. Government officials were taken aback when wheat did not begin arriving 
on the market after the harvest in May 1941. Estimates were made that the wheat harvest 
was one sixth smaller than average, and trade officials suspected producers had begun 
hoarding their crop in anticipation of an increase in the government’s fixed prices. The 
inevitable price increase came June 2, but it was accompanied with a mandate by military 
proclamation for bakers to mix 10% rice or corn flour into their dough. Still, the bakers of 
Cairo and Alexandria went on strike for several days because many could not obtain 
enough flour of any variety to fulfill demand.21 In response, the British military released 
some of its stocks of flour purchased from the 1940 crop and canceled any further 
purchases. The British Ministry of Food also arranged emergency consignments of wheat 
from Australia. With the temporary shortage of flour ended, private sales began to 
                                                 
20 Robert Vitalis, When Capitalists Collide: Business Conflict and the End of Empire in Egypt (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995). 
21 DWQ 0081-026615, Alexandria Chamber of Commerce to Egyptian Federation of Industries, 25 Oct. 
1945. See also Kirk, The Middle East in the War, 202. 
 
 179 
resume, especially from poorer peasants who could not afford to hoard for very long, 
although periodic shortages and bakery strikes were a feature of the following year.  
 While this first wheat supply crisis was being resolved, Egypt’s cotton was 
ripening in the field, and with it, the recurring political struggle over its sale. The 
government had passed a few minor laws restricting the sowing of cotton in the prior 
year. But these laws failed to decrease the size of the crop, which was estimated again to 
be 9 million qintars.22 With the British now bailing the government out with supplies of 
wheat, they had much greater leverage to demand far stricter reductions in cotton for the 
coming season, so that food crops could be grown instead.23 Although no British officials 
ever explicitly threatened either cutting off the emergency wheat or simply leaving the 
cotton unfunded, which could ruin small cotton growers, their firm position forced 
parliament to compromise in key areas. In the final settlement, Parliament passed a law 
restricting cotton acreage to 27% of land in the delta and 23% in Upper Egypt. This 
ultimately reduced the size of the following year’s cotton crop by one third. 
 By the autumn of 1941, policies governing the supply of fertilizer and the growth 
and marketing of cotton and wheat had become inextricably linked. The British would 
henceforth use their monopoly control over foreign trade into Egypt, especially on the 
imports of fertilizer, to negotiate British prerogatives in Egypt’s agricultural policies. 
They facilitated this mode of control, in Egypt and across the region including Iran after 
                                                 
22 0081-075556 410218 Law 6, restricting cotton As Promulgated 410220, Law 6 forbids the cultivation of 
cotton on land used for Shitawi crops in the 1940-41 season, that is, Fuul, Halaba, Lentils, Kitan or Barley. 
23 FO 371-35556 J 1850. Memo by Evelyn Baring (the second son of Lord Cromer), 14 Nov 1941. They 
also demanded a lower price for cotton, despite sharp increases in the American price, monopoly control on 
exports for the purchasing commission, and even that the government impose new direct taxes to finance 
the Egyptian share of the purchases. The government agreed to maintain the purchase price at 1940 levels 
shared equally between the British and Egyptian governments, with a 15% bonus paid by solely the 
Egyptian government. The Egyptian side of the commission financed part of its purchase and the bonus 




the British and Russian invasions there in August, by creating the Middle East Supply 
Center. The MESC’s most important task was the collection of intelligence about 
agricultural production and consumption in the region for the purpose of planning import 
allocations that it designed to determine local economic policies. The officers of the 
MESC, along with British Commercial Counselor Charles Empson, became the primary 
representatives in a series of Anglo-Egyptian joint supply committees in which these 
policies were hammered out on the subject of wheat, cotton, sugar, nitrates and internal 
transport, among other subjects.  
 Egyptian and British administrators fought intensely over the form and powers of 
these committees for the following year. In the last several months before the implosion 
of his ministry, Husayn Sirri was caught between the intransigence of the large 
landowners in parliament who refused to pass or enforce tougher measures to obtain 
agricultural produce at fixed prices, and the historically novel situation that certain 
imported foods or fertilizer were unavailable at any price. To give some credit to Sirri, 
the political problems of shifting the entrenched political-economic system of Egypt were 
familiar and permanent, while the shipping outlook could shift from positive to negative 
depending on how disastrous the German U-boat attacks were in the North Atlantic 
month after month. British plans and promises for deliveries frequently changed at the 
last minute. While the MESC was in its infancy, before many of the joint committees 
mentioned above existed, Sirri made several efforts to obtain imported supplies directly 
from their sources, only to be rebuffed by the British Ministry of War Transport through 
Lampson.  Sirri sent Lampson a schedule of imports of roughly 30,000 tons of fertilizer 
and 30,000 tons of either wheat or corn per month from November until August 1942. He 
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appealed to Lampson in the political elite’s shared language of social crisis: “the shortage 
of bread which is one of the staple foods of the people would be liable to give rise to 
disturbances. It is imperative for the sake of public security and tranquility that its supply 
should be assured.”24 
 However much Lampson agreed with that sentiment, he made forceful moves to 
impress upon Sirri the need to make Egyptian farmers produce more food. With the 
Ministry of War Transport at his back, he first sought to end the Egyptian tactic of 
seeking supplies outside of British control: not only would this lead to confused “double-
booking” of cargo space in some cases, he said, “direct negotiation of this nature are 
contrary to Egypt’s own interest since they tend to raise prices against the British 
authorities and hence against the Egyptian government themselves.”25 The recent creation 
of the MESC aimed to reduce the region’s reliance on imports to the greatest extent 
possible, which would require even further reforms in domestic policy. As Lampson 
wrote, 
… The supplies of cereals on the way to the Middle East have to be allocated 
where the need is greatest. While information as to stocks is being provided by 
other territories concerned, so that a clear picture of the wheat position there will 
emerge no such information has so far been provided for Egypt. (underline in 
original)… In fact, with barely six months passed since the last local wheat 
harvest, the only assumption can be drawn, failing evidence to the contrary, is that 
                                                 
24 DWQ 0081-026615 Sirri to Lampson 27 Sep. 1941. 
25 DWQ 026615, Lampson to Sirri 10 Nov. 1941. 
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a real condition of shortage cannot yet have been reached in Egypt and that 
considerable stocks of wheat must exist in the country.26  
In his last message on the subject before his resignation, Sirri reminded Lampson that he 
had passed military proclamations requiring all agricultural growers to declare their 
stocks of wheat in September, but that the amount they discovered was far less than the 
British estimates. In his last weeks as prime minister, Sirri had also achieved another 
restriction on cotton sowing to 23 and 15 percent in lower and upper Egypt respectively, 
and prohibited letting any land lie fallow in the summer season.27 Strategically released 
wheat imports, even 30,000 tons out of to a total crop of 1.12 million tons, kept the 
market liquid and prevented serious unrest through 1941. But the prioritization of wheat 
over fertilizer meant effectively no fertilizer was imported for the last half of the year, 
with disastrous long-term effects on agricultural yields.  
 The advent of the Wafd in February 1942 accelerated government control of 
agricultural production. By putting the Wafd in government, the British had neutralized 
the strongest landowner opposition to policies designed to grow more wheat. Instead, the 
Wafd acquired full responsibility for feeding the nation. Unlike Sirri, Al-Nahhas and the 
Wafd-dominated parliament (after the March 1942 parliamentary elections) had the 
political capital to execute the policies. Getting al-Nahhas to play a more proactive role in 
economic management took further persuasion on the part of the British, but once the 
Wafd was committed to state ownership of wheat, it applied itself with aplomb to 
prosecuting the policy to its advantage.  
                                                 
26 DWQ 0081-026615 Lampson to Sirri, December 1, 1941. (Underline in original) 
27 DWQ 0081-026615, Sirri to Lampson, 24 Jan. 1942. 
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 Sirri’s failure demonstrated that a good price alone was not going to lure grain 
hoarders to sell, so al-Nahhas passed military proclamations in April to the effect that the 
government was directly acquiring 5.5 million out of an estimated total 8 million ardebs 
for town consumption and reserves by making compulsory purchases from every 
cultivator according to his means (1 ardeb of wheat = 150 kg). However, the initial policy 
contained a regressive loophole: it banned private trade only until the end of August. This 
forced smaller-scale cultivators who needed to pay creditors to sell to the government 
early at the fixed price. At the same time, it allowed large landowners to hoard the 
majority of their crop in anticipation of private trade resuming or an increase in the 
government price. When the wheat stocks ran out once again just before the harvest in 
May 1942, the British arranged for a last minute loan of 24,000 tons of wheat directly 
from imported British military reserves (see Figure 4.2), but only if the Wafd promised to 
pay back the loan before the next crop and to create a joint committee with MESC 
members so they could monitor the progress of the government scheme.28 It was the 
pressure of this committee, after the first month of collections pulled in a disappointing 
1.3 million ardebs, that forced al-Nahhas to end any time or quantity limits to the 
government monopoly.29 Once a policy of total government acquisition was clarified in 
an announcement in Al-Ahram newspaper on June 26 (drafted in the joint committee’s 
third meeting,) wheat deliveries from the countryside began to arrive in large quantities at 
the government storehouses.  
                                                 
28 FO 922/65, Minutes of meeting between British authorities, Makram ʿEbeid and Amin Osman, 21 May 
1942. 




 The 1942 summer season was the first crop after the major cotton restrictions had 
been passed. Extra barley planting resulted in a large surplus, and trade in this grain was 
not restricted. However, yields on maize fell precipitously, in part because the 
government fertilizer allowance had been reduced to a mere 20 kg per feddan for this 
crop. The government therefore changed the subsidized bread mixture formula to include 
more barley. By the next wheat harvest in May 1943, the government had obtained 4.4 
million ardebs of wheat. This was lower than their target of 5.5 million in the prior year, 
but with total consumption in the city governorates and provincial centers of just less than 
4 million ardebs, they were able to repay the British military wheat loan from the year 
before and keep a stock of 400,000 ardebs as the new wheat came in.30 In fact, the 
government’s overconfidence in its monopoly control on grain allowed it to slacken 
enforcement of cotton restrictions in the following 1944 wheat season, which combined 
with soil exhaustion led to the worst wheat crop of the war and renewed shortages from 
1944 to 1945. 
 With Egypt nearly self-sufficient in wheat after mid-1942, the British shifted 
quickly to use fertilizer and machinery imports as leverage to obtain Egyptian surpluses 
of two crucial food crops for its empire: rice for its South Asian colonies and sugar for 
redistribution in the region, again to reduce long distance shipping. Climatic conditions 
and crop rotations in the Egyptian delta are ideal for growing a large amount of rice. 
Unlike wheat, rice was not the principal staple of the Egyptian diet, and there was always 
a surplus. With restrictions on cotton, this surplus increased.  
 After losing Burma to the Japanese military at the end of April 1942, Britain 
desperately needed rice for Ceylon, but it was only able to obtain a surplus of 15,000 tons 
                                                 
30 FO 922/66 Joint Wheat Commission statistical annex, 15 May 1943. 
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from mainland India. By late 1942, they wished to obtain the estimated 250,000 ton rice 
surplus from Egypt. Al-Nahhas quickly imposed a LE 50 per ton export tax on rice, 
which sold for only LE 23 domestically, to exploit high global prices. Lampson described 
this as the “first real trial of strength” with al-Nahhas, and was uncharacteristically 
willing to export the rice by subterfuge or force if necessary.31 The commercial wing of 
the British Embassy instructed the British office of the joint censorship board to begin 
secretly culling Egyptian letters and telegrams for any information about the commercial 
disposal of rice (and sugar).32  
 At this point, the institutional specialization of the British war bureaucracy began 
causing internecine competition. The MESC was interested in keeping domestic affairs in 
the Middle Eastern stable. The Ministry of War Transport wanted only to maximize free 
shipping space. The Ministry of Food needed to acquire food for areas outside the Middle 
East. Finally, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, the private but not-for-profit 
corporation that was actually financing and executing the purchasing deals wished to 
obtain the best price. Although 75,000 tons of rice were guaranteed in the deal connected 
to the 1942 loan of wheat, the Egyptians held out for a confirmed schedule of nitrate 
fertilizer imports before making a deal for the remainder.33 The Ministry of War 
Transport was generally dismissive of the “Egyptian addiction to nitrate,” and was 
                                                 
31 FO 371/31557, J 5136, Nahhas to Foreign Office, 15 Dec. 1942. Moreover, he wished to sell the rice by 
competitive auction to the British and private traders, who could drive the price up, instead of on a 
cooperative “cost plus” basis with the British government. 
32 FO 371/35557, J 814, Censorship Rice Report no. 8, 1 Feb 1943. In particular, Egyptian traders were 
receiving strong inquiries from Turkey and Syria for the rice despite the high export taxes. 
33 FO 371/35557, Anthony Eden to Johnstone, Department of Overseas Trade, 23 Feb 1943. Eden wrote, 
“We expected to be able to supply Egypt during 1943 on the reduced scale of 10,000 tons [of fertilizer] a 
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big stick to secure not only this year’s harvest but also a lien on the next harvest. Then suddenly… we were 
faced with a very different situation. Owing to the restriction on shipping from North America we were told 
by the ministry of war transport that no more shipments of nitrate could be programmed for an indefinite 
number of months ahead.” 
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reluctant to send any at the end of 1942. However, the pressure of the Foreign Office 
forced the ministry to reallocate space to fertilizer to guarantee the 10,000 tons. In return, 
Egypt waived the export taxes on rice, sold 75,000 tons of milled rice at a fixed price of 
LE 25 per ton and allowed the MESC to acquire a further 83,000 tons on the open market 
at slightly higher prices and a second 75,000-ton contract from the Egyptian government 
in June 1943.34 After observing the relative success of the state wheat monopoly, the 
Egyptian government shifted to a compulsory purchasing scheme for the October 1943 
rice crop. But rather than creating it to ensure enough food for Egyptians directly, al-
Nahhas instituted this policy to secure his long-negotiated British fertilizer-for-rice 
bargain.  
 Although the amounts involved were smaller than the rice crop, supplying the 
British with sugar was politically more challenging because the private sugar monopoly 
was under the control of powerful industrialist Ahmed ʿAbbud.35 The Egyptian 
government created protectionist tariffs in 1931 and granted the Sugar Company a 
domestic monopoly to ward off the effects of depressed global sugar prices. In return, the 
company’s convention granted an average 80% of the company’s profits to the 
government. However, this 10-year agreement expired in 1941, and Parliament and 
ʿAbbud battled over a new contract for three years. In this time, the company ceased 
remitting the government’s share of profits. ʿAbbud was in no hurry, because there was 
no chance that effective competition to the company’s hegemony could exist under war 
conditions. He took this opportunity to consolidate his control over the company, after 
                                                 
34 Lloyd, Food and Inflation, 250. However, this contract fell short by 22,000 tons. 
35 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 19-53. Chapter one examines the connection between the sugar monopoly and 
the 1944 outbreak of famine and malaria in Upper Egypt, where most of the sugar cane is grown, spread by 
mosquitoes breeding in standing water after the extension of irrigation in these areas. The DDT used to 
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purchasing the outstanding shares of Henri Naus Bey, a Belgian industrialist who had 
been a major shareholder, upon Naus’ death in 1938.36  
 After the ban on growing cotton in basin irrigation areas of Upper Egypt in 1942, 
ʿAbbud persuaded his suppliers to commit their summer season to growing more sugar 
cane. In return, the sugar company required more machinery to process the raw cane. 
ʿAbbud took advantage of his independence from government control to direct a much 
larger portion of his profits towards reinvestment in the company, and he made increasing 
demands on imports from the British in exchange for sugar exports. ʿAbbud asked for LE 
41 per ton, while the Ministry of Food wished to pay LE 25. The British began by 
bluffing ʿAbbud, claiming in December 1942 that they would not negotiate on price as 
they had obtained supplies elsewhere.37 After six months of long negotiations, ʿAbbud 
finally agreed to sell 60,000 tons of sugar in June 1943 for LE 27 per ton as a loan that 
the British would sell back to the company at the same price after the war. There is little 
doubt ʿAbbud was aided in these negotiations by the ascent of his principal ally in the 
Wafd party, Amin Osman, who had become Minister of Finance at the end of 1942. After 
long negotiations, Osman was able to push a new convention through opposition in the 
senate that essentially forgave all the government share of profit ʿAbbud had used in the 
intervening years.38 The government also allowed a sharp increase in the fixed domestic 
retail sugar price, which helped satisfy ʿAbbud when the 1944 crop had very little surplus 
to export to the British at such high prices. The public’s emotional connection to 
consumer goods, and in particular the few luxuries the masses could afford like sugar, tea 
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and tobacco, meant ʿAbbud was the target of public rage when these negotiations became 
public. 
 
CARROT AND STICK: MODES OF POLICY ENFORCEMENT 
Uncertainty in economic management at the level of international diplomacy made for 
chaos in the domestic execution of supply policies. The dissonance between the official 
ideology that war measures were taken in the interest of the public security, and the 
visible reality of bad implementation and corruption, had a demoralizing effect on 
Egyptian society. This was not lost on the media or the effendi bureaucrats whom the 
media mainly addressed.  
 Before the start of mandatory purchases in 1942, the Ministry of Supply had no 
mission other than to act as vendor for the small amounts of grain peasants decided to sell 
it, and as the state wholesaler of rationed kerosene. This administration was at first a 
ministry in name only, because it had none of its own employees, but merely used 
employees attached to it from the commerce and industry, interior and finance ministries 
part time. It had no separate office space and it had no budget in 1940 and early 1941. In 
the 1941-1942 budget, parliament allocated it exactly LE 4,079. Most importantly, the 
Minister of Supply had no more authority than a secretary within the Supreme Council of 
Supplies, the ministerial committee that determined supply policy.  
 After the Wafd came to power and began building up the ministry, the new 
director of the Supply Ministry complaints department, ʿAbdel Halim Nusayr, wrote, 
“The first minister was appointed without jurisdiction, which made the ministry like a 
 
 189 
body without a soul or a soldier without a weapon.”39 Having multiple ministries 
collaborate on a single issue could produce headaches enough, but the supply 
bureaucracy was required both to arrange the acquisition and distribution of government 
supplies and also to stop crimes either in the retailing of these supplies or infringement of 
price controls on many other privately traded goods. Even after bread flour was 
subsidized and its formula fixed in June 1941, there was no coordination between the 
Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Interior in matters of surveillance, arrest and 
prosecution of corrupt millers and bakers. As discussed in prior chapters, this ministry’s 
authority was mostly founded on military proclamations under the state of siege, and in 
1941, the attributes of the military courts, military parquet and their relationship to the 
police and Ministry of Interior were also still vague. Under Nusayr’s plan, supply 
ministry officials became the chief repository of investigation reports of supply code 
violations used by the police, parquet, and the Military Governor’s office. He also 
requested monthly reports from the military parquet on the status of all cases seen by the 
military courts, to anticipate any of the defendants’ semi-formal appeals to the military 
governor to suspend the judgment.40 These reforms did not come too soon, because the 
volume of criminal supply cases tripled over the course of 1942. These bureaucratic 
forms continued developing over the course of the war. Al-Nahhas only finally made the 
Minister of Supply the top authority in matters of legal execution of supply laws and 
                                                 
39 DWQ 0069-005607, ʿAbdel Halim Nusayr, Secret report on the Supply complaints department, 8 June, 
1942. 
40 Ibid. In practice, as discussed in Chapter 2, El-Nahhas built up the military governor’s office to perform 
this task, and to get analysis from the government legal office. 
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military proclamations in July 1943;41 A permanent office of the military parquet was 
only set up at the Ministry of Supply in 1945.42  
 As a repressive apparatus, the Ministry of Supply exerted much more of its energy 
on the urban black market than either on rural distribution problems or on rural grain 
requisition. However, I will analyze its role in managing agricultural production and in 
building wholesale reserves here, and its role in distribution in the final section.  
 It is important to stress again that the compulsory purchase of wheat starting in 
1942 was a last-resort measure into which the British technocrats had to push the 
Egyptians. The first and most important mechanisms to compel farmers to grow the 
desired mixture of crops and to sell them to the government, were sale price and the 
availability of cheap credit. The wholesale price of unmilled wheat and maize had been 
fixed at LE 1.5 per ardeb at the start of the war. In 1941, during the first shortage, the 
government raised the price to LE 2, which was in line with the general rise in the cost of 
living and probably helped end that temporary crisis. The Wafd raised wheat prices to LE 
3 shortly after taking office, despite British worries this could cause annual subsidies to 
reach LE 5 million. When the government decided it wanted to prioritize certain crops 
like wheat, maize or barley, it would offer advances through the Agricultural Credit Bank 
at low rates and at the new price, increased prices to peasants who committed to sow the 
target areas (before they became mandatory).43 The government planned to further 
                                                 
41 DWQ 0081-019346, Council of Ministers decree defining attributes of Minister of Supply, July 1, 1943. 
Ahmad Hamza, Ministry of Supply had written to El-Nahhas on April 19, 1943, to complain that his hands 
were still bound by his inferior position in the bureaucracy. El-Nahhas first made him head of the Supreme 
Council of Supply on June 6, 1943 by Council of Ministers Decree. Both documents from DWQ 0081-
26611. 
42 DWQ 0081-121194, Council of Ministers decree creating a permanent office military parquet at ministry 
of supplies, April 7, 1945. 
43 DWQ 0081-023722, National Bank of Egypt governor Nixon to Sabry, 27 July 1940. Nixon pointed out 
peasants would use such advances for their cotton picking expenses, and thus urged him to reach a 
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increase the price for the 1944 wheat crop to LE 4 per ardeb in late 1943. British 
Commercial Counselor Terrence Shone attempted to intervene with al-Nahhas, warning 
that this decision would fuel inflation. More important to the British was the political 
effect in neighboring countries under MESC supervision that would expect similar price 
increases that the British could not afford to subsidize. Al-Nahhas proceeded with the 
plan anyway.44 Postwar calculations put the wheat subsidy bill between 1942 and 1945 at 
                                                                                                                                                 
settlement with the British about the purchasing commission. See also DWQ 0081-34209 Ministry of 
Finance memo, 30 June 1941. 
44 DWQ 0081-26616, Shone to Nahhas, 20 Oct 1943. 
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LE 5.34 million, which was not as large as the British forecast because of reduced 
consumption overall.45 Even though postwar governments lowered the official grain 
prices in a temporary bid at deflation, Egypt has never abandoned the wheat subsidy until 
the present day, with remarkable effects on its consumption across the country. 
 Farmers recognized the earlier means of government intervention as legitimate, 
since they had been used in World War I and during the Great Depression. However, the 
compulsory government buying scheme launched in 1942 was an unpopular innovation. 
Upon the announcement of the scheme in April 1942 in Military Proclamation 243, an 
avalanche of peasant petitions protesting the decision arrived in Cairo. Although the 
Prime Minister had issued the military proclamation and the Ministry of Supply would be 
carrying out the task, petitioners frequently sent copies directly to the King, and the 
King’s Diwan remained a clearinghouse for petitions on all subjects in the 1940s.46 Like 
many peasant petitions for aid in time of crop failure or a problem shared by a whole 
locality, single petitions contain as many as 50 signatures from villagers and they were 
frequently addressed in the voice (if not the pen) of the ʿumda or shaykh.  
 About 30 petitions from a broad but geographically bounded region in the north 
Nile Delta between April 20 and 25, 1942 are present in the ʿAbdin palace archival unit 
in the Egyptian National Archive (see map, Figure 4.1). They uniformly complained that 
the government assessment for their wheat, the first three ardebs produced per feddan, 
was more than their land had produced that year. Complying with this new law would 
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leave them with no sowing seed or wheat for home consumption.47 Many of these 
northern villages were situated on land that had been reclaimed from marshy lakes within 
the past 50 years. The peasants of Al-Gamaleya in Al-Daqhaliya, specifically wrote “Our 
land is situated on the banks of Lake Manzala and is immersed in salty water and cannot 
produce wheat… It is not fair that our food should be taken away while we are hungry 
and poor. We appeal to the mercy of His Majesty the King… .” The breadth of this 
campaign indicates there was a breakdown in the capacity of the Ministry of Supply to 
properly assess appropriate demands across different regions in the country.48 
 Mahmoud Ahmad ʿIsa, a proprietor of 40 feddans in Nag Hammadi fought with 
his tenants, who paid rent in kind rather than cash, over their obligations to each other in 
light of the new rule. He petitioned the king in different language about the new policy: 
“We are in an era of the state of siege, the Military Governor General and a war 
emergency,” he wrote, “and this has resulted in the looting of the wheat we have grown 
and threshed and cleaned ourselves. If the landowner complains he’s the victim and 
informs the government, they refuse to adjust the amount. The Ministry of Supply 
demands wheat from me, and then the Ministry of Finance also demands my wealth. So 
now it seems as if I don’t own my own crop anymore, which I have worked on all 
year….”49 Far more powerful landowners in parliament expressed similar sentiments 
                                                 
47 DWQ 0069-009916, Petitions to the King from farmers in: (from Al-Sharqiya) ʿAzazi, Markaz Fāqūs 
and Abu Hammād, (from Al-Daqhaliya), Mit Al-Qumṣ, Um Al-Rizq, Kafr Saʾad, Farskur, Al-Manzala, Mit 
Khouli Muʿmin, Markaz Mit Ghamr, Markaz Aga, Markaz Dikirnis, Al-Gamaliya, Mit Tamama and Mit 
Salsīl, (from Al-Gharbiya) Markaz Disūq, Uṣayfir, Markaz Sanṭa, and (from Al-Beheira) Kom Hamada. 
20-23 April, 1942. 
48 The Ministry of Agriculture faced similar difficulty in reassessing requisition amounts during the 1944 
wheat harvest, the worst of the war. The Ministry of Social Affairs Fellah Department forwarded the 
complaint of a cooperative in Markaz ʿAshmoun, al-Manufiya, that their yields were 1-3 ardebs per feddan, 
less than the government request. DWQ 4029-000175, Memo, Fellah Dept. Director to Vice Minister of 
Social Affairs, 1 July, 1944. 
49 DWQ 0069-00916, Petition from Mahmoud Ahmad ʿIsa to the King, 29 June 1942. 
 
 194 
about the government overstepping its bounds and infringing on the sanctity of private 
property. However, the biggest landowners, who owned one or more ʿezbas (private 
villages with associated plantations that employed both sharecroppers and wage labor), 
had always controlled the marketing of their tenants’ crops, and so adapted quite handily 
to exploiting the situation to the greatest extent they could. 
 The penalties legislated in the 1942 military proclamations were potentially 
ruinous for growers considering hoarding their grain or selling it on the black market. 
While the government paid LE 3 for an ardeb of wheat, and the most a small peasant 
could hope to profit from cultivating a feddan of wheat at that price was LE 5 to 10, the 
standard punishment in military court for not delivering the compulsory share of wheat 
was three months in prison and LE 6 pounds for each ardeb owed. Anyone caught 
transporting wheat without the proper license was assumed to be engaging in the illegal 
black market grain trade and charged anywhere from LE 20 to 50. Larger landowners 
could exploit their social position and cash reserves to hoard their yield more effectively, 
holding out through the summer in response to any rumor that the government would 
make a latter requisition of grain for the next season’s sowing seed at a higher price than 
the current offer. Meanwhile, to make ends meet, smallholders either had to sell to the 
government immediately, or risk selling to the black market. The government made a few 
large institutions the only legitimate buyers of wheat, like the Agricultural Credit Bank 
and Barclays, which operated grain storage areas around the country. MESC director 
R.G.A. Jackson noted, “The banks have been deducting all the taxes instead of only a 
quarter and the whole of the debts due to the Credit Agricole and many of the fellahin 
have only received literally a few milliemes for the wheat they have delivered to the 
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Govt. [Black market] merchants have been active, offering as much as six pounds an 
ardeb (i.e., double the price)…”50 
 British land investor W.A. Lancaster, who corresponded with the MESC staff on 
agricultural affairs in this period, confirmed in July 1942, that the upper class was 
immune to the military courts. “It would seem that when severe measures are taken this 
has so far applied chiefly to small unimportant growers,” he wrote.51 In council with the 
other MESC country managers, Empson complained that while the overall wheat income 
was on target, the Egyptian supply police and judiciary measures were far too lenient.52 
My detailed survey of military cases in the last three months of 1942 shows that of the 
cases where the number of ardebs of wheat hoarded is noted, indeed very few charges 
exceeded three or four ardebs, roughly equivalent to the government share from one 
cultivated feddan.53 But a fine of LE 20 and three months in prison could ruin a small 
peasant family. Perhaps this is why, of the 537 farm hoarding cases in this three-month 
period, al-Nahhas as military governor upheld convictions on only 48% of them. The 
courts found 18% innocent, and the military governor’s bureaucracy suspended or 
canceled a further 34% of the sentences. This was the highest rate of suspension of fines 
or sentences for any variety of military crime. Despite increasingly harsh punishments, 
al-Nahhas was constantly granting exceptions to the rule, for example, mandating in Law 
81 of 1944 suspended sentences if peasants delivered the full amount of grain after their 
                                                 
50 FO 922/65 MESC memo, Summary of Cereals Situation in Egypt, RGA Jackson. 23-25 June 1942. 
Starting in May 1942, the Anglo-Egyptian Joint Wheat committee, and its MESC British staff adjunct to 
the Egyptian Ministry of Supply, provide a much more complete record than the Egyptian National Archive 
holding of Supply Ministry records. 
51 FO 922/65 WA Lancaster to Jackson, 9 July 1942. 
52 FO 371/35557, J 855, Minutes of Cereals Control Conference, 12-13 Nov. 1942. 
53 DWQ 0081-030436, analysis of court ledgers from October-December 1942. 
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arrest but before their first court date.54 On the other hand, when farmer Qabil Ahmad 
ʿAli beat a village guard who demanded his wheat with the butt of his rifle, he was 
sentenced to two years in prison in military court.55 Rural areas were the Wafd Party’s 
largest and most solid source of electoral support. It seems that al-Nahhas and the 
Ministry of Supply were satisfied with using the courts as a tool to intimidate individual 
peasants into sending wheat rather than creating deterrence through punishment.  
 
COOPERATIVES: HELPING THE MIDDLE CLASS 
Even as the military courts and police managed to extract the grain that was grown in the 
countryside for use in the cities, the agricultural bureaucracy also sought a way to more 
adequately control the circulation in the rural economy at the lowest cost possible. Here 
the government’s interests coincided with a long-running movement for social reform in 
the countryside — rural cooperatives for seed, fertilizer, fuel and other consumer goods. 
Cooperatives had existed in Egypt since the 1907 recession, when ʿUmar Lotfy set up 
eleven outlets in the environs of Cairo and a central financing arm to deal directly with 
banks, which had not been interested in small rural clients. A 1911 law outlawing 
mortgage foreclosures on landholdings smaller than five feddans, intended to help small 
landowners, in effect further curtailed the credit available to them. Under the British 
protectorate during the First World War, no new legislation was passed to give 
encouragement to form new cooperatives. The concept did not really take off until the 
Great Depression and the founding of the Agricultural Credit Bank in 1931, which was 
                                                 
54 DWQ 0081-030813, Disuq Military Misdemeanor 287 for 1944, Ahmad Muhammad Hassan delivered 
his wheat on 9 June 1944, before his 23 Oct. 1944 court hearing. Tanta Military Misdemeanor 523 for 
1944, Muhammad Muhammad Hūd delivered his wheat on 17 June 1944, before his 4 Sept. 1944 hearing. 
Both judgements were suspended. 
55 DWQ 0081-030610, Memorandum on Qena Military Felony 90 of 1944, 15 May 1944. 
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given a mandate to lend to cooperatives at 5%, and 4% for periods longer than one year, 
down from a customary 9% from commercial banks and even higher rates from rural 
moneylenders.56 However, a policy of lending at even lower interest to qualified 
individuals (rather than only to cooperatives), who were mainly holders of one half to 
five feddans, again slowed the development of the organizations. The number of 
cooperatives in Egypt increased at the rate of about 50 per year in the ‘30s to reach 800, 
with 100,000 members and about LE 200,000 in capital in 1939.57 
 The Ministry of Social Affairs assumed the co-operatives portfolio from the 
Ministry of Agriculture after the ministry’s creation in mid-1939, and the social scientific 
training and enthusiasm of its new employees gave the movement a more evangelical 
aspect. Muhammad al-ʿAshmawi Bey, a judicial employee of the ministry and vice 
president of the Union for Social Reform, waxed lyrical in Social Affairs Magazine, the 
official ministry organ, about the benefits of cooperation on all scales of life in 1942.58 
He employs some typical reformist tropes, scolding absentee landlords and the 
“enlightened” classes of ignoring the needs of their tenants and poorer, less-educated 
neighbors. This he claims, results in an absence of vision, even among the founders of 
new co-operative societies: “The societies are empty of the true spirit of cooperation, but 
are rather stamped with materialism. They have become an instrument for cliques of 
members to seek profit over others…”59 As with social reform elsewhere, it was not 
enough to al-ʿAshmawi that the cooperative members go through the motions of creating 
                                                 
56 DWQ 4029-000753, Memorandum on the development of the Cooperative Movement, Office of the 
Minister of Agriculture, 5 Mar. 1934. 
57 FO 922/94 Ministry of War Transport report, “The Cooperative Movement in Egypt,” by the Foreign 
Research and Press Service, Balliol College, Oxford, 24 Dec. 1943. 
58 Muhammad Al-ʿAshmawi, “Athar Al-Taʿāwun fil-Al-Islāḥ Al-Ijtimāʿī” (“The Effect of Cooperation on 
Social Reform”), Social Affairs Magazine, Feb. 1942, 18-21. 
59 Ibid., 20. 
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the cooperative corporations. He believed that they needed to be properly educated in the 
spirit of cooperation and its role in the development of the national state for the co-
operative societies to have their desired effect. 
 The exigencies of war, however, meant the cooperatives could serve as a tool to 
prevent the peasantry’s exploitation by moneylenders and traders in a time of scarcity and 
market confusion. The bulk of day-to-day work for the Ministry of Social Affairs’ Co-op 
department therefore concerned two issues: regulating the relations between the 
Agricultural Credit Bank and the cooperatives, and ensuring fertilizer (and, increasingly, 
consumer goods like sugar and fabric) was properly distributed through the cooperatives. 
The rapid expansion of the agricultural cooperatives during the first years of the Great 
Depression occurred without strong government oversight, or even a legal regulatory 
framework. By 1939, many had fallen into disarray and had long-term unpaid debts to the 
Credit Agricole because of bad management. As a result, the Credit Agricole was 
unwilling to extend new credit to the co-ops.60 ʿAbd al-Hamid Radwan, the secretary of 
the Cooperative Union of Sahragat al-Kubra in al-Daqhaliya, wrote a detailed 
memorandum to Ahmad Hussein and ʿAbd al-Latif Amer, the directors of the Peasant 
and Co-operative departments respectively, proposing a new system of government 
oversight to reform the system.61 Although his complaints principally focus on the 
inflexibility of the Agricultural Credit Bank to renegotiate the terms of bad loans, and its 
propensity to lend to individuals, his ambitious slate of suggestions are oriented more 
towards the borrowers’ actions than the bank’s. He proposed the co-ops should start 
                                                 
60 FO 922/94 Ministry of War Transport report, “The Cooperative Movement in Egypt,” by the Foreign 
Research and Press Service, Balliol College, Oxford, 24 Dec. 1943. cf. Al Ahram, 22. Feb 1940. 
61 DWQ 4029-000175, ʿAbd al-Hamid Radwan, 
Secretary of the Cooperative Union of Ṣahragat Al Kubra, to the Ministry of Social Affairs. 25 Oct. 1943. 
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submitting weekly balance sheets, refuse loans to members larger than 150% of the value 
of their shares and bar delinquent borrowers immediately and begin repossession 
procedures. More broadly, he wishes for greater guidance from the Bank on how to 
assign credit and fertilizer to individuals, and for the local ʿumda or shaykh to make an 
official recommendation of creditworthiness to the Ministry and Bank. These 
departments had already increased their informal surveillance under the Wafdist 
expansion, and many of Radwan’s suggestions shortly became enshrined in the 1944 Co-
operatives law. Besides more structured legal guarantees to the Bank for repayment, the 
law also required the co-operative board members attend basic accounting and business 
training to understand how to keep a rudimentary ledger.62  
 The principal point of conflict between the Agricultural Credit Bank and 
individuals or co-operative societies during the war was over the use of and payment for 
nitrogenous fertilizers. As stated above, because of the severe shortages, only a few 
companies like banks were licensed to transact large wholesale trades. They then resold 
to co-operatives, small merchants or directly to growers. The government assigned strict 
quotas of fertilizer per feddan for each crop, favoring food crops, like wheat and barley 
(usually 30-50 kg per feddan), and sugar cane (200 kg per feddan), for political reasons.63 
No fertilizer was allocated for cotton after 1940. Peasants would receive their share of 
fertilizer on credit and then resell it at a high price to black market merchants, sometimes 
waiting a literal stone’s throw from the bank premises to make these transactions.64 
Merchants resold fertilizer from Lower Egypt, where there was more active propaganda 
                                                 
62 ʿAbd al-Latif Amer, “Agricultural and Co-operative Credit in Egypt”, L'Egypte Contemporaine, March 
1948. See also Ministry of Social Affairs, Social Welfare in Egypt, 1950, official report, pp. 41-59, attached 
to USNARA, RG 84, 874.4, memo 2 Dec. 1950. 
63 Lamer, The World Fertilizer Economy, 588. 
64 FO 922/66 MESC Memo Report on tour through Lower Egypt by P.S. Palmer. 24-27 Jan. 1943. 
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to make organic fertilizer and soil fertility was generally higher, to the voracious cane 
growers in Upper Egypt.65 Peasants also frequently lied to the banks, declaring they 
would plant larger areas of grain then they actually did to obtain more fertilizer for other 
crops. Even if they used it all themselves, irregular yields on the grain crops meant they 
could lose out in the long run if they had to buy grain on the black market to remit the 
government’s share of their inflated grain estimates. It is likely much of this black-market 
fertilizer went to cotton to compensate for area restrictions on sowing the crop; statistics 
subsequently showed yields on cotton continued to rise during the war even while grain 
yields fell precipitously.66 
 Despite the difficulties the government faced in controlling the black market in 
fertilizer, with their semi-monopoly on a reliable and legal supply chain in remote rural 
areas, the number of villages with co-operatives exploded from 1942-1945, increasing 
from 862 co-ops with 124,000 members and LE 338,000 in capital to 2,018 co-ops with 
782,000 members and LE 1.3 million in capital.67 A few detailed files about specific 
agricultural cooperatives founded in this period survive in the Egyptian archives, and 
they provide a fascinating view of the financial and social structure of rural Egypt in this 
period. Middling peasants had very few options for investment and saving beyond 
struggling to acquire more highly-priced land. The cooperatives gave them a way to 
invest in incremental shares in an enterprise that would both lower the costs of their crops 
and potentially bring a small income. Thirty-five residents of Kafr Abu Farag, Markaz 
                                                 
65 See Amīn Aḥmad ʿAnbar Al-Barr, Al-Asmada Al-ʿUḍiwiya (Cairo: Matabat al-Anglū al-Misriya, 1943), 
official Ministry of Agriculture literature on the latest advice in organic fertilizer chemistry and social 
propagation. 
66 Lamer, The World Fertilizer Economy, 588. 
67 USNARA, RG 84, 874.4, Appended Ministry of Social Affairs publication, “Social Welfare in Egypt” 2 
Dec. 1950, 43. 
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Hihya in Al-Sharqiya founded a cooperative on October 9, 1943, in which each 
purchased between one to 18 shares for 50 piasters per share, for a total capitalization of 
LE 101.50 in 203 shares.68 The ledgers also note that the members owned a total of 102 
feddans. Although the officers of the cooperative were all men owning 10 shares or more, 
women members owned 84 shares in addition to their 34 feddans. Based on their names, 
it appears half of the members of the cooperative belonged to a single extended family, 
the descendants of Mahmoud Raslan. Balance sheets from the 1940s indicate that the 
group’s capital was used to maintain a line of credit with the Credit Agricole Bank that 
allowed it to obtain seed, an adequate amount of fertilizer, consumer goods like fabric, 
and even some new motorized pumps. It also produced an average LE 7 annual profit that 
the co-op used to build its capital and that it distributed to shareholders. An inspector 
from the Ministry of Social Affairs traveled to Markaz Hihya once a year to attend the 
annual meeting and make his pencil report for the file. 
 
SKYROCKETING LAND RENTS: FAILING THE LOWER CLASS 
If the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Social Affairs were moderately successful helping 
the class of small peasants who had even a little disposable capital to better their lot by 
establishing cooperatives, they had far less success in helping the growing class of 
landless tenants. These peasants found themselves trapped between fixed legal prices for 
their produce, soaring but illegal black market demand, and the audacious demands from 
landlords for rent increases that reflected these inflated prices. While Egypt’s large 
landowners could tolerate restrictions on the sowing areas and prices of their own crops 
                                                 
68 DWQ 4029-000185 Files of the Cooperatives of Al-Sharqiya. A clipping from the announcement in the 
Official Gazette is from 18 Oct. 1943. Other documents include annual reports in pencil until 1949. 
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through the manipulations stated above, they looked far less kindly on legislation that 
limited in any way their customary economic liberties and the lordly social position they 
held above their tenants and laborers. In conditions of extreme scarcity, the government 
decided to subsidize grain prices, but there was no political will to enforce any form of 
rent control. A system of agricultural tenure typically without formal contracts led 
owners immediately to reap the benefits of those high prices. Tenants, meanwhile, were 
pushed to the brink of disaster on a season-by-season basis. 
 As with many of the social problems caused by the war, the government only 
became aware of the extortionate rents landowners were charging by 1942, when the 
Ministries of Supply, Agriculture and Social Affairs began receiving tenant petitions that 
rents had already more than doubled in some cases from 1939 levels.69 These petitions 
also reveal how well-informed peasant renters were about political and economic 
conditions resulting from the war remote from their villages. Mikhaʾil Zaki, a local waqf 
administrator from Mit Ghamr writing on behalf of local residents, petitioned the prime 
minister in early 1943 to institute a new law restricting land rents similar to the law 
recently passed restricting increases on rents for apartments in urban areas.70 Short of a 
                                                 
69 See DWQ 4029-000597 and 4029-000598 for reports and memoranda from Ministry of Social Affairs 
employees Abdel Fattah Zayat, Riad Ghonemy and Ahmed Hussein, and compilations of tenant petitions. 
Petitions received 14 Sep. 1942 from Shibin Al-Kum, Al-Menoufiyya governorate allege rents increased 
from LE 12 to LE 30 to 35. Because the Ministry of Supply had more intensive contact with agricultural 
producers, it often forwarded rent-related petitions to Social Affairs from peasants who claimed they could 
not deliver the full amount of wheat or rice his ministry was requesting, DWQ 4029-000597, Hamza to 
ʿAbdel Haq, 10 Apr. 1943. 
70 DWQ 4029-000597, Mikhaʾil Zaki to Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Nahhas, 10 Feb, 1943. Zaki is referring 
to Military Proclamation 315 restricting urban rents, which became controversial among urban landowners. 
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new law, he implores the government to help set up reconciliation committees between 
owners and renters, “the way the government did when the cotton price fell in 1920.”71  
 Another petition from tenants on the Sheikh Fadel Land Company in Al-Minya 
governorate sparked a very detailed investigation by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The 
Fadel company was a large sugar cane plantation that charged its tenants rent in kind, but 
had refused to reduce its claimed share of 450 qintars of cane per feddan when yields fell 
from 700 to 400 qintars. ʿAbd al-Fattah al-Zayat, an official from the Peasant department, 
traveled to Al-Minya and prepared a sociological and historical report explaining that 
mismanagement of the irrigation on the land was principally to fault for the falling off of 
yields, in addition to the irregular application of fertilizer. He argued the peasants of the 
Sheikh Fadel plantation required a one-time rent reduction to 200 qintars in order to 
maintain their meager standard of living, and drafted a military proclamation to this 
effect.72 However, the owners of Sheikh Fadel were extremely well connected — the 
company was chaired by ex-minister Tawfiq Duss Pasha — and the government took no 
further action on this report.73 Only after the malaria epidemic in Upper Egypt become 
evident did Al-Nahhas push a special land tax in Qena and Aswan governorates through 
parliament to help fund relief efforts in those areas, and not without complaint and 
controversy.74  
 Because the state had never registered or surveyed ownership deeds or rental 
contracts, it had no reliable up-to-date statistical information about increases in rent. 
                                                 
71 The government also intervened to grant amnesty on rents during the crisis at the beginning of the Great 
Depression. Decree Laws 110 of 1931 and 55 of 1932 delayed 30% of the rent due owners for the 1931-
1932 growing season, and Decree Law 83 of 1933 allowed renters never to pay that share of the rent. 
72 DWQ 4029-000597, Report on the conditions of tenants at Sheikh Fadel Land Company, Al Minya, by 
ʿAbd al-Fattah al-Zayat, 22 April 1944. 
73 The Stock Exchange Year-Book of Egypt, ed. Clement Levy, 1943, 308-311. The Sheikh Fadel Land 
Company’s profits had increased every year from 1939 to 1942. 
74 Gallagher, Egypt’s Other Wars, 56-58. 
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Workers at the Ministry of Social Affairs began trying to collect this data starting in 
1943.75 The ministry discovered that the problem for renters was not only that 
landowners were charging higher rents, but that the landowners ignored their tenants’ 
increased input costs, which had also doubled in the case of sowing seed and fertilizer.76 
Ministry officials also discovered that some tenants were also making large profits from 
the progressively increased food crop prices if they could keep their costs under control, 
while some middling landlords who had tenants with long-term contracts had the temerity 
to petition to allow their rent to be renegotiated upward to capture some of the upside of 
war profits. For owners of land suited for growing grain, the program of government 
requisition of grains at a fixed price generally disrupted liberal area systems of 
sharecropping. New statistical surveys allowed the ministry by the end of the 1940s to 
determine that owners of many ʿizab (plantations) who had hired laborers or employed 
sharecroppers prior to the war began instead leasing much more of their land for cash 
rents. Ministry employee Ghonemy observed the proportion of cultivated land rented for 
cash soared from 17% to 60% of all in the course of the 1940s.77 This revolution in tenure 
had a hugely destabilizing effect on rural society. 
 As cash rents skyrocketed in 1942 and 1943, the concept of a “land crisis” 
evolved in public discourse into its most acute form, revitalizing a social movement for 
the welfare of rural tenants and workers that had been developing in the 10 years since 
                                                 
75 DWQ 4029-000597, Peasant Department, Ministry of Social Affairs to Minster of Awqaf and State 
Land, 22 March 1943. The department received no statistics from these authorities two months after asking 
for them. 
76 DWQ 4029-000597, Salah Labib of the Statistics Department to the Fellah Department, Ministry of 
Social Affairs, 17 April 1943. 
77 Alan Richards, Egypt’s Agricultural Development, 1800-1980: Technical and Social Change (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 172-174; Mohamed Riad Ghonemy, “Resource Use and Income in Egyptian 
Agriculture Before and After the Land Reform With Particular Reference to Economic Development,” 
(Ph.D., University of North Carolina, 1953), 46-47. Neither of these authors draw a direct connection of 
these developments to the government grain monopoly and collection policies. 
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the start of the Depression. Controversy over the proper resolution to this problem lasted 
until the Free Officers restricted private land ownership to 200 feddans after their coup in 
1952. Many academic agronomists and economists, and government technocrats, insisted 
improvements in land and labor productivity through mechanization and public health 
measures, reductions in the birth rate to reduce demands on land, and reforms to Islamic 
law to prevent the fragmentation of family landholdings could address the problem 
without radical changes to ownership laws. Commentary that touched directly on the 
issue of the relationship between renters and owners was generally conservative, 
advocating imposing written contracts with clauses for set rent increases and mandatory 
arbitration,78 or reform to Waqf lands to increase the land market (see also Figure 4.3).79 
                                                 
78 Mohamed Aly El Ghatit, “L’Agriculture En Egypte Et L’Apres-Guerre,” L’Egypte Contemporaine, No. 
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In a policy pamphlet from 1944 sponsored by the British Council, Minister of Agriculture 
Mustafa Nusrat went so far as to recommend laws restricting the amount of land wealthy 
owners could acquire each year, as well as much more radically progressive land taxes on 
large owners.80 
 Different solutions to the land crisis in proposed legislation provoked extensive 
political conflict even before the war was over. Leftist senator Muhammad Khattab 
sponsored a controversial bill reducing inequality in land ownership over time by 
preventing any person owning 50 feddans or more in land from acquiring more through 
purchase or inheritance.81 By the time this bill reached the senate floor in 1945, 
prominent social reformist Mirrit Ghali had published Agricultural Reform, and reversed 
his prior stand on rural reform to make one of the first high-profile calls for real land 
redistribution from a member of the intellectual elite. With economist Rashid Barrawi, 
Ghali shortly founded the Society of National Renaissance, a group of young intellectuals 
who supported state management of the economy as a solution to income inequality and 
other social ills and who later became important members of the 1950s government.82  
 In contrast to the radical solution presented through restrictions on land 
ownership, starting in 1943, the Ministry of Social Affairs quietly prepared more modest 
reform proposals that would require written rent contracts, peg rent increases to soil 
                                                                                                                                                 
216-217, Jan.-Feb. 1944, 72-73. 
79 M. Jungfleish, “Problèmes Ruraux: ‘Propriétaire et locataire,’” L’Egypte Contemporaine, No. 214,Nov. 
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80 Mustafa Nusrat, “A Post-War Agricultural Policy in Egypt,” Post War Economic Policy Series, British 
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81 See Misako Ikeda, “Sociopolitical Debates in Late Parliamentary Egypt, 1944-1952,” (Ph.D., Harvard 
University, 1998), 59-103, for a narrative of the fight over Muhammad Khattab’s bill. 
82 Mirrīt Ghālī, Al-Iṣlaḥ Al-Zirāʿī (Cairo: Jamāʿat al-Naḥḍa al-Qawmiya, 1945). Meijer, The Quest for 
Modernity discusses the development of the Society of National Renaissance in detail. 
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fertility and average price of crops and safeguard against unlawful evictions.83 Al-Ahram 
published a story on March 19, 1943 suggesting the Ministry of Social Affairs was 
considering developing legislation to protect tenants, which elicited another wave of 
petitions supporting this concept, many of which cited the article directly. Some of the 
most aggrieved petitions were from sub-letters of tenants of government land, the rent on 
which had not been re-assessed and increased since the 1937 land survey.84 The council 
of ministers approved the final draft of this law, which restricted rental contracts for the 
1944-1945 growing year to no more than 110% more than 1940 rents, 90% more than 
1941 rents, or 33.3% more than 1942 rents, for submission to parliament on May 31, 
1944.85 As both bills were under consideration, the ministry’s peasant department 
director Ahmad Husayn had the opportunity to speak against Khattab’s bill while 
supporting his own in a Parliamentary Special Committee for Social Affairs and Labor. 
Suitably enough, Khattab’s bill was passed through the committee only to be voted down 
on the senate floor, as no senator wanted to be on the record in opposition to a bill that 
had gained such populist support, while the Ministry’s moderate bill, which probably had 
a better chance of success overall but had less public notice, died in the committee.86 
 As with the difficult controls over chaotic boundaries between British military 
and Egyptian civilian space, varying coercive measures taken to obtain grain were also 
made in the name of state security. The war witnessed the increase of government 
intervention into the agricultural economy, but because of the institutional inertia and the 
material interests of political parties, increased bureaucratic knowledge did not translate 
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smoothly to new policies to control social and economic developments. Even with the 
power to unilaterally pass rent restrictions as military proclamations, Al-Nahhas 
evidently did not feel he could survive the political backlash that would result from 
implementing such a policy. 
 
THE BLACK MARKET AND THE POLITICS OF CONSUMPTION 
Despite the fact that smallholders and landless tenants and laborers lost ground in the 
struggles over agricultural wealth during the war, the Wafd policies did ultimately 
guarantee enough production of the raw foodstuffs it had decided the government should 
control directly to prevent a famine across urban and rural areas. The concept of a 
“supply crisis” in the Egyptian media came to mean problems with the distribution and 
retail end of the economic cycle. Although Egypt did not experience war austerity on the 
level of Great Britain, the extreme disparity between British military spending and goods 
available in Egypt meant black markets existed everywhere for nearly all goods. I will 
focus here on the supply politics of three staple commodities produced in Egypt itself: 
bread, sugar and fabric. The media closely followed the availability of these three 
consumer goods that defined personal identity and social class in intimate ways.  
 The study of mass consumption as a window into economic and social history is a 
recent innovation in Egyptian historiography of the colonial era. Relli Shechter and 
Nancy Reynolds have productively demonstrated how successive generations of Egyptian 
urbanites defined themselves through their styles of consuming tobacco and clothing, 
respectively.87 In particular they reveal the binary identities that the urban middle classes 
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struggled to reconcile through their modes of consumption in the early 20th century: 
between Western styles that carried the positive values of modernity and elitism, and neo-
traditional styles that emblematized authenticity and national autonomy, consumers 
frequently create hybridized styles of consumption. Studies of mass consumption in First 
and Second World War-era Europe have greatly broadened the social history of states 
and people on the home front, demonstrating that the evolution of a community’s 
provision of basic goods to all had as wide ranging effects on consumption habits after 
the end of austerity regimes as did an individual’s choice on a free market.88 Determining 
what constituted the “basic needs” of the average Egyptian, considering broad regional 
differences and a countryside still partially subsisting on self-grown produce, was a 
preeminently political process. The Middle East Supply Center agronomists, some of 
whom were veterans of the British Ministry of Food who had carefully calculated the 
calories and vitamins that each share of rations in Britain carried, were restricted by the 
statistics available in Egypt and by their limited jurisdiction to offering vaguer 
assessments of feasible rather than optimum reductions.89 While popular demands, 
mediated through Egyptian publications, forced the government to act to provide 
subsidized food and goods, the government in turn sought to use a public discourse of 
security to transform the opinions and consumption habits of Egypt. 
 The Egyptian government was reluctant to enforce reductions in cotton acreage or 
to stop raising the government price of grain crops to encourage large and small 
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landowners alike to grow wheat. At the same time, it refused to ration bread to avoid 
urban unrest: shortages of flour had caused mass closure of bakeries in May 1941 and 
public demonstrations demanding bread, and the government feared a relapse of such 
protests in 1942.90 Even the semi-official magazine The Ministry of Social Affairs said the 
crisis revealed the “weakness of social solidarity and the victory of a vile egoism… that 
the government must intervene to stop.”91  
 The principal technocratic response to uneven grain harvests was therefore to 
experiment with mixing wheat, corn, rice and barley flour at different levels of germ 
extraction to try to produce loaves with the texture, smell and color best approximating 
pure wheat white flour loaves. This subjective issue of consumption fashions recurred in 
governmental meetings during 1942. Since the urbanization and adoption of European 
culture by the upper class in the early 20th century, this class had begun to consume 
white bread made with refined wheat flour. Meanwhile, the peasants baked a cheaper 
baladi (country) loaf from home-ground maize cornmeal. Tawfik al-Hakim recalled in 
his autobiographical novel The Return of The Season how upset his mother would 
become if the servants on the family’s farm had not laid in a supply of white bread when 
they visited: “She shouted at him, ‘Don’t disgust me… Do I eat bread like that? Go and 
send one of the peasants at once to bring me French bread from Damanhour.’”92 That the 
Minister of Interior could spend an hour discussing whether 1/3 yellow corn or 1/3 white 
corn mixture with wheat produced the most pleasant tasting loaf indicates how smoothly 
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the problems of consumption and state security had become blended. This committee 
even considered creating a two-tiered system that allowed for whiter, more expensive 
bread for upper-class areas, before abandoning the whole scheme as too complex and 
potentially embarrassing to the Wafd’s populist image.93  
 After the government bought up as much maize corn as it could in the summer of 
1942 to mix with wheat for the cities, the late-summer maize harvest was also far below 
average, threatening the peasants’ supply of their main subsistence food. As a result, the 
Ministry of Supply instructed banks to leave more wheat in the countryside than was 
customary for that year for peasant consumption. The peasant loaf therefore actually 
became closer to white bread.94 Intense news coverage of supply problems also 
established “the loaf” of bread, now unified in size, weight, and texture across urban and 
rural areas, as a unified national symbol of public security and stability. According to the 
Minister of Supply in 1943, his number one priority was to “get the loaf to the Egyptian 
people,” establishing it practically as a civil right of all urban and rural Egyptian subjects 
to purchase for five millemes (one half piaster).95 As a result, peasants began consuming 
far more wheat than had been their custom. This precedent required government 
intervention in the economy long after the war in the name of food security. It contributed 
to the foundation of permanent state-controlled barter agreements between Egypt, Britain 
and the United States. 
 In contrast to wheat, the worldwide scarcity and relative luxury of sugar meant 
that it was the only staple good, in addition to kerosene, that the government rationed. 
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The monopoly of Ahmad ʿAbbud’s Sugar Company meant that it was relatively easy for 
sugar wholesalers to manipulate the market, by secretly selling sugar to retailers in 
advance of the mandated schedule for prices in excess of the fixed official price.96 As 
retailers in return sold illegal shares of sugar in advance, rural areas and smaller cities 
regularly experienced shortages of sugar. The military governor passed proclamations 
repeatedly to stem the advance sales of sugar, but by 1943, the official policy had 
switched to increasing the official share of sugar to break the black market.97 ʿAbbud was 
able to provide the Ministry of Supply with these extra amounts, when they were 
available. His brinksmanship negotiations with the British over bulk trade of sugar for 
fertilizers frequently collapsed, while increases in the official domestic price of sugar 
became competitive with the British offers. Ministry officials also discovered that sugar 
was important as a so-called “inducement good,” along with tea (the peasant’s main 
medium of sugar consumption) and tobacco, for getting the peasantry to bring their 
government share of wheat to the grain banks to obtain cash.98 In this sense, increasing 
the reach of the market economy for consumer goods in the countryside was the Ministry 
of Social Affairs’ ulterior motive for increasing the number of local cooperatives.99 The 
ministry also sought to use its (minimal) supervision over the cooperatives as a way to 
reduce the black market in rural areas. As a result of the relatively plentiful supply, the 
consumption of domestically produced sugar in the country increased from an average of 
123,000 tons in the years before the war to 180,000 tons in 1943, and towards more than 
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200,000 after the war.100 As with fabric, however, the increase in consumption was not 
shared evenly across the country, and working class and rural consumers complained 
about shortages. 
 A crisis over the shortage of cheap fabric entered public discourse later in the war, 
as the clothing of the poor wore out beyond repair. As customary, the major magazines 
finally took notice when large lines of women began forming in cities to buy scarce 
coarse cloth in early 1944.101 Unlike wheat, which the Allied armies actively forswore, 
and sugar, which the British were unable to acquire, the textile economy in Egypt was not 
so easily cured through a domestic monopoly or import substitution. Egypt customarily 
exported its finest grade cotton to European mills and imported poorer quality cotton and 
finished piece goods from India for local consumption. Egyptian factories more than 
doubled their output from 83 to 210 million square yards from 1939 to 1944, as high 
quality long-staple Egyptian cotton textiles were incredibly useful for military purposes 
ranging from uniforms to supply drop parachutes. Despite the increase in output, goods 
made from this grade of cotton were generally too expensive for lower-class Egyptians to 
buy. The issue was politicized when lack of cloth for new clothing and blankets in Upper 
Egypt threatened to encourage the spread of malaria during the chilly weather in the 
winter of 1944. King Faruq, restless after two years of a hostile Wafd government, sought 
to score political points by claiming that the Wafd had allowed the British to buy food 
and cloth needed by the peasants. Wafd officials countered that peasants were not paid 
well enough on the King’s own Upper-Egyptian land to afford new clothing.102 A new 
scandal arose when the public learned that the Ministry of Supply expressly directed 
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supply officials to ration coarse cloth in proportion to the social class of the purchaser: in 
this case, reserving 7.5 yards per person per years for urban areas and sending only 2.5 
yards to rural areas, which many did not receive at all because of poor distribution. The 
government pledged subsidized yarn to the larger factories, which reserved a portion of 
their productive power to making cheaper goods, and the wide range of smaller 
manufacturers around the country who could produce “popular” cloth at a low overhead 
to satisfy the demand from the lower classes.103 
 Weaknesses in the Ministry of Supply administration, and the relative 
concentration of the power of the importers and wholesalers, was politically ensured. The 
coercive power of state security was therefore the final resort, not just in maintaining 
retail supply, but in demonstrating to the public that the state was serious about enforcing 
justice in supply matters. In comparison to the military courts’ relatively lenient attitude 
towards enforcing violations of agricultural war legislation, coercive action against urban 
retail black marketeers was much harsher, and the military courts more consistently 
executed the letter of the law.  
 The military governor painstakingly legislated punishments for the various ways a 
baker could defraud his customer, from incorrectly extracting bran or mixing in other 
impurities, to making loaves smaller, lighter or wetter than the new standards for the 
fixed loaf. Although fines scaled downward to 50 to 100 piasters for small operators 
caught reselling bread at a markup, corrupt bakers faced up to LE 50 fines. Retailers of 
sugar and kerosene were subject to LE three to six fines for not maintaining a ledger to 
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remit to the Ministry of Supply of their customers’ purchases as allotted to their families’ 
ration cards.  
 Punishments for selling consumer goods in excess of the fixed price were the 
harshest of all. Besides fines of up to LE 100, price gougers received typically from three 
months up to a year in prison, the closure of their shops for more than a week, and 
mandatory local newspaper ads announcing their conviction. A raid on a Port Said fabric 
shop run by Ibrahim Muhammad Al-Sayerfi, age 30, illustrates the sophistication with 
which some retailers evaded price controls and surveillance. Responding to a complaint, 
an undercover supply officer entered Al-Sayerfi’s shop on the evening of September 25, 
1943 and asked to purchase some of the rationed varieties of cloth.  Producing his ration 
card for Al-Sayerfi to mark down in his official ledger, Al-Sayerfi claimed he didn’t have 
any of those varieties. When the officer returned the next morning and asked again, Al-
Sayerfi offered him the cloth, even more than the rationed amount, if he was willing to 
pay more than the fixed price to “a boy waiting behind the shop.” He then produced a box 
with the ration cards of “many different names,” presumably neighborhood accomplices, 
of which he registered a few randomly in his ledger. The boy returned with 15 pieces of 
the rationed cloth stored in an unknown location. Al-Sayerfi was convicted in military 
court and sentenced to six months in prison, a LE 100 fine and the two-week closure of 
his shop.104 
 For a brief period in 1942, Al-Nahhas mandated corporal punishment by lashing 
for black market offenses. As an example, on November 28, 1942, the military court of 
Fayyum issued summary sentences to 25 black market traders of three months in prison 
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and 15 lashes of the whip.105 It appears in the record that this sentence fell out of use 
relatively quickly, and judges resorted to high fines as a deterrent. In contrast to the 
relative frequency with which al-Nahhas intervened to pardon farmers for hoarding, his 
bureaucracy pardoned less than 5% of consumer goods hoarding and price gouging cases 
in military trials during the last three months of 1942, which came to court at a rate of 75 
per week in this period (see again Figure 2.3).106  
 It is evident from many of the cases that local Ministry of Interior officials were 
complicit in the maldistribution of goods, and many refused to cooperate with Ministry of 
Supply officials in improving the situation. Al-Nahhas wrote an angry memorandum to 
the mudirs (regional governors) asking them to better monitor the ʿumdas and shaykhs 
(local administrators) under their authority in matters of supply:  
We have learned that… some of the ʿumdas and shaykhs, who are the functional 
hand and sleepless eye of the government in the countryside, and responsible for 
executing its orders in the boundaries of justice and the law, are not deserving of 
the trust put in them. When this government put matters of supply at the top its 
priorities, it intended… that rich and poor alike should receive equal shares of 
food. So turn your attentions to this matter. I hope to learn you are exerting the 
greatest effort possible to directly monitor the supply affairs.107  
 
Individual case reports also reveal the extent that corruption infected the Ministry of 
Supply administration, ranging from bribe taking from mid-range retailers, which netted 
one supply inspector seven years in prison and a LE 20 fine,108 to the entrapment and 
extortion of retailers by ministry inspectors.109 However, the government generally made 
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a pointed effort in public announcements to direct dissatisfaction away from agricultural 
hoarders and corrupt bureaucrats, who in fact obtained the largest share of black market 
profits, towards the more visible greediness of neighborhood and retail merchants.110 The 
major newspapers frequently published sensational reports of large amounts of goods 
confiscated and the stiff penalties to which hoarders were subject. 
 Indeed, the news media, literature and film most often depicted the “ghani al-
harb” (war profiteer) as a lower-class trader who used his ill-gotten gains to transcend the 
trappings of his class and make absurd and vulgar consumption choices. A notable 
example includes the neighborhood grocer and baker from the 1945 Studio Misr film al-
Suq al-Sawdāʾ (The Black Market), who use their new wealth and power to terrorize their 
local clients and to wear fancy clothes and perfume (see Figure 4.4). In a darkly 
humorous musical number, the baker pulls loaves out of his oven while singing cynical 
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justifications for taking advantage of his customers and his assistants chant “we have 
seen nothing” in call and response.111 The hero of the story delivers several rousing 
monologues about how the black marketeers are setting back the nationalist cause of 
Egypt by defrauding and even threatening the lives of the poor. However, the film 
demonstrates more obviously that most military trials for black marketing depended on 
denunciations from angry consumers. For the most part, local communities banded 
together to keep black markets secret out of fear of reprisals from merchants or fear of 
losing access to scarce goods. The Egyptian Gazette went so far as to shame the reader 
directly to get them to denounce black market traders: “Are YOU guilty of working hand-
in-hand with the blackmarketeers: Have you ever paid an exorbitant price for something 
you wanted badly — and did nothing but curse? … Get the Ministry of Supply on the 
phone or write them a letter giving full details.”112 The bombast of the paper’s tone 
betrays the futility of its campaign.  
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 Newspapers and magazines were filled with advice and commentary that reflected 
the particularly gendered nature of anxiety over consumption and the black market. 
Articles frequently floated suspicion of women as difficult-to-detect capillaries in the 
black market, less scrupulous about resorting to the black market, and more desirous of 
frivolous consumption goods like fashion and luxury foods. A grocer interviewed in Al-
Ithneyn wal-Dunya went so far as to accuse women taking up the habit of smoking as the 
cause of a match shortage.113 Ruz Al-Yusuf epitomized these fears in a strangely kinky 
cartoon from June 1942, in which two police officers are depicted “reluctantly” whipping 
a young girl “of the upper class.” (Figure 4.5) It satirizes the new corporal punishments 
for traders convicted of hoarding or price gouging and the perception of the propensity of 
young women to be avaricious hoarders and consumers.114 Generally, the state brought 
few women to court for black market activity, and the cartoon’s outlandishness reflects 
the general untouchability of the rich by the military court system. 
 As the end of the war approached, the state’s funding for the Ministry of Supply 
became more substantial, amounting to more than LE 2 million in the 1944-45 fiscal 
year. The ministry released its first annual report in early 1945, which provides evidence 
of its institutional maturation — and the development of a more sophisticated discourse 
about the relationship between the state and people with regards to supply. The report 
begins by acknowledging the legitimacy of the “complaints of the masses.”115 It then 
meticulously addresses the alleged problems with the distribution of bread and cloth, 
most prominently, as well as oil, sugar, tea, kerosene, meat and other goods. In reparation 
perhaps for the cloth scandals, the repeated emphasis on the report is getting every 
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Egyptian subject an equal share of these goods through increased subsidization, 
surveillance and distribution. While the pamphlet is undoubtedly a political tool of the 
Saʿadist party to point out the abuses of the Wafd, which had left office by this point, it 
reflects new techniques and attitudes towards supply administration. At the same time, 
these administrators were adopting socialistic language that attempted to cloak their 
ultimate aim of defending the private ownership of the means of production. 
 Regardless of their trenchant critique of bureaucratic incompetence, corruption 
and widespread acceptance of oligarchic capitalism, Egyptian leftists largely agreed with 
state managers about the role government should play in the regulation of the economy. 
Communist Ahmad Sadiq Saʿad published The Tragedy of Supply in 1945, a long expose 
of the abuses at the Ministry of Supply and in big business that resulted in prolonged 
shortages of fabric, sugar and other necessities for the poor.116 Rejecting easy allegations 
that Allied military consumption was the cause of shortages, he points to large-scale 
monopolies (especially owned by foreign capital) on goods that prevented them from 
reaching the cooperatives and other ration-priced outlets. His proposed solution is the 
partial requisition of the production of all sectors and industries on a progressive scale, 
subsidized resale by ration, and the nationalization of all other services and utilities that 
can’t be subdivided this way. Although he does not spell it out explicitly, the only 
authority that could have further reordered this system and requisitioned these supplies, 
in light of conservative political elite opposition, was an even stronger military governor 
and state of siege. He does not address how the political system would prevent the 
attendant risks of corruption that result from such a concentration of state power. 
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The world economic situation after the war forced the Egyptian government to remain 
involved in managing the food supply far longer than farmers, traders and politicians 
expected. Because of a LE 500 million pound sterling debt the British government owed 
to the National Bank of Egypt, the Egyptian economy was restricted for several years in 
its trade with other states in the British Empire or whose currencies were tied to the 
pound Sterling. These countries collectively had a net shortage of wheat and fertilizers 
compared to states that had dollars available to trade with the United States. For most of 
the 1940s, the state engaged in complex multi-party barter agreements between states in 
the sterling area and later with the United States to trade rice in bulk for the wheat it 
needed.117 Domestic political interests also capitalized on and provoked the 
institutionalization of a nationalized food supply. Postwar Egyptian governments could 
no longer resist the strong opposition to restrictions on the cultivation of cotton. But 
rather than negotiating for a fair or even progressive distribution of cotton sowing rights, 
the government merely turned a blind eye to widespread violations of the restriction 
laws.118 Because of the extent to which these half-enforced laws continued to interfere 
with optimal crop rotations, projected wheat crops continued to exceed the actual 
depressed harvests. All these factors in turn necessitated continued government 
intervention to arrange barter import agreements and to manage maize and millet stocks 
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to mix into wheat flour. The government ended the state of siege in October 1945, while 
the national food supply was still tenuous, and so it extended the state’s monopoly over 
trade in rice, wheat and flour by royal decree-legislation. At the same time, it increased 
the subsidies on wheat bread, increasing prices for producers and reducing the retail 
price.119 Because the supply situation after 1945 was easier than during the war and 
fertilizer became incrementally more available, the state was able to make these populist 
maneuvers with little objection from farmers. 
 While the Egyptians and British both had begun the war believing that unrest 
among the urban masses posed the greatest threat to public security, the Egyptian 
bureaucracy recognized that managing import-substitution solutions to the variety of 
shortages across the country required more holistic strategies that brought rural producers 
into consideration as consumers themselves. Temporary labor migration to the British 
military workshops further blurred the lines between the urban and rural economy. The 
MESC played an important role in providing a new vocabulary and some surveillance 
techniques to this bureaucracy, but I argue the political problems unique to Egypt shaped 
the government’s ultimate solutions to them. In this regard, many of the short-term 
security and subsidization policies were acceptable to the political elite, because this elite 
perceived the crisis in shortages as a temporary problem caused by the British monopoly 
over imports. However, the Egyptian government discovered after the war that this 
variety of economic management allowed it to avoid many of the more fraught questions 
of democratic rights or deeper welfare programs that it faced from a growing and 
urbanizing society.
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An Unpaid Debt 
British Manipulation of Egyptian Money, Labor and Fiscal Planning 
 
Military metaphors for the mobilization of society spread in Egyptian discourse during 
the war. This trend did not result just from the material impact of the war on Egyptian 
life, or from the symbolic identification of the nationalist struggle for independence as a 
military struggle. In 1942, Iskandar Ṣalib Sulaymān employed military symbolism in 
describing the workers movement, in a way that straddled the metaphorical and 
functional: 
This war has a great lesson to one who considers it. Free, independent Egypt 
needs to have a stronger army, but this army is not a military force… alone, for 
this present war is a war of reason, a war of invention, a war of brutal machines, 
and a war of productive industrial forces... In Egypt, one should not hesitate to 
call its industrial forces an army of workers in all their different professions. This 
is the army of the united nation — the industrial army of Egypt represents the 
sanctuary of hope known as nationalism. And yet... your working army remains a 
defeated army that doesn’t have laws to protect it from the evils of unemployment 
or poverty or insurance against life’s tragedies.1 
 Sulaymān’s essay appeared in the newspaper Shubra during its brief career as the 
official newspaper of the General Union of Mechanized Textile Workers of Shubra al-
Khayma and Cairo, one of the few unions that remained independent of the influence of 
the Wafd party during the war. It reflects workers’ knowledge that they were not only 
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playing a crucial role in the current Allied war effort, but that industrial labor would 
continue to be central to the defense of Egypt in future wars as an independent, sovereign 
state. Although domestic Egyptian industry had received some stimulus during the 
downturn of the Great Depression, the Egyptian working class remained small and 
disconnected both in disparate industries and vocations and remote locations.  
 Starting in 1940, hundreds of thousands of new civilian workers began working in 
a wide variety of trades in the British military base camps and engineering workshops, as 
well as in the private industries that won large contracts with the military and also 
stepped up production to replace goods that had been imported before the war. These 
workshops and factories brought larger numbers of workers together in concentrated 
numbers for longer periods of time than ever before. Just as a broad segment of the 
middle class had initially identified Egyptian sovereignty with cooperation with the 
British in the war, the workers’ movement saw the Wafd’s ascent to power in 1942 as the 
occasion the Wafd would finally fulfill its promises of enacting legal protections for 
laborers. Sulaymān describes the relationship between workers and the government like 
that between “the body and the head,” and that actions of reciprocal care and 
responsibility would benefit both. Despite the reservations of opposition parties and 
conservative business leaders, the Wafd delivered on these decade-long promises, passing 
laws recognizing the existence of trade unions and requiring large enterprises to hire 
workers on individual contracts and to insure them against injuries. As Beinin and 
Lockman have demonstrated, the Wafd engaged these maneuvers with broadened 
political patronage to the unions and attempted until 1944 to corporatize the labor 
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movement, for which it received some inspiration from British models of government-
labor relations.2  
 There were deeper structural problems with the expansion of industrial 
employment, of the labor movement and of the Egyptian economy more broadly, that 
seriously threatened to undermine these gains. British military demand was underpinned 
by its unlimited supply of pounds Sterling to which the Egyptian pound was inflexibly 
pegged. As Britain’s debt to Egypt approached £500 million, and its debt to India 
surpassed £1 billion, every country with currency pegged to the Sterling (the Empire and 
commonwealth) experienced severe inflation. But this was no ordinary wartime inflation. 
As members of the “Sterling area,” these states resigned not just their monetary policy, 
but essentially also their ability to obtain other currencies for trade, to the British. This 
meant Egypt could not obtain desperately needed industrial supplies for many years after 
the end of the war.  
 Technocratic intervention on prices and wages under these conditions strained 
liberal Egyptian state administrators’ abilities to reconceive the economy. In internal 
bureaucratic negotiations and conferences with the British to craft policies to reduce 
inflation and improve the government fiscal balance, problems like the sovereign debt, 
the value of the pound sterling, the level of new taxes and business privileges became 
nationalist issues. When postwar deflation failed to occur because of the new Keynesian 
footing of the global economy and the enduring Egyptian connection to the British 
sterling area, the Egyptian state extended its exceptional legal powers to retrench its 
interventions into the economy. 
 
                                                 
2 Beinin and Lockman, Workers on the Nile, 297-309. 
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WORKING FOR THE BRITISH ARMY 
All Egyptians experienced the threat of air raids and the privation of rationing and food 
shortages to a greater or lesser degree during the war, but the greatest impact the war had 
on particular Egyptians’ lives was undoubtedly on the men (and a few women) who went 
to work for the British military. At the height of the war effort in 1942 and 1943, British 
authorities estimated fighting, engineering and logistical units employed around 150,000 
Egyptian civilians, with another 100,000 employed in private work gangs and factories 
on military contracts.3 At a time when employment in the manufacturing and construction 
trades barely totaled 500,000, this made the British military the second largest employer 
in Egypt behind the government itself. Employment with the military held out the 
promise of steady work for unskilled urban and farm laborers who had struggled to make 
ends meet since the start of the Great Depression. It also proposed two avenues of 
socioeconomic ascension — the first, to obtain vocational training as a skilled industrial 
worker, and the other, to enter business as a contractor of goods and services to the 
British military. A great deal of money was transferred to Egyptians lucky enough to get 
such good jobs during the five years of war, and it trickled down to all of the businesses 
that served these workers and Allied troops.  
 The Egyptian and British authorities eventually worried about the inflationary 
effect of this new money, and towards the end of the war, about the political dangers of 
unemployment resulting from the shutting down of the British workshops. A closer 
analysis of the Allied military economy in Egypt reveals that its transformation of 
Egyptian society did not only operate on the macroeconomic scale. Rather than merely 
                                                 
3 FO 922/174, MESC memorandum “Labour Survey of Egypt” July 1943, n/d. The unit diaries of the 
General Headquarters, Middle East Forces, Directorate of Pioneer and Labour for 1942-1943 (WO 
169/3899 and WO 169/8393) corroborate these figures. 
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privileging one lucky group of 250,000 individuals, the extremely high turnover in 
employment meant far, far more people worked for the military for shorter periods during 
the war. The workers who did remain for many years in the military’s employ were in the 
minority. Rather, the consistent experience for all workers was coming to terms with a 
new instability in their lives, whether it was migrating 1,000 miles from home to seek out 
work in dangerous areas, or being introduced to new forms of labor protest when 
surrounded by different employers competing for skilled workers by offering different 
wages.  
  A large-scale demographic movement occurred during the war, a rapid rural-to-
urban migration particularly of laborers from Upper Egypt, south of Cairo. Between the 
1937 and 1947 censuses, the overall population of Egypt increased from roughly 16 to 19 
million, but the population of urban governorates Cairo, Alexandria, Damietta, Port Said 
and Suez increased 50%, 2.2 million to 3.4 million.4 Despite plans at the end of the war 
to encourage rural-born Egyptians to return to their villages, the government did not have 
the ability to enforce this policy on hundreds of thousands of migrants. Egyptian 
literature reflected the instability of military employment, which exemplified the 
insecurity and quickening tempo of modernity in the cultural realm. Notably, in Naguib 
Mahfouz’ Midaq Alley, two young friends obtain jobs in the British military workshops 
and both come to ruin because of it. The roguish Husayn Kirsha loses his job after 
stealing goods for black marketers. The hero ʿAbbas succeeds for a longer period, only to 
be arrested after assaulting British soldiers on leave who are consorting with his fiancée 
Hamida, who became a prostitute in his absence.5 Husayn Kirsha’s experience was more 
                                                 
4 Egyptian Ministry of Finance, Census, 1947. 
5 Najīb Maḥfūẓ, Midaq Alley, Trans. Trevor Le Gassick (New York: Anchor Books, 1992). 
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common than that of ʿAbbas’, but neither their prior petty jobs as waiter and barber nor 
their prior worldviews limited to the impoverished and traditional Midaq Alley would 
satisfy either of them again. 
 For the first year of the war, the military’s demand for extra workers was almost 
entirely for casual, unskilled labor to improve fortifications on the Western Desert front, 
which only became active after Italy declared war in 1940. During this time, no more 
than 10,000 Bedouin and upper Egyptians worked with three British companies in the 
Western Desert. The first full tally of unskilled labor in the Alexandria, Cairo and Canal 
zones showed a total of 20,000 further civilian workers in December 1940.6 With the 
collapse of the Greek front, the withdrawal from Crete and the arrival of Rommel and the 
Germans in Libya in April 1941, labor recruitment both of military labor from Africa and 
India and among Egyptian civilians went into high gear. The British military’s 
assessments of its manpower resources were pessimistic in 1941. The subjective nature of 
its needs reflected a racial hierarchy of skills and duties characteristic of the British 
Empire for a long time. Middle East Forces Assistant Deputy Adjutant General Col. JEC 
McCandlesh wrote, 
The white manpower resources of the Empire are limited and less than those at 
the disposal of Germany. It is, therefore, necessary to plan the use of British 
manpower so as to obtain the utmost value from it. Troops from the following 
Colonies, Mandates, etc. are already serving in the MEF: Malta, Cyprus, 
Palestine, Transjordan, Sudan, Libya & Western Desert, Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanganyka, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Mauritius & Seychelles [and] 
Ceylon… Non-European troops [from the colonies] can be used in one or both of 
two capacities. As non-European units with British officers and NCOs, or as 
dilution within existing units… Some of these produce men of higher quality than 
others as soldiers, but in all cases it is necessary that British Service units and 
particularly all commanders, should do their utmost to make the best use of non-
European troops now being raised.”7 
                                                 
6 WO 169/36, Directorate of Pioneers and Labor, GHQ MEF, Diary, 13 Dec. 1940. 




Among the non-white imperial subjects who fought with the white British, Free French, 
Polish, Yugoslavians and Greeks, the Indian army had the most experience fighting under 
British commanders and took pride of place. To allow these men to take leadership and 
frontline fighting roles, new African and Arab recruits would more likely end up in Royal 
Pioneer companies, which performed engineering, logistical, guard or other service 
duties. As standing units recruited from distant areas, stationed in camps and fed rations, 
pioneer companies were more costly to use than casual Egyptian labor, but were also 
better trained, more reliable, and completely versatile to the needs of the British 
commanders.8 In the crucial period before Egypt’s war neutrality had been firmly settled, 
the British Army attempted to recruit Egyptians directly into Pioneer units under British 
command rather than employing them as civilians.9 The bitter memory of Egyptians 
having been abused and killed in regiments abroad during the First World War made it 
politically important to prevent this from happening again. As a part of the successive 
prime ministers’ policies of “shielding Egypt from the horrors of war,” which included 
keeping the Egyptian army inactive, and to keep jurisdictional claims straightforward, 
they did not allow Egyptians to enlist in the British army. The British army gave up on 
this direct recruitment effort by April 1941.10  
 The Wafd government went even further to maintain the state’s control over 
Egyptian civilians by barring them from working as war contractors outside of the 
                                                 
8 See David Killingray, “’If I Fight for Them, Maybe Then I Can Go Back to the Village’: African Soldiers 
in the Mediterranean and European Campaigns, 1939-1945,” in Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of 
War in the West, 1939-1945, eds. Paul Addison and Angus Calder (London: Pimlico, 1997), Ashley 
Jackson, “Supplying War: The High Commission Territories’ Military-Logistical Contribution in the 
Second World War,” The Journal of Military History 66:3 (2002). 
9 WO 169/36, Directorate of Pioneers and Labor, GHQ MEF, Diary, 21 Sep. 1940. 
10 WO 169/979, Directorate of Pioneers and Labor, GHQ MEF, to Brigadier ALI Friend, 22 April 1941: 
“Egyptian Army Labour Companies are dead.” 
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borders of Egypt. A 1942 request from a quartermaster in Transjordan requesting 400 
Saʿidi laborers to work on a construction project in Aqaba, eventually involved the 
British Ambassador and Prime Minister Al-Nahhas (al-Saʿīd is the Arabic name for 
Upper Egypt), Al-Nahhas firmly intervened: “As you are no doubt aware, the definite 
policy of my Government is not to send Egyptian subjects outside Egypt, whether they be 
labourers or clerks.”11 This exchange coincided with the highest demand for labor in 
Egypt, so it is natural al-Nahhas did not want to deprive his business allies of Egyptians 
to work in their expanding factories and other enterprises. As a result, the majority of the 
colonial Pioneer companies in the Middle East area ended up serving outside Egypt in 
areas with relatively scarcer labor, with 53 companies in Libya and 40 in Iraq and Iran, 
but only 30,000 pioneers in 16 companies in Egypt, by the end of 1943.12 
 Although the Adjutant General and Director of Pioneers and Labor at GHQ 
Middle East Forces and British Troops in Egypt maintained estimates of upcoming labor 
requirements and overall budget allowances, recruitment of labor across the country was 
to a great extent decentralized. Depending on their location, brigades, battalions and 
companies had Pioneer and Labor Control Officers whose task it was to recruit, supervise 
and pay laborers, and billet them in camps if they were too far from their homes to 
commute. To achieve these goals, PLCOs were instructed: “In towns, P.L.C.O. should 
keep in touch with the local Police and Labor bureaus. In villages, with Headmen or 
Omdas (mayors) or any reputable source of supply of labour.”13 Casual labor frequently 
had a social character, whereby men from the same village would be recruited and work 
                                                 
11 DWQ 0069-007383, Al-Nahhas to Lampson, 30 April 1942. 
12 WO 169/8393 Directorate of Pioneers and Labor, GHQ MEF, pioneer companies order of battle, 1 Nov. 
1943. 
13 WO 169/979, memorandum “Instructions for Pioneer and Labor Control Officers,” Maj. CN Ades, 
Deputy Asst. Director of P&L, 10 Apr. 1941. 
 
 231 
in groups under the authority of headmen (raʾis, pl. Ruʾasaʾ), who would take extra 
wages and sometimes a cut of his workers’ pay. British NCO Arnold Lewis recounted the 
dynamics of these work gangs when working at the Royal Army Service Corps in 
Helwan, south of Cairo: 
 These gangs were often from a village in the area and the rais was the village 
headman… If one of the gang was back-sliding and failing to work, or thieving, a 
complaint to the rais resulted in the offender being given several blows with the 
staff or whip. They used to take it, too, with little protest. In general, a fairly 
satisfactory relationship developed between our men and the labourers. Next in 
importance to the rais, there was always one individual who led the gang by 
singing working songs or chants when there was a lengthy or tiring job, or a job 
which had to be done without delay, such as unloading a few lorry loads of 
commodities and stacking the sacks or cases. The labourers worked much better 
to a rhythm set by the singer and they joined in what might be a chorus. [He 
transcribes one as “Solly y Nebby, Solly,” roughly “Pray for the Prophet, Pray”]14 
 
 Because of the persistence in basin irrigation in Upper Egypt, this was the last 
area in Egypt without perennial agriculture, and as a result, agricultural laborers were 
both more generally available for employment in the off season, and they accepted lower 
wages. However, control of migrant laborers became more difficult the farther the 
recruits had to travel from their villages. The Pioneer and Labor directorates recorded a 
constant stream of unskilled laborers being recruited and abandoning their posts.  One of 
the more detailed accounts from December 1942 reveals how local labor was by nature 
more pliant than “imported” labor: 
Serious strike at SIDI BARAKAT labour camp. 300 Saidis deserted and 
congregated at Amiriya. Complaints are that the Bash Raises have been extracting 
inordinate amounts of “blood money” [i.e., service payments] and that they have 
received harsh treatment at the hands of employing units. Several hundreds 
Alexandrians left the camp and went to neighbouring villages. The PLCO LT 
GFE Harris contacted the men and raises, and, after talking to them, the majority 
of them started to return to camp. The 300 Saidis who had gone to Amiriya would 
                                                 
14 Imperial War Museum Archive, personal papers of A. Lewis. 
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not however, under any circumstances return. Arrangements were therefore made 
for them to be sent to MATRUH...15 
 
The Alexandria military docks confronted a similar problem in August 1943 of contract 
monopolization and excessive sub-contracting which raked-off the wages of stevedores 
and other dock laborers. The Egyptian government intervened to arrest the corrupt 
contractors after a four-day strike.16 The Egyptian Ministry of Social Affairs played a 
limited role in attempting to stop abuses of this sort. By mutual agreement, ministry 
employees inspected work conditions at military camps, and mediated worker 
complaints. A new system of labor bureaus placed around 600 clerical workers and 2,000 
skilled laborers in 1941 and 1942, but they did not effectively extend oversight to 
contractors of unskilled labor.17  
 Casual labor moreover had a low tolerance for working in dangerous areas. The 
Assistant Director for Pioneers and Labor for the Eighth Army in the Western Desert 
reported after serious bombing at Sidi Heneish camp nearly 1,000 Saʿidi laborers went on 
strike and demanded to be sent home. When the British army took no action, 700 men 
“jumped” a night freight train back to Alexandria.18 The officer soon recruited a similar 
number of men, some of whom may have been the same individuals. When an explosion 
on an ammunition barge killed 100 Egyptians in Port Said, the full contingent of the dock 
laborers, 30 gangs, refused to work the next day without an increase in pay. The labor 
officer arranged for a Pioneer company to replace the Egyptians temporarily, which 
demonstrates the usefulness of having a few such military units in reserve to break 
                                                 
15 WO 169/4369 Deputy Assistant Director for P&L, Alexandria Area, Diary, 22 Dec. 1942. 
16 FO 371/41380, J2671/369/16, Report by Mr. T. E. Evans on Conditions of Labour and Trade Unions in 
Egypt, 28 July 1944, 14. 
17 DWQ 4029-000155 Ministry of Social Affairs Labor Department quarterly report, April 1943 n/d. 
Examples of P&L and Ministry of Social Affairs cooperation in WO 169/1034, ADPL British Troops in 
Egypt diary, 4 Apr., 13 July and 11 Sep. 1941; 
18 WO 169/1021 Asst. Director for P&L, Eighth Army, Diary, 8-12 Oct. 1941. 
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strikes.19 To combat the unexpected movement of labor, the Egyptian authorities helped 
in the administration of a system of licenses and passes for all laborers entering the 
British military work zones.20 Over time, the British abandoned some of the lax, 
inexpensive practices of labor employment at the beginning of the war, like allowing 
migrant laborers to stay in local villages, when a typhus scare occurred across the country 
in mid-1942. Egyptian laborers resented the more invasive measures the British army 
took to combat the disease, including clearing whole villages and forcing migrant and 
local laborers alike to live in hygienic camps, and in particular, forcing workers to 
undergo disinfestation and to wear lice-repellant lethane belts.21 
 Egyptian security cooperated in the creation of exclusive military work zones, 
even though the military camps became extraterritorial zones where Egyptians had little 
power to enforce labor conditions. After mistreatment from their employers, and 
unsuccessful attempts to seek help from the Egyptian authorities, workmen at the 
American Army Workshops, Heliopolis, petitioned Alexander Kirk, the American 
Ambassador to Egypt, 
We have been very glad to work with the American Army, to do our duty in this 
war and help the Democracies. For a long time we have carried on our task 
energetically, working day and night, not minding any fatigue. But on March 20, 
1943, which was pay day, one of the paymaster’s staff started suddenly flogging 
our almost naked bodies. A brawl ensued… To make things worse, the officer 
under whom we used to work has been replaced by a new one who, unfortunately, 
has fallen under the influence of our oppressor and is now treating us very cruelly, 
                                                 
19 WO 169/4330 Asst. Director for P&L, British Troops in Egypt, Diary, 5 April 1942. 
20 These licensing systems were subject to constant negotiations between units in favor either of specificity, 
to stop unauthorized movement, or of inclusiveness in larger areas, to facilitate intentional transfer of 
laborers between units. WO 169/4398 DADPL Geneifa 79 Area, in the Canal Zone, suggests a very 
restrictive system whereby metal “tallies” would be fixed to the left wrist of each worker and they would be 
permanently assigned to work gangs (memorandum, 25 May 1942). 
21 See WO 169/9202 Asst. Director for P&L, Canal zone, Diary 26 Jan. 1943. The ADPL noted that they 
would not fire artisans who refused to submit to disinfestation, as the Egyptian government would only 
allow them “in the event of an epidemic.” 
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insulting, threatening and discharging workmen without any reason although there 
is plenty of work and many hands are needed.22 
 
 Despite these experiences, unskilled labor was attracted to the British camps 
because the British paid seven to 10 piasters per day compared to an average of less than 
five piasters that a wage laborer could earn in agriculture, especially in the south. More 
privileged still were laborers who could receive training as apprentices and climb into the 
ranks of skilled workers and artisans to earn as much as 15 to 60 piasters per day. The 
British army only started keeping figures on skilled labor in 1941, which they further 
broke into “artisan” and “skilled labor” categories in 1942. While the number of unskilled 
laborers peaked at 100,000 around the time of the second battle of El-Alamein, when 
there were 30,000 artisans and 10,000 skilled laborers, the number of trained Egyptian 
workers continued to increase and plateau around 60,000 by the middle of 1943 until the 
end of the war.23 This reflects both the maturation of the training of the Egyptian 
workforce, and the overall transformation of Egypt from a battle front into the main 
workshop for the Mediterranean theater, or as General Sir Bernard Paget wrote, “Though 
the war has continued to roll away from the NILE Valley, the MIDDLE EAST Base has 
continued to perform most of the same tasks for the EIGHTH ARMY, and other 
operational forces in ITALY as it did in the Desert Campaign.”24  
 Detailed reports from the No. 2 Royal Engineers Base in Al-Tal Al-Kabir reveal 
the rhythms of work and life at one of the largest ordnance workshops, which with the 
adjacent bases employed more than 17,000 Egyptian civilians at its peak in 1943-1944. 
                                                 
22 NARA, RG 84, 820, Kirk to Maj. Gen Robert W. Crawford, USAF in the Middle East, 12 May 1943, 
enclosed copy. 
23 These figures are compiled from British Middle East Force, Directorate of Pioneer and Labor, diaries in 
WO 169/36, 169/979, 169/3899, 169/8393, 169/15728, 169/19605 and 169/22927. 
24 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London, papers of Lt Gen Sir Wilfred Gordon 
Lindsell, 2/3, Memorandum, “The Middle East Base,” General Sir Bernard Paget Commander-in-Chief, 
Middle East Forces, 27 Oct. 1944. 
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At the junction of rail and paved highway networks between Cairo and Ismailiya, and at 
the border between the inhabited farmland of Al-Sharqiya and the desert, it is no 
coincidence that this huge entrepot of Egyptian-British cooperation was built on the spot 
that the revolutionary Egyptian army of Ahmed ʿUrabi capitulated to the British forces in 
1882, starting the British military occupation of Egypt. Between 1941 and 1944, this 
workshop repaired or completely overhauled an average of 640 tanks and armored 
vehicles, 585 lighter motor vehicles and nearly 1,000 engines per month, in addition to a 
stream of thousands of artillery pieces and small arms and other essential fine military 
tools and mechanisms like rangefinders, sights, binoculars and periscopes, fuel gauges 
and thermometers and watches and clocks.25 A British company of 238, including 31 
officers and 131 soldiers trained as artisans oversaw 6-8,000 civilian workers mediated 
by 37 civilian clerks and foremen.26  
 Compared to the labor required in a typical infantry or service unit camp, these 
workshops required far more skilled labor, which the recruiting officers had difficulty 
                                                 
25 WO 201/2666C Report of 2 Base Workshops, REME Al-Tal Al-Kabir, Appendix 121. 
26 WO 201/2666C Report of 2 Base Workshops, REME Al-Tal Al-Kabir, Appendix 113. 
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finding initially. They worked closely with Egyptian officials to hire the passing students 
of trade schools in the Delta cities of Mansoura, Tanta and Zagazig, but also instituted a 
training period of 2 to 6 weeks for unskilled artisan mates to achieve the rank of Class III 
fitter.27 This was the most common grade of worker in these shops, who worked on 
assembly lines that required refined knowledge of several precision tools and procedures. 
These workers received wages of 14 to 27 piasters per day. However, the labor officer 
complained of a labor turnover of 25% per month, which kept training costs relatively 
high. 
 In late 1942, the office of the British Minister of State for the Middle East 
commissioned a study of service-wide civilian employment practices to try to understand 
and combat these high levels of labor turnover and “wastage.” With comprehensive 
surveys of many different units like the workshop at Al-Tal Al-Kabir, the report 
determined that the monthly rate of 25% turnover of workers was typical throughout the 
military, particularly among trained artisans, because “Different methods of applying 
wage rates and scales result in considerable inter-unit and inter-service competition 
giving rise to the continual movement of labour,” and “Rates and pay of civilian 
contractors are alleged to be generally higher than those paid by the army.”28 In the case 
of the Al-Tal Al-Kabir camps, such contract work included machining, casting, forging 
and welding replacement parts, which they tendered to small shops in the surrounding 
delta towns, despite the fact that many lacked capital to do the work and needed to have 
part of the payment forwarded to them to purchase supplies.29 Manufacturing contractors 
with service and transport units did lighter work, typically the assembly of tins and 
                                                 
27 WO 201/2666B Report of 2 Base Workshops, REME Al-Tal Al-Kabir, main section, 143. 
28 WO 922/174, Memorandum “LABOUR SURVEY OF EGYPT,” WT Matthews, May 1943, n/d, 1a. 
29 WO 201/2666B Report of 2 Base Workshops, REME Al-Tal Al-Kabir, main section, 74. 
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canisters, which were in high demand, and tailoring and textile work, in firms ranging 
from 60 to 2,000 workers.30 Noting the difficulty in maintaining the quality of work 
because of this cycle of replacement, the report concluded that “in the Canal area due to 
task work system contractors’ employees earn about double money paid for day’s work 
by W.D. and [because] civilian contractors have a very much closer system of 
supervision and get a very much greater output from their employees.”31 Furthermore, 
Egyptian workers moved to civilian contractors for less tangible reasons than wages 
alone. Many wished to live closer to home rather than in military camps or to avoid long 
commutes to desert areas, and to prevent the occasional abuse that resulted from 
bureaucratic inconsistency, cultural miscommunication between officers and Egyptian 
foremen, or simply the racism of British and American personnel.  
                                                 
30 FO 921/290 Col. MJ Hathaway to Robert Peers, “Report on Contractors,” 25 February 1944. 
31 WO 922/174, Memorandum “LABOUR SURVEY OF EGYPT,” WT Matthews, May 1943, n/d, 27. 
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 Although the British military labor managers genuinely wanted to improve 
working conditions, or better coordinate the level of wages between divisions of the army 
and contractors, they generally had few incentives to do so. Employing Egyptians was 
much cheaper than using pioneer labor brought from Africa, India or even Palestine, and 
the aggressive surveillance of wages would have required an expense that would not have 
paid off, considering the always fluctuating needs of the army.  
 
HIS MAJESTY THE PIASTER 
The total military expenditure in Egypt amounted to LE 70 million per year between 
1942 and 1944, a sum roughly equivalent to the state budget in each of those years. 
Because the Egyptian pound was pegged to the British pound Sterling, Britain could 
easily expand its Egyptian credit by selling British treasury bonds to the National Bank of 
Egypt, the issuer of Egyptian currency. By the end of the war, Egypt’s total credit to 
Britain amounted to LE 450 million and total money in circulation had increased from LE 
26 million to LE 140 million. At the bottom of the scale, the hoarding of small change, 
millieme and piaster coins, made life difficult for the lower classes. As the Egyptian 
government and economists from the Middle East Supply Center complained by the end 
of the war, the British military had made no effort to restrain its spending in the broader 
interest of limiting its negative impact on the Egyptian economy. 
 The government approached the management of the economy with the same 
bureaucratic and juridical style as it did with supply problems. It implemented emergency 
military proclamations that were wholly reactionary to current conditions, passed in 
consultation with British and business figures, but without the transparency of 
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parliamentary legislation. Although the Wafd party eventually used its brief term of 
unchallengeable power to pass permanent parliamentary legislation affecting working 
conditions and labor organization, the use of the state of siege to arrest strikers or appease 
them with unplanned temporary cost of living bonuses further entrenched the “labor 
problem” as a public security issue in this period. 
 The beginning of the war witnessed a brief downturn in economic activity 
because of the interruption of the supply of raw materials and markets for finished 
products.32 This provided industrial workers in new concentrations since the middle of 
the 1930s their first test of strength against management. At the Henry Pierre textile 
factory in Shubra, workers went on hunger strike for four days after an entire shift was 
laid off in early 1940. In response, Ali Mahir passed Military Proclamation 75, which 
made it a crime under military jurisdiction both for workers to stage strikes and for 
employers to lay any workers off in industries of “public utility or general interest.” In 
this case, the government included large textile factories in that industry definition.33  
 The nature of worker’s struggles shifted when the war boom came into full swing. 
Productive activity eventually evolved to address import substitution demands, 
encouraging new or expanded output in metals, such as ferro-alloy, cast iron and steel, 
lead pipes and asbestos production, a wide variety of chemicals like battery acid, bleach, 
calcium carbonate for welding and sulphur, and consumer goods and appliances, primus 
and cooking stoves, cigarette lighters, and glass and ceramic ware. The production of 
                                                 
32 Nawāl ʿAbd al-ʿĀzīz Rāḍī, Aḍwaʾ Jadīda ʿAla Al-Ḥaraka Al-ʿUmmāliya Al-Miṣriyya, 1930-1945 (Cairo: 
Maṭbaʿa Jāmiʿat al-Qāhira, 1977), 131-133. 
33 Beinin and Lockman, Workers on the Nile, 283. 
 
 240 
soap, matches and cement expanded nearly to satisfy the full domestic demand.34 
Employment levels in manufacturing rose accordingly, from roughly 450,000 before the 
war to 700,000 by 1947. However, because of the labor mobility demonstrated above, 
which extended to private sector factories that contracted to the military, a much larger 
number of Egyptians spent some time in a factory setting. When MESC economist 
Robert Peers inquired into employment patterns at the Misr group textile mills at Mahalla 
al-Kubra, the largest such factories in Egypt, he discovered that: 
After the outbreak of war, a large number of their original workers migrated to the 
larger towns, especially Cairo and Alexandria, where they could earn much higher 
wages working long hours for small textile employers, instead of being tied down 
to an eight-hour shift. Their places were filled by recruits from the surrounding 
country. Meanwhile, however, the first wave of migrants, having got to the large 
towns, had discovered that they could earn still higher wages by working for the 
Forces, and many of them even acquired skilled trades… the third recruitment of 
the latter involved a new and more widespread collection from rural areas.35 
 
Although the Misr group, the largest private industrial concern in Egypt, made major 
expansions during the war to produce cotton textiles for military tents, uniforms and drop 
chutes, political circumstances forced it to commit the majority of its output to the 
domestic market as yarn for hand weavers or coarse “popular” fabric.36 The industry’s 
profit margins were therefore reduced by the cost of the high quality long staple cotton 
used in the production of this fabric, while the retail prices of the cloth were fixed by 
government decree. Under these conditions of supply and employment poaching, skill 
was not as important to the company as keeping costs down, and so wages stagnated. 
 Workers in services on which the government enjoyed or had granted a 
monopoly, like public utilities, rail and streetcar transportation, printing and policing, 
                                                 
34 Mahmoud Ahmad Anis, “National Income of Egypt,” L’Egypte Contemporaine, No. 261-262, Nov.-Dec. 
1950, 780-782. 
35 FO 921/310, memorandum, “Post-War Employment Prospects: Egypt,” Robert Peers, 5 Sep. 1944. 
36 FO 922/372, MESC memorandum, “Cotton Yarn Production - Egypt” JD Hynd, 27 Oct 1944. 
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who relied on seniority of tenure to obtain raises and benefits, also confronted the falling 
value of their wages because they could not as readily switch jobs. The demonstration 
effect of social interactions with workers in the British workshops worsened the 
perception of falling behind. In his memoirs, Muhammad Hafiz, a leader in the General 
Union of the Royal Printing Press and president of the executive board of the Congress of 
Government Workers in the 1930s and 1940s, recalled: “The [other industrial workers] 
would see them and meet up with them after they had received their very high salaries. 
Many of them would go around the shops carrying 10 pound notes [200 times the daily 
wage of an unskilled laborer], and the illustrated magazines published pictures of them... 
lighting cigarettes with 10 pound notes. We as government workers were in a very tight 
position as our salaries were meager…”37  
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 The privation of the average Egyptian worker was not psychological alone. The 
average retail cost of living index for food was 40% higher than 1939 prices by the end of 
1941, 93% by 1942, 163% by 1943, and reached 212% in 1944, a level at which it 
roughly remained for the rest of the 1940s.38 The intensity of this inflation and the falling 
standard of living, combined with the spread of industrial employment, gave a powerful 
stimulus to the labor movement and to labor issues in the public sphere. Egypt’s working 
class had been searching for its voice and place in the nationalist movement since the 
1919 revolution. After a brief period of independent activism and communist 
organization leading to the establishment of parliamentary politics in 1924, labor 
organization became dominated by the patronage of non-worker groups or individuals. 
Depending on its political fortunes, the Wafd party could provide public support towards 
and in turn expect the allegiance of industrial labor, and government workers in 
particular, despite the generally poor prevailing economic conditions and the slow 
expansion of industry until the mid-1930s.  
 During periods the Wafd was out of power, such as the years after a schism in late 
1937 through the beginning of the war, a variety of other political forces sought to 
mobilize workers for their political ends. The most notable example was ʿAbbas Halim, a 
cadet prince of the Muhammad Ali dynasty, who had led the Wafdist National Federation 
of Trade Unions in the early 1930s, but who eventually became a rival with support in the 
pro-palace groups like Misr al-Fatat. Just prior to the war, ʿAbbas Halim obtained the 
leadership of the Cairo Tramway Workers Union and expanded it to include several other 
minor bus and tram unions in 1940.39 It was natural, given the instability of labor 
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conditions in competitive private industry, that this new transport union was the first to 
stage a large-scale strike in response to the decline in their real wages. The government 
had made localized 10% monthly cost of living bonuses to government workers in the 
Suez Canal zone as danger and hardship pay starting in June 1941.  
 On September 17, 1941, all public transportation workers besides cab drivers 
struck in Cairo demanding they too receive this benefit. Despite the fact the prime 
minister had the power as military governor to crack down on the protests severely, he 
chose instead to make the 10% cost of living adjustment universal to all government 
employees making less than 10 piasters a month. The council of ministers set aside LE 
200,000 for these payments for the remainder of the year, which was expanded to LE 
800,000 through the end of the 1941-1942 fiscal year.40 They soon expanded this into a 
progressive scheme that would pay up to 50% per month for the lowest income workers 
with three or more children, with an expanded budget of LE 2 million. Although the 
government stopped short of mandating a cost of living adjustment for workers in private 
industry, affiliated companies were outraged. The Fayoum and Delta Light Railways 
complained their workers would have very good grounds for demanding such a bonus 
after the Egyptian State Railway workers received theirs, claiming higher expenses and 
concessions to military travelers were pushing down their profits.41 
 Business owners were right to be nervous. The concept of the cost of living 
adjustment spread rapidly through public discourse among workers and administrators. 
500 workers at the Beso textile mill, a Greek firm in Shubra al-Khayma, launched a 
hunger strike in January 1942 for improved wages, and obtained a 10% cost of living 
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adjustment on the intervention of the new Wafd ministry in March.42 Because the British 
military wage scale was not as flexible as wages available in private factories, unskilled 
laborers in military workshops eventually also demanded a similar bonus as government 
workers in strikes in the spring and summer of 1942, and ultimately received a 
concession of 20% bonuses for workers whose monthly wages were less than LE 3 in 
June. Suez, perhaps the fastest-growing city in this period thanks to migrant labor, 
witnessed major strikes at the Shell oil refinery and Khedivial Mail Line docks at Port 
Fuad over the issue of bonuses, both of which necessitated arrests and trials in military 
courts.43 In December 1942, the military governor intervened with Military Proclamation 
358, which extended the requirement of a cost of living bonus at the same rate as the 
government to all workers in private enterprises employing 50 or more workers, and 
added an absolute minimum wage of 7.5 piastres per day for government workers. As 
prices continued to rise, the ritual of increasing the cost of living adjustment through 
military proclamation became institutionalized on an annual basis for the remaining two 
years of the war. Al-Nahhas increased the values of the entire scheme of bonuses to 70% 
maximum in Proclamation 451 in December 1943, and the new ministry of Ahmed Mahir 
increased it further to 100% for the poorest workers with Proclamation 548 in December 
1944. Mahir’s successor Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi grandfathered these military 
proclamations into the civil code in October 1945, and it became a permanent feature of 
government and large industrial salaries.44 
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43 FO 371/41380, J2671/369/16, Report by Mr. T. E. Evans on Conditions of Labour and Trade Unions in 
Egypt, 28 July 1944, 12. 
44 Al-Muhama Magazine, Vol. 15, Nos. 7-8 (Mar.-Apr. 1945). 
 
 245 
 The state budget’s funding for cost of living adjustments for government workers 
accordingly expanded during the war to become its single largest line item. By 1943, the 
sum reserved for this program totaled LE 7.8 million, or 10% of the total state budget, 
and increased to LE 11 million in the 1945 budget. The burgeoning of this budgetary item 
reflects Egyptian bureaucrats’ economic expectations that the wage level would return to 
normal after the war. Because it did not decline, and escalated further after the Palestine 
and Korean wars, the budgeted amount only increased to LE 26 million in the 1950-1951 
budget, when the adjustment maximum was raised to 150% of the lowest-earning 
workers’ wages. More fundamentally, the strategy of adjustment by emergency statute 
added a political volatility to the wage rate of government and private workers. The 
government announced bonuses frequently as a tool to display its support of workers, but 
it did not have the resources to strictly enforce these regulations in the private sector. This 
shortcoming threatened meant many workers had difficulty receiving their bonuses, 
especially the great majority working in small factories. The Mixed Courts Journal noted 
that the proclamations’ penalties of three months in prison and no more than LE 50 per 
infraction would not be high enough to encourage private employers to comply.45 As a 
result, many of the labor struggles of 1943 were strikes in which workers tried merely to 
get their employers to obey the military legislation and pay the bonuses. Moreover, the 
journal’s editors foresaw that fixed cost of living bonuses would depress increases in the 
“base wage” for new workers over time. Given that the average wage for unskilled and 
skilled adult male industrial workers inclusive of the bonus rose from nearly 8 piasters 
per day before the war to 16 piasters by 1945, this increase seems to track the legally 
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mandated bonus schedule very closely.46 However, because of a 200% rise in the 
consumer price index, the real wage fell by one third during the war. 
 Just as the state of siege made these unilateral cost of living adjustments a quick 
and easy way to relieve the pressure of worker protest at appropriate moments, the Wafd 
sought to bureaucratize labor protest itself by military proclamation in the interest of 
wartime security. In the midst of the February 1942 Beso mill strike, just after the Wafd 
took office, Mustafa Al-Nahhas issued Proclamation 239 on March 23, creating district-
level labor conciliation and arbitration committees headed by the Governor or Mudir 
(regional executive) with the power to issue legally binding settlements between workers 
and management. This replaced an older arrangement in which the labor department of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs made non-binding recommendations. As a result of this 
proclamation, internal labor department records noted the number of complaints it 
received doubled from 1940 to 1942 to 5,000, of which 2,047 were disputes over the 
application of the cost of living adjustment, but that with the power to mandate a 
solution, more than two thirds of the disputes were settled “positively.”47 As soon as he 
issued the proclamation, Al-Nahhas made a public statement strongly warning the 
workers that now that they had a legitimate and legal avenue for airing their complaints 
with their employers strikes would no longer be necessary and would be treated 
according to the harshest letter of the law.48 This emergency-imposed system was also 
grandfathered into civilian law until mid-1948, when the commissions were redefined 
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under normal legislation to impose actual judicial power over the proceedings after 
workers secured too many politically unpopular concessions from companies such as the 
Suez Canal Company and Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields.49 
 As illustrated above, the number of protests and strikes, sometimes coordinated 
between workers in military camps and civilian firms, only increased as the war 
progressed. But compared to the rate of prosecution and imprisonment of black 
marketeers, the government’s use of military courts to coerce striking workers was 
relatively lenient. The Ministry of Interior brought strikers to trial most commonly only 
when they had done violence to management, their tools or to the police — and usually in 
small groups. For example, 14 teenage workers at the Shurbagi spinning and weaving 
factory struck on June 17, 1942. They destroyed several spinning machines and assaulted 
the Maʾmur (chief Interior administrator) of Ramleh district and a squad of men, 
wounding two. The Alexandria Military Court sentenced the ringleaders, Saʿad Naqawi 
and Marʾai Ahmad Marʾai to two years in prison, six of the remaining 12 to one year, and 
found the others innocent.50 
 These disputes and strikes in the first few years of the war intensified public 
debate about the labor movement and its connection to the standard of living for the 
working class and the poor in general. The Wafd sought to capitalize on its wartime 
window of opportunity and on the temporary good will of labor unions toward its 10-year 
proposed legislative program by acting quickly to establish its bona fides. The official 
magazine of the Ministry of Social Affairs was here again a useful tool for floating ideas 
for legislation while negotiations with oppositional forces in parliament and private 
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business were in the formative stages. Director of the Ministry’s Labor Department, Radi 
Abu Sayf Radi, wrote an editorial on “The Problem of the Worker,” lamenting the fact 
that there was “no relationship between worker and employer.” As a result of the casual 
status of day labor in most factories, it was difficult to obtain any benefits for workers, 
including the new cost of living adjustments. In response, he proposed a slate of 
legislation the ministry had been formalizing since the beginning of 1942 that would 
formalize and legalize trade union activity and mandate individual contracts between 
workers and employers of certain sizes and compulsory worker insurance.51  
 Emboldened by the Wafd’s outspoken support of unionization, workers in several 
trades founded or bought small newspapers to support and promote organizing activities 
with different rhetoric from the reform-and-welfare discourse of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs. Al Madaniya, the newspaper of the Egyptian General Printer’s Union, argued 
that the liberty of labor organization is one of the underlying tenets of democracy in the 
modern world, explicitly referencing the country’s fight for global democracy.52 Another 
of the more independent unions, the General Union of Mechanized Textile Workers of 
Shubra al-Khayma and Cairo, appropriated Shubra and published editorials with an even 
stronger tenor. In the months leading to the vote on unions, Shubra editorials stressed the 
crucial role of workers in a modern “war of logistics” and decried the moves of 
organizations like the Egyptian Federation of Industries to imply workers should reduce 
their demands at these times.53 Yet at this phase, even the textile workers were focusing 
on the reciprocity of duties between the government and the workers, as structured 
through the law.  
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 The Wafd quickly secured its chief goal, the legalization of labor unions, in 
September 1942. As was typical for a legislature dominated by agricultural interests, the 
major opposition was against allowing agricultural workers and domestic servants to 
organize, a stipulation to which the Wafd leadership agreed.54 Passing the law was an 
extension of its strategy with the conciliation committees. The workers rushed to register 
unions, opening 311 with approximately 120,000 members in the first two years after the 
passage of the law, of which the majority had fewer than 200 members and represented 
small crafts. The largest unions represented workers in the transport and textiles industry, 
culminating with 17,000 workers registered at Misr Weaving and Spinning in Mahalla al-
Kubra.55  
 If the workers were the army of the Egyptian nation, as Shubra magazine so 
confidently asserted, then the Wafd wanted this army to be under its command. The 
legitimization of labor negotiations made it easier to establish patron-client relationship 
with the unions. The law’s stipulations prevented local and factory unions from 
federating into nationwide organizations, and so the Ministry of Social Affairs acted as 
their principal mediators; as many as 30 unions took office space with the Wafd in central 
Cairo. A good share of the success of the Wafd’s pro-union strategy is due to the 
popularity among workers of the new Minister of Social Affairs, ʿAbd al-Halim ʿAbd al-
Haq, who had been so outspoken against the state of siege as the opposition leader in 
parliament in 1939. ِAlthough his popularity was in part manufactured by the Wafd-
owned worker’s newspaper Al-ʿYara, he did make a large effort to meet with unions and 
respond to their concerns, going so far as to insinuate that he disagreed with al-Nahhas’ 
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ban on striking in the pages of Shubra.56 It appears the new unions even took advantage 
of the split between the progressive wing of the Wafd and its leadership. The unions 
planned a special celebration for 20,000 unionized Cairene workers on May 30, 1943 to 
highlight the achievements of the Ministry of Social Affairs in the prior year. Although 
the workers made Al-Nahhas’ speech the centerpiece of the event, ʿAbd al-Haq received 
significant homage, and he spoke of compassion for workers and plans for future 
legislation. The workers in return declared their intention to celebrate May 30 as 
Egyptian Labor Day henceforth. The upper-class backlash after the event was immediate, 
and gave Al-Nahhas an appropriate pretext to remove ʿAbd al-Haq from his post in favor 
of rising young aristocrat Fuʾad Sirag Al-Din.57 ʿAbd al-Haq was transferred to the 
Ministry of Awqaf (religious endowments), where he immediately began a program 
nationalizing a large area of land north of Giza and directly west of the Nile from Cairo 
to form a “Waqf City” to house the poor. President Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasir would later 
grant most of this land for chic villas for the technocratic middle class of the late 50s and 
60s, and the neighborhood acquired the name Mohandiseen (“Engineers”) instead.  
 Government bureaucrats were kept to fixed pay grades, and they felt the crush of 
inflation as equally as the working class, if in ways more connected to the consumption 
expected of their middling class. By the end of 1943, the mass magazines were reporting 
on the dilemmas of the home economics of this class in a way more intimate than the 
“labor problem” of the working class masses. In a typical article in Al-Ithnein wa-l-
Dunya, “This is how Muhammad Effendi Lives!,” a brief interview with the family of a 
government clerk at the sixth grade who made LE 15 per month reveals they needed to 
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make difficult decisions about expenditures. The typical month’s unguarded purchases 
totaled LE 21.65, which included LE 2.50 for rent, LE 8.60 for food, which had more 
than doubled during the war, but also LE 1.50 for cigarettes, LE 1 for school fees, LE 4 
for clothing and laundering and, notably, only LE 1 for his housemaid.58 Although by the 
end of the war, the cost of living bonus was giving demonstrable help to workers lower 
down on the wage scale: “Muhammad Effendi” would have received a monthly bonus of 
as much as 30% or LE 5. The weekly magazines frequently published brief essays and 
cartoons lampooning the desperate penury of bureaucrats at higher pay grades that had 
formerly elicited respect and envy. The economic pain of salaried bureaucrats casts an 
important light on the efforts of the employees of the Ministries of Social Affairs and 
Supply to help rewrite the social contract between the government, private employers and 
workers that I have examined throughout this dissertation. 
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 In general, government clerical workers’ tactics differed from the working class. 
By the end of the war, internal associations of employees from individual ministries, or 
larger groupings from different offices of employees that shared educational 
qualifications or pay grades, launched petition campaigns to secure higher wages, 
predictability in the rate of promotion, job security and other benefits. Upon the collapse 
of the Wafd government in October 1944, new Finance Minister Makram ʿUbayd moved 
to secure the loyalties of these employees by issuing the first government wide “cadre for 
employees” on November 23 that set not just consistent salary grades, but also a schedule 
for promotion, and other benefits.59 Although many workers lauded this new program, 
the outpouring of petitions to the king afterwards indicates the huge variety of 
government employees, contracted or casual workers that were left out of it and their 
high level of organization. These petitions came from such groups as “Employees of the 
Ports Department of the Communication and Transportation Ministry holding a primary 
education certificate,” “Employees of the Finance Ministry holding the Baccalaureate,” 
“Scribes of the Division of Railway Engineers,” “Qena Governorate workers holding the 
Al-Azhar secondary certificate,” and many others.60 Al-Ithnayn’s satirical response was 
that the government should instead improve the standard of living of everyone holding a 
“birth certificate.”61 
 The British had an ambivalent attitude towards Egyptian governments’ new 
engagement with the labor movement. Egyptian liberals took many of their cues on labor 
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from current British policy. For example, legislator and popular writer ʿAbbas Mahmoud 
Al-ʿAqqad editorialized favorably the rising fortunes of the trade unions in Britain under 
the leadership of Ernest Bevin as Minister of Labor, and of the Emergency Powers 
(Defense) Act in 1940, which used wartime insecurity as a pretext to corporatize unions 
to reduce labor disputes.62 ʿAbd al-Haq had translated and publicized the report by Lord 
Beveridge presenting a comprehensive liberal plan for social security for Britain in 1942, 
explicitly drawing a connection between his ministry’s plans for reform and this 
platform, which became the basis of the welfare state in Britain starting in the postwar 
Labour party government.  
 At the same time, the Allies were often suspicious of more progressive members 
of the Ministry of Social Affairs as representing a leftist vanguard in the Egyptian 
government. The British knew best how tenuous the Wafd’s hold on power was in this 
period, and they were afraid of encouraging political groups that could be difficult to 
control after the Wafd left government. After his dismissal from the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, the British embassy considered ʿAbdel Haq a man “who in moments of 
pessimism is spoken of as future Labour Prime Minister of Egypt.”63 Although the British 
were frequently complimentary of Radi, the American legation suspected the Labor 
department in encouraging a variety of labor actions including the strike of the Khedivial 
Mail Line workers in 1943.64 Moreover, the British continued to oppose, with little 
success, work, welfare, visa and residency legislation that British businesses felt 
discriminated against the employment of non-Egyptians, which the next chapter will 
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examine in more depth. Towards the end of the war, the British gained more enthusiasm 
for actively guiding the Egyptian labor movement. In 1945, the Labour Government sent 
a committed labor councillor to the Cairo Embassy, M. Audsley, to actively encourage 
the further corporatization of the individual trade unions into a federation with strong 
links to the International Labor Organization that could quell communistic tendencies at 
individual shops.65 For example, he arranged a high-profile delegation of Egyptian union 
leaders to tour Britain in the summer of 1946. However, the Egyptian governments after 
the Wafd were far less eager to encourage formal labor organization, especially after the 
labor and nationalist students started launching unified strikes in 1946 opposing the 
political compromises these governments had made with the postwar British military 
occupation.  
 
RECONCILING UNEMPLOYMENT, PLANNING AND LIBERALISM 
British and Egyptian economists became aware that legislating progressively higher cost 
of living adjustments, under the condition of severely restricted supply, would only 
increase the level of inflation, leading to a cycle of price and wage increases. Egyptian 
governments confronted pressure from every political interest group in the country, 
expressed in the language of conflicting economic theories, over policies to reduce 
inflation by withdrawing money from circulation through increased taxation or other 
measures. Notably, while the Middle East Supply Center had a large impact on the 
condition of commodity consumption in Egypt because of their control on imports, their 
purview over the long-term fiscal health of the countries of the Middle East was limited 
both by their jurisdiction and by military exigency. The Cairo office of the MESC hosted 
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an impressive-sounding regional Anti-Inflation conference in September 1942 and an 
even larger Middle East Financial Conference in April 1944. In these meetings it 
attempted to shape a broader postwar plan to stabilize regional trade and state budgets — 
and in the process, secure Britain’s postwar political hegemony. But these meetings 
tended to reemphasize the necessity of rationing and price controls, and touched only 
briefly on the concept that the excess demand for goods and labor was itself overheating 
prices because this demand was inflexible.  
 Crucially, the state of siege did not give the Egyptian prime minister power to 
raise revenue through taxation or artificially alter the state budget by fiat. Parliament did 
pass a range of new taxes to fund its necessary wartime programs and to try to absorb the 
surplus purchasing power as a result of British military spending, but the overall levels of 
taxation were low and enforcement lax. It is important to note again that most forms of 
direct taxation beyond the land tax had been nearly impossible to implement in a 
politically acceptable fashion prior to the 1937 Montreux convention, as foreigners had 
been exempted from the Egyptian penal and civil code until that point. The most notable 
new tax was the 1941 surtax on exceptional profits. It followed a progressive scale of 
20% on profits higher than 8% of a company’s invested capital, 35% on all profits 
beyond 25% of that amount, and 50% on profits beyond 50%. The scale was increased to 
30-70% in 1943. The tax did bring in around LE 6 million in extra revenue each year 
between 1942 and 1944, or a declining 9-7% of total state revenue over time.  
 It is possible that this tax could have brought in far more revenue than it 
ultimately did. The Egyptian Ministry of Finance experienced difficulty in enforcing the 
excess profits tax because the British military refused to cooperate in reporting the names 
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of its contractors and the volume of business and sums paid to them over the course of 
the war. Although this law was based on similar legislation implemented in Britain and 
its colonies at this time, Lampson complained to Prime Minister Husayn Sirri about the 
logistical difficulty for military headquarters in supplying detailed information on all 
contractors with more than LE 500 contracts, in Arabic, to the Ministry of Finance. Sirri 
was concerned that a great number of contractors were new to business on that scale and 
would operate in cash without formal accounting and hence avoid taxation. Although 
Lampson agreed to establish a system to provide periodical summaries of this activity, 
the military staged a slow campaign of non-cooperation, protesting the security 
sensitivity of this information.66 When the Egyptians tried again to look into the matter in 
1949 to collect back taxes, the Foreign Office, confronted with the military’s confusion 
as to why this matter would be sensitive any longer, had to create new excuses to keep 
this information back, as it “might give the Egyptian Government opportunities of raising 
contentious matters against the British government or British businesses.”67 The embassy 
discovered a loophole in Egyptian tax law whereby only the recipient of the income was 
liable to report it to the Egyptian government and this was their excuse for a final refusal. 
It is not surprising, in retrospect, that Egyptian contractors were able to pay their workers 
so well, given that they could avoid paying taxes on their profits so easily. 
 Land and other small-scale new income taxes brought the total amount of direct 
taxation to around LE 22 million, or a quarter of the budget by 1944-1945, from what had 
been a very minimal level prior to the war. The remainder of revenue came from licenses, 
tariffs and sales taxes and state property and enterprises. In particular because these taxes 
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were targeted at particular types of activity, and had not yet been compiled into a general 
income tax, the war saw increased public debate on tax policy among those particular 
subjects of increased tax. The Egyptian Federation of Industries raised the frequent 
complaint, not without merit, that the new taxes disproportionately targeted industrial and 
commercial entrepreneurs, while the level of agricultural land taxation stagnated. 
Parliament actually granted tax relief for smallholding peasants during the war, again a 
sign it preferred relief for the middle class over the laboring poor. 
 The Minister of Supply, Abd al-Magid Ibrahim Salih, issued a stinging rebuke to 
those who complained about high taxes in Egypt or sought to avoid paying them: “The 
treasury serves the people! Everyone who avoids paying taxes is a selfish coward… This 
is the only way Egypt will fund its reform programs. Combatting poverty, ignorance and 
sickness will require millions of pounds.” In a now familiar rebuke to liberal legality and 
politics, Salih ends his argument by stating, “the tax jurists will tell you that a state 
should only collect as much in taxes as it is willing to spend… I say the interest of the 
state is above all jurisprudence and fixed legislation — it is above everyone!”68 In his 
rebuttal to the Minister of Supply, the liberal editor of Al-Ahram, Antoun Gamayel, 
warned against raising taxes too quickly before the capacity of the state to wisely use the 
revenue had been established. “If 100 workers are required to build a house in three 
months, then can we use 10,000 workers to build it in a matter of hours? This is not a 
practical solution,” he wrote.69  
 Gamayel’s critique had a basis in current practices at the Ministry of Finance. 
Although the level of taxation in Egypt was far below that of the European states that 
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were active belligerents in the war, the Egyptian government actually had more difficulty 
in expanding state expenditures as fast as revenues, leading to large budget surpluses. 
Again, unplanned emergency measures that were legislated were targeted less at funding 
new welfare programs than at restraining illegal economic activity. Despite the 
complaints of opposition politicians about the general overstaffing and underemployment 
of all grades of the Egyptian bureaucracy, total employment in government stagnated 
during the war, increasing very slightly from 272,000 to 280,000 between 1940 and 
1945.70 Legislators were also wary of planning too many permanent programs that could 
require contraction if tax revenues declined after the war. They preferred instead to let the 
surplus accrue in the General Reserve, an accounting relic of the days of fiscal tightness 
during the late Ottoman era.  
 The liberals promoted other means of ensuring postwar stability through fiscal 
austerity and monetary deflation. Funneling populist anger against the ballooning sterling 
credits that opposition politicians like Watanist Hassan Galal frequently cited as a source 
of inflation and Egyptian bondage to Britain more generally, Wafd Finance Minister 
Amin Osman negotiated a conversion of the remaining £90 million external sovereign 
debt in pounds sterling to domestic treasury bills in Egyptian pounds in September 1943. 
The Wafd succeeded in portraying this as a nationalist triumph, at least among the 
bourgeoisie, who flocked to the banks to subscribe to the new bonds. One young man 
interviewed at the subscription desk said “I saved up 130 pounds with the sweat of my 
brow, and I didn’t know how to invest it, but I heard about the new bonds and I knew that 
they would bring great benefits to the country and to me personally…”71 The Egyptians 
                                                 
70 Egyptian Ministry of Finance, Annuaire Statistique, 1940-1945. 
71 “In the Last Hour,” Al-Itheneyn wa-l-Dunya, 15 Nov. 1943. 
 
 259 
similarly permitted the British to sell gold on the open market, one of the few places in 
the world without price restrictions. In this win-win arrangement, the British could obtain 
Egyptian currency without adding to the Egyptian sterling credit and at the same time 
Egyptians make a profit on nominal sterling prices in gold. However, sales were not as 
strong as hoped because they only began in late 1943, after the price of gold began to 
level off along with inflation, at a 30% premium over prices in India. 
 By early 1943, concerns about managing the wartime boom began to be replaced 
with anxiety over the potential for a postwar slump. The principal object of anxiety was 
the social effect of a large number of workers that would be released from the army 
workshops as work was transferred elsewhere, in addition to layoffs in private industry 
resulting from a decline in demand. Anticipating the wrenching economic transformation 
that the war’s end would cause provoked equally wrenching intellectual debates about the 
nature of the economy itself. In the crucial late years of the war, different interest groups 
failed to reconcile the goal of stemming inflation, which had hurt wage laborers but 
threatened capital holders even more, with the goal of full employment, which would 
require strong prices. Early discourse on the potential for post-war unemployment 
lumped this issue vaguely with a large variety of social and economic problems, 
including education and illiteracy and the trade union movement broadly. In March 1943, 
Al-Musawwar surveyed opinions on solutions ranging from étatist work programs 
suggested by ʿAbdel Haq through liberal arguments for restriction of work hours and the 
quick liberalization of industrial regulations after the war on the part of Ahmad 
ʿAbboud.72 Privately, the Egyptian government contended that the British military should 
create a program for the responsible demobilization of civilian workers in the army 
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workshops, with elements both of unemployment insurance and the transfer of Army 
industrial machinery and factories to civilian production. As with supply management, 
the government’s low-cost social insurance planning required security oriented 
interventions. Hassan Rifaat, Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Interior, proposed 
to the Allied Headquarters that the Egyptian government pass a military proclamation 
requiring all Egyptian workers in Allied employment to save a share of their wages until 
their eventual layoff.73 Fifteen logistical officers and diplomats met in August 1943 to 
discuss the practicality of this scheme. Although C.N. Ades, the Director of Pioneer and 
Labor department expressed hope that savings accounts would better tie down workers to 
their job and prevent absenteeism and poaching by contractors, they ultimately agreed 
with William Harpham of the British Embassy that it would add too much expense in 
administrative costs and lead to demands for higher wages. 
 The Wafd turned to a more general strategy to guarantee general forms of 
insurance for laid off workers, passing Law 41 of 1944 mandating individual contracts 
for workers in large industrial concerns. In addition to many different kinds of benefits, it 
required indemnities of 10 days’ pay per year of continuous service for every worker 
discharged. The British military instantly perceived that since this law would be difficult 
to enforce for all but the largest plants, it was mostly a backup measure to the failed 
obligatory savings scheme of 1943. The law passed despite misgivings from Egyptian 
industry and the strong objections of the military to increased supervisory powers for the 
                                                 




Ministry of Social Affairs into disciplinary practices at the Army workshops 
themselves.74  
 British studies of the post-war Egyptian economy were essentially reactions to 
Egyptian political pressure and were again hampered by inter-bureaucratic disagreement. 
The Minister of State for the Middle East’s office adapted the labor surveillance methods 
it had used to try to improve the efficiency among civilian workers in the prior two years 
to assess the extent of the problem. Professor Robert Peers conducted another survey of 
the workshops and contractors and presented a mixed picture: he at once gave evidence 
that the majority of the workers in the British workshops had been casual and unskilled 
laborers and had not formed either an attachment to their place of work or with industrial 
employment in particular, although 50,000 skilled artisans would require the continuation 
or transformation of their jobs. After stressing that the majority of these workers and their 
families would “never return to the land,” he gives standard demographic arguments 
about the absorptive quality of the rural areas and hopes for its expansion by land 
reclamation. His summary recommendations include different ways of maximizing 
Egyptian employment, suggesting that expanding private and public works construction 
will be the most effective in the short run, with adapting and manufacturing over the 
longer run.75 The military responded to these findings by downplaying the threat of 
layoffs in the immediate future. In reference to Peers’ report, Lt. Gen. Arthur Dowler, 
MEF Chief of Administration, believed that “the EGYPTIAN Government are 
deliberately exaggerating the problem with the intention of using it as a stick with which 
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to beat us.”76 British Financial Counsellor WJ Johnson, who saw Peers’ 
recommendations as a threat to British commercial prospects after the war, made a more 
incisive critique. Specifically, he warns that Peers’ policies to encourage local 
manufacturing through devaluation of the Egyptian pound against sterling could “destroy 
Egypt’s confidence in sterling.” 77  
 The British and Egyptians entered into a series of joint committee conferences in 
late 1944 to reach consensus over the direction and funding of postwar demobilization 
and reemployment plans. The Ministry of Social Affairs proposed building on the 
recently established survey of industrial employment with a comprehensive registry of 
individual industrial workers and an expansion of the employment bureaus to smaller 
centers like Kafr el-Dawwar, Suez, Asyut and Mansoura. The Egyptians also kept up the 
pressure on the military to sell off dormant military factories and machinery for use in the 
private sector, although the British remained firmly non-committal.78 The Egyptian 
representatives also introduced a formal resolution to develop a five year plan of 
government spending on public works and industry, based on a template developed by 
the International Labor Organization for post war development in smaller economies.  
 The transition after the victory in Europe 1945 to a higher rate of layoffs 
highlighted the different priorities of the civilian and military British establishment, as 
well as the tentativeness and inadequacy of the various social nets the Egyptians and 
British had discussed. At war’s end, the British Army initially claimed that the Anglo-
Egyptian treaty exempted them from making the indemnity payments mandated in Law 
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41. The Ministry of Social Affairs had announced in October 1945 payments would be 
made before the British relented came under. The Americans, who had no claim to 
immunity like the British, helped persuade the British to make a joint payment schedule 
by November. At any rate, the high turnover of labor at these workshops had left a small 
proportion of workers with evidence of one year of tenure in the workshops, which made 
the indemnity program little more than symbolic.79 
 Acrimony over the continued employment of Egyptians in the British workshops 
through the late 1940s had less to do with the precise number of Egyptians remaining 
than perceptions of unfairness. There had been prisoner-of-war labor in the workshops in 
Egypt since the first large wave of cooperative Italian captives in early 1941. Their 
impact on Egyptian employment was not noticed towards the end of the war as many 
Italians were repatriated in 1944 and 1945, freeing jobs for Egyptians as demand 
slackened.  However, by 1946, the labor movement was scandalized to discover the 
extent of increased employment of German prisoner-of-war labor in military camps, 
replacing Egyptian workers. In representations to the British embassy, army officials 
claimed it was required of them “that whenever and wherever possible a saving must be 
effected in the expenditure of sterling in this country.”80  
 The American legation estimated the number of unemployed Egyptians by mid-
1946 at as much as 400,000.81 The Social Affairs employment bureaus ended up being 
ineffectual, getting only 15,000 visits from unemployed workers by mid-1946, of which 
the government was only able to find new jobs for 3,000, and provide subsidized meals 
and limited monetary aid for the rest. This low rate of success discouraged most workers 
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from bothering to register. As a desperate backup measure, the government was 
continuing to use Military Proclamation 75, extended by decree law, to prevent the textile 
industry from laying off its workers.82 Rather than allaying anxiety, this practice was 
rather provoking workers, who had no way of knowing how low their total hours of 
weekly work would sink, towards greater militancy. The ministry finally prepared its 
five-year plan, which it had been planning for two years, to the Council of Ministers in 
June 1945. It proudly proclaimed that Egypt was taking its place among “all civilized 
countries,” which “follow a defined and pre-arranged plan for their reform schemes. 
Their object is to raise the standard of living of their peoples at large and to provide full 
employment for the working population by speeding up or slowing down the execution of 
these schemes according to the exigencies of unemployment.” With this confident 
expression of Keynesian intention, it proposed LE 115 million in important investments 
in the infrastructure, public education, public health, utilities and machinery, which it 
conservatively restricted to LE 46 million for the first five years. The cabinet reduced this 
budget to LE 26 million, or a mere LE 5 million per year, fearing that the budget 
surpluses of the war years would evaporate because several of the exceptional taxes had 
been slated to expire that year.83 
 The transfer of military factories to civilian control occurred only on a small 
scale, as the British preferred to transfer its useful movable capital (i.e., machinery, parts, 
raw material) to other places in the Empire, or retain it in the reduced military zone 
around the Suez Canal after 1947. Prime Minister Sidqi therefore eliminated a LE 1 
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million fund dedicated to purchasing Army surplus supplies and machinery from the five-
year plan mentioned above in March 1946. This fact exemplifies the general difficulty 
Egypt faced in transforming its inflated fiat money into real fixed capital. Monetary 
exchange controls on sterling instituted at the beginning of the war including a fixed 
exchange rate with the US dollar. This meant that Egypt and the colonies, commonwealth 
states and others in this so-called sterling area whose currencies were pegged to the 
sterling after Great Britain left the gold standard in 1931 were forced to pool their dollars 
and other hard currencies for Sterling credit.84 After six years of severe current account 
deficits with the rest of the world these sterling credits were not convertible to hard 
currencies. Britain, by its very bankruptcy, held another form of sovereign control over 
the Egyptian economy by refusing to allocate goods to Egypt for purchase in sterling, or 
to release more than a nominal amount of dollars to Egypt after the end of the war. 
 Because of import restrictions during the war, there was very little reinvestment in 
new physical machinery in Egypt. After the war, a shortage of machinery from Britain 
and the Sterling area and a shortage of dollars or other hard currency to buy machinery 
from the United States threatened Egyptian productivity. In the textile industry, after 
several years of high output and overtime for workers, the breakdown of machinery was 
interfering with keeping these workers employed.85 Vitalis has demonstrated how the 
business conflict over scarce machinery imports helped delay the development of a 
hydroelectric and fertilizer plant in Aswan for 10 years after the Second World War.86 
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The lack of real capital in the form of machines and surplus commodities in the sterling 
area tended more generally to cause the failure of the British postwar project of 
neocolonial economic influence in the Middle East based on the emerging concepts of 
development and modernization aid.87 At the same time that the United States managed 
to defeat British control over imports by ending its support for the MESC, it did not have 
the political support for a similar dollar-aid program to the region until the Point IV 
program in the early 1950s. 
 Structural adjustments to the British economy slowly let Egypt out of the vice 
grip of austerity, but not before a decade of extended controls had marked governmental 
policies in Egypt permanently. A spike in Egyptian unemployment occurred in the short 
run because of these continuing trade restrictions following the sharp decline in British 
demand. However, no deflation occurred. The price level stabilized for several years, as 
the government kept all major food staples under price controls. Egypt left the sterling 
area in 1947, gaining control of the dollars it earned from its exports and eventually 
founding an independent central bank. However, this came at the cost of the devaluation 
of its sterling credit balances by about 40% versus the value of the Egyptian pound in 
1949. Between 1948 and 1949, the British economy had begun to improve and it 
liberalized the release of credits from the blocked account, for example, allowing Egypt 
to import 42,000 tons of British textile machinery, compared to less than 5,000 tons 
during the war.88 However, the effect of this delayed investment always trailed the 
demands of the large number of industrial workers trained during the war for improved 
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hours and wages. This industrial strife helped spread communist influence in the labor 
movement and caused severe labor protests between 1946 and 1948. 
 Despite the obvious failure of economic solutions to the end of wartime demand, 
liberal attitudes about economic intervention and monetary policy lingered on in 
Egyptian technocratic discourse because of the expectation that Egypt would return to a 
laissez faire environment much faster than it did.89 The economic research published in 
L’Egypte Contemporaine, the magazine of the Fuad I Society of Political Economy, 
Statistics and Legislation, was consistently optimistic that once Egyptian importers were 
able to purchase British goods with the sterling credit, the increased supply of goods 
would lead naturally to a deflation of the Egyptian pound, even at the cost of “temporary 
unemployment.”90 The fact that government statistics continued to express the cost of 
living index as a multiple of the 1939 prices as late as the 1952 military coup exposes the 
liberal technocratic belief that prewar prices would eventually return. This school of 
social science continued to chalk up unemployment and poverty to overpopulation and 
underproductivity rather than the progressive destruction of Egyptian capital through the 
financial and monetary controls examined above.91  
 Indeed, the Middle East Supply Center economists and their Egyptian 
counterparts had some familiarity with particular Keynesian policies. However, a 
Keynesian statistical apparatus in Egypt for measuring the total production of the 
economy and expressing it in terms of a rate of growth over time, in which deflation 
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would be negative rather than a restoration of equilibrium, scarcely existed. Mahmoud 
Anis made the first attempt at an analysis of Egyptian GNP in 1950.92 A new generation 
of “authoritarian modernist” economists led by Rashid al-Barrawi acknowledged the new 
footing of Egypt in the world economy after the bankruptcy of Britain, which made some 
headway towards reconciling the contradictions of Egypt’s illiberal short-term economic 
control measures with actual state planning to build up industrial investment. However, 
these economists achieved positions of influence with the government only during the 
late 1950s.93 
 The 1948 Palestine War in some respects marked a qualitative change in the 
security state’s treatment of the economy. The minority government of al-Nuqrashi was 
definitely more draconian than the Wafd had been during the Second World War in 
interning striking labor and communists under a renewed state of siege. Moreover, as this 
was the first war in which Egypt fielded an army independent of British control, 
parliament found it politically feasible to increase the size of the budget much more 
drastically than during the Second World War. It imposed a progressive income tax in 
1949 of up to 70% on incomes greater than LE 50,000 to fund LE 40 million in new 
military expenditures and expanded social welfare programs.94 In other regards, the 
Egyptian government used the security policies of the Second World War era in similar 
ways. Along with the rise in world cotton prices during the Korean War, the Palestine 
War stimulus reopened the problem of inflation. The Wafd, in its last term in office 
between 1950 and 1951, used the state of siege again to increase the mandatory cost of 
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living adjustment. After five years of relatively more friendly governments emboldened 
Egyptian industry again refused to grant these increases, leading to another wave of 
strikes and protests. After a long negotiation with Ahmad ʿAbbud’s sugar monopoly, 
ʿAbbud agreed to pay 3,000 striking workers the increase, but only if the government 
allowed him to sell one third of the company’s output to the public off ration at 
accordingly inflated prices — effectively neutralizing the policy of keeping prices and 
wages in check.95 It is clear that economic management by emergency statute made it 
easy for ministers to put short-term political gains ahead of long-term objectives through 
the end of the monarchic period. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Fundamentally, the exploitation and control of labor became a political issue between 
Egypt and Britain that was difficult to reconcile with other aspects of Britain’s negotiated 
occupation, with nationalist ideology, and most importantly, with security priorities. 
Egypt remained trapped in the extremely unfavorable trade and currency exchange 
regime of the British Empire, the Sterling area. The British wished to obtain the cheapest 
and most convenient labor for military workshops that they could. The expedient mix of 
casual and contracted labor, alongside with extensive training for skilled laborers, fit their 
purposes. Well-connected Egyptian entrepreneurs reaped the benefits of labor and supply 
contracts but acquiesced to many of the populist Wafdist measures to mitigate the 
increased demand for labor. The wartime concentration of industrial labor made workers 
themselves foot soldiers in a growing social movement that increasingly identified with 
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the nationalist movement. However, the very fragmentation of work opportunities 
between the different British workshops, and their calcification in micro-scale regimes of 
security helped prevent the worker organization necessary for the long-term success of 
the labor movement. When the good jobs and wages of the wartime dried up, Egyptian 
workers could see more clearly the manner in which the British and Egyptian 
governments had exploited them. 
 As the British postwar military occupation solidified, the contradictory impulses 
for political parties of maintaining public security and burnishing nationalist credentials 
intensified. The most striking example of this contradiction occurred in the last year of 
nationalist confrontations that led to the Free Officer coup. Although Egyptian 
governments tried initially to retain employment opportunities in the British workshops 
for their subjects, this cohabitation ended when the Wafd unilaterally abrogated the 1936 
treaty in October 1951 to break a stalemate on the schedule of British military 
withdrawal. More than 70,000 Egyptian workers remaining in the Suez Canal workshops 
and assorted contractors left their jobs; most went on strike voluntarily, but there is 
evidence that the Egyptian police pressured many others to leave. Of the actions the 
government took to challenge the British position in Suez, including encouraging 
guerrilla attacks on British troops by police and civilians alike, this labor protest was 
probably one of the most effective; officers and diplomats scrambled to find replacement 
workers, considering Cyrenaicans, Cypriots, Jordanians and even Palestinian refugees 
before disqualifying each category because of the legal and diplomatic difficulties of 
bringing them into Egypt.96 The Wafd party government did not fully appreciate the 
backlash this action would have on its own stability. The Ministry of Social Affairs made 
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a great display of providing another wave of suddenly jobless workers positions in new 
factories or assistance in returning to their villages. Likely, many joined the front lines of 
a discontented nationalist urban crowd responsible for the Cairo Fire of January 26, 1952 
that ended the Wafd government and caused a prolonged crisis in the Egyptian state. The 
Nasser government did not allow the labor movement any more technical independence 
than the liberal monarchic governments had before, but its staunch nationalism swept 




Internees, Draftees and Refugees 
The State’s Redefinition of the Egyptian Subject and Nation 
 
There was an upsurge in nationalist discourse in 1945 as it became clear that the British 
military had ruined the national economy and that it planned to occupy Egypt for the 
indefinite future. The minority government’s relaxation of censorship at the end of the 
war allowed newspaper Al-Akhbar Al-Yawm to publish the first public account of the 
February 4, 1942 palace coup, inflaming public opinion about British manipulation of 
Egyptian politics. Certainly, a growing segment of radical nationalists considered all 
diplomatic negotiations between the British and Egyptian governments illegitimate, from 
the promises of the 1936 treaty to the tacit principles behind Egyptian support for the war 
itself. They proclaimed the first and most important solution to Egypt’s multiple social 
and political problems would be the unilateral withdrawal of the British Army and the 
end of European economic exploitation. Anwar al-Gindi’s 1946 tract, Get Out of My 
Country, published by an Islamist press associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
exemplifies this opinion: “Where are Wilson’s Fourteen Points… where is the Atlantic 
Charter and where are the four freedoms? All of these are avenues of victory in the war 
 
 273 
of colonialism, to return Britain in victory once again to the enslavement of peoples and 
the degradation of nations.”1 
 Liberal intellectuals anticipating or analyzing postwar political outcomes for 
Egypt usually took negotiations about the diplomatic relationship of Egypt and Britain 
more seriously. These writers and politicians had few illusions about the power of the 
British, or their duplicity in the past. They looked, however, to the incremental social and 
political gains that negotiations — particularly those culminating in legislation — could 
achieve. The brief 1945 book Problems of Egypt After the War, by Court of Cassation 
lawyer Hassan ʿAkush, for example, focused instead on quickly eliminating all unfair 
legal institutions and extraterritoriality for foreigners, principally the Mixed Courts, 
which were already scheduled for closure in 1949. Britain should assent to this, he 
argued, because the state of siege had already effectively demolished European legal 
privileges. He reminded readers that all Axis nationals had lost their standing in the 
Mixed Courts and were subject to sequestration and internment, while civilians of all 
nationalities were subject to Egyptian military courts.2 This liberal view proposed that 
nationalist aims of independence, equality before the law and economic and social 
development could still be achieved by imposing Egyptian legal jurisdiction over foreign 
communities rather than expelling any group of foreigners wholesale. 
 Much historical writing on the disintegration of Egypt’s foreign communities 
between 1940 and 1960 has reduced its causes to the rise of radical xenophobic Egyptian 
nationalism against a foreign elite, of the type al-Gindi expressed. The lived reality for 
non-subject residents in Egypt was as diverse as the political reasons for their ultimate 
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departure, however. Egypt had remained a sub-sovereign part of the Ottoman Empire 
prior to 1914. This meant that residents’ means of identifying as foreigner, “local” or 
Egyptian changed drastically in the decades after the First World War and relied on 
subjective strategies positioning language, religion and evidence of residency.  
 Before the consolidation of an Egyptian bureaucracy that carefully administered 
and tracked passports and residency permits, ex-Ottoman subjects from the Levant and 
Armenia, many of whom were Jews and Christians, also lived between local- and 
foreign-oriented cultural zones. There was also a great deal of stratification between the 
experiences of upper and lower classes. The seemingly seamless integration of foreigners 
into elite Egyptian life was in fact structured through privileged residential 
neighborhoods and commercial districts guarded by foreign police. The Italian and Greek 
communities, as well as Maltese and Cypriot subjects of the British Empire, had social 
and educational institutions that set them apart from Arabic-speaking Egyptians and 
maintained their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness, but their working-class majorities 
had more in common and more day-to-day contact with working-class Egyptians than 
their elite members.3  These groups, who had made their home in Egypt for many 
generations by the 1930s, have been known as the mutamassirun (“Egyptianized”) 
communities. 
 Nationalist historiography has tended to condense or eliminate the significant 
cultural and economic role of non-Muslim and non-Coptic communities in the early 20th 
century, while the personal memoirs of mutamassir émigrés idealize a “cosmopolitan” 
liberal past that often simplifies the diplomatic context and political history behind the 
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dissolution of specific communities.4 Egyptian agency in both these narratives appears 
the driving cause behind the events that symbolize the end of these communities, such as 
the 1948 Palestine war in the case of Egypt’s Jews, and the Suez Canal crisis and 
nationalizations of 1961 for the Greeks. Projected backwards, the 1937 Montreux 
Convention, which ended the Capitulations and scheduled the closure of the Mixed 
Courts in 1949, symbolizes “the beginning of the end” for the foreign communities 
because of the end of the legal privileges that preserved their wealth and distinctiveness. 
 I argue this view once again confounds the framework of Egyptian liberal legal 
sovereignty with the specific events and bureaucratic framework that produced its 
functional results. It ignores the strategic interests and ideological movements of the 
European powers in Egypt in the decades leading up to the Second World War. The 
threat of war was the most important reason Britain agreed to the Montreux convention. 
The change in the treatment of foreigners that appears on the surface to be purely an 
Egyptian ideological move can be better understood as a worldwide phenomenon of the 
hardening of national identities and the state-security-formulated documentation that is 
familiar to any traveler today. In particular, the aggression of Mussolini’s designs on the 
Eastern Mediterranean and his desire to co-opt the Egyptian Italian community as a 
vanguard of Italian colonialism in Egypt helped destroy the atmosphere of laissez-faire 
European residency, trade and investment that rested on assumed British hegemony.5 
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British imperial security requirements also inverted the logics of European privilege and 
exception before the war to combat this threat, even at the expense of weakening the 
privileges of the British community itself. 
 The emergency laws the Egyptian state applied to enemy nationalities during the 
war, although they were imposed at the request of the British, set powerful precedents for 
Egyptian bureaucratic attitudes and nationalist ideology. The Egyptian state obtained its 
first power over and responsibility for large numbers of displaced and mobile people that 
were potentially threatening to the state: war refugees, governments in exile and political 
dissidents. During and after the war, the Egyptian government used both the law and 
exceptional administrative measures to attempt to exclude or control powerful foreign 
political and economic concerns. They also sought to limit the expenditure of welfare 
resources on destitute and “unproductive” groups. Hemmed in by Allied influence and 
political instability, this regime reflected neither a sovereign move to deport entire groups 
nor a liberal affirmation of individual foreigners’ rights to remain in Egypt. 
  
AXIS SUBJECTS: FOREIGN COMMUNITIES AS FIFTH COLUMN 
Enforcing the spacial and juridical boundaries between the British army and Egyptian 
populace was difficult enough for the Egyptian state. Defining the state’s jurisdiction 
over and its physical and financial responsibility for Axis expatriates stressed its 
institutional capacity even further. One result of the Capitulations surviving into the 
1930s was that the ability of the Egyptian state to regulate the entry, residency and 
economic activities of protected foreign nationals remained limited compared to much of 
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the rest of the world, even compared to states under more direct colonial control. With 
the arrival of war, Egyptian administrators experienced a revolutionary change both in 
their legal powers to categorize and control the enemies of the Allied powers. The 
Egyptians generally were willing to cooperate with the British in security actions to stop 
espionage, sabotage and propaganda against its military and political position in Egypt. 
However, Egyptian politicians had reservations about giving up too much of Egypt’s 
legal sovereignty in questions of civilian residents of Egypt. These politicians were wary 
that the British were seeking to replace the formal structures of the privileges of the 
Capitulations with informal British hegemony over the foreign communities. The British 
Embassy again restrained the British military from direct police actions outside of 
military camps and related transport zones to preserve the literal strictures of Egyptian 
sovereignty as both sides interpreted it. At the same time, the Egyptians sought to shift as 
much of the expenses for the execution of security plans as possible on to the British and 
conserve the resources of the Egyptian state.  
 The German presence in Egypt in 1939 was limited to the diplomatic corps and a 
small number of educated businesspeople and technicians and their families. Many of 
these were Nazi party members, but there was no extensive social organization or 
extensive contact with the Egyptians. Military Proclamation 7 mandated the detention of 
Germans. In the third week of September 1939, the Egyptian authorities rounded up some 
60 German men and interviewed them for Nazi susceptibilities, and ended up only 
detaining 33.6 Under pressure from the Army, the British tried strenuously to interpret 
article seven of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty to mean that the Egyptians should turn over 
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all Germans to British custody, but the Egyptians refused.7 Rather than simply a case of 
Prime Minister ʿAli Mahir “trimming” with the Axis, as British Ambassador Sir Miles 
Lampson accused him of doing, even the Foreign Office acknowledged that the principal 
factor holding back the Egyptians from taking stronger measures against resident 
Germans was the fear of retribution against more than 50 Egyptian detainees “stupidly 
caught” in Germany, including the Egyptian legation staff.8 As with many other proposed 
exchanges, this deal was ultimately unsuccessful, and small numbers of Egyptians and 
Germans remained interned in the respective enemy countries for the duration of the war. 
 Compared to the small German expatriate community, the logistics and 
diplomatic stakes behind the treatment of the Italian community upon Italy’s entrance to 
the war caused much more significant conflict among Egyptians and with the British. The 
1937 census counted 47,708 Italian subjects, of diverse social classes, trades, and lengths 
of tenure in Egypt. The large Italian presence dated to the reign of the successors of 
Muhammad Ali Pasha in the mid-19th century, who encouraged Mediterranean trade and 
business for skilled European crafts like construction, textiles, tanning and metalwork.9 
Many Italians found Egypt a convenient refuge during the wars of the Risorgimento. By 
the mid-20th century, their numbers included a sizable Jewish contingent. Many of these 
Jews the Italian consulate derisively considered “Passport Italians” — former Ottoman 
subjects who obtained Italian nationality in the aftermath of the First World War. In the 
1920s and 1930s, Egyptian Italians were subject to a rise of Fascist propaganda through 
the Italian consulate to gain their support for Mussolini’s vision for a pan-Mediterranean 
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Italian colonial empire.10 The new Fascist groups expanded and established roots in a 
diverse social milieu that included religious communities, charitable organizations, 
schools and hospitals. Mussolini’s efforts met with some ambivalence, especially from 
families that had lived in Egypt for generations who were less invested in contemporary 
Italian culture and some of whom were even not fluent in Italian. But in an age of 
increasing nationalist sentiment around the world, his vision attracted enthusiasm and met 
relatively little resistance in Egypt until the Italian Race laws of 1938, which restricted 
Italian Jews’ civil rights and banned them from holding political office.11 
 Much of the growing alienation of Egyptian Jews leading to the community’s 
emigration after the founding of Israel in 1948 has been attributed to Egyptian 
nationalism and anti-Zionism, but the Italian Race laws played an important part in 
ending the social connections and worldviews that underpinned the Italian Jewish 
community in Egypt. Although these laws resulted from Mussolini’s desire to forge a 
closer alliance with Nazi Germany, the Italian consul in Alexandria sought to use them to 
combat what he bemoaned was the “‘colonisation’ of the fascio, or to be more exact, its 
‘Judaisation,’” rather than the Fascist dominance of the Egyptian Italian colony.12 In 
response, the Jewish community of Alexandria, led proudly by influential Italian Jews, 
organized a boycott of Italian goods and services. These protests inspired the creation of 
two competing anti-Fascist groups by the late 1930s, although the hardening of Egyptian 
Italian public opinion during the victories of the beginning of the war made it difficult for 
                                                 
10 See Muftāḥ Bilʿid ʿUthmān Ghawīta, Al-Nishāṭ Al-Īṭālī Fi Miṣr Tijāh Istiʿmār Lībiyā, 1882-1943 (Al-
Tarābulūs: Al-Jamāhīrīa al-ʿArabiya al-Lībīya al-Shaʿbiya Al-Ishtirākiya Al-ʿAẓmā, 2009). 
11 Anouchka Lazarev, “Italians, Italianity and Fascism,” in Alexandria 1860-1960: The Brief Life of a 
Cosmopolitan Community, eds. Robert Ilbert and Ilios Yannakakis (Alexandria: BAFRA Graphics, 1997), 
78-79. 
12 Lazarev, “Italians, Italianity and Fascism”, 86. 
 
 280 
the groups to organize and finance their activities; they ended up as mouthpieces for 
British propaganda.13 
 The overall Fascist dominance of Italian social life made it difficult for the 
Egyptians and British to disaggregate “apolitical” Italian institutions from potential fifth 
column activity at the start of the war. Middle East Forces Commander Gen. Wavell 
wrote to Lampson on June 12, 1940 to demand the registration of all Italian men, the 
internment of all members of the Fascist party and men between the ages of 17 and 55, 
and the formation of an Anglo-Egyptian internment committee with military authorities. 
The military estimated there to be a total of 12,000 Italians who fell into these categories: 
5,800 Fascists plus 6,150 other males of military age, of which 4,500 were in Cairo, 
5,000 in Alexandria and the remainder in rural areas or provincial cities.14 Ali Mahir 
complied with this request, issuing Proclamation 57 on June 17, which mandated 
registration of men and women and internment on the schedule requested.15 Wavell 
objected to the inclusion of women in the scheme and, as the weeks passed, the speed of 
its execution, but could not fault the letter of the legislation.16 However, the top brass 
were taking no chances. GHQ shortly held a meeting with Russell and Baker, the 
commandants of the Cairo and Alexandria police forces, and Lieutenant Colonel 
Maunsell, the head of military intelligence to make a back-up plan “in the event of a non-
cooperative or non-existent Egyptian Government.”17 The minutes provide a 
comprehensive look at the simplicity with which the British military viewed diplomatic 
relations between the British Embassy and the Egyptian government. The plan follows 
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the traditional “condominium” relationship: a British-planned central internment camp in 
Geneifa (on the Suez Canal south of Ismailia), with British commandants, Egyptian labor 
and, notably, Egyptian funding, both for the camps and welfare for women and children 
of prisoners. (“In the first instance. Repayment to be considered.” is penned in). The 
report concludes: “When detailed B.T.E. scheme is complete it should be presented to the 
Egyptian Government and latter pressed to implement it without delay. In the event of 
there being no Egyptian Government or British Martial Law, it should be put into force 
by the British authorities at once.”18 Although it implicitly acknowledged the difference 
between the Egyptian state of siege and British martial law, the report seems to predict 
the collapse of the Egyptian government in the short run, before Italian forces had even 
crossed into Egypt. 
 The Egyptian government resisted nearly every aspect of this plan, and it won 
significant concessions. The Egyptians successfully asserted their right to enjoy the sole 
right of arresting Italian residents of Egypt, and eventually secured British funding for the 
camps, reversing British intentions for the scheme. The Ministry of Interior surveillance 
over the Italian community, which it inherited from the British-run European Department 
in 1937, was more sophisticated than the British military wished to concede. Selim Zaki 
of the special branch of the Cairo Police produced comprehensive reports in English of 
Fascist organization activities and Italian public opinion about the war and internment. 
The reports both justified Egyptian actions and probably sought to aid and appease the 
British authorities about the administrative ability of Egyptians to maintain control of 
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Italian civilians.19 Zaki built up a network of anti-Fascist informants or secret 
sympathizers over time who collaborated with the Egyptian police in preventing Italian 
espionage and propaganda.20  
 The next prime minister, Hassan Sabri, opposed the wholesale shipment of Italian 
internees from Alexandria and Cairo to the Canal Zone, far from their families, and put 
off the formation of a joint internment committee until July 13. When it finally met as an 
‘informal committee’ under the chairmanship of Ministry of Interior Undersecretary 
Hassan Rifaʿat, the committee recognized the transit camps at Italian schools in the main 
cities as permanent residences for many internees. More importantly, it acknowledged 
that “internment camps, their administration, guarding, etc. will rest entirely with the 
Egyptian Government.”21 With police resources strained, the British military had to be 
satisfied with gradual arrests of Fascist party members and other young men at a rate of 
around 20 to 30 per day.22 The arrests accelerated in September, and the 4,000-person 
main internment camp, which had been moved to Fayid on the Great Bitter Lake, 
approached capacity by the end of the month. This camp had Egyptian commanders and 
guards, but relied almost entirely for both food and tent canvas on the quartermaster 
supply from the nearby British military camps.23 
 The extreme concentration of the hard-core Fascist civilians at Fayid camp, side 
by side with Italian POW camps, fueled the struggle over control of the internment 
system. It had been the intention of the British military and Colonial Office after the entry 
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of Italy to the war to send any civilian internees and European prisoners of war in Egypt 
to India, and they began sending requests to prepare the transport facilities to do this in 
June 1940.24 Only after the first 6,000 internees were successfully imprisoned did such 
calls become of practical concern to the British authorities in Egypt. Lampson broached 
the subject with Sabri on October 8 and, in his words, Sabri said that “as a lawyer he 
didn’t like this idea of handing these people over to us to go to India. He had thought 
about it a long time but the idea just did not appeal to his legal mind.”25 By November, 
this position had evolved into a firm refusal; according to Lampson, “( …apart from 
legality of handing civilians over to us when Egypt is not at war with Italy, their amour 
propre is involved).”  
 Slightly later, plans to repatriate 2,000 Italians, or around 700 families, foundered 
on a dispute over who would pay for the transportation costs. Moreover, Italy would not 
admit the Italian refugees unless the Egyptian government gave each person LE 20 from 
the fund of sequestered Italian property to finance their first weeks back in their 
homeland.26 The issue reached a stalemate and no large group of Italians was repatriated 
besides a few ships carrying 1,000 Italian children in 1940.27 The British army removed 
Italian prisoners of war taken in Africa, who totaled 200,000 by August 1941 and more 
than half a million after the Italian surrender in September 1943, through Egypt in waves 
to Sudan, Kenya, India, South Africa, Australia and even to work camps in the British 
Isles.28  
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 The only alternative to sending the Italian civilians to India or back to Italy was 
the costly expansion of Fayid and eventually other new camps.29 Complaints from 
Wavell about the lack of discipline and organization of visitors to the camp at Fayid, and 
the overall lack of efficiency of the Egyptian guards, continued to increase. He expressed 
anxiety that enemy aliens at liberty could acquire information about the nearby canal 
zone military installations.30 The official Egyptian and British policy evolved to moving 
the majority of prisoners to provincial camps, while Fayid, where conditions were 
acknowledged to be poor, remained the center for the youngest and most politically 
dangerous men.31 Dissatisfaction with the state of affairs was the sharpest among the 
subaltern British liaison staff at Fayid, particularly Colonel C.D. Baker-Carr, chief of the 
liaison office. The BTE staged a “Court of Inquiry” to officially hear testimony from 
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these officers about the poor — and potentially medically threatening — conditions under 
Egyptian administration.32 In the middle of the inquiry, a riot broke out at Fayid 
immediately following the return of several internees who had escaped. Italians assaulted 
the Egyptian guards, some of whom opened fire on them, killing two and wounding 11 
inmates.33 After this event, the Egyptian authorities capitulated and agreed that the British 
military in charge of the adjoining prisoner of war camps would guard Fayid until it 
could be disassembled and the prisoners decentralized.34 However, because of 
administrative inertia and a lack of funding for such a project, it remained in existence 
until 1945. The number of civilian internees peaked at around 9,000 in late 1941, and had 
declined to 6,006 as late as August 1943.35  
 Egyptian-Italian Albino Ceserta’s oral history of the Italian internees at Fayid 
presents its harsh desert living conditions, which the British did little to ameliorate, as a 
trial that the Italian community eventually overcame through solidarity.36 (The camp 
power struggles no doubt subsided after the Anti-Fascist prisoners had been better 
segregated from the Fascist majority). The camp council ultimately published a 
mimeographed newsletter and organized orchestras and football teams. Ceserta’s history 
also reflects the Italian view, perhaps in nostalgic retrospect, that they never doubted the 
sympathy of the Egyptian guards and even the higher officials in the Ministry of Interior 
that it was only British imperial policy that was compelling the Egyptians to arrest and 
intern Italians. 
                                                 
32 WO 201/2409, Copy “Proceedings of A Court of Inquiry, Internee Camp Geneifa. 6 Jan. 1941. 
33 FO 371/27406, J 495, “Internee Camp, Fayid - Disturbance 3rd February 1941,” Col. F.V. Foster, 
General Officer CIC, BTE, 18 Feb. 1941. 
34 WO 201/2410, Memorandum of Conversation, Hassan Rifaat, Ahmad Sadiq, Napier Clavering, Terence 
Shone etc. 8 Feb. 1941. 
35 FO 371/27408, Lampson to Foreign Office, 9 Oct. 1941; FO 371/37318 
36 Albino Caserta, “Storia, Politica, Internamento,” in Gli Italiani D’Egitto Nella Seconda Guerra 
Mondiale, ed. Franco Greco (Rome: Associazione Nazionale Pro Italiani D’Egitto, 2007). 
 
 286 
  British requirements, Egyptian bureaucratic and diplomatic needs and 
humanitarian concerns over the maintenance of destitute Italians all competed and 
overlapped in determining the Egyptian state’s policies towards the Italian community. 
The Egyptian government used the state of siege to put German, Italian and other Axis 
property under sequestration at the same time as it imposed trade restrictions of the 
respective countries. The administration of this property, of which there is no objective 
total but which Italian estimates (undoubtedly on the high end) after the war valued at 
approximately LE 200 million and included banks, insurance companies, and industrial 
concerns in rubber, cigarettes, ice, phosphate fertilizers and automobiles among other 
sectors, represented yet another inadvertent government intervention into the private 
sector.37 The Egyptian state applied measures similar to its broader welfare programs to 
ensure the security and quiescence of the Egyptian population at large. British financial 
administrators were worried, when the Egyptian Sequestrator Muhammad Zaki al-Ibrashi 
began to liquidate the assets of Italian insurance companies in Egypt to reimburse 
Egyptian civilians for air raid damages, that the Italians would exact penalties on British 
companies in Italy in return. From the perspective of Foreign Office, the situation was 
simpler: “The amount of Italian property in Egypt exceeds that of Egyptian property in 
Italy. Therefore I see no reason why the Egyptians should desist from using Italian assets 
for compensation to air raid victims.”38  
 The British Embassy also had to mediate disputes between the British military 
and the Egyptian government over the military’s use of Italian assets. The British military 
sought to withhold payment to the sequestrator for Italian land it was occupying and 
                                                 
37 Petricioli, Oltre Il Mito: L’Egitto Degli Italiani (1917-1947), 464. 
38 FO 371/27406, McCombe to Tufnell, 1 Jan. 1941.; Foreign Office to Lampson, 17 Jan. 1941. 
 
 287 
£27,000 worth of timber it obtained from an Italian company before it was sequestered.39 
The Foreign Office’s interpretation hewed closely again to diplomatic conceptions of law 
and debt: “We wanted the Italians in Egypt interned. Only the Egyptian Government had 
the legal right to do this, and in order to get them to sanction this we have had to agree to 
pay for their internment. I cannot see how this can possibly, in equity or otherwise, give 
us any right to refuse to pay to the Sequestrator debts owing by the British military 
authorities to Italian nationals, payable to the Sequestrator under Egyptian law.”40 To 
raise this money, the sequestration administration pursued cash debts to the Italian 
companies held by members of the public and Allied states, and it held auctions to 
liquidate property that drew ready buyers, like an auction of 25 cars and motorcycles 
(mostly Fiats, but also a Ford and Studebaker) advertised in Ruz al-Yusuf magazine in 
mid-1942.41  
 Moreover, by 1943, the Egyptian Government was obliged to use a large amount 
of the sums under sequestration to provide welfare to the families of interned or 
unemployed Italians, or those whose businesses had been confiscated. The Swiss 
Legation, which provided diplomatic representation for the Italian community, reported 
in March 1943 it had been distributing LE 37,000 per month from the Italian state for this 
purpose for several years, but that it was running out of resources to do so. The Egyptians 
had already been supplementing this amount with LE 15,000 from the sequestered assets 
to be able to pay a monthly support of LE 3.50 per person up to LE 10 for large families, 
for around 20,000 Italians.42 By August of that year, the Swiss reported the Italians had 
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not sent any money at all for destitute Italians for two months and the Egyptians had 
begun paying the full LE 52,000 per month by liquidating sequestered Italian property.43 
The British generally agreed with the assessment of al-Nahhas that “The Egyptian 
Government finds itself with the choice of continuing to pay these subsidies out of the 
Italian goods under sequestration — at the risk of weakening the position of Egypt in the 
question of [post-war] reparations, — or of treating numerous Italian families devoid of 
all resources in a fashion that does not conform to humanitarian principles.”44  
 Italian calls for the end to internment and sequestration increased after the Italian 
armistice with the Allies on September 8, 1943. Renato Prunas, secretary general of the 
Italian Foreign Ministry, wrote to Harold Caccia, in the Allied Control Commission of 
Italy, that “the Italians in Egypt, once a prosperous and flourishing colony of 65.000 
souls, are now subjected to a spiritual confusion which is the primary cause of many 
forms of moral degradation, which for humanitarian motives, calls for immediate 
correction. Italian schools are closed and children are growing up without even receiving 
an indispensable elementary instruction. Misery and prostitution are widespread.”45 The 
British were somewhat ambivalent about easing the burden on Italian families that were 
not proven Fascist. But because the burden of providing welfare fell so strongly on the 
Egyptian government, and it was anxious about maintaining its postwar bargaining 
position with the Italians, al-Ibrashi refused to release sequestered property early. He 
wrote to the British that most of the Italians coming forward at this point had not been 
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among the Italian Jews or Anti-Fascists exempted at the beginning of the war and should 
be considered opportunists who had nothing to lose.46  
 Such negotiations caused a final peace treaty between Egypt and Italy to take until 
late 1946 to be concluded. The treaty was not ratified and the final sequestrations lifted 
on Italian companies until April 1948. As a part of the settlement, the Egyptian 
government received the phosphate company in Quseir as security on the delivery of LE 
4.5 million in cash and Italian owned land as reparations, in addition to which the Italians 
disavowed any of its subjects’ claims to the LE 2.1 million that the sequestrator had 
liquidated (of which most went to support the Italian community but LE 350,000 was 
paid to Egyptians for air raid damages).47 Many Italian businesses, and crucially, Italian 
community organizations, received back fractions of the property they had owned in 
1940, leading to some angry allegations that the Italian government had sacrificed the 
community in Egypt to normalize diplomatic relations.48 At the same time, employment 
opportunities for middle- and lower-class Italians dwindled in Italian companies and at 
Egyptian enterprises that were subject to new restrictions on the number of foreigners 
they could employ (explained below). Although the Italian community did not disappear, 
its number declined by nearly 40% to 28,000 in the next census in 1947. 
 
GREEK REFUGEES, SOLDIERS AND COMMUNISTS 
The liberal intent of the Montreux process was meant to make all foreigners equal under 
Egyptian law, but the exigencies of war forced the Egyptian government to make tough 
political choices about how to exercise its emergency jurisdiction over particular 
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nationalities. Upon the Nazi invasion of the Balkans, a large number of Yugoslav and 
Greek subjects sought refuge in Egypt, as well as the royal governments of the respective 
states. Because the Egyptian state had little grounds or practical ability to refuse these 
refugees, it combined older legal conceptions of the communal responsibility of foreign 
nationalities with contemporary modes of control and surveillance over them. The 
Egyptian government sought to secure the commitment of the British and Greek 
governments to finance the housing and feeding of all Greek refugees. For example, 
nearly four months of negotiations occurred before the Egyptians accepted 3,000 Greek 
children, who were billeted in the homes of “rich compatriots.”49 Egyptians responded to 
British requests for permission to open Egypt to a further 10,000 Greeks from Turkey, 
Cyprus and Lebanon with the requirement that the refugees be housed in a military camp 
and “be passed on to their ultimate destination as soon as possible.” Al-Nahhas’ 
diplomatic response was usually “I have been swayed by the humanitarian consideration 
to accede to your request.”50 When, as the government predicted, refugees tended to 
overstay the negotiated terms of their domicile, opposition politicians subverted this 
language to highlight the country’s taxed resources. “It is a very serious matter,” if 
refugees are taking food from hungry Egyptians, “since we know that humanitarianism is 
satisfied when the people of a country can eat first and foremost!” angrily proclaimed 
deputy Muhammad Abdel Rahman Nuṣayr, a Liberal Constitutionalist partisan who later 
joined the Muslim Brotherhood, in parliamentary debate. The Wafd Minister of Justice 
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Sabri Abu ʿAlam went to great lengths to demonstrate that these refugees were kept in 
military camps separate from the greater population and served with their own supplies.51 
 The arrival of the Greek King George II, the Greek army, and these refugees in 
Egypt had a strong impact on Egyptian Greeks, who at 69,000 people, were the largest 
expatriate community in Egypt. Greece had been governed since 1936 by a pro-royalist 
military dictatorship under General Ioannis Metaxas, who had restored the Greek royal 
dynasty after a decade of republican rule. Metaxas’ death in January 1941 and the 
withdrawal from Greece forced the army to restore any republican and leftist officers 
who could escape to serve in a royalist dominated military-in-exile. An intense political 
rivalry between these factions continued to grow in the military and in civilian life in 
Egypt.  
 Unlike the Egyptian Government’s reluctance to give authority over Italians as 
involuntary enemies of the British, it had less justification for resisting British hegemony 
over the policies of its Greek ally and the Greek community in Egypt. Foremost among 
its interventions, the Greek and British militaries drafted 7,000 young Egyptian Greeks to 
fight in the First Greek Brigade at El Alamein and in units in Syria, some of whom had 
never set foot in Greece. (This resulted in a good deal of resentment towards young 
British men deemed essential to civilian jobs in Egypt who were exempted from military 
service.)52 These drafted soldiers, largely of the middle and working classes, sympathized 
with the left-wing political orientation of the subaltern officers of mainland and 
archipelago origin and the military in Egypt became a hotbed of politics. The Greek First 
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Brigade of 5,000 troops played a successful role in the Second Battle of El-Alamein, but 
the Second Brigade on subsequent guard duty in Palestine was in constant tumult for 
most of 1943. This unit petitioned the government for the purge of its right wing officers 
and for the formation of a cabinet with leftist representation, contrary to liberal Prime 
Minister Panayotis Kanellopoulos’ plans for a centrist government. The British imposed a 
type of juridical discipline on the Greek army on several occasions, holding a court of 
enquiry in March 1943 into the “state of indiscipline” that resulted in the disbanding of 
the Second Brigade.53 The agitation culminated in April 1944 in a three-week mutiny of 
the army and navy in and around Alexandria in support of the EAM (Communist) 
provisional government set up in Greece after the Italian withdrawal. The Greek 
Seaman’s Union, a newly formed trade union with a strong local presence in Alexandria, 
supported the mutiny.54 Uncharacteristically, Rifaʿat turned all responsibility over this 
joint civilian-military strike to the British military forces, allowing them to arrest the 
Union’s local leader, civilian Nikos Karayannis, and withdrawing all Egyptian police 
from the Alexandria ports so that the British military could storm the three occupied 
Greek vessels and defeat the mutineers.55  
 After the suppression of the mutiny, as many as 10,000 participants were court 
martialed, and 49 were handed death sentences that were suspended only after strenuous 
British protest.56 The great majority was detained indefinitely in camps in Libya and 
Eritrea under British control, effectively halving the size of the Greek military, which the 
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monarchy heavily reorganized to secure right-wing leadership. At this point, the Egyptian 
Ministry of Interior intervened to request that the British distinguish between the officer 
leadership of the mutiny from mainland Greece from Egyptian Greek draftees and to 
amnesty and demobilize the latter. “They are the real victims because they were always 
against all idea of revolution and every breach of discipline,” the report stated. “Because 
they were against these ideas, the Greeks from Greece detested, insulted and threatened 
them with death.”57 This report goes to some lengths to identify the refugee officers as 
outsiders and an important source of communist ideology threatening Egypt as a way of 
explaining away the rise of independent Egyptian-Greek communist groups at the time. 
In the end, the British treated all soldiers involved in the mutinies similarly. A year and a 
half later, a committee of the parents of 2,000 Egyptian Greek soldiers in internment had 
to resort to petitioning the British and American Ambassadors for the release of their 
sons.58 Upon the return of these men, and the eventual demobilization of the Egyptian 
Greeks who were deemed loyal enough to stay in the army and who decided to return to 
Egypt, working class Greeks in particular faced the same difficulties in regaining their 
old jobs during the wave of post-war unemployment as liberated Italians.59  
 The immediate postwar tensions with the Soviet Union coincided with the Greek 
Civil war and a rise in radical labor organization in Egypt, fueling the Egyptian security 
services’ symbolic transformation of the Greek community into a source of Communist 
conspiracy. Ironically, the nascent Egyptian communist movement had been better 
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integrated with the activities of the Soviet Union through the Comintern in the 1920s and 
1930s before its demise.60 By the 1940s, the Soviet Union had sworn off direct patronage 
of Communist groups so as to establish serious diplomatic connections with the 
increasingly independent Middle Eastern states. The new Communist groups of the 
1940s, like Iskra and The Egyptian Movement for National Liberation, grew through 
local organization and the rising activity of the Egyptian trade unions. These groups were 
founded by Jewish Egyptians of European origins, Hillel Schwartz and Henri Curiel 
respectively, and included a large number of Jewish, Greek and British members despite 
general efforts to include Muslim and Coptic Egyptians. The heterogenous membership 
of these movements made them vulnerable to outdated accusations of Soviet conspiracy. 
In the first state maneuver since the start of the Second World War to invoke widespread 
fear of communist activity, Prime Minister Ismail Sidqi struck out in July 1946 at 
student, labor and Wafd-led protests of growing social inequality and of the stagnation of 
his renegotiation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. He arrested 200 political activists and 
banned a number of left-wing papers and the official Wafd daily, Al-Wafd al-Misri.  
 A memorandum from Hassan Rifaʿat of the Interior Ministry to the British 
Embassy one month prior to these arrests provides an extensive look at the connection 
between the communist movement in Egypt, Soviet propaganda and even the “infection” 
of foreign social groups in the bureaucratic mind. Rifaʿat accused the Allied nations of 
turning a blind eye to — and even spreading — Russian propaganda in the interest of 
helping war morale. Moreover, “A number of Foreign units came to Egypt, Polish, 
Yugoslavs and Greeks, carrying with them the microbe of communist propaganda, 
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disseminating it among Egyptian civilians, which had the effect of increasing the number 
of theorists anxious to learn more about communism…” Interestingly, he also indicts 
Levantine Arabs as a source of propaganda that had filtered into an eastern social 
medium. Rifaʿat constructed a conspiracy whereby all communist activity in Egypt is 
directed by the Soviet legation and in turn “these institutions support the Soviet legation.” 
Of the French, Greeks and Italians, “At a conservative estimate, 30% can be considered 
as having communist tendencies; the majority of the Greeks consider them[selves] as 
Soviet subjects.”61  
 Public discourse usually followed innuendo rather than outrageous and 
unprovable statements like this one. In his announcement of the communist arrests, Sidqi 
maintained (instead) that “It is possible some Greek Communists have a connection to 
the EAM [the mainland Greek Communist movement opposing the Royalist 
government].”62 Sidqi’s legislation banning communist activity, which he passed as a 
royal decree law during the parliamentary recess in 1946, stressed the interdiction of 
foreign political interference in Egypt as one of its defining characteristics, sentencing a 
fine and prison to “everyone, who without the government’s authorization, establishes, 
founds, organizes or directs societies, groups or organizations of any kind which have an 
international character or which have branches abroad.” Sidqi informed La Bourse 
Egyptienne it was his opinion that the recent student and labor protests had been 
coordinated by “foreign communists” to spoil the negotiations for a new treaty.63 In 
actuality, many Greeks participated independently from the EAM in the Egyptian 
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nationalist communist movement in the 1940s, although these points of contact became 
more limited as the scrutiny of the security forces increased and the culture of the 
communist movement became Arabized and Egyptianized by the 1950s.64 
 The failure of the Greek mutiny represents the tragic culmination of the third 
volume of Egyptian Greek author Stratis Tsirkas’ epic novel about the Greek leftist 
movement in exile across the Eastern Mediterranean during the Second World War, 
Drifting Cities. Tsirkas indicts both the British for interfering so strongly to prop up the 
unpopular royal dynasty, and the Soviet Union, which withdrew support for left-wing 
activists in the army at a crucial moment to preserve unity among the Allies. But, rightly 
or wrongly, he saves an important critique for the Greeks in Egypt. In the second book, 
Ariagne, the protagonist Manos Simonidis takes refuge with Ariagne, a Greek Egyptian 
woman in Cairo, after being wounded in Libya in 1943, where he publishes a left-wing 
nationalist newspaper. While the character of Manos remains fixated on the cause of 
bringing about a left-wing democracy in Greece, Tsirkas does include a vision of the 
insecurity these conflicts brought to the Greeks living long-term in Egypt through the 
eyes of Ariagne. She worries that Greek social superiority to Egyptians and specifically 
Manos’ political intrigues would alienate the Egyptian authorities from the practical 
position of the majority of Egyptian Greeks who knew no other home would lead to their 
ultimate exile:  
I can see the crowds bustling on the pier, surrounded by mountains of suitcases 
and bundles and mattresses. And behind them, the graves of parents, 
grandparents, small children, left to the mercy of God. Left without an oil lamp, 
without even a bucket of water to quench their thirsty bones. And all the toil, the 
festive occasions, the daily worries of a lifetime —  fifty, eighty, a hundred years 
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— left behind, even though you may think you’re taking them away with you… 
Mark my words, once you’ve lived a lifetime in a particular place, in a particular 
way, it’s over and done with, you can’t start again somewhere else…65  
 
This vision is perhaps a projection of a later period — Tsirkas wrote the trilogy in the late 
1950s — but the Greek diaspora already had undergone such an evacuation from Western 
Anatolia after the First World War. The nation state logic that underpinned population 
transfer in the Greco-Turkish war was infinitely expandable. 
 
ALLIED SUBJECTS AND CITIZENS IN MILITARY COURT 
The idea that Europeans could be tried by an Egyptian judge, for the first time in around 
90 years, for crimes under state of siege jurisdiction was a shocking development to 
many foreign lawyers and jurists who had made careers in Egypt. As before, the British 
played an important liaison role in explaining and defending the new legal regime that 
corresponded to their interpretation of the Montreux convention. Pierre de Witnesse, the 
French Consul, wrote to the British on September 13, 1939 to elicit support for Egyptian 
military tribunals for Europeans that would be composed of two Egyptian officers and a 
Mixed Court judge of the accused’s own nationality instead of an Egyptian judge. 
Lampson replied, after consulting with ʿAbd al-Hamid Badawi, head of the State Legal 
Department, that the Egyptian government was prepared to defend their sovereign right 
to a purely Egyptian judiciary in all state of siege cases quite vigorously. However, he 
insinuated that if there were an actual case of “victimization” of a European in military 
court, they might have a stronger case for intervention.66 As the Mixed Courts continued 
to operate as usual, the only way to bring foreigners under the jurisdiction of the military 
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courts was to pass proclamations expanding military jurisdiction for everyone in new 
crimes. For example, as the original state of siege law and proclamations had failed to 
mention punishments for espionage, ʿAli Mahir passed Proclamation 23 primarily to 
ensure that two Italians charged with the crime would appear before the military courts 
and not a mixed tribunal led by an Italian judge early in the war.67 
 Generally, the British Embassy was willing to accede to Egyptian military trials 
of Europeans. Most frequently, the military courts sentenced Greek merchants and 
grocers for security and supply infringements. In March 1944, the issue nonetheless 
broke out as a British parliamentary imbroglio when metropolitan politicians raised a 
complaint about a British subject who had been tried in the Egyptian military courts. 
Lampson had learned in February of Alice Marks, a British subject sentenced to six 
months imprisonment along with two Egyptian women for running a brothel, when her 
two sons serving in the Air Force complained to the British HQ in Egypt. He wrote to 
Nahhas to ask for her release as “an act of grace upon the part of the Egyptian 
Government”.68 Al-Nahhas refused to grant her a pardon. He argued that her treatment 
was identical to the Egyptian defendants, and also that current regulations did not allow 
him to reverse a his decision as military governor.69 As with the prior cases of Egyptian 
hegemony over the state of siege, the British Embassy had to give up this request for 
symbolic privilege in order to maintain an Egyptian political order on which they relied 
so heavily. 
 Unlike the other affairs this one gained brief political attention in London. Marks’ 
son’s complaint also made it to MP Sir John Mellor, who officially asked the Foreign 
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Office in Parliament on March 22 why “British subjects (were) being tried otherwise than 
in accordance with the Treaty of Montreaux.”70 Killearn found himself explaining and 
defending the Egyptian state of siege to the Foreign Office, which had mostly ignored the 
issue of military jurisdiction as long as it produced favorable results. He claimed there 
were no records of other British subjects tried in Egyptian military court, although he 
immediately qualified this with a case against the head of the Maltese community in 
military court for whisky bootlegging, which ended in acquittal. After a basic outline of 
the system under the constitution and treaty to the Foreign Office, Killearn argued the 
“Council of Ministers have exercised these powers under Article 6 of the law mainly if 
not entirely at our request,” to maintain public security and the “safeguarding of British 
troops,” of which running an unlicensed brothel was an infringement.71  
 There is evidence there had been other British subjects tried in military courts. 
Killearn’s assertion no other British subjects had been tried in military court may be 
another case of bureaucratic amnesia, but the British embassy had actually been 
interested and possibly keeping track of all Egyptian military court cases involving 
British subjects since 1940, when a severe sentence against a Maltese man for possessing 
illegal weapons led the Embassy to alert the Alexandria, Port Said and Cairo Consuls to 
keep an eye on the courts’ activities with an eye to making a complaint.72 Although there 
are no firm figures, there were enough foreigners in state of siege detention to warrant 
Mustafa al-Nahhas to request a full investigation of their treatment by the Ministries of 
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Interior and Health at the start of the Wafd government in 1942.73 Later that year, the 
British had also clarified the question of the jurisdictional status of a Greek woman, 
Beatrice Ilyas Haddad, married to a British military officer William Wood, on trial in 
military court for running a brothel. The British Embassy confirmed to the Egyptian 
Ministry of Justice that as her husband was serving outside Egypt, she was not eligible 
for the immunity for families of the British armed forces in Egypt, and her trial went 
ahead.74 
 Lampson attempted to shift the 1944 controversy from the issue of jurisdiction, 
which he could not change, to the prison treatment of the convicted British subjects. “The 
trial of Mrs. Marks by the military tribunal is in no way peculiar,” he noted. “The trouble 
is that she was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment… the conditions of Mrs. Marks’ 
imprisonment… have been found to be most unsatisfactory”75 Even after the Foreign 
Office had satisfied Mellor in Parliament that the state of siege changes were merely a 
wartime measure, Killearn pursued the issue of special prison treatment for foreigners as 
another mostly symbolic demonstration of British power in a realm in which they no 
longer wielded it. Even after Marks’ term of imprisonment had ended (as had a Maltese 
pub proprietor’s six-month sentence for infringing alcohol regulations), Killearn 
continued to cite these cases as evidence that the Egyptians had been obstructing 
applications for better food and less crowded cells to which the military governor had 
given its informal consent in 1942. He perhaps did not recommend his cause with a dash 
of colonial chauvinism: “Your Excellency knows as well as I that British subjects in 
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common with other Europeans and many Egyptians have a mode of life and standard of 
minimum comfort which is, unfortunately, far above that of the lower elements of the 
Egyptian population.”76 Despite receiving confidential advice from Minister for Social 
Affairs Fuʾad Sirag Ad-Din to simply give all foreigners special treatment 
automatically,77 Nahhas preferred instead to form a dossier of all the positive comments 
British and European observers had recently given of the Egyptian Penal system, 
presumably for retort to Killearn.78 The Egyptian government did not address the issue 
until the Wafd left power in October, when new PM Ahmed Mahir sent a memo to all 
military parquets directing them always to inform foreign defendants of their right to 
apply for special penal treatment.79 Dissatisfied, Killearn protested to Mahir that 
foreigners should automatically be given special treatment, and in the prevailing spirit of 
conciliation with the British, Mahir conceded this final point.80 
 
THE SECURITIZATION OF RESIDENCY AND NATIONALITY 
In one sense, the Montreux convention and war had removed all the impediments that 
had prevented Britain from exercising its informal hegemony over the foreign 
communities in Egypt since the 1870s. It also ensnared the British community in the web 
of a negotiated Egyptian administration. No administrative power was as central to the 
material and symbolic operation and security of the state as customs and passport 
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control.81 Unlike the juridical powers over permanent residents of Egypt described above 
that gradually devolved on the Egyptian state, the sovereign state did not have to justify 
itself directly for its decisions on whom to admit or exclude from crossing its borders, 
although diplomatic pressure was a factor in these decisions. 
 The issue of defining Egyptian nationality, as distinct from Ottoman nationality, 
had originated before the First World War. Under the then-current 1929 nationality law, 
the right of nationality was passed by paternal lineage (“jus sanguinis”), not by fact of 
birth in Egypt. Individuals from families resident since 1848 automatically received 
Egyptian nationality, along with Ottoman subjects resident before 1914. Conditions for 
naturalization were 10 years’ tenure in the country, a productive livelihood, good 
behavior and functional fluency in Arabic. In practice, the administration’s criteria for 
actually issuing nationality papers were less clear. Affluent Ottoman subjects, in 
particular Christians and Jews from North Africa, had been able to obtain Italian and 
French passports in the years after the First World War. Until 1936, the Capitulations had 
incentivized obtaining European passports, although some in non-Muslim migrant 
communities from the east, like the Armenians and Levantine Arabs, successfully 
obtained Egyptian nationality in the interwar period and became documented 
mutamassirin. Even roughly 5,000 Greeks in Alexandria, of a population of roughly 
50,000, obtained Egyptian nationality by 1937.82 
 The Egyptian government had assumed the independent power to issue and 
revoke visas and residency permits for the first time after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and 
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Montreux convention. At the same time, it endeavored in the convention to grant 
residents formerly protected under the capitulations who had lived in Egypt for at least 
five years before 1937 perpetual permission to remain unless imprisoned for more than 
three months, convicted of subversive political activities or declared indigent. With the 
intensification of the war, the Egyptian government attempted to strengthen its 
surveillance over foreigners, with mixed success. Military Proclamation 25 of May 7, 
1940 essentially revoked all existing visas and required all foreigners entering or 
returning to Egypt to obtain new documentation. Although the Egyptian government took 
pains to demonstrate to the British that its increased vigilance prevented the entry of 
enemy nationalities, this policy gave Ministry of Interior bureaucrats the license to make 
procedures more stringent for all nationalities at a time when nationalist sentiment looked 
with suspicion on the privileges and economic domination of the foreign communities. 
The American embassy registered complaints as early as 1938 that the passport and visa 
office were rejecting visa applications from Jews bearing passports “which are likely to 
be revoked by the governments of which they are nationals.”83  
 The Egyptians had no control over the entry of Allied troops to Egyptian territory, 
but by the middle of the war, private businesses of allied nations were complaining of the 
widespread obstruction of the passport offices. “By the strictest regulations, applied 
nominally for security reasons, the entry of foreigners has been severely limited; even the 
entry of vitally necessary British non-official personnel has at times only been obtained 
through diplomatic intervention,” wrote G. C. G. Charvet, the Managing Director of 
Royal Dutch Shell in Egypt to Killearn in a typical comment.84 One of the main reasons 
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for the passport office to refuse long-term work permits was to prevent a foreigner from 
taking a job that an Egyptian could fill, although before the late ’40s this was also an 
inconsistent policy. As a compromise, the Ministry of Interior sought to get foreign 
businesses to accept temporary permits for the employees in question to train Egyptian 
replacements.85  
 Other legislation attempted to better extend surveillance of foreigners from the 
borders into the interior of the country. Law 49 of 1940 required foreigners to register 
with the police within 48 hours of their arrival and obtain a special ID pass card. 
Although foreign communities were counted broadly in the 10-year census, the Ministry 
of Interior complained of lacking detailed information about the current residence and 
employment status of every foreigner. In fact, many of the working class foreigners who 
had not traveled outside Egypt since 1936 did not hold valid visas or residency permits at 
all. Prior to the Montreux conference, working class Europeans who made it into Egypt 
were essentially protected from deportation by the Capitulations. Crucially, the new law 
also held employers liable for registering all their foreign employees with the police. In a 
complaint common to the hunt for illegal immigrants around the world, the explanatory 
note to the law proclaimed, “Many foreigners enter Egypt for touristic purposes and then 
stay to work in trade and industry… is it not strange that we would refuse entry to any 
working hands who would compete with our nationals?”86 The Ministry of Interior did 
not issue detailed regulations for this law until 1946, because so much of the traffic of 
foreigners was regulated separately under military jurisdiction, which made a 
comprehensive survey difficult to make. 
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 This new administrative attitude was just one of the various signs of 
“xenophobia” to which the British Embassy and British Chamber of Commerce directed 
their interest when first considering the “postwar reconstruction” of the British 
community in 1943. British businessmen feared the more stringent implementation of the 
Arabic Language Law of 1942, which required all paperwork with the Egyptian 
bureaucracy to be conducted in Arabic; the Egyptian government had customarily 
accepted French and English. The government justified the act by citing the large amount 
of paperwork that new commercial and labor surveillance and tax laws mandated — and 
“for the sake of national dignity,” according to al-Nahhas.87 The British persuaded the 
Egyptians not to enforce the law on the military and its contractors, although certain 
offices — such as passports and immigration — were known to require Arabic at their 
discretion during the war.88 The Chamber of Commerce consistently complained of the 
increase in taxes, tariffs and import restrictions that occurred as a result of the war as if 
they were policies targeting foreigners, simply because foreign capital was more 
dominant in trade and industry than agriculture. The most important task for the British 
Embassy was ensuring the livelihood of the average British subject. The prospect of 
demobilization and reemployment of British residents of Egypt posed similar problems as 
it did for native Egyptians and the Greek and Italian communities. The embassy worried 
in particular about the larger number of Maltese and Cypriots who competed with Greeks 
and Italians as skilled labor, “to maintain themselves and their families in a way that will 
do credit to their race.”89  
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 Killearn usually dismissed Egyptian changes to the status of foreigners as 
“pinpricks,” but the large amount of time the embassy spent defending its subjects’ 
threatened privileges betrays just how important these types of issues were for the 
imperial edifice of the British. More than anything, it was the increasingly nationalistic 
tone of the Egyptian media and opposition parties towards eliminating foreign 
exploitation of Egyptians during the war crisis, more than any concrete policy, which led 
to the foreboding of elite foreigners. “We Don’t Own Anything!” roared the headline of a 
news article on the common theme of the foreign domination of all trades and businesses. 
“As an example [of this domination], the installation and repair of elevators was a 
monopoly of the Italians, such that an Egyptian couldn’t import a single one,” read one 
provocative line, “so that it took the internment of all the Italians for Egyptians to 
advance in this field.”90 The negative publicity in the foreign press from the Chamber of 
Commerce’s 1943 report resulted in several high-profile Egyptians making public 
appearances to reassure the foreign communities. “Egypt and her government, I say, 
extends to [foreigners] today as they will tomorrow and after the suppression of the 
Mixed Courts, the most cordial welcome and will consider them always as brothers 
partaking our sentiments, our joys and our sufferings,” al-Nahhas proclaimed at the 
celebration of the signing of the Independence of the Judiciary law.91 
 The importance of the surveillance of foreigners and the restriction of their re-
entry increased at the end of the war. The unemployment problem, which had been a 
nationalist trope mainly about educated Egyptian youth before the war, was generalized 
into a crisis of office work and manual labor with the reduction of war industry. In 1945, 
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an inter-ministerial committee reassessed the customs regime with an eye to improving 
tourism while tightening controls over residency permits. The Egyptian state legal 
department introduced an interpretation of the Montreux convention whereby long-term 
residents of Axis nationalities, most notably the Italians, had lost any right of protection 
from deportation or to return after a long absence.92 Moreover, the Egyptian government 
appeared to reject the implied notion that Montreux protections for long-term residents 
would apply any longer after the transition period ended in 1949 and the Mixed Courts 
closed. Greek, Italian and French efforts to settle establishment treaties with Egypt that 
would salvage some of the former legal privileges before Montreux were first delayed by 
postwar peace negotiations and then abandoned altogether.93 The Minister of Social 
Affairs began appending paperwork to all businesses’ requests for residency permits 
along the following lines: “with ref. to your application for an extension of the residence 
permit of . . . . . . . please send me as soon as possible a list showing the names of all the 
employees of your company, their nationality, pay nature of work and date of 
appointment, written in Arabic: this is required to enable us to express an opinion on your 
request to the Ministry of Interior.”94 The British Embassy gave credence to allegations 
that the passport office had been infiltrated by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who 
were carrying out a long-term xenophobic agenda of quietly obstructing the entry of 
foreigners to avoid detection.95 
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 These legislative and administrative trends culminated in the controversial 
Company Law, drafted in 1945 and passed in 1947. The law required that Egyptians own 
51% of the shares of new joint stock companies and hold 40% of the directorships, and 
that all joint stock companies employ Egyptians at a rate of 75% of all salaried 
employees and 90% of all laborers, who would receive 65% and 80% of all wages 
respectively. A large new bureaucracy made a considerable effort to investigate and 
enforce this law at hundreds of companies across Egypt, but its task was hindered by the 
ambiguity of the law’s meaning. Just who counted as “Egyptian”? The Companies 
Department, tasked with enforcing the law, held different people to different standards: 
employees with non-Arab or Muslim sounding names were required to produce 
nationality certificates, or in the case of Copts, certification from the patriarchate.96 For 
Italian and Greek office clerks and working class Jewish Egyptians with no passports or 
sufficient residency paperwork, this presented a major threat to the livelihoods of 
individuals and to the social and economic networks that underpinned their communities. 
The Company Law marked a transition, ten years after Montreux, to the first 
parliamentary (i.e., not emergency) legislation regulating foreigners that was expressly 
not liberal. Nationalist ideology fueled and justified this change, but this form of 
demographic control contains the logic of ten years of security-oriented management of 
labor and residency. 
  
CONCLUSION 
The end of the Mixed Courts in 1949 did not accelerate the end of the foreign community 
in Egypt, as some diplomats had worried. If anything, the merger of the courts system, 
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along with the implementation of a new Civil Code drafted by ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanhuri 
and secularization of the personal status courts, was an advance for liberal legality in 
Egypt.97 Robert Tignor details the British business community’s adaptation to the new 
“equitable” rules by the late 40s and 50s, and their eager desire for the British 
Government to make concessions on the control of the Suez Canal to avoid further 
enflaming Egyptian opinion.98 
 In another sense, emergency internments and increasingly illiberal immigration 
and foreign residency policies became characteristic of the experience of foreign and 
mutamassir communities because they became routine. The context of the war enabled 
this process, in which the severity of the threat to the state justified the severity of its 
security measures. The Egyptian bureaucracy became more adept and comfortable with 
interning civilians and sequestering their assets, such as during the 1948 Palestine War 
and 1956 Suez Canal crisis. If this cycle followed the letter of liberal legality, or what 
was constitutionally acceptable in its defense, it did not reflect the spirit of liberalism. 
Even a liberal regime centered on surveillance of the individual, under conditions of 
constitutionally defined crisis, can come to treat communities who either pose a general 
danger to the security of the state or do not meet the criteria for its protection with a form 
of collective punishment. That this treatment was mostly unplanned makes it no less 
constitutive of the experience of these communities and the resulting social 
transformation of the Egyptian public. 
                                                 
97 Guy Bechor, The Sanhuri Code, and the Emergence of Modern Arab Civil Law (1932 to 1949) (Leiden: 
Brill, 2007). 
98 Robert L. Tignor, “Decolonization and Business: The Case of Egypt,” The Journal of Modern History 
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 While there is good evidence that Egyptian administrators used their new powers 
to further a nationalist agenda to marginalize non-Muslim, non-Arabic speaking 
communities, this analysis has tried to highlight the specific conjuncture of events that 
made these administrative choices possible. As much as nationalist public opinion 
censured the ongoing economic domination of foreign elites, the various crises of war 
highlighted the ways Egyptian government worried non-elite foreigners and 
undocumented mutamassirin could threaten the liberal regime that the Egyptian and 
foreign upper classes dominated. In assuming the burden of managing Egypt’s economy, 
the government became more intolerant of these groups staking a claim on state 
resources, whether subsidized goods or access to the employment market. In the case of 
war refugees, and internees, this meant segregating them from the civilian life and 
forcing the community of co-nationals (or their patrons, like the British in the case of the 
Greeks) to foot the bill for their maintenance.  The more confidently the Egyptian 
bureaucracy assured itself and its British and American diplomatic representatives that 
there was no way communism could garner support among good Muslim Egyptians, the 
more plausible it was to view — and legally categorize — mutamassir leftists as not 
Egyptian. Collectively, these were an important stage in the Egypt’s postcolonial 
transition to an étatist mode of state management, in which the state sought to discredit 




 Conclusion  
 
The redefinition of an epistemology of society and the repertory of government 
techniques, rather than any definite or permanent solutions, characterizes the importance 
of the Second World War in the development of the Egyptian state. Impending military 
defeat and food scarcity prompted political actors to seek solutions that could reach far 
beyond the strictures of their ideologies or class interests. The tactical governance of 
administrators amounted to more than the short-term horizon on which many of these 
administrators focused. Through the state of siege, Egyptian politicians, intellectuals and 
the British diplomatic establishment together sought to preserve the liberal nature of the 
Egyptian state and political economy throughout the war, although that nature was 
substantially transformed. They did this not merely because these actors wished to defend 
their property and the property of their clients, or because of the strength of constitutional 
and liberal welfare discourse, or by the dictate of the British. Poulantzas proposes a 
description of the state that can encompass the dynamic complexity of these events: it is 
“not purely and simply a relationship, or the condensation of a relationship; it is the 
specific material condensation of a relationship of forces among classes and class 
fractions.”1 This perspective allows an analysis of expanded executive powers under the 
state of emergency not just as a code of laws, but rather as a complete and integrated 
material institution extending from the military governor through his military justices, 
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state prosecutors, the increased police officers and police-like administrators of the 
Ministries of Interior, Supply and Social Affairs to the farmers, bread bakers and workers 
in British workshops whose livelihoods hinged on the opportunities and possible 
punishments the system structured. This institution, itself the product of a range of 
possibilities before the war, structured the range of political possibilities during and after 
the war.  
 The durability and success of the state of siege as a legacy of war governance in 
public discourse in Egypt was possible through a constant interchange between its 
material-institutional and ideological aspects. The major advances in the sophistication of 
the laws and bureaucracy to regularize a system of government intervention in the 1940s 
were inseparable from the narrative of Egypt’s progression towards sovereign self-
government and the maintenance of its own security through its participation in the war. 
The construction of the positive legal forms of the emergency occurred in tandem with 
the steady, if sometimes inconsistent, manipulation of public consensus. The narrative of 
Egyptian-British diplomatic cooperation to win the war as the reason for legal exception 
and étatism broke down after 1945 when it became clear to the Egyptian public that this 
supposedly epoch-ending war did not mean British withdrawal. By the late 1940s, 
however, these techniques had been firmly welded to state nationalist practices and goals. 
The way Egyptian politicians and bureaucrats crafted the state of siege depended on 
current conditions and ideology, but they inevitably deployed it as a bolster to state 
sovereignty parallel to liberal institutions in crises in which colonial power, international 
military or economic threats, or domestic unrest threatened the state’s control or image.  
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 More fundamentally than any single economic or political project, therefore, the 
legal framework born with the state of siege continued after the war and the 1952 Free 
Officer coup. Indeed, it has continued until the present day in Egypt. It is now well 
established, although not universally accepted in the nationalist narrative of a 
postcolonial “1952 Revolution,” that the new regime initially did very little to change the 
basic form of the government and its policies.2 The bureaucratic record of the Prime 
Minister’s role as Military Governor, which began in 1939, continues directly into the 
1950s. Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi’s leadership of the Saʿadist party facilitated his revival of 
the state of siege as prime minister during the 1948 war in Palestine. The Wafd party 
brought the Palestine War state of siege to an end in 1950. However, the short-lived 
governments that came after the January 26, 1952 Cairo Fire imposed another state of 
siege that lasted through the Free Officer coup in July of that year until the promulgation 
of the Republican Constitution in 1956.3  
 The institutions of the state of siege therefore bridged a gap of three years during 
the constitutional interregnum between the end of the monarchy in 1953 and the first 
republican constitution passed by referendum in 1956. In part because the Free Officers 
closed parliament and ruled by executive decree in all fields of government during this 
period, the concept of the state of siege itself (rather than merely protest over a single 
issue such as censorship or civil internment) for the first time became a topic of 
controversy in many newspapers and magazines.4 However, a good deal of this 
                                                 
2 Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement; Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, 
and Civil Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). 
3 DWQ 0081-030604, Council of Ministers files contain decisions appointing military officers as justices in 
military courts as late as March 13, 1954, signed by Muhammad Naguib in his capacity as military 
governor. 
4 Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World, 83. 
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controversy centered on a series of short-lived exceptional show trials that were 
technically not a part of the institutions of the state of siege. These included the 
Mahkamat al-Ghadr (Court of Treason) in late 1952, periodic trials of communists, the 
Mahkamat al-Thawra (Court of the Revolution), which tried former ministers of the old 
regime in 1953, and the Mahakim al-Shaʿb (People’s Courts) in 1954-1955, which tried 
the Muslim Brotherhood after its assassination attempt on ʿAbd al-Nasir.5 Ultimately, the 
1958 Emergency Law brought these explicitly political courts to an end and restored the 
French style of state of siege by moving the military governor’s powers to the president. 
The law introduced a new tier of institutionalized permanent state security courts under 
his power that, like the military courts of the Second World War, the constitution 
sanctioned completely and operated with the cooperation of the judiciary, even though 
the balance of power rested more and more with the military members of the court. The 
1958 law is now extinct, but this form of emergency, given its flexible relationship to 
Egyptian constitutions, is alive in state practice to this day. While these courts have not 
had the transparency or liberal due process of civilian courts, they both preserve the 
functional liberalism of the legal system on issues not threatening to the state and 
regularize the action of the security apparatus. 
 The chaotic conjuncture of wartime events demonstrates that a state of emergency 
does not unavoidably or inevitably dismantle liberal practices or wholly invalidate the 
social utility of rule of law, although it is corrosive to its spirit. Scholars of 20th century 
Egyptian history have sought to explain the endurance of political and cultural pluralism 
in the face of years of authoritarian colonial, monarchic and later military and republican 
styles of government. Tamir Moustafa and Nathan Brown both emphasize the important 
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role the judiciary and legal profession have played since the 19th and early 20th centuries in 
structuring this pluralism. An independent judiciary, they both argue, has helped 
sublimate the political tensions originating with authoritarian governments, particularly 
when it has come to the disposition of private property and the development of the 
economy. In the brief period in which Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasir attempted to exchange the 
civil/security parallel justice system in the 1960s for a new form of “socialist” legality, 
there was an immediate political backlash from the Egyptian bourgeoisie and capital 
flight from the country.6 This opposition hastened the right-wing infitah under President 
Sadat in the 1970s, who enshrined the state’s commitment to protecting private property 
in a new supreme constitutional court in 1979, which provided a frequent forum for 
political opposition to the National Democratic Party regime as well.7 These reforms and 
the tense condition of war that prevailed for most of the 1970s also allowed the quiet 
resurrection of security and military courts with the consent and cooperation of the 
independent judiciary itself, as in the 1940s.8 
 What role did the British play in directly precipitating the state of siege and the 
elaboration of institutions around it? Chatterjee and Cooper both argue that postcolonial 
forms of governance bear a genealogical relationship to colonial forms, but evolve 
significantly because of the utility and cultural context of policies during the events of 
decolonization. Because of the extreme strain on the British Treasury, the British 
influence on Egyptian policy was the result of Britain’s monetary and logistical exigency 
rather than design. The British and Allied military forces, by the diplomatic arrangements 
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that allowed them to occupy Egypt and subsequently by their presence alone, stimulated 
the Egyptian government to spread and intensify the various security measures that the 
state of siege merely proposed. The need to distinguish and separate the Egyptian 
population from the battle front, lines of transit, military camps and supply depots, 
resulted in the Egyptian state enforcing a highly militarized division of space without yet 
having its own large military. Under these conditions, the shared immediate concern of 
defending Egypt from real military threats and the disciplinary structures of Egyptian 
employment in British workshops, the Egyptian public tolerated the hundreds of 
thousands of soldiers, clerks and engineers to a degree that allowed the Allied military to 
function smoothly.  
 Compared to the integration of this new spacial framework with the existing 
criminal code, the significance of which was concealed behind the dramatic war events it 
sought to manage, the coercive apparatus of the expanded security state appeared far 
more active in transforming the shape and behavior of economic activity. However, this 
analysis has stressed the various limits on viewing étatist, security-centered wartime 
policies as “Keynesian.” British economic experts at the Middle East Supply Center and 
minister for state E. M. H. Lloyd and R. F. Khan had been colleagues of Keynes, whose 
views had gained ascendancy in the prior decade at the British Treasury.9 These experts 
made a variety of monetary policy suggestions to limit inflation in Egypt, but none that 
came at the risk of destabilizing the pound sterling. As Goldberg points out, truly 
Keynesian management of the Egyptian economy was impossible before the creation of 
an Egyptian central bank, which the crisis over Egypt’s frozen Sterling account 
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precipitated in 1951.10 The MESC’s true task was not introducing Keynesianism to Egypt 
or any other country in the region, but rather to command the logistics that would 
guarantee the success of the war effort. All other effects were incidental, which is one of 
the most important reasons why the British project to turn the MESC into a tool for 
British economic influence after the war failed so rapidly.11 Because both the value of 
goods and the level of employment were so dependent on erratic British imports and 
military demand respectively, the Egyptian state devised a set of defensive economic 
mechanisms that private business interests easily manipulated after the end of the war. 
 The pent-up pressure to return Egyptian agriculture to cotton among politically 
powerful landlords in 1945 obliged the Ministry of Supply to assume a permanent and 
fundamental role in organizing and subsidizing wheat flour and bread consumption in 
Egypt. Domestic food production fell so precipitously after the war that the state was 
forced not only to maintain minimum acreage requirements from growers on wheat at a 
relatively low fixed price, it also maintained a monopoly on rice exports, which it 
bartered with other states to import the wheat to fill the gap between production and 
consumption.12 With cotton as one of the remaining large-scale uncontrolled commercial 
crops, cheating on legal requirements to grow minimum amounts of food crops became 
endemic.13 
 Continuing these price controls after the war for political reasons had precisely an 
anti-Keynesian effect, depressing prices and wages. It also marked the permanent change 
in consumption habits that eliminated much of the remaining subsistence agriculture 
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among poorer owners and tenants. The resulting breakdown in the ʿizba sharecropping 
system caused an increase in landless agricultural wage laborers at a time that wages 
were stagnating and rural subsidy distribution was far less equitable than in the cities. 
This encouraged urban migration, compounding the very problem of feeding the urban 
lumpenproletariat that sparked the original cycle of government intervention. 
 In a period of renaissance in several industrial sectors providing import-
substitution goods to the domestic market, owners made such substantial profits that 
organized labor was able to obtain better wages and benefits with less animosity than in 
the 1920s and ‘30s, although in reality these wages struggled to keep pace with prices. In 
the process, the Wafd government set up the infrastructure for its paternalistic and 
corporatist control of unions while allowing the military courts to be relatively lenient 
with striking workers. The wave of post-war unemployment and underemployment 
severely tested this settlement, as communist organization and the infusion of radical 
nationalist and student protest divided the trade union movement. At the same time, the 
Egyptian state was unable to defy the demands of Egyptian industrialists under renewed 
global competition and totally unprepared to implement a Keynesian plan to prop up 
spending on mass infrastructure construction or state-run industry building. However, the 
corporatist mode of trade unionism became a cornerstone of populist politics in the 
1950s, as the Free Officers repeatedly sided with workers on wages and benefits in 
arbitration at the expense of (often foreign) owners — and ultimately the independence of 
the unions themselves. 
 Moreover, the major economic reforms the state implemented after 1952, like 
land ownership limits and redistribution, the nationalization of big utilities, and the 
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limited spread of model villages and collectivization, were all projects that had been tried 
or deeply debated for the entire duration of the 1940s.14 Although the 1952 reforms 
limited landownership to 100 feddans per person, which dismantled the political 
dominance of the wealthiest class of pashas, the Egyptian state in the 1950s cultivated the 
rural middle class through an expansion of the cooperatives system, and the urban middle 
class with guaranteed university education. Well-connected upper-middle class families 
with members educated in the technocratic sciences became the new leadership of the 
state. Robert Springborg’s biography of Sayyid Mareʿi, a wealthy landowner and 
agronomist who survived a stint in parliament before 1952 to become the director of land 
reform under ʿAbd al-Nasir and then a key ally of al-Sadat and speaker of parliament in 
the 1970s illustrates just how these families transformed financial capital into political 
capital in the 1960s, and subsequently back into financial capital after the 1970s 
liberalization, while remaining dominant throughout.15 
  This analysis repositions the role of nationalist ideology in the transformation of 
Egypt’s foreign communities in the late colonial era to reemphasize the priorities and 
functions of state security. Joel Beinin argues expatriate and Jewish Egyptian “neo-
lachrymose” narratives have portrayed the state’s discriminatory economic treatment of 
these communities as a punishment specifically designed to drive them out of the 
country, or at best, satisfy the populist feelings of nationalists seeking to improve job and 
investment opportunities for Muslim and Coptic Egyptians in the uncertain postwar 
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Cohorts (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 244. 
 
 320 
economy.16 This work has shown that the conjuncture of war events posed real, not 
artificially manufactured, dilemmas over the legal status of different foreign 
communities, their property and the legitimacy of their claims on the Egyptian state for 
protection. Ironically, British war aims accelerated their loss of formerly default legal 
privileges and also propelled the Egyptian state’s administration of enemy and displaced 
populations. Once again, these policies did not herald the wholesale abandonment of 
formally liberal legal attitudes towards the residence and property of foreigners. 
However, they did construct a bureaucratic network that assigned foreigners — 
particularly from the lower classes — to increasingly more tenuous claims on 
membership in the Egyptian nation defined by closer surveillance and more 
comprehensive welfare services than ever before. 
 The legal and bureaucratic innovations of the Second World War set precedents 
that the neoliberal security state after 1970 has reflected better than the experiments of 
the ʿAbd al-Nasir era. The way the Allied powers defined the freedom they fought for in 
the war did not mean supporting democracy for Egypt and other African and Asian states, 
but rather promoting a global liberalism in which Egypt maintained an active military and 
economic security partnership with capitalist European states and the United States. 
Although the United States withheld its support for Egypt’s claim for independence in the 
United Nations in 1947, it provided material support and a global endorsement for the 
Free Officer regime and its anti-Imperialist policies culminating in the Suez Crisis.17 This 
partnership struggled during ʿAbd al-Nasir’s short-lived switch to Soviet military support 
after 1956, but food aid from the United States remained an important factor throughout 
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the 1960s and 1970s, allowing Egypt to maintain subsidized bread through a period of 
high world wheat prices.18 With the victory of the right wing in Egypt after ʿAbd al-
Nasir’s death, Egypt not only rejoined a Cold War strategic bloc, but also a shared global 
narrative in which Western imperialism became sublimated to more familiar tropes of 
progress and security. 
 This brings me back to the dissertation’s third and final theme. The Second World 
War’s trajectory in Egyptian nationalist historical narratives mirrors Egypt’s return to 
liberalism and Western clienthood. Egyptian Tourism Bureau head Mukhtar al-Sabrawi 
Pasha announced the government was launching a project to make El-Alamein battlefield 
into a tourist site in February 1951. Al-Sabrawi told local press a recent visit a bureau 
delegation made to the Waterloo battlefield in Belgium had inspired the idea. The plan 
included a modern hotel resort on the still undeveloped Western Desert Mediterranean 
coastline, better transportation options and a military museum near the Commonwealth, 
German and Italian war cemeteries.19 The plan was a logical if ambivalent product of a 
Wafdist tourism administration. The British victory at El Alamein in October and 
November 1942 was an event that the Wafd party could celebrate as one of the successes 
of its prior term in government. Any plans for a celebration of British military victory 
were shelved during the ensuing ten-month nationalist crisis against the British Suez 
Canal garrison and the Free Officers’ coup d’etat that brought 34-year-old Lt. Colonel 
Gamal Abdel Nasser to power in 1952. The Egyptian government eventually built and 
opened a museum on December 16, 1965, as a small complement to the military 
cemeteries that had recently been completed nearby. A low-ranking general officiated at 
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a dedication ceremony that Al-Ahram newspaper did not even cover; it focused instead on 
the Rhodesian crisis, broken ties with Britain and the aggravation of the Egyptian-Saudi 
proxy civil war in Yemen.20  
 It was only after the museum’s renovation in 1992 for the 50th anniversary of the 
battle of El Alamein that it received positive Egyptian press coverage. The work was part 
of the Mubarak regime’s early-1990s building program of military museums funded and 
designed by North Korea, which included the 1973 War Panorama in Heliopolis and the 
renovation of the immense Egyptian Military Museum at Muhammad Ali Pasha’s 
residence in the Citadel. These propaganda palaces were tools for the regime at a time of 
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economic stagnation to both promote Mubarak’s own role as the head of the victorious 
Air Force in the 1973 war, but also to epitomize Egypt’s triumphant return to the Arab 
League and international community through its participation in the Gulf War coalition 
that included staging Egyptian troops to be the first to enter and “liberate” Kuwait from 
the aggressor Iraq. In ceremonies opening El-Alamein Museum with German, Italian and 
British representatives, Minister of Defense Muhammad al-Tantawi (subsequently head 
of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces junta ruling Egypt between February 2011 
and June 2012) emphasized the new “Egyptian” room. This room, equal in size to those 
dedicated to the other nationalities, displayed uniforms, arms, and most importantly new 
documents “revealing for the first time the true extent of Egypt’s role in World War II.”21 
The room proudly displays images of King Faruq as “Egypt’s Commander in Chief,” 
fond letters of support between Egyptian politicians and British military heroes, and 
North Korean paintings of the few skirmishes in which the Egyptian army and police 
took an active role. Changing geopolitical conditions have erased the stigma of 
colonialism and made the event and site of El Alamein, as Pierre Nora has written, once 
again “open to the full range of its possible significations” in contemporary Egyptian 
nationalism.22  
 Since the Camp David peace accords, and the end of the Cold War more 
generally, United States, Europe and Egypt have shared a new global victory narrative — 
which contains leitmotifs from the Second World War narrative — of a “war on 
terrorism.” Given the less specific nature of this threat and wide-open parameters of time 
and place of its setting, the security state today has a more stable foundation in official 
                                                 
21 “The Battle of El-Alamein in a Historical Docment,” Al-Ahram, 24 Oct. 1992. 




ideology. Despite the endurance of this ideology in Egypt today, a counterhegemonic 
discourse denouncing emergency law as a fundamental inversion of liberal legality, 
which was non-existent during the Second World War and only nascent at the end of the 
last pluralistic parliament in 1953, now presents a constant, sophisticated and 
heterogenous threat to its legitimacy. Put more simply, regimes of emergency law can be 
effective and even sophisticated tools for states in limited periods of time or territories. 




Egyptian Military Parquet Misdemeanor Reports to the Military Governor 
The supplementary statistics provided here are drawn from a series of roughly 225 
reports from the office of the military court parquet (prosecutor) to the prime minister in 
his role as military governor. They report 4,606 cases involving 8,812 defendants on 
court dates from February 5, 1941 through December 3, 1942. Each report typically 
summarizes the activities of a single day from a single military court, although some 
combined different dates and locations. The reports read as ledgers, with the following 
information for each case: the date tried, location, case number, names of the defendants, 
criminal charges, the fine and/or prison time sentenced, notes on the charge or penalty. At 
the end of each line, there is a typed notation from the military governor’s office (i.e. a 
department of the prime minister’s office) if the military governor decided to cancel the 
case. I have drawn the available data from two unique files at the Egyptian National 
Archives: 0081-030432, which covers 70 court dates from February 5, 1941 through 
March 23, 1942; and 0081-030436, which covers 72 dates from July 18, 1942 to 
December 4, 1942 (and some extra files from the Alexandria court between January and 
March 1942 that I have grouped with the earlier cases). The activity of the military courts 
before 1941 was minimal, and the bureaucracy for reporting to the military governor had 
not yet been formalized. As the military courts’ activity expanded further in 1943 and 
afterwards, these ledger reports became merely case number indices for (now absent) 
case files, and they no longer contain any useful information about the cases. 
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I argue these two extant groups of data shows important trends from two periods 
of similar duration before and after the consolidation of Wafd administration in the 
bureaucracy. These include the overall growth of military court activities, the increase in 
the severity of punishments, and the increased intervention of Mustafa al-Nahhas as 
military governor. While I believe the information is significant, there are gaps and 
irregularities in the available data both in its temporal and geographical distribution. The 
charts below do not represent a claim to a comprehensive accounting of the military court 
activity from these dates and places. I’m only seeking to be transparent about the 
distribution of the material I found. 
The eight “types of crime” I have categorized in Figure 2.2 and here correspond 
more fully to the following charges. 
Theft: stealing (Allied or Egyptian) army goods; possession of army goods. 
Agriculture: hoarding government restricted grains; transporting or trading in 
such grains; cutting trees without a permit or fishing without a permit in 
military areas; failing to report crop yields. 
Black Market: misusing or not using a ration card; refusing to sell rationed goods; 
seller’s misuse of ration information ledgers; hoarding goods; selling for 
more than the fixed prices; selling goods without a license; not keeping 
proper shop hours. 
Weapons: possessing an unlicensed weapon; possessing unlicensed ammunition. 
Meat and Alcohol: selling either without a license; selling meat on “meatless” 
days of the week. 
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Bread: selling bread with the incorrect weight or flour mixture; selling ground 
flour with the incorrect mixture of wheat, barley, rice, etc. 
Trespassing: trespassing in a military zone, without a pass. 
Parole: usually, failing to report to the local police office. Parole (al-murāqiba, 
surveillance) could be assigned without a prior prison sentence. 
Other: insulting or striking a police officer or government official; running a 
brothel; bribery; escaping from prison on a military charge; hiding such an 
escaped prisoner; hoarding banknotes or precious metal; inciting a strike 
or striking from industrial work; foreigners’ failure to register with the 
Ministry of Interior; illegal construction near a military area. 
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Military Court Defendants by Month and Administrative District, Feb. 1941-Mar. 
1942. 
 















Alexandria 0 0 0 67 140 207 
Aswan 0 0 0 0 20 20 
Asyut 0 18 184 216 36 454 
Al-Buhayra 0 0 3 137 41 181 
Bani Suwayf 50 0 33 0 0 83 
Canal 102 94 7 77 21 301 
Al-Daqhaliya 0 2 0 27 99 128 
Dumyat 0 1 0 0 18 19 
Al-Fayyum 2 0 2 1 0 5 
Al-Gharbiya 0 4 0 82 133 219 
Girga 0 1 18 75 0 94 
Al-Giza 0 1 0 48 39 88 
Al-Manufiya 0 3 44 55 51 153 
Al-Minya 0 0 56 20 180 256 
Cairo 6 13 33 309 196 557 
Al-Qalyubiya 0 0 0 16 1 17 
Qena 0 1 50 15 149 215 
Al-Sharqiya 1 0 5 151 400 557 
Suez 0 3 0 0 0 3 
TOTAL 161 141 435 1296 1524 3557 
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1942 Sep. 1942 Oct. 1942 
Nov.-Dec. 
1942 TOTAL 
Alexandria 104 97 253 347 801 
Aswan 0 0 18 0 18 
Asyut 0 23 61 104 188 
Al-Buhayra 0 0 83 74 157 
Bani Suwayf 0 108 136 155 399 
Canal 14 49 46 0 109 
Al-Daqhaliya 2 0 48 266 316 
Dumyat 0 0 0 27 27 
Al-Fayyum 3 0 0 300 303 
Al-Gharbiya 0 149 216 146 511 
Girga 0 28 21 145 194 
Al-Giza 0 0 119 61 180 
Al-Manufiya 0 45 95 287 427 
Al-Minya 0 0 43 136 179 
Cairo 0 131 350 428 909 
Al-Qalyubiya 0 0 0 54 54 
Qena 0 0 0 187 187 
Al-Sharqiya 0 17 116 99 232 
Suez 0 59 0 5 64 
TOTAL 123 706 1605 2821 5255 




Military Court Defendants by Type of Crime and Administrative District, Feb. 1941-Mar. 1942 
 




Alcohol Bread Trespassing Parole Other TOTAL 
Alexandria 205 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 207 
Aswan 0 5 10 3 0 1 0 1 0 20 
Asyut 8 0 198 209 17 0 8 8 6 454 
Al-Buhayra 22 2 101 18 14 0 13 2 9 181 
Bani Suwayf 1 0 27 45 1 0 0 8 1 83 
Canal 102 0 145 10 0 4 6 1 33 301 
Al-Daqhaliya 6 15 42 34 15 5 4 6 1 128 
Dumyat 0 0 2 1 0 4 10 1 1 19 
Al-Fayyum 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Al-Gharbiya 10 15 132 27 14 2 5 7 7 219 
Girga 0 24 39 13 14 0 1 1 2 94 
Al-Giza 36 0 20 19 3 2 8 0 0 88 
Al-Manufiya 2 44 72 22 5 0 4 3 1 153 
Al-Minya 1 10 122 89 21 1 4 7 1 256 
Cairo 80 0 325 12 35 12 66 0 27 557 
Al-Qalyubiya 4 0 3 3 1 0 1 4 1 17 
Qena 17 38 44 51 27 0 7 25 6 215 
Al-Sharqiya 271 7 123 11 10 1 120 6 8 557 
Suez 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
TOTAL 765 160 1411 569 177 32 258 80 105 3557 
Source: DWQ 0081-030432 and 0081-030436. 
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Military Court Defendants by Type of Crime and Administrative District, July 1941-Dec. 1942 
 




Alcohol Bread Trespassing Parole Other TOTAL 
Alexandria 507 18 141 15 77 12 4 17 10 801 
Aswan 0 6 9 0 2 1 0 0 0 18 
Asyut 0 59 77 16 14 6 0 0 16 188 
Al-Buhayra 7 32 78 8 18 2 2 0 10 157 
Bani Suwayf 0 42 291 23 39 1 0 2 1 399 
Canal 109 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 109 
Al-Daqhaliya 6 51 188 14 34 8 3 2 10 316 
Dumyat 1 0 13 1 0 1 0 0 11 27 
Al-Fayyum 1 143 125 11 13 5 0 2 3 303 
Al-Gharbiya 13 95 282 26 54 8 7 10 16 511 
Girga 0 79 73 15 17 2 1 3 4 194 
Al-Giza 48 37 40 25 9 2 7 7 5 180 
Al-Manufiya 6 183 150 30 32 5 7 9 5 427 
Al-Minya 1 51 105 5 11 4 0 0 2 179 
Cairo 176 3 441 20 109 104 7 5 44 909 
Al-Qalyubiya 0 1 49 1 3 0 0 0 0 54 
Qena 10 81 58 4 15 14 3 1 1 187 
Al-Sharqiya 110 44 43 10 13 0 2 7 3 232 
Suez 55 3 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 64 
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